


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TRANSPORT COUNCIL.

1918.



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
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


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ALLIED MARITIME
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1918.

ALLIED MARITIME TRANSPORT COUNCIL, 1918.

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ALLIED MARITIME TRANSPORT COUNCIL, 1918.

II.—Formation and Objects of Council.

The conclusion of the Armistice with Germany on November 11th, 1918, following upon those already concluded with Bulgaria, Turkey, and Austro-Hungary, marks a stage in the work of the Allied Maritime Transport Council at which it may be convenient to print in a single volume the minutes and other more important documents, together with a brief review of the work of the Council since its establishment.

Formation of Council.

In the earlier years of the war each of the Allied Governments solved its own supply and transport problem independently, France and Italy obtaining a specified and fixed amount of tonnage from Great Britain and then allotting the total tonnage under their control as best they could among their own national programmes. This method of dealing with the problem proved inadequate, however, as the war proceeded, and as the increasing shortage of ships made it a matter of vital importance that they should be distributed in such a way as to give the maximum assistance to the general war effort.

In the first place, an arbitrary allocation of a definite amount of tonnage, not varying with the varying necessities of the several Allies, did not achieve the desired object. Nor was there any organisation through which these varying and competing necessities could be examined and balanced.

In the second place, it became clear that, with shipping seriously inadequate to meet all the main supply requirements in full, an organisation wider in its basis than that of the shipping authorities alone was necessary. In the absence of such an organisation, the shipping authorities, by the mere fact of carrying out their executive duty of giving orders to the vessels under their control, necessarily determined priority as between supply services. It was obvious, however, that while the shipping authorities must decide what total quantity of supplies could be carried from each source of origin, the choice between those supplies ought to be determined by a supply, and not by a purely shipping, organisation.*

In the third place, it became clear that the real and proper line of competition for the available tonnage was between the various Allied Supply Services, and not between the Allied countries; *i.e.*, that the question really requiring decision was how far Allied food as a whole should absorb tonnage as compared with, and at the expense of, Allied munitions as a whole, and not how much tonnage, or what total supplies of both food and munitions, Great Britain should have as compared with France. The original method of deciding how much tonnage in total one Ally was to have was, in effect, always liable to be rendered ineffective through a particular supply to that country (*e.g.*, nitrates or munitions), falling to such a dangerous level that cargoes or stocks of that commodity had to be diverted from another country at the last moment.

The fourth reason for the establishment of a new organisation was the entry of America into the war with the prospect that France and Italy would be looking to both America and Great Britain instead of to Great Britain alone for the necessary supplement to their own tonnage, in which case it was clear that allocations of tonnage could not be made independently by the two latter countries. An organisation through which the assistance to be given could be co-ordinated was clearly necessary.

* This principle had already been recognized in Great Britain by the appointment of a Departmental Committee (The Tonnage Priority Committee) under the Chairmanship of Sir Leo Chiozza Money, M.P.

Objects of Council.

In these circumstances the Paris Conference in December 1917, decided to establish the Allied Maritime Transport Council with the following objects:—

- (a) To make the most economical use of tonnage under the control of all the Allies;
- (b) To allot that tonnage as between the different needs of the Allies in such a way as to add most to the general war effort; and
- (c) To adjust the programmes of requirements of the different Allies in such a way as to bring them within the scope of the possible carrying power of the tonnage available.

Principles of Organization.

The organisation established for this purpose was based upon the following main principles:—

- (a) The requirements of the several Allies for all imported commodities should, in the first instance, be dealt with by Allied Programme Committees, consisting of experts able to speak as to the requirements of their respective countries for the commodity in question. These committees, it will be noticed, consisted of experts from the several Supply Departments, and not from the Shipping Departments of the different Governments.
- (b) A number of these Programme Committees were first co-ordinated under two Councils, a Food Council and a Munitions Council, which respectively surveyed the needs of Food and Munitions as a whole. Proposals had been made for the establishment of a similar Raw Materials Council dealing with the other Programme Committees, but such a Council has, so far, not been appointed.
- (c) These various Councils and Programme Committees have reported their requirements to the Allied Maritime Transport Council, whose duty it has been to arrange with them such reductions as have been necessary to bring the total demands upon tonnage within the capacity of the tonnage available.
- (d) The Council itself consists of two Ministers from France, Italy and Great Britain, and two delegates from America, these members being responsible for reporting to their respective Governments with a view to securing that the decisions and action required to give effect to any recommendations made by the Council are taken in their respective countries. The Council itself has met in formal session on four occasions.
- (e) The current work of the Council has been carried out by the Allied Maritime Transport Executive, a permanent organisation consisting of four National sections and situated in London.

The general purpose of the Council and the Executive has been to supervise the general conduct of Allied transport in order to obtain the most effective use of tonnage for the prosecution of the war, leaving each nation responsible for the management of the tonnage under its own control.

Each country retained executive control over its own ships, and the Council has had no power by a majority vote to determine the employment of National tonnage without the assent of the relevant Government. The principle throughout has been that the representatives of the four Governments have attempted to survey the shipping and supply position as a whole, and to devise plans for securing the most advantageous allocation of tonnage of any nationality, any plans so devised being recommended for execution to each Government so far as they have concerned tonnage under the control of that Government.

Relation of Transport Council to other Councils and Programme Committees.

The Food and Munitions Councils and the various Programme Committees have been independently constituted by the several Governments for the purpose of arranging programmes of requirements. They have only strictly been responsible to the Allied Maritime Transport Council so far as those requirements have necessitated tonnage, and they have in many cases had many duties (some of an executive character, such as that of purchasing jointly) in respect of which they have been responsible directly to their Governments, and not to the Council.

The serious shortage of shipping, however, throughout the period now in question has meant that the allocation of shipping has been the determining factor in the arrangements of the different programmes. It has throughout been, with relatively unimportant exceptions, a safe assumption that the supplies available in the countries of origin have been greater than the shipping which could be allocated, and that finance could be found for all the supplies for which shipping could be provided. This has meant in practice that the Transport Council has balanced the competing requirements of the different Councils and Committees, and with its Executive has served as the co-ordinating body for the whole Allied organisation. It was contemplated from the first that the Council should exercise these functions as was indicated by the name at first proposed (Council for Shipping and Importations), and by the fact that it was on the initiative of the Council that the Raw Materials Programme Committees were established.

Association of America.

An important development in the effective authority and organisation of the Council took place on Mr. Secretary Baker's visit to this country in September 1918, when the United States definitely entered into complete association with the Transport Council on a full and equal basis. The detailed arrangements are stated on pp. 201-204.

Officers and Men and Submarine Danger.

The following pages illustrate the almost innumerable difficulties with which the Allied supply and transport arrangements have been confronted during the War. Apart from the destruction of ships by submarine, any change in the military fortunes or in military or naval strategy, the failure of a harvest, a political event such as the Russian Revolution, a severe winter frost in North America, an epidemic of influenza and a host of less important events have at once, and to a serious extent, affected the adjustment of supplies to tonnage. Amid these many difficulties the Allies have been happily free from any anxiety whatever as to the conduct of the Officers and Seamen of the Mercantile Marine. No calculation has ever had to include an allowance for the human factor. Even when vessels unarmed and without wireless were required to proceed unescorted and without convoy to waters infested with submarines, crews were always available and willing to sail. The enemy had attempted two objects in adopting the more ruthless form of submarine war, the first to increase the destruction of vessels, the second to break the morale of the officers and men of the Mercantile Marine. In the first, they achieved for a time a considerable, and a dangerous, success. In the second, they failed and failed absolutely.

The submarine warfare of the enemy had, to all appearance, been definitely beaten before the conclusion of the armistice. Although the actual stringency of tonnage was continually increasing right up to the cessation of hostilities, world building (including American) exceeded world losses by 810,431 tons in the first ten months of 1918, and in the last completed month before the armistice Allied building and world building even outside America exceeded losses. There was a prospect that this steady increase in world tonnage would have substantially eased the general tonnage position by the early summer of next year, even in spite of the immense American Military Programme.

General Tonnage Position.

The period covered by this report witnessed a greater development in the military situation than any previous period, including as it did at its commencement the greatest apparent successes of the enemy and at its conclusion the complete success of the Allies. This variation in the political fortunes reacted directly upon the shipping situation. In the early part of the period the whole of the shipping position was seriously affected by the loss of the output of the Pas de Calais mines through the enemy advance with a consequent shortage of coal, and by the possibility of the loss of the Channel ports; while these dangers were removed by the subsequent successes of the Allies, these successes themselves made further demands upon tonnage for shipments of munitions to meet the rapid increase in consumption resulting from the new character of the warfare. During the period, Allied and world shipping as a whole, including American, for the first time exceeded the losses, but, at the same time, the acceleration of the American military programme, due in the first instance to the enemy successes in March, made a further extra demand on tonnage for the transportation of supplies for the American Army largely

exceeding the measure of this net gain. Since 1st January 1918, Allied buildings of sea-going steamers over 500 gross tons have amounted to 5,400,000 tons dead weight including 2,600,000 tons American, and Allied losses have amounted to 3,900,000 tons dead weight including 400,000 tons American. The strain on tonnage involved by the transport and supply of American troops may be taken at the end of the period as having reached a maximum equivalent to the continuous employment of nearly 4,000,000 tons dead weight.

The general tonnage situation at the conclusion of the period is stated in detail on pages 196-202. It will be seen that the European Allies started the new cereal year with 2,000,000 tons dead weight less than they had at the end of the previous cereal year, and the total importing capacity for the year of the tonnage under their control was estimated to be 72·5 million tons as compared with stated requirements of over 81 million tons and actual imports during the past year of about 75 million tons; at the same time the provisional estimate of the American Army supply programme showed that the cargo which could be conveyed under American control in the period was some 2,000,000 tons less than the stated requirements of the American Army supply service. In these circumstances, the following provisional arrangements were made:—

5,500,000 tons were deducted from the European Allies' food programme; 1,000,000 tons from their munition programme, and over 2,000,000 tons from their raw material programme.

At the same time the arrangements were made to meet the American deficit by providing tonnage during the winter months with the expectation that American tonnage would be available to make good the consequent deficit in the later months of the cereal year.

General Tonnage Position on Cessation of Hostilities.

The general tonnage position was entirely changed by the cessation of hostilities. The substitution of independent sailings for convoys, the termination of munitions requirements, and the cessation of war losses, which, apart from a few unimportant exceptions, ceased on October 18th, have substantially increased the tonnage available. On the other hand, the need for feeding liberated areas, &c., and possibly enemy countries, and the repatriation of troops, created new demands, at present difficult to estimate, and involving the allocation of a large amount of tonnage to more distant routes. On the whole, however, there has been a net improvement in the tonnage position of the first importance.

General Note as to Work of Council and Executive.

The Council first met on March 11th, 1918, and hostilities ceased on November 11th, 1918. This brief period of exactly eight months witnessed the complete transformation of all Allied Maritime transport and supply arrangements, which is described in Section III., and may be here briefly summarised.

A new organisation covering the whole range of imported commodities was built up and got into working order. Apart from the Allied Maritime Transport Council itself, the Inter-Allied Munitions Council and the Inter-Allied Food Council (each with its own permanent organisation), 20 programme committees were established. The effect of their work on the actual execution of Allied programmes is shown in the following paragraphs.

At the beginning of the period Italy's coal position was desperate. Her imports during 1917 averaged only about 440,000 tons a month against a consumption of about 600,000, with the consequence that her stocks were exhausted. There was no Allied obligation for any part of her supply except for the provision of 50,000 tons a month by Great Britain. A programme of 600,000 tons was agreed upon at the first meeting of the Council and has been carried out throughout the period within an almost negligible margin of deficiency.

The French coal position was rendered equally serious by the German successes of the Spring, which greatly reduced the output of the Pas de Calais mines. This problem has also been dealt with. Difficulties have arisen through shortage of coal and congestion of ports, but as far as ships are concerned (with which alone the Council can deal) practically all that could be usefully employed have been supplied.

The supplies of food, again, to both France and Italy were last year in a most unsatisfactory position, and indeed both they and this country were in a serious danger last winter of famine in the Spring of 1918. The position was retrieved by the summer of this year, and by the end of the cereal year tonnage had been arranged for all three

countries on an agreed repartition programme for the most essential food, *i.e.*, bread-stuffs and cereals generally. From the beginning of the new cereal year the same principle has been applied to all food (meat, sugar, oil-seeds, &c.) and has been worked to very closely.

The tonnage arrangements for Allied munitions were also in a dangerous position in the winter of last year, the Italian position being almost desperate after the losses of Caporetto. This position has also been retrieved, and the munitions programme of the Allies was this Autumn commenced on the same basis of equality as the food programme. The new system had not got into full working order for munitions when hostilities ceased, but in the meantime all the tonnage asked for had been supplied.

Considerable assistance was also given to French and Italian raw materials, though the examination of the programmes by the Programme Committees had not proceeded far enough for the principle of automatic allocation of tonnage in accordance with them to be applied. Raw materials outside the munitions programme were, however, a very small proportion of the imports dealt with under the arrangements described above for food and munitions (amounting, for instance, to less than one-thirtieth in the case of Italy).

The general position, therefore, is that the import services of France and Italy were this year put upon a substantially satisfactory and a substantially equal basis. This has been effected in a period when the stringency of the general tonnage situation was continually increasing, the European Allies having in the cereal year 1917-18 lost about 2,000,000 tons dead-weight more than they built and the American excess of building over losses being much less than the additional demands of the increased American military programme. In addition, the Executive have dealt with the Belgian Relief requirements, assisted the American Military Programme, directed the employment of over 500,000 tons dead-weight of neutral pool tonnage, and effected a number of detailed economies and advantageous interchanges of tonnage.

December 1918.

J. A. SALTER.

III.—ORGANISATION OF COUNCIL, EXECUTIVE AND ASSOCIATED ALLIED BODIES.

The Council itself consists of the following members :—

The Council.

Lord Robert Cecil, K.C.	-	-	-	-	} Great Britain.
Sir Joseph Maclay, Bart.	-	-	-	-	
M. Clementel	-	-	-	-	} France.
M. Loucheur	-	-	-	-	
Signor Villa	-	-	-	-	} Italy.
Signor Crespi	-	-	-	-	
Hon. R. B. Stevens	-	-	-	-	} United States.
Hon. G. Rublee	-	-	-	-	

Signor Villa joined the Council (Signor Salvatore Orlando retiring) in May and the Hon. George Rublee joined in July.

The Council itself only met at long intervals. The current work, including both the ordinary administrative work, and also the task of co-ordinating the policy of the several Governments by detailed communication with the respective Ministers, has been carried on by the Allied Maritime Transport Executive. This body has consisted of the following :—

The Allied Maritime Transport Executive.

M. Jean Monnet (France).
 Professor Attolico, C.B. (Italy).
 Hon. G. Rublee (United States).
 Mr. J. A. Salter, C.B. (Great Britain).

Captain Pilliard also attended meetings of the Executive as representative of M. Loucheur.

Under this Executive the organisation has been co-ordinated by two further International Committees.

(a) Tonnage Committee, consisting of—

M. Revillon (France).
 Lieut. Farina (Italy).
 Mr. L. H. Shearman (United States).^{*}
 Mr. L. Browett (Great Britain).

Mr. C. W. Hurcomb, C.B.E., also joined this Committee, and represented the Transport Executive in arranging for the execution of the Food Programme in conjunction with the Freight Committee of the Food Council.

(b) Imports Committee, consisting of—

M. Halgouet (France).
 Professor Attolico (Italy).
 Mr. D. W. Morrow (United States).
 Mr. G. M. Booth (Great Britain).

The staff now numbers about 300, and is organised as follows :—

(i) *National Divisions.*

There are four National Divisions—French, Italian, American, and British—working under the members of the Executive (*see above*).

(ii) *International Committees.* For personnel *see (a) and (b) above.*

(1) Executive ; (2) Tonnage ; (3) Imports, questions of policy being decided through this international machinery of Committees and international points of view adjusted.

^{*} NOTE.—Mr. L. H. Shearman was succeeded in July by Mr. J. R. Gordon.

(iii) "*Non-National*" Secretariat. (Secretary, Mr. J. F. Henderson.)

Members of this Secretariat are of different nationalities, but on entering the Secretariat divest themselves of any national point of view. The duty of the Secretariat is to give executive and administrative effect to the policy decided upon by the Council and by the International Committees. This Secretariat has included Mr. Davis as head of the Statistical Section and M. Simon for munitions requirements.

(iv) *Shipping Intelligence Section*. (Mr. G. V. Howell, O.B.E.)

The Shipping Intelligence Section, which has been transferred from the Ministry of Shipping, keeps a continuous record of the position and employment of all ocean-going vessels of every nationality.

Associated Allied Bodies.—Programme Committees. (*For personnel see pages 143-147.*)

Programme Committees have been established to cover almost the whole range of imported commodities, separate Committees being formed for—

- (1) Wool.
- (2) Cotton.
- (3) Flax, Hemp, and Jute.
- (4) Hides and Leather.
- (5) Tobacco.
- (6) Paper.
- (7) Timber.
- (8) Petroleum.
- (9) Coal and Coke.

In addition, a Food Council has been established co-ordinating the work of Executives or Committees for—

- (10) Cereals.
- (11) Oil Seeds.
- (12) Sugar.
- (13) Meats and Fats,

and a Munitions Council with Sub-Committees for—

- (14) Nitrates.
 - (15) Aircraft.
 - (16) Chemicals.
 - (17) Explosives.
 - (18) Non-Ferrous Metals.
 - (19) Mechanical Transport.
 - (20) Steel.
-

IV.—DETAILED REPORT OF WORK OF ALLIED MARITIME TRANSPORT EXECUTIVE.

The Executive are glad to report that on the cessation of hostilities they have satisfactorily executed the specific tasks entrusted to them by the Council. The services for which the Council accepted special responsibility were the following :—

- (a) Italian Coal.
- (b) French Coal.
- (c) Belgian Relief.
- (d) Allied Food Programme.
- (e) Allied Munitions Programme.
- (f) Management of Neutral Pool Tonnage.

The general position of these services on the cessation of hostilities was as follows :—

(a) Italian Coal.

No collective responsibility for supplies of coal to Italy was undertaken by the Allies until March 1918 beyond 50,000 tons a month provided by Great Britain. Italian imports throughout 1917 averaged only about 400,000 tons a month, and early in 1918 her stocks were exhausted, while her minimum requirements were between 200,000 and 300,000 tons a month in excess of her imports. After careful examination 600,000 tons a month was agreed to be her minimum requirement; 350,000 tons of this to be supplied by the French mines (Great Britain providing replacement), the remainder being sent from England, either *viâ* Blaye or by the long sea route *viâ* Gibraltar. A Franco-Italian Committee was established in Paris to watch the actual supply day by day, and inform the Council of the position. The following table shows the way in which the programme was executed. It will be seen that the shipments by the long sea route were largely in excess of the programme, while despatch by rail was far below, the total supply being almost exactly in conformity with the total programme :—

ITALIAN COAL.

Execution, March 1918–November 1918.

	Shipments, British Coal by Long Sea Route.	British Coal passing Italian Frontier.	French Coal passing Italian Frontier.	French Coal at Board at Mediterranean Ports.	Total.
Programme - -	Tons. 150,000	Tons. 100,000	Tons. 170,000	Tons. 180,000	Tons. 600,000
15th March–14th April -	227,372	161,135	132,109	104,802	625,418
15th April–14th May -	246,545	123,973	137,082	88,169	595,769
15th May–14th June -	161,194	108,918	108,122	111,943	490,177
15th June–14th July -	281,500	116,931	104,962	111,565	614,958
15th July–14th August	302,839	93,994	107,459	124,439	628,731
15th August–14th September	295,804	97,932	104,578	105,000	603,314
15th September–14th October	289,492	88,137	91,335	93,971	562,935
15th October–14th November	402,986	85,175	68,383	80,479	637,023
Total - - -	2,207,732	876,195	854,030	820,368	4,758,325
Programme, 8 months - - -	1,200,000	800,000	1,360,000	1,440,000	4,800,000

Of this total about 78,494 tons was lost at sea.

In addition to the above quantities, a special military allocation of 150,000 tons of British coal was despatched to Italy to constitute a strategic reserve in the event of unforeseen troop movements throwing a sudden demand upon the coal stocks in that country.

(b) French Coal.

During 1916 and 1917 imports of coal from the U.K. to France averaged about 1,500,000 tons a month, and until the middle of March 1918 the French Coal Programme had been entirely a problem of shipping, as there was always more coal available for export than ships to take it. The 350,000 tons of French coal which in March 1918 was agreed should be supplied to Italy every month was undertaken by the French authorities on the understanding that an equivalent amount should be supplied to France by Great Britain as replacement. A provisional total of 1,740,000 tons a month was at the same time fixed as the amount to be supplied each month from the U.K. to France. Unfortunately the German advance, which reduced France's output from her own mines and increased her requirements, was accompanied by a serious shortage of coal in Great Britain, due mainly to the recruiting of miners for the Army. France consequently throughout the summer of 1918 received less coal than she needed both for current requirements and to form a reserve for the winter, the average only amounting to 1,406,593 tons over the eight months ending November 30th. The capacity of the French ports (and particularly delays in evacuating them through shortage of railway wagons) constituted another difficulty. Through nearly the whole of the period these difficulties, and not the allocation of tonnage, were the limiting factor, though since September there have been occasions when the ports could have received larger quantities had extra prompt tonnage been available at precisely the right moment.

FRENCH COAL.

Provisional Programme, 1,740,000 Tons a Month.

Execution, March 1918 to November 1918.

April.	May.	June.	July.	August.	September.	October.	November.
1,495,000	1,530,458	1,260,068	1,488,894	1,394,140	1,244,174	1,251,073	1,261,704

(c) Belgian Relief.

Until the spring of 1918 the Belgian Relief Commission secured transport partly by use of Belgian ships and partly by chartering neutrals. The control of neutral vessels by America and Great Britain had, however, become so complete by April 1918 as to render it impossible for the Commission to obtain tonnage in this way. The result was that Belgian relief was confronted by a very serious situation, neither any one Ally nor the Allies collectively having assumed any responsibility for the provision of shipping which could not in practice be obtained without their help.

The Council decided to assume direct responsibility for the provision of necessary tonnage, and arrangements were made for sharing the responsibility equally between Great Britain and the United States. It was agreed that the permanent solution of the problem of providing this assistance lay in the allocation of neutral non-war zone vessels. In accordance with this principle, it was decided that Belgian relief should have the first call on the tonnage obtained by the United States and Great Britain under the Swedish agreement (a little under 200,000 tons dead-weight). Until the vessels thus obtained were available, however, emergency cargoes had to be arranged, America and Great Britain each accepting the responsibility for eight. In addition, further shipments had immediately to be made from England to tide over the crisis, and 10,000 tons of flour were despatched to Rotterdam as well as about 14,000 tons of miscellaneous articles held by the Belgian Relief Commission in this country.

The immediate situation was thus restored and the gradual allocation of the Swedish tonnage as it became available has enabled Belgian Relief requirements to be met within a margin of 7 per cent. up to the end of November 1918, and on the basis of the authorised programme the tonnage allocated for December 1918 will have very nearly met this deficiency.

BELGIAN RELIEF.

Shipping Position showing Comparison between Programme Requirements and Execution for Six Months ending 25th November 1918.

(Based on cargo capacity. In metric tons.)

Month.	Programme.	Execution.
June-August - - - -	360,000	334,070
September - - - -	122,500	80,170
26th September-31st October - -	161,000	163,940
November - - - -	111,800	116,500
	755,300	694,680

(d) Allied Food Programme.

After the conclusion of the 3rd November 1917 Agreement (*see* page 18) Great Britain in practice accepted responsibility for supplementing deficiencies in tonnage required for transporting to France and Italy their agreed shares in the *cereal* programme, and by the end of the cereal year 1918 (31st August), tonnage had been arranged so as to secure delivery in accordance with the agreed repartition programme.

The Council then accepted the responsibility for dealing with the whole Allied Food Programme covering meat, sugar, oil seed, &c., as well as cereals, on the repartition basis. Arrangements have since been made in accordance with this programme. The exact results are shown on page 222. It will be seen that every country had tonnage arranged for its full cereal programme, and tonnage was also arranged in very close conformity with the programme for other foodstuffs, the maximum deficiency on any total National programme being less than 6 per cent.

The work of arranging for the allocation and diversion of ships in accordance with the Food Programme (which in practice necessarily meant the diversion of British ships, as Great Britain alone had ships available after meeting her own reduced requirements), was entrusted to Mr. C. W. Hurcomb, who represented the Transport Executive in relation to the Freight Committee of the Food Council and arranged the allocation of British ships in virtue of his position in the Ministry of Shipping.

Cereals Diverted to France and Italy in British Tonnage in accordance with 3rd November Agreement.

	April 1918.	May.	June.	July.	August.	September.	October.
France - -	109,000	75,000	104,000	163,000	244,000	218,000	191,000
Italy - -	92,000	207,000	158,000	78,000	105,000	133,000	216,000
France, total -		-	-	-	-	1,104,000	
Italy, total		-	-		-	989,000	

(e) Allied Munitions Programme.

On September 30th, 1918, the Council accepted a similar responsibility for the Allied Munitions' Programme for the ensuing year. Before then the supplies of munitions to France and Italy had been allocated as circumstances required, but not in exact accordance with an agreed programme, and with the consequent disadvantage that occasional shortages had to be met by emergency shipments at short notice. As far as France was concerned, such arrangements as were necessary were made to supplement French imports of nitrates and general munitions, and though there was a deficiency in such articles as railway wagons and materials, the position on the whole was never critical. In Italy, on the contrary, the munitions position, particularly after the great enemy captures at Caporetto, was very serious. The Allies had no complete information of her munition requirements, and had assumed no collective responsibility. A review of the position early in 1918 showed the absolute necessity for further imports and munitions, and large shipments were made both from the

United Kingdom and from America. This additional assistance, given both in steel, nitrates, and general munitions, afforded very substantial relief to the situation. Since the 30th September, when the Council accepted responsibility for the Allied Munitions' Programme, insufficient time had, of course, elapsed before the conclusion of hostilities to get this programme into full working order, but the Executive were able to arrange for all the tonnage asked for by the Tonnage Committee of the Munitions Council (*see* correspondence attached, pp. 215, 221).

(f) Pool Tonnage.

In April 1918 an agreement was concluded between the Governments of France, Italy, and Great Britain whereby neutral vessels time-chartered to any of these Allies were to constitute a pool of tonnage to be employed during the period of the war, as directed by the Allied Maritime Transport Council, the Inter-Allied Chartering Executive* allocating the tonnage in accordance with the directions of the Council. Early in May, allocations were begun in conformity with the plan (Appendix 27, page 123) agreed upon as presenting the most effective use for the vessels :—

- (a) Up to 1,700 tons dead weight, French coal trade ;
- (b) 1,700 to 3,000 tons dead weight, coal either to Blaye for Italy or to the Bay for France, returning with ore ;
- (c) 3,000 to 4,500 tons dead weight, coal to Italy, returning with ore.
- (d) Over 4,500 tons, coal to Italy. Then Wheat Executive.

This plan had the advantage of fulfilling requirements the urgent need of which was beyond discussion. On November 30, 1918, 226 vessels of 602,887 dead weight tons had been allocated and out of an ultimate total of about 750,000 tons dead weight, and 11 vessels had been sunk.

Table showing Employment of Pool Tonnage on November 30th, 1918.

	Tons dead-weight.
Coal to France (Channel and Bay ports) - - -	115,844
Coal to Italy :—	
(a) To Blaye - - - - -	50,063
(b) U.K./Italy Ore home - - -	70,988
(c) Mediterranean Trade, France/Italy - -	31,686
	<hr/> 152,737
Wheat Executive - - - - -	124,592
Belgian Relief - - - - -	98,572
Miscellaneous Voyages - - - - -	35,815
	<hr/>
Total - - - - -	527,560

NOTE.—The difference between this total and the 602,887 dead-weight tons which is the total allocated up to November 30th is made up by 38,377 tons deadweight which has been allocated but not yet come into service, the sinkings, and 4,460 tons dead-weight which have been released from the Pool previous to November 30.

American Military Programme.

The Council authorised the allocation of tonnage to supplement the American Military Supply Programme. The quantity provisionally indicated was 200,000 tons for loading in October, and 300,000 tons in the two months of November and December together, this quantity, however, being subject to variation if the Executive considered it desirable. The quantity actually allotted in October was 204,000 tons. Arrangements had been made to allot 150,000 tons in November, but in view of the changed military position these were by agreement modified.

Note on Raw Materials.

While no definite programme for raw materials has been possible, the principle was provisionally approved that the actual recorded consumption of 1917 should be taken as setting the maximum limit for programmes for the ensuing year. In

* The Chartering Executive consists of the following members : M. de Lubersac (France), Lieutenant Farina (Italy), and Sir O. Holmden, K.B.E. (Great Britain).

raw materials the Italian requirements were estimated to amount to about one-thirtieth of her total requirements. Commodities such as coal, munitions, and food; essential to the direct prosecution of the war, naturally were given the preference, and the Italian position in some cases—*e.g.*, wool—has been serious.

With regard to France, the same general remarks apply as in the case of Italy, a preference having been given to food and munitions.

Statistical Work.

The Statistical Section, under Mr. Davis, in conjunction with the Shipping Intelligence Section under Mr. Howell, have compiled monthly statements of the tonnage of every nation (showing losses, building, and employment). The tables showing the position just before the Armistice, which are more complete, particularly as to the employment of world tonnage, than any hitherto available, are printed on pages 223 to 228.

Other Work.

In addition to the above work the Executive has effected a great number of detailed economies in the use and employment of tonnage, by arranging for the diversion of vessels to the work for which they were most suitable, or from more distant to nearer sources of origin, by the economical combination of light and heavy cargoes, and by advantageous interchanges of tonnage. Particulars of this work are to be found in the Reports of Action and Minutes, but it is too detailed and varied in character for description in this covering Report.

V.—DOCUMENTS RELATING TO FORMATION OF THE COUNCIL.

HISTORICAL NOTE IN EXPLANATION OF FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS.

By the autumn of 1917 the increased losses due to the intensive submarine campaign had so seriously reduced tonnage as to threaten both dislocation of military supply services and a real danger of starvation in the European Allied countries. Each of the countries had import programmes largely in excess of what the tonnage could carry. The process of reducing these programmes and of prohibiting certain classes of import had lagged far behind the development of the shipping situation under the new submarine conditions. The situation, therefore, imperatively demanded new organisation to deal with the supply programmes. In the United Kingdom a Cabinet Committee, under Lord Curzon's chairmanship, using but carrying further the work of the Tonnage Priority Committee, effected the necessary drastic reduction in British programmes, after allowance for the continuance of shipping assistance to France and Italy. Similar work was performed in France by a standing Committee under the chairmanship of M. Clémentel. The result of the latter body's work was that M. Clémentel felt that, with the tonnage at her disposal under the old arrangements, France could feel no assurance that she would not be faced with famine by the spring or summer of the next year. He therefore entered into negotiations with the British Government, as a result of which the Agreement of November 3rd (p. 18) was concluded. The principle of this agreement was that the Allies accepted the responsibility for providing tonnage for food, proportionately to their respective means of transport. The actual application of this principle involved a number of difficulties which are described in the Memorandum on p. 20. Of these, one of the main ones was that responsibility for the transport of food could not in practice be divorced from that of other supplies. The amount of tonnage claimed by France and Italy from Great Britain to supplement their own tonnage in carrying food would, obviously, be affected by the amount of tonnage these countries were allotting to the conveyance of munitions, steel, wool, cotton, &c.; and the principle therefore involved an Allied examination of all Allied demands and Allied tonnage. The way in which the principle was in fact worked out in regard to cereals is shown in the letter from the Ministry of Shipping to the Wheat Executive on p. 19. In the meantime the larger problem of extending the principle to all other supplies was being worked on, and, finally, at a meeting in the second week in November at Sir Percy Bates' house, at which he, M. Jean Monnet, Mr. John Anderson and Mr. J. A. Salter were present, a detailed plan for an Allied organisation was worked out. This plan is described in the Memorandum of November 17th on p. 20. It was discussed and accepted in principle by the British Government, and then by Colonel House's Mission (with Mr. Bainbridge Colby on behalf of the American Shipping Board) in the third week in November. The same plan was then embodied in a further Memorandum of November 21st (p. 23), which included also a review of the whole shipping position. This latter Memorandum was taken as the basis of the discussion at the Paris Conference of November 29–December 3, 1917, at which the A.M.T.C. was finally resolved upon by the Associated Governments, the decisions being as shown in the extracts from the official report reported on p. 35. Representatives of the different Governments met and arranged the actual establishment of the organisation on February 15th, 1918 (p. 38), and the Council itself met in formal session on March 11th. Thenceforth the work of the Council is shown in the Minutes of the Council and Monthly Reports of Action printed from pp. 41–228.

NOVEMBER 3rd, 1917, AGREEMENT.

**Amended Copy of the Tonnage Agreement communicated to the French Chargé d'Affaires
by Lord Robert Cecil.**

The Governments of Great Britain, France, and Italy, find that, owing to the failure of the French and Italian harvests, the submarine warfare and other causes, there is not sufficient tonnage for all their wants. They consider that of these wants, food is the most important, and can be treated separately; the amount of food that has to be imported is known; and they think that the burden of providing the tonnage for carrying it should be a common charge on all the Allies, including the United States; but inasmuch as the need for an immediate arrangement is pressing, the three Governments are prepared to accept the responsibility of providing the tonnage that may be required *proportionately to their respective means of transport*, with or without the help of the United States.

The three Governments further agree that they will proceed forthwith to examine the other hardly less important needs of the Allies.

This Agreement is to be kept secret for the present.

3rd November 1917.

LETTER FROM MINISTRY OF SHIPPING TO WHEAT EXECUTIVE, IN CONNECTION
WITH ABOVE AGREEMENT, 7TH MARCH 1918.

The principles and procedure proposed by the Wheat Executive for the application of that Agreement are in the main in accordance with the views of the Shipping Controller. It is, however, necessary to make these subject to the following observations.

It is unfortunately impossible to make the execution of the programmes of the Wheat Executive entirely independent of the condition of other programmes, as ships are interchangeable between wheat and other commodities, any addition to the number required for other commodities reducing those available for wheat.

No Ally has interpreted the November 3rd Agreement as in practice implying an absolute priority for the execution of the programmes of the different Executives and Departments for cereals or foodstuffs generally over all other services. The mere fact that Great Britain, France, and Italy have all continued overseas vessels in the coal service is sufficient proof of this. In no event, moreover, could any Ally claim under the November 3rd Agreement a supplement of tonnage belonging to any other Ally unless it were admitted that the Ally claiming assistance had adjusted its shipping and supply services so as to contribute in proportion to its means at least as much as the Ally from whom the tonnage was being requested. This must obviously be a question which would be extremely difficult to determine, though the machinery of the Allied Maritime Transport Council may assist.

In the meantime it is clear that an Ally from whom tonnage is requested must retain the right in the event of a difference of opinion as to the use and allocation of the tonnage (or the arrangement of a supply service affecting tonnage) of an Ally requesting assistance, to give expression to its own opinion by withholding in whole or in part a diversion which would otherwise have been arranged.

With these prefatory remarks the Controller is prepared to agree that, information being communicated in the manner proposed in the previous correspondence, a division of the shipping allotted to cereals should be normally made as among the Allies in accordance with the allotments of wheat recommended by the Wheat Executive, this arrangement being a working practice adopted for the time being (and not admitted as following necessarily from the 3rd November Agreement) being subject to cancellation by notice, and not extending beyond cereals, and being in any case (and apart from actual cancellation by notice) subject to the proviso indicated (viz., that it is conditional upon the Ally from whom tonnage is requested being at the time satisfied as to the allocation of the tonnage, and the arrangement of the supply services, of the Ally claiming and that diversions may be withheld in whole or in part if this condition is not satisfied), and being further subject to any arrangements that may be made by the Allied Maritime Transport Council.

The Controller believes that, while it has been necessary to safeguard the above proposals by provisos designed to secure that no undue share of the burden of the cereal programme is placed upon a particular Ally, the arrangement is such as both to avoid the practical difficulties to which allusion has been made in the discussion of this subject and also to give effect to the intention of the 3rd November Agreement.

**NOTE AS TO FORM OF CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE ALLIES,
NOVEMBER 17th, 1917.**

*(Handed to Lord Reading in connection with the American Conference on
November 20th at which the principles suggested were accepted.)*

NOTE.—This is a purely British document, prepared for the use of the British Government. It is included here as indicating the considerations which afterwards led to the establishment of the A.M.T.C.

In considering the best form of co-operation which we should attempt to secure between the Allies, including America and ourselves, we must start with the following decisions already arrived at :—

1. The Agreement of the 3rd November 1917. In this, France and Great Britain agreed that they considered that of the different allied wants, food is the most important and can be treated separately, and that the burden of providing the tonnage for carrying it should be a common charge on all the Allies, including the United States ; but that inasmuch as the need for an immediate arrangement is pressing the Governments concerned would accept the responsibility of providing the tonnage that might be required *proportionately to their respective means of transport* with or without the help of the United States, and they further agreed that they would proceed forthwith to examine the other hardly less important needs of the Allies.

This Agreement is not altogether easy to interpret with precision. It apparently contemplates pooling tonnage for food but not for other requirements. The tonnage, however, is to be provided “proportionally to the respective means of transport.” This cannot mean the mere application of a mathematical formula. It would, for instance, be absurd to say that if Great Britain had 7,000,000 tons engaged in importing work, France 2,000,000 tons and Italy 1,000,000 tons, the tonnage required for the agreed programme of all three countries should be provided in the exact proportions of 7, 2, and 1 by the three countries respectively without regard to the nature of their needs. Putting aside this impossible interpretation, however, the only alternative one is that tonnage should be provided after common examination of all the demands upon the tonnage of the three countries, and this in practice almost does away with the distinction made in the Note between food and other requirements. The only difference is perhaps the recognition that food should have a general priority. The distinction, however, between withdrawing a certain quantity of tonnage from each country for food and therefore leaving a consequent amount of tonnage for other requirements after examination of these requirements, and, on the other hand, pooling for all purposes is clearly rather a slender one.

The following two further principles have been agreed between ourselves and M. Monnet and circulated to Lord Milner, Lord Robert Cecil, Mr. Churchill, and Sir Albert Stanley :—

2. That America, France, Italy, and Great Britain should all tabulate and make available to each other a statement showing in detail and as nearly as possible in the same form each class of requirements for which tonnage is needed, and, secondly, the tonnage now available and likely to be available in future through new building, &c. ; and

3. That all four countries should agree that the neutral and interned tonnage obtained through any channel and by whatever country should be used in such a way as to increase by an equal extent the tonnage in direct war services, the extra tonnage being allotted so far as practicable to the most urgent war need of any of the Allies. The method of allocation must be worked out later, but it is important that the principle should be recognised that it is urgency of war needs and not the method by which the tonnage has been obtained that should be the criterion.

We require to consider in some detail the machinery required to give effect to these principles.

For this purpose the following suggestions are submitted :—

1. The Wheat Executive has shown the great advantage of Inter-allied criticisms of a particular class of requirements by the experts of each country. It is proposed that this machinery should be extended to cover all the main classes of imports. Executives on the model of the Wheat Executive are already being formed for sugar, for meat, and for oil seeds and fats. By similar additions to such executives, or by extension of the powers of the Wheat Executive, food can easily be covered. A nitrate

Executive has also been proposed and it might be either extended to cover other munitions or have a Munitions Executive working on the same lines. Later on, perhaps, an Inter-Allied Raw Materials Executive could also be formed. It will be noted that these Executives consist essentially of experts of the various Supply Departments and are not shipping in character though they have to be very closely linked to the shipping machinery. Naval and Military demands in the narrower sense, *e.g.*, for vessels directly engaged in combatant services or in troop carrying, &c., would be outside such arrangements, and the coal and ore trade could similarly be set aside, though it is conceivable it might be brought within a similar arrangement at a later date.

2. With such Inter-Allied Executives appointed, it is necessary to consider their relation to the main problem of the allocation, programming and direction of ships, and to the national import restriction authorities. Probably the most convenient course is that we should proceed as at present with an investigation of our own imports on the basis of an estimated available importing capacity which assumed certain specified liabilities. In our case these assumptions are that we will maintain the same number of British vessels in the service of our Allies as at present, and also meet the increases in their cereal demands. It is desirable that France and Italy should take in hand a similar reduction upon complementary assumptions as to the liability of their tonnage, *i.e.*, that they will be liable to meet their demands with the tonnage they now have plus extra assistance from us for cereals. When the Milner Committee has completed its work, the representatives of the different Supply Departments would, through the Inter-Allied Executives, try to arrange that the other countries were submitting to reductions on such a standard as would imply as far as possible an equal degree of sacrifice. The result would doubtless be to carry the French and Italian programmes a long way towards solution, though a deficit would still be likely to result in view of the large loss of carrying power of their mercantile marines during this year. If, however, America is associated with the different Executives, the application of the above principle should be sufficient to bring the requirements much more nearly within the programme limits. To the extent to which this is impossible, it will be necessary for the Milner Committee and similar bodies established in the Allied countries to tackle the problem afresh on a more drastic standard.

3. As the programme of requirements are being modified in the above manner, it is necessary to have machinery to programme the ships in conformity with the gradual modification of requirement programmes. For this purpose, however, it is extremely undesirable that anything like an International Shipping Board should be established. *The danger is that such a Board would consist of people who are at once out of touch with the actual executive machinery of the different Shipping Departments and at the same time not invested with such authority as Ministers like Lord Milner or M. Clémentel would have to secure actual decisions for cutting down.* What it is suggested is wanted is first of all to secure that there are in London people who can speak for the different Shipping Departments, who would confer with ourselves so as to arrive at a statement of the most appropriate general programming of ships in accordance with the arranged programming of requirements and an agreed statement of the extent to which a further reduction in requirements is necessary in order to make the shipping programme possible. For this purpose, we already have suitable people in the executive machines of France and Italy, and if Mr. Shearman is appointed to act in a somewhat similar capacity in this country to that which Sir Thomas Royden occupies for us in America, the people required would be available. These people would not meet as a permanent Committee and would not necessarily be always the same, the best method of working being *ad hoc* Conferences called at the most appropriate moments. From the work of such Conferences representations would be made to the respective Governments though their representatives for either the re-allocation of blocks of tonnage, whether national or neutral, and, or as a complement an application for an order to the respective authorities engaged in cutting down imports to cut them down to a specified extent.

4. The allocation and general programming of steamers having been arranged in this way, the arrangements for actual direction require to be considered. For this purpose, it is essential that the Commercial Branch in this Ministry should have different sections linking on to the different Executive in the manner already arranged for the Wheat Executive, and that in accordance with the principle laid down in the Wheat Agreement the actual decision as to the ports to which a specified ship

should go, should be given by that Branch in the case of all the commodities dealt with by the different Executives. This is already working for Italy, and France would be willing to accept a similar arrangement. The details of management, payment of the vessel and all consequent executive details would be settled by the respective countries in Rome, Paris, London, &c. In the case of America it is doubtful whether a similar arrangement would be possible. We should, however, at least arrange that America should keep us informed by cable of every decision to allocate a vessel to a specified American port and we could adjust the rest of the tonnage upon that basis, communicating with America where necessary to secure a change in her plans.

J. A. S.

17th November 1917.

THE SHIPPING SITUATION AND AMERICAN ASSISTANCE.

British Memorandum of November 21st, 1917.

(Taken as Basis of Discussions at Paris Conference, November–December 1917.*)

The losses of British, Allied and Neutral ships and the serious failure of the French and Italian harvests this year have created a tonnage situation of great gravity.

The position may be briefly summarised as follows :

Great Britain during the war has lost about 10 million tons dead-weight by war and marine risks. She has lost net (after allowing for both building and captured ships) about 4 million tons dead-weight. Taking world tonnage as a whole the gross losses may be taken at about 17 million tons dead-weight, and the net losses at nearly 9 million tons dead-weight. Of these losses more than half have occurred during this year, some 9 million tons dead-weight being lost already this year without allowing for vessels seriously damaged. (Detailed tables of losses are appended.)

Excluding vessels unsuitable for ocean-going trade, it may be said that the total world tonnage now amounts to about 45 million tonnage dead-weight. Of this about half is British ; of the remainder about three-fifths is Allied and two-fifths Neutral.

In a telegram sent to America in September, it was estimated that world building would overtake losses if America could build 6 million tons gross, or, say, 9 million tons dead-weight per annum. This estimate was based upon the experience of this year and made some allowance for marine loss, for obsolescence and for serious damage to vessels not actually sunk ; it was not, however, designed to do more than overtake losses, *i.e.*, it would not compensate for past losses or for future losses before the new programme matured. Since then losses have somewhat declined, but, on the other hand, the British building programme, which it was then hoped might reach 4 million tons dead-weight, will, it is probable, not produce more than $2\frac{3}{4}$ million tons dead-weight. On the whole 6 million tons gross or 9 millions tons dead-weight is still suggested as the best standard for America to take. It was explained in that telegram that the reason why it was impossible for Great Britain and the European Allies to build on such a scale as that suggested for America was that in the early stages of the war the immediate necessity was to increase armies, navies and munitions, and the Allied strength has, therefore, been committed in these directions. A much smaller effort directed to shipbuilding would have enabled them to outbuild submarine destruction even at the present rate. Fortunately, it was just when merchant shipping became as vital a factor as armies, navies and munitions, that America, whose industrial and engineering resources are the greatest in the world, entered the war.

NOTE.—Tonnage throughout this memorandum is, in accordance with American custom, given in dead-weight, except in the calculations of the tonnage for the American Army where the tonnage is given in gross in view of the large proportion of vessels of a passenger type for which dead-weight figures are misleading.

As compared with the 6 million tons gross or 9 million tons dead-weight, America is said to be contemplating a programme of about 6 million tons dead-weight. The actual programme forwarded to us, however, only provides for about 5 million tons dead-weight.

The situation has been rendered still more difficult from the British point of view by the fact that nearly 900,000 tons dead-weight of shipping which the British Government had ordered in America has been requisitioned by the American Government. This tonnage (allowing for delivery dates) would have had an importing capacity of about 2 million tons in 1918 and would have enabled Great Britain to give additional assistance to the Allies to that extent. It will be recognised that but for the foresight of the British Government in ordering these vessels early in this year and many months before the American Government Shipbuilding organisation had been completed, the output of American yards this year and early next would presumably have been much less than it now will be.

Great Britain is now providing France and Italy with over 2 million tons dead-weight of British tonnage in addition to over half-a-million tons dead-weight lent to

* NOTE.—It will be observed that this memorandum, being written in November 1917, assumes in the shipping calculations an American military programme designed to land 1,000,000 men in France by the end of 1918. The increase in the programme (under which over 2,000,000 men were in France before the end of hostilities) of course transformed the whole shipping position, and was indeed the main factor in the Council's problem of adjusting supplies to tonnage.

Russia, the total for all Allies being about 3 million dead-weight. This tonnage, if withdrawn into British service, would suffice to keep Great Britain's imports next year up to her imports for this year, so that the general position is that her tonnage is sufficient in spite of losses to maintain her own part in the war. The difficulty arises through the necessity of helping the Allies in spite of those losses. It is, however, obviously impossible for Great Britain to withdraw her tonnage from the Allies. On the contrary, she is, in view of the extreme gravity of the position, endeavouring so to restrict even her essential imports next year as to enable her to continue her present assistance to her Allies, to replace British vessels lost in their service and also to provide tonnage sufficient to help in meeting the increase in their cereal requirements through bad harvests, the latter meaning the conveyance of over 2 million extra tons and requiring a further tonnage of about 750,000 tons dead-weight. If this should prove possible, however, it will only be at the most serious cost to this country. If no further assistance be given to the Allies, British imports next year would be reduced from about 34 million tons to about 28 million tons (excluding oil fuel for Admiralty in both cases). In considering those figures it must be remembered that British imports of food (which are capable of little reduction) amount to about 15 million tons, that over 11 million tons consist of ore and munitions, and that a large proportion of the remaining imports are required for war purposes. As compared with these figures, her pre-war imports amounted to about 54 million tons. That is her imports, excluding food and munitions, which amounted to over 36 million tons in peace times, have this year fallen to about 8 million tons; and 6 million tons must, as stated above, be taken partly off this figure and partly off the food and munitions requirements for next year, even apart from the conveyance of the further 2 million tons of cereals for the Allies.

It is necessary to emphasise the fact that if in spite of the above facts and of the loss of the British ships building in America, Great Britain is able to realise this programme, it represents the most extreme assistance it is conceivable that she can give and that it may be impossible to give assistance to this extent.

Of about 27 million tons dead-weight of British ocean-going tonnage at the beginning of the war, we have sustained a net loss of about 4 million dead-weight. A further million tons is in the Yards for small and big repairs. About 5 million dead-weight tons are required for direct Army and Navy services apart from indirect requirements such as munitions, and about 3 million tons dead-weight are in the service of the Allies. Excluding vessels which are unsuitable for general work or are required for essential supplies of the Colonies, this leaves only some 9½ million tons dead-weight for importing work. In order to make this contribution to the war, Great Britain has had to sacrifice her shipping interests, whole Lines built up for many years being completely destroyed, *e.g.*, the Prince and Booth Lines between North and South America. She has had to sacrifice her export trade, exports only being allowed so far as there is space available in outgoing ships sent to bring back essential imports. She has already had to impose severe hardships on civilian interests, the use of petrol being for instance stopped for pleasure traffic, oats not being allowed except for horses engaged in essential work, and the supply of cotton for the main British industry in Lancashire being reduced to 60 per cent. The further programme contemplated for next year will go far beyond this and will involve some industrial disaster and the absolute cutting off of many articles of foodstuffs ordinarily regarded as essential.

In spite of those measures, there must, however, still be a serious deficit in the tonnage required for absolutely essential French and Italian requirements through the fact that France and Italy as well as ourselves have had serious losses during this year. France's own statement* of her deficit of tonnage is about 1½ million tons gross or 2,400,000 tons dead-weight, or 6 million tons of imports, which would still leave a deficit of over 4 million tons after allowing for the extra assistance for cereals contemplated as above by Great Britain. It may, however, be perhaps fairly assumed that France could carry on if she had sufficient tonnage (in addition to that given by Great Britain for her increase in cereal demands) to keep her imports for 1918 up to those for 1917, *i.e.*, to compensate for the reduction in the carrying power of vessels under her own control through losses. This means additional tonnage sufficient to carry some 2½ million tons of imports in the year, or say, 750,000 tons dead-weight continuously employed. Italy, on a similar basis, would

* Statements showing the present disposition of British, French, and Italian tonnage are enclosed.

require tonnage for some $1\frac{1}{4}$ million tons of imports or say 500,000 tons dead-weight. This extra tonnage, amounting to some $1\frac{1}{4}$ million tons dead-weight, can only be provided from American tonnage or from *extra* neutral tonnage (in addition to what is not in war service and the vessels to replace future losses). This figure (which is less than half the aid Great Britain proposes to give in spite of the loss of the vessels building in America and would mean a contribution by America of only some half a million tons in addition to those vessels) must be taken as a low figure which would still involve very considerable hardship and risk for France and Italy as well as for Great Britain.

It is suggested that America should aim at providing for an average continuous employment for France and Italy or for Great Britain (which would thereupon give equivalent tonnage to France or Italy) not less than $1\frac{1}{4}$ million tons dead-weight excluding oilers, and meeting her own military requirements with the balance. It is hoped that half a million tons of this can be given at once, and the rest provided as the American shipbuilding programme develops.

The tanker position is somewhat different. Great Britain has throughout made it clear that, while she could transport her own supplies, although not all the Allies' supplies, without assistance, she had insufficient tank vessels for the supply of oil fuel to the Navy. In consequence of this deficiency, it has been necessary to use the double bottoms of ordinary cargo vessels (to the extent of about 100,000 tons a month) to carry oil fuel, which is uneconomical and means delay and the loss of an equivalent weight of ordinary cargo. America, however, is relatively rich in tank vessels, and in arranging to give additional ordinary tonnage to her Allies in spite of her own serious position Great Britain hopes that America will find it possible to provide, by requisitioning from commercial employment, sufficient extra tankers to make up the deficit, and to render unnecessary the continued use of double bottoms. Full particulars of the oil fuel and tanker position have been given to the American Government.

What is urgently needed is the immediate provision of 100,000 tons dead-weight of tanker tonnage with a further addition of 200,000 tons dead-weight as soon as possible.

In considering the possibility of America accepting this position, it is necessary to take into account the American military requirements on the one hand, and on the other the tonnage at her disposal now and during next year.

Official information just received from the American Government states the American position at present to be as follows:—

There is a total of 539 vessels under American Registry over 2,500 tons dead-weight, aggregating 3,620,320 dead-weight, of which tankers represent 1,052,253. As against this the Navy has (excluding tankers) 30 vessels, aggregating 151,509 dead-weight tons. The Army has 103 of 848,894 dead-weight tons, 48 vessels of 308,719 dead-weight tons have been allotted to Allied Governments, and 81 vessels of 501,705 dead-weight tons are in private trade in the war zone. American requirements for necessary supplies are estimated at $2\frac{1}{2}$ million tons dead-weight, excluding tankers, representing a considerable increase from the former figures, which showed a requirement for $1\frac{3}{4}$ million tons dead-weight for imports from the Far East and from South America.

It is stated that there are no vessels now capable of being withdrawn from present-trades, and the American tonnage shortage on the above figures is given as $1\frac{1}{2}$ million tons dead-weight, without counting about 1 million further tons which are being asked for by the Allies.

The above figures, of course, do not include the small vessels under 2,500 tons dead-weight which are presumably available to help in coastwise work, nor sailing vessels available for the same purpose, nor do they include neutral vessels employed in American waters, of which there are believed to be some three-quarter million tons dead-weight mainly Norwegian. In addition the Eastern imports can presumably be largely carried in Japanese tonnage, of which it is understood something like 500,000 tons dead-weight might be available. In addition there is the possibility of bringing into employment refugee neutral tonnage that is now idle in American ports which is understood to amount to some half to three-quarter million tons dead-weight. There are also possibilities of interned vessels in South America being brought into use. Beyond this there is, of course, the American new buildings. By the 1st April this should, according to the present programme, give an extra million tons dead-weight. Later the situation should improve rapidly, as new building from April to June should give a further $1\frac{1}{2}$ million tons, and from July to September a further $1\frac{1}{4}$ million tons dead-weight, and from October to December a further $1\frac{1}{4}$ million tons dead-weight.

Some reference may also be made to British experience in connection with the statement that no ships are capable of being withdrawn from their present trades. This of course must be for America to decide, and Great Britain has no desire, nor the necessary information, to criticise the estimate upon which this conclusion has been formed. It may be useful to remark, however, that one of the most remarkable things Great Britain has learnt in the war is the extent to which it is possible, without absolute disaster, to cut off requirements that on first careful investigation appeared to be absolutely essential. Great Britain is more dependent upon imports than any other of the main belligerents. She has to import four-fifths of her wheat and in peace times imports nearly 20 million tons of foodstuffs a year. Under the strain of the war, however, her imports have, as stated above, been reduced from some 36 million tons excluding foodstuffs to some 8 million tons excluding foodstuffs and munitions, and this figure must again be reduced for next year. It was never anticipated earlier in the war that a reduction so drastic would be possible. It is experience alone which has shown that a country which (like America) has a large civilian consumption and (unlike America) is hampered by an inadequate home producing capacity could bear so big a strain. A careful examination by the British Government of the 50 million tons of imports coming in earlier in the war showed that only a little over 2 million tons were regarded as non-essential. In fact, however, the determination to continue her increased naval and military operations and to continue her assistance to the Allies has resulted in the immense further reductions shown above, and though there has been hardship and inconvenience there has so far been no actual disaster. There are, of course, a very great number of imported articles which are both required for military purposes and are also used for civilian consumption. The only practical way which Great Britain has found of economising tonnage in these circumstances is to start by actually withdrawing ships so ruthlessly that those left are quite inadequate for normal civilian consumption. In the more important cases such as steel, it has been found necessary to prevent any civilian consumption except through a specific licence given only on the ground that the proposed use was essential in the national interests. It is suggested that in a similar way America might find some of the wool which she requires for military purposes by obtaining it from the wool consumed by her large civilian population. Nothing has been more strikingly shown in the war than that civilian requirements can adjust themselves to reduced supplies when the necessity actually arises, through the withdrawal of vessels for military service, to a very much greater extent than the best experts considered possible beforehand. It may be hoped, therefore, that America will find that some further vessels than she now thinks possible may be rendered available from private employment for war service, and the total tonnage shown above as available for the latter purpose may be increased accordingly.

Against this tonnage there are the American requirements stated above, plus the additional Allied requirements also stated, a necessary provision to meet losses, and, above all, the increased needs of the Army.

The needs of the Army are extremely difficult to calculate, as the exact composition of American divisions, and the way in which they will be transported, are unknown, and the provision for reinforcements and for hospital ships, which must, of course, depend upon casualties, &c., is in any case very speculative.

It may be said generally that it takes 4 gross tons of shipping to transport a man, 8 gross tons to transport a horse or mule, and to supply one man from America would require 1 gross ton perpetually employed. These figures, however, make no allowance for hospital ships, reinforcements, &c.

A memorandum is attached showing the vessels required for different military programmes. It has been ascertained to-day that much more exact information is now available as to the American arrangements. A more precise statement is now being prepared and will be substituted for this estimate, which must be regarded as very hypothetical. It will be seen on the assumption that—

(1) Wastage of personnel will occur at roughly $8\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. per month or 100 per cent. per annum;

(2) Wastage of horses will occur at roughly $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. per month or 30 per cent. per annum; and

(3) Wounded or sick would be retained in France and only the permanently disabled men repatriated to America. The following tonnage would be required on different military programmes (the estimate is designed to show the tonnage

required to transport, maintain, and supply a given force, commencing December 1st, 1917—it does not take into account the numbers already transported):—

(a) If 400,000 men (including non-combatants, L. of C. troops, &c.) and 70,000 horses are to be in France by the 30th April 1918, the tonnage required would rise from about 1 million tons gross to 1,527,500 tons gross on the 30th April. If no addition were then made to the force 544,500 tons gross would be sufficient to maintain the force and provide reinforcements.

(b) In order to have 800,000 men in France by the 30th September 1918 (including non-combatants, L. of C. troops, &c.) and 140,000 horses, the tonnage, instead of being reduced after the 30th April would rise gradually until by the 30th September it reached 2,072,000 gross tons.* If the force were not thereafter increased, 1,089,000 gross tons would suffice to maintain the force and transport reinforcements.

(c) If the force were thereafter increased to 1 million by the 31st December 1918 (including non-combatants, L. of C. troops, &c.) and 175,000 horses, the tonnage, instead of declining after the 30th September, would increase till it reached 2,341,000 gross tons on the 31st December, the tonnage thereafter required for maintenance and reinforcements, if no further addition to the total force were made, being 1,358,000 gross tons.

It is apparent from the above figures that with the tonnage immediately under American control and with her requirements as at present stated, America can scarcely do more than provide about half a million tons dead-weight for the Allies in the immediate future without definitely limiting her military expedition. If, however, she can bring into use the neutral tonnage now lying idle or out of war work, can meet her Eastern requirements with Japanese tonnage and can reduce her import requirements, *e.g.*, by restricting civilian consumption, there is a reasonable hope that she could provide France and Italy with the minimum tonnage they require as described above and also make her military programme on the basis of having a million men in France by the end of next year with the aid of her new building. Any such estimate, however, must necessarily be very hypothetical, and to secure any margin it would be necessary that America should expedite building to the utmost possible extent, and if possible raise the rate of output to the 9 million tons dead-weight per annum previously suggested.

Form of Co-operation between the Allies.

The objects to be secured are of course—

- (a) to make the most economical use of tonnage under the control of all the Allies;
- (b) to allot that tonnage as between the different needs of the Allies in such a way as to add most to the general war effort; and
- (c) to adjust the programmes of requirements of the different Allies in such a way as to bring them within the scope of the possible carrying power of the tonnage available.

To secure these objects an International Board with complete executive power over common pool of tonnage had been proposed, but has been rejected for the following reasons:—

It would be difficult for any country, and particularly for America or Great Britain, to delegate absolute power to dispose of its tonnage (which is the basis of all its civilian and military requirements) to a representative on an International Board on which he might be outvoted. Such a Board, moreover, would not lead to administrative efficiency, partly because the complete control of all tonnage can scarcely be well concentrated in one place, and partly because representatives upon it would tend to be at once out of touch with the actual administrative executive machinery, and at the same time would be scarcely invested with sufficient authority to make reductions in the various supply programmes, munitions, food, &c.

It must be remembered that the problem of the allocation of tonnage is largely a problem of securing that the different requirements which make demands upon

* The tonnage is given in gross tons, as it is misleading to calculate in dead-weight where a large proportion of the vessels are of the passenger type.

tonnage should be adjusted in the fairest and best way, and that these requirements can only be so restricted by the experts in each class of commodities. It is, for instance, impossible for any except the munitions experts of the different Allied countries to deal with the restriction of the Allied munitions programmes within specified limits.

In view of the above considerations the following principles were agreed on 20th November:—

(a) That America, France, Italy, and Great Britain should all tabulate and make available to each other a statement, showing in detail, and as nearly as possible in the same form, each class of requirements for which tonnage is needed, and, secondly, the tonnage now available and likely to be available in future through new building, &c. These requirements having been classified (showing the source of supply, &c.), and having been adjusted (1) to secure a reasonably uniform standard of adequacy both as between classes of commodities and as between countries, and (2) to bring the total within the carrying capacity of the Allies as a whole, would form the basis on which the general allocation of tonnage would be determined. The calculation would be revised at convenient intervals in the light of losses, new building, war requirements, and other factors in the problem; but it would be an essential feature of the scheme that, subject to such periodical reallocation, each nation should manage and supervise the tonnage under its control.

(b) That all four countries should agree that the neutral and interned tonnage obtained through any channel and by whatever country should be used in such a way as to increase by an equal extent the tonnage in direct war services, the extra tonnage being allotted, so far as practicable, to the most urgent war need of any of the Allies. The method of allocation must be worked out later, but it is important that the principle should be recognised that it is urgency of war needs and not the method by which the tonnage has been obtained that should be the criterion.

(c) Steps to be taken to bring into war service all possible further tonnage, such as in South America, &c., &c.

(d) Control over cargoes carried to be such as to insure that they satisfy the most urgent war needs in respect of which the tonnage has been allotted.

It is the intention in carrying out (a) and (b) above that Allied bodies for the different main requirements for food, for munitions, and for raw materials should be formed on the model of the Wheat Executive, and it is hoped that America will be associated with these bodies.

It is at the same time absolutely essential that for the proper interchange of views and information about the tonnage situation there should be an American representative in this country, as there are already French and Italian representatives, who would act in the same capacity here as Sir Thomas Royden does for us in America.

It may be convenient to add a short summary of the main conclusion indicated in this Memorandum, and certain tables giving certain statistics in greater detail.

Summary.

The conclusions which appear to follow from the above statement and from the recent discussions between American, French, Italian, and British representatives are:—

1. That America should aim at building at the rate of 6 million tons gross (*i.e.*, 9 millions tons dead-weight) not 6 millions dead-weight per annum.

2. That it is of extreme importance that she should supplement the assistance given to France and Italy by Great Britain by providing at least half a million tons dead-weight in the immediate future and by raising this figure to an average of at least $1\frac{1}{4}$ million tons (including more than three-quarter million tons of British ships building in America).

3. That this is only possible without limiting her military effort if she (a) takes every possible step to bring into war service neutral and interned vessels now idle or out of war service, (b) obtains the maximum assistance from Japan, (c) reduces her

own requirements of imports (*e.g.*, by restricting civilian consumption) and requisitions drastically from her own trade along the lines already adopted by Great Britain.

That if she takes these steps, however, there is a prospect of her being able to transport and maintain an American Army of 500,000 by the early summer and of 1 million later in the year.

4. That Great Britain in promising further assistance to the Allies to meet their increased cereal demands, in spite of the loss to herself of the British vessels building in America, has done so in the hope that America will help with additional tank tonnage to the extent of rendering unnecessary the further uneconomical use of double bottoms in British cargo vessels for oil fuel for the Navy (100,000 tons a month). It is hoped that America will take steps to provide sufficient tank tonnage for this purpose, and to meet the deficit in stocks by requisitioning tankers from their present commercial employment, 100,000 tons dead-weight being immediately required and a further 200,000 as soon as possible.

5. That America should, like ourselves, accept the principle that neutral and interned tonnage obtained through any channel and by whatever country should be used in such a way as to increase to an equal extent the tonnage in direct war services, the extra tonnage being allotted, so far as practicable, to the most urgent war need of any of the Allies.

6. That in order to secure the necessary co-ordination and economy in the use of tonnage, America should appoint a permanent representative who can confer with the British, French, and Italian shipping officials in London as Sir Thomas Royden confers with the American Shipping Board.

An International Shipping Board is not considered either desirable or practicable. It is recognised that neither the American nor the British Government would be willing to delegate to such a Board the final allocation of their respective ships, and that the management of American and British ships cannot be centralised in one place. At the same time it is of vital importance that there should be the fullest possible interchange of information and views such as can only be obtained through the presence of an American representative in this country and a British representative in America.

7. That the machinery for effecting the necessary economies in all the various commodities requiring transport is provided through Allied Committees for each main class of commodity consisting of exports in that commodity. That committees should therefore be formed in London for other foodstuffs, for munitions, and for raw materials on the model of the Wheat Executive; and that in view of the close relation of the work of such committees with the general tonnage position and with American policy in the provision both of ships and commodities, appropriate American representatives should be associated with these committees.

The following tables are attached :—

- (1) Vessels sunk since the beginning of the War.
- (2) British vessels sunk during 1917.
- (3) Present employment of British tonnage.
- (4) Approximate disposition of Italian national tonnage.
- (5) Disposition of French steamships on 1st June 1917.
- (6) Estimate of tonnage required for American military requirements.

Note.—It will be realised that this memorandum has been prepared in order to elucidate the tonnage position, and does not imply any view as to the extent of American military assistance which is desirable.

J. A. S.,
21/11/17.

APPENDICES TO PRECEDING MEMORANDUM.

(1) VESSELS SUNK SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR.

WAR LOSSES.

	British.		American.		French.		Italian.		Neutral.		Miscellaneous.		Total.	
	No.	G.T.	No.	G.T.	No.	G.T.	No.	G.T.	No.	G.T.	No.	G.T.	No.	G.T.
August—December 1914.	59	240,733	—	—	5	14,376	—	—	27	43,863	4	4,094	95	303,066
January — December 1915.	242	834,356	6	14,583	37	101,390	16	40,045	140	189,334	39	75,989	480	1,255,691
January — December 1916.	338	1,220,246	4	14,181	138	188,007	183	269,836	397	561,856	41	79,028	1,101	2,333,148
January — October 1917.	811	3,173,197	49	135,025	228	364,907	220	329,065	672	1,077,121	132	253,335	2,112	5,332,650
August 1914 to October 1917 inclusive.	1,450	5,468,526	59	163,789	408	668,680	419	638,946	1,236	1,872,168	216	412,446	3,788	9,224,555
	*	*												

* These figures refer to vessels of 500 tons (gross) and upwards.

MARINE LOSSES.

British.

	No.	G.T.
August to December 1914 - - -	22	66,710
January to December 1915 - - -	77	248,682
January to December 1916 - - -	76	230,753
January to October 1917 - - -	83	256,145
August 1914 to October 1917 - - -	258	802,290
Other Nationalities,—say - - -		750,000
Total - - -		1,552,290

(2) BRITISH VESSELS SUNK DURING 1917.

Week ending	War Losses.		Marine Losses.		Tank Tonnage included under War Losses.	
	No.	G.T.	No.	G.T.	No.	G.T.
7 January	9	41,218	4	13,791	—	—
14 " -	7	19,733	2	6,623		
21 " -	17	93,950	—	—		
28 " -	41	50,799	4	13,082		
4 February -	3	15,236	1	3,009	2	10,344
11 " -	13	52,633	—	—		
18 " -	19	73,605	—	—		
25 " -	10	39,810	3	10,266		
4 March -	17	84,924	1	3,444	1	9,196
11 " -	19	68,392	2	10,093		
18 " -	17	60,898	1	1,916		
25 " -	26	126,501	—	—		
1 April -	21	78,871	1	3,749	6	36,920
8 " -	17	70,696	2	6,363		
15 " -	23	87,692	2	3,577		
22 " -	44	159,649	4	12,793		
29 " -	40	168,112	3	7,135	3	21,738
6 May -	27	100,008	1	3,509		
13 " -	18	70,055	2	5,915		
20 " -	21	73,852	2	2,202		
27 " -	17	62,640	3	11,508		

BRITISH VESSELS SUNK DURING 1917—*cont.*

Week ending	War Losses.		Marine Losses.		Tank Tonnage included under War Losses.	
	No.	G.T.	No.	G.T.	No.	G.T.
3 June - - - - -	16	63,656	2	7,568	3	15,398
10 " - - - - -	28	109,187	1	3,921		
17 " - - - - -	34	138,121	1	4,572		
24 " - - - - -	23	96,406	2	7,587		
1 July - - - - -	15	58,118	2	2,611	2	12,692
8 " - - - - -	16	69,957	3	9,645		
15 " - - - - -	16	59,621	1	2,123		
22 " - - - - -	21	74,226	2	5,301		
29 " - - - - -	21	91,263	2	5,306		
5 August - - - - -	21	77,787	—	—	1	6,069
12 " - - - - -	15	52,953	1	961		
19 " - - - - -	17	70,350	2	12,984		
26 " - - - - -	23	95,049	3	13,443		
2 September - - - - -	21	75,540	6	19,130	1	4,589
9 " - - - - -	14	58,316	2	3,15		
16 " - - - - -	12	34,353	3	3,557		
23 " - - - - -	14	45,696	1	801		
30 " - - - - -	11	33,862	—	—		
7 October - - - - -	15	55,075	—	—	1	3,700
14 " - - - - -	16	58,674	2	5,997		
21 " - - - - -	23	80,462	4	16,933		
28 " - - - - -	16	49,959	2	5,155		
4 November - - - - -	12	41,086	3	6,560		
11 " - - - - -	4	8,292	1	3,223		
18 " - - - - -	15	41,212	4	8,063		
Total - - - - -	835	3,238,495	88	267,431		

(3) PRESENT EMPLOYMENT OF BRITISH TONNAGE 500 G.T. AND OVER.

	Ordinary Tonnage.		Oiler Tonnage.	
	No.	G.T.	No.	G.T.
In Naval Service - - - - -	500	1,600,000	—	590,000*
„ Military Service - - - - -	500	1,600,000	—	—
„ Allied Service - - - - -	800	2,600,000	—	60,000
„ Naval, Military, or Allied Service outwards, commercial inwards.	450	2,350,000	—	—
Commercial (including liners) - - - - -	900	4,456,000	—	150,000
Permanently abroad, coasting, &c. - - - - -	800	1,700,000	—	100,000
Repairing (10 days or over) - - - - -	80	350,000	—	100,000
Total - - - - -	4,030	14,656,000	200	1,000,000

* Includes vessels engaged on Fleet attendance.

2nd November 1917.

(4) APPROXIMATE DISPOSITION OF ITALIAN NATIONAL TONNAGE.

	No. of Vessels.	D.W.
Import Services - - - - -	165	908,042
Ministry of War - - - - -	49	88,057
Ministry of Marine - - - - -	44	40,536
Mediterranean - - - - -	93	124,028
Total - - - - -	351	1,160,663

Small vessels are excluded from the above statement. In view of the large proportion of Passenger Vessels amongst Italian National Steamers it is considered that the total D.W. approximates to the G.T.

(5) DISPOSITION OF FRENCH STEAMSHIPS ON 1ST JUNE 1917.—PAVILLON FRANCAIS.

	Navires.	Portée en Lourd.
A.—NAVAIRES AU SERVICE DE L'ETAT.		
1. <i>Services Militaires.</i>		
Croiseurs Auxiliares, Eclaireurs, etc.	10	24,002
Navires Hopitaux	9	55,074
Navires de Prise	15	52,300
Navires Ravitailleurs	32	165,541
Transports de Charbons de Navigation Française, Besoins Généraux des Ports de Guerre.	28	111,591
Transports de Charbons Industriels (Constructions Navales)	8	14,570
2. <i>Transports pour le Compte des Services Publics.</i>		
Navires Postaux	60	210,227
Transports de Matériel pour la Défense Nationale	28	130,954
Navires Dirigés—Utilisation fixe imposée par les Sces. Publics	33	191,513
Navires non affrétés : Usines de Guerre Schneider & Co., Comité des Forges, etc.	28	75,524
3. <i>Ravitaillement Civil.</i>		
Service d'Arkangelsk	5	22,128
Blés	5	23,300
Pétroliers	5	19,800
Total	266	1,096,524
B.—NAVIRES LAISSÉS AU SERVICE DES PARTICULIERS.		
Charbonniers	93	212,439
Marchandises Diverses	112	356,654
Total	205	569,093
C.—AUTRES SERVICES.		
Gouvernement Russe	7	23,100
Gouvernement Britannique	3	9,200
Stationnaires aux Colonies	25	32,436
Total	35	64,736

NOTE.—The following estimate is designed to show the tonnage required to transport, maintain and supply a given force, commencing December 1st, 1917. It does not take into account the numbers already transported.

Assumptions :—

- (1) That wastage of personnel will occur at, roughly, $8\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. per month, 100 per cent. per annum.
- (2) That wastage of horses will occur at, roughly, $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. per month, 30 per cent. per annum.
- (3) That wounded and sick would be retained in France, only permanently disabled men being repatriated to America, and that one hospital ship a week would be sufficient for the purpose for a force of 400,000 men.

It has to-day been ascertained that much more exact information is now available as to the American arrangements. A more precise estimate is now being prepared and will be substituted for this estimate, which must be regarded as very hypothetical.

400,000 men (including non-combatants, L. of C. troops, &c.) and 70,000 horses in France by 30th April 1918.			800,000 men (including non-combatants, L. of C. troops, &c.) and 140,000 horses by 30th September 1918.		1,000,000 men (including non-combatants, L. of C. troops, &c.) and 175,000 horses in France by 31st December 1918.	
Tonnage in Service on that date.	Ships.	Gross Tonnage.	Ships.	Gross Tonnage.	Ships.	Gross Tonnage.
Conveyance of Divisions -	80	600,000	80	600,000	80	600,000
Dismounted details -	40	320,000	40	320,000	40	320,000
M.T. -	14	63,000	14	63,000	14	63,000
Maintenance -	50	200,000	100	400,000	125	500,000
Reinforcements -	34	272,000	68	544,000	85	680,000
Remounts	4	27,000	8	54,000	10	67,500
Hospital ships -	7	45,500	14	91,000	17	110,500
Total	229	1,527,500	324	2,072,000	371	2,341,000
Maintenance, reinforcements, remounts, &c., for a force of 400,000 men.			Maintenance, reinforcements, remounts, &c., for a force of 800,000 men.		Maintenance, reinforcements, remounts, &c. for a force of 1,000,000 men.	
	95	544,500	190	1,089,000	237	1,358,000

Paris Conference, Nov. 29th to Dec. 3rd, 1917.

LIST OF DELEGATES PRESENT :

France :

M. CLÉMENTEL, Ministre de Commerce, de l'Industrie, des Postes et des Télégraphes, des Transports Maritimes & de la Marine Marchande.

M. LOUCHEUR, Ministre de l'Armement & des Fabrications de Guerre.

M. VICTOR BORET, Ministre de l'Agriculture et du Ravitaillement.

M. LEMÉRY, Sous-Secrétaire d'Etat des Transports Maritimes & de la Marine Marchande.

M. VILGRAIN, Sous-Secrétaire d'Etat du Ravitaillement.

M. TARDIEU, Haut Commissaire de la République Française aux Etats-Unis.

M. JEAN MONNET, délégué de Ministre du Commerce, de l'Industrie, des Postes et des Télégraphes, des Transports Maritimes & de la Marine Marchande et du Ministère du Ravitaillement à Londres.

M. CHASSERIAU, Chef du Service des Approvisionnements à l'Etranger au Ministère du Commerce.

M. BERENGIER, Directeur des Transports Maritimes au Sous-Secrétariat d'Etat des Transports Maritimes & de la Marine Marchande.

M. CABLAT, Chef du Service de la Flotte Commerciale au Sous-Secrétariat d'Etat des Transports Maritimes & de la Marine Marchande.

M. LAROCHE, Chef de bureau à la Direction de l'Europe du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères.

Capitaine BLÉTRY, Chef du Service central des Transports & Combustibles au Ministère de l'Armement.

M. DELAUAUD, délégué du Ministère du Blocus.

M. SERRUYS, délégué du Ministère du Blocus.

M. AVENOL, délégué du Ministère des Finances.

M. JAHAN, Membre de la Commission Interministérielle des Achats à l'Etranger.

Commandant PUECH, de l'Etat-Major Général de la Marine.

M. GILLET, Secrétaire Général de Haut-Commissariat, à New York.

Belgique :

Baron de BROCQUEVILLE, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.

Baron de GAIFFIER D'HESTROY, Ministre de Belgique à Paris.

Bresil :

M. O. de MAGALHES, Ministre du Brésil à Paris.

Chine :

Cuba :

M. le Général VELEZ, Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire de la République de Cuba à Londres.

Etats-unis.

M. COLBY, Membre du Shipping Board.

M. McCORMICK, Président du War Trade Board.

M. DAY, Attaché au Shipping Board.

Grande Bretagne :

Lord READING, Lord Chief Justice.

Sir J. MACLAY, Shipping Controller.

Mr. JOHN ANDERSON, Secrétaire du Ministry of Shipping.

Mr. J. A. SALTER, Directeur de la Réquisition Maritime.

Grèce :

M. VENIZELOS, Président du Conseil des Ministres.
M. ARGYROPOULO, Gouverneur Général de Salonique.

Italie :

M. NITTI, Ministre des Finances.
M. BIANCHI, Ministre des Transports.

Japon :

M. HONDA, Conseiller de l'Ambassade du Japon à Londres.
M. SABURI, Secrétaire d'Ambassade de 1ère Classe.

*Montenegro :**Portugal :*

M. Alfonso COSTA, Président du Conseil des Ministres.
M. A. SOARES, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.
M. ARMANDO NAVARRO, Conseiller Commercial de la Légation de Portugal.

Roumanie :

M. ANTONESCO, Ministre de Roumanie en France.

Russie :

Commandant DMITRIEFF, Capitaine de vaisseau.

Serbie :

M. VESNITCH, Ministre de Serbie à Paris.
Général RACHITCH, Chef de la Mission Militaire Serbe au G.Q.G. français.

Extract from Official Report of Paris Conference, Nov. 29th-Dec. 3rd, 1917.

The Special Committee for Maritime Transport and General Imports of the Interallied Conference of Paris has decided by unanimous resolution of the delegates of the United States of America, Great Britain, Italy and France, that it is necessary to arrange a form of co-operation between the Allies which will secure the following objects :—

- (a) To make the most economical use of tonnage under the control of all the Allies.
- (b) To allot that tonnage as between the different needs of the Allies in such a way as to add most to the general war effort ; and
- (c) To adjust the programmes of requirements of the different Allies in such a way as to bring them within the scope of the possible carrying power of the tonnage available.

To secure these objects an International Board with complete executive power over a common pool of tonnage had been proposed, but has been rejected for the following reasons :—

It would be difficult for any country, and particularly for America or Great Britain, to delegate absolute power to dispose of its tonnage (which is the basis of all its civilian and military requirements) to a representative on an International Board on which he might be outvoted. Such a Board, moreover, would not lead to administrative efficiency, partly because the complete control of all tonnage can scarcely be well concentrated in one place and partly because representatives upon it would tend to be at once out of touch with the actual administrative executive machinery and at the same time scarcely invested with sufficient authority to make reductions in the various supply programmes, munitions, food, &c.

The problem of the allocation of tonnage is largely a problem of securing that the different requirements which make demands upon tonnage should be adjusted in

the fairest and best way, and these requirements can only be so restricted by the experts in each class of commodities. It is, for instance, impossible for any except the munitions experts of the different Allied countries to deal with the restriction of the Allied munitions programme within specified limits.

The Allies are accordingly agreed :—

- (a) That America, France, Italy, and Great Britain will all tabulate and make available to each other a statement showing in detail, and as nearly as possible in the same form, each class of requirements for which tonnage is needed, and, secondly, the tonnage now available and likely to be available in future through new building, &c.

These requirements having been classified (showing the source of supply, &c.), and having been adjusted—(1) to secure a reasonably uniform standard of adequacy both as between classes of commodities and as between countries; and (2) to bring the total within the carrying capacity of the Allies as a whole, will form the basis on which the general allocation of tonnage will be determined. The calculation will be revised at convenient intervals in the light of losses, new building, war requirements, and other factors in the problem; but it will be an essential feature of the scheme that subject to such periodical re-allocation each Nation shall manage and supervise the tonnage under its control.

- (b) That the neutral and interned tonnage obtained through any channel and by whatever country shall be used in such a way as to increase by an equal extent the tonnage in direct war services, the extra tonnage being allotted so far as practicable to the most urgent war need of any of the Allies. The method of allocation will be worked out later, but the principle is recognised that it is urgency of war needs and not the method by which the tonnage has been obtained that is to be the criterion.
- (c) That steps shall be taken to bring into war services all possible tonnage, such as that in South America, &c.
- (d) That control over cargoes carried shall be such as to ensure that they satisfy the most urgent war needs in respect of which the tonnage has been allotted.

To carry out (a) and (b) above, Allied bodies for the different main requirements for food, for munitions and for raw materials will be formed on the model of the Wheat Executive, America being associated with these bodies.

It being necessary in order to obtain decisions by the respective Governments that each country shall designate one or two ministers—the United States one or two special delegates—who will be responsible towards their respective Governments for the execution of the agreements arrived at and who will meet in conference as Allied representatives as may be necessary from time to time, whether in Paris or in London, according to the circumstances of the case, either on their own motion or at the request of the Executive Departments, it was resolved that “for the purpose of carrying out the common policy above indicated the appropriate Ministers in France, Italy and Great Britain, together with representatives of America, shall take steps to secure the necessary exchange of information, and co-ordination of policy and effort, establishing a permanent office and staff for the purpose.”

After the review of the present tonnage position and of the efforts being made by the European Allies, it was agreed unanimously by the Representatives of America, Great Britain, Italy, and France, that the annexed statement should in the name of the Inter-Allied Conference be represented to the American Government as representing the claim which the situation makes upon America so far as regards her participation in the solution of the tonnage problem.

ANNEXED STATEMENT.

(1) It is important that America should aim at building at the rate of 6 million tons gross (that is, 9 million tons dead-weight) in place of the present programme of 6 million tons dead-weight per annum.

(2) It is important that she should supplement the assistance given to France and Italy by Great Britain by providing at least half a million tons dead-weight in the immediate future and by raising this figure to an average of at least 1½ million tons.

(3) Having regard to the projected military effort of America, the foregoing assistance can only be provided if America—

- (a) Takes every possible steps to bring into war service neutral and interned vessels now idle or out of war service.
- (b) Obtains the maximum assistance from Japan.
- (c) Reduces her own requirements of imports (*e.g.*, by restricting civilian consumption) and requisitions drastically from her own trade.

(4) Great Britain in promising further assistance to the Allies to meet their increased cereal demands, has done so in the hope that America will help with additional tank tonnage to the extent of rendering unnecessary the further uneconomical use of double bottoms in British cargo vessels for oil fuel for the Navy (100,000 tons a month). It is hoped that America will take steps to provide sufficient tank tonnage for this purpose and to meet the deficit in stocks by requisitioning tankers from their present commercial employment, 100,000 tons dead-weight being immediately required and a further 200,000 as soon as possible.

Minutes of Meeting held at the Foreign Office on February 15th, 1918, in Connection with the Establishment of the Inter-Allied Shipping Organisation decided upon at the Paris Conference of December 1917.

A Conference of representatives of France, Italy, U.S.A. and Great Britain met at the Foreign Office on the 15th February 1918, at the invitation of Lord Robert Cecil, to consider the establishment of the Inter-Allied Shipping Organisation decided upon at the Paris Conference in December 1917.

There were present :

M. DE FLEURIAU }
M. MONNET } France.

Signor CRESPI }
Professor ATTOLICO } Italy.

Mr. CROSBY U.S.A. at request of Ambassador Page.

Lord ROBERT CECIL }
Mr. J. A. SALTER } Great Britain.

Lord Robert Cecil, who took the Chair, explained that he had invited the Conference in order to arrange for the first meeting of the new Council and for the discussion of certain preliminary questions which it was desirable to agree upon before the Council itself met, and in particular to make provisional arrangements for the staff required in connection with the work of the Council.

Signor Crespi raised the preliminary question as to the meaning and effect of a resolution adopted by the Supreme War Council since the Paris Conference as to the establishment of a Committee to co-ordinate tonnage and supplies. It was, however, considered that this resolution should not be interpreted in such a way as to be inconsistent with the establishment of a new Council in the form contemplated by the Paris Conference.

The following questions were considered, and provisional decisions arrived at.

(1) The Adoption of the Name of the new Organisation.

The name "Allied Maritime Transport Council" was decided upon. Mr. Crosby stated that he must point out that the U.S.A. were not technically an Ally, and he desired this remark to be recorded in the minutes. He concurred, however, in the adoption of the name for the Council.

(2) The functions of the new Council and the scope of its duties were discussed. Mr. Crosby raised a preliminary question as to the relation between the new Council and the one over which he presided as to the allocation of finance. He pointed out that the two limiting factors to imports were tonnage and finance, and that unless satisfactory co-ordination was effected between the two bodies, there was some danger that one might deal with programmes of imports without the knowledge that the other might have been dealing with the same programmes or be about to do so in a conflicting manner. It was pointed out that tonnage was perhaps more likely to be the more serious and more absolute limiting factor, but it was realised that close relations between the two bodies would be essential. This would be effected partly through the different Executive Committees and partly by the Secretaries of the two bodies keeping in close touch.

It was agreed to recommend the following to the Council as a convenient description of their functions and duties, though, as M. de Fleuriau pointed out, the wording of the report of the Paris Conference must in case of doubt remain as the binding document at least until the meeting of the Council itself.

"The purpose of the Allied Maritime Transport Council is to watch over the general conduct of Allied transport, and while leaving each Nation responsible for the management and supervision of the tonnage under its own control, to secure the necessary exchange of information and co-ordination in policy and effort on the part of the four Governments of France, Italy, U.S.A. and Great Britain, in adjusting their programmes of imports to the carrying capacity of the available tonnage (having regard to naval and military requirements) and in making the most advantageous allocation and disposition of the tonnage under their control in accordance with the urgency of war needs.

"For this purpose the Council will obtain through its permanent staff the programmes of import requirements drawn up by the Inter-Allied Executive Committees which are established or to be established on the model of the Wheat Executive (with such modifications as may be necessary in the different cases) for each of the main classes of essential imports and take these as the basis. It will also be responsible for obtaining through its permanent staff the fullest information as to the tonnage available to the respective Governments, for examining the import programmes furnished by the Executives in relation to the carrying power of the available tonnage, for ascertaining the extent of any deficit, and for considering the means whereby such a deficit may be met, whether by a further reduction in the programmes of imports or by the acquisition, if practicable, of further tonnage for importing work. If the Council agrees that reductions in any of the different programmes of imports to a defined extent are necessary, the ministers will so report to their respective Governments with a view to secure that the necessary decisions and action are taken in the respective countries and the necessary modifications are made in the programmes produced by the several Inter-Allied Executive Committees."

(3) *Arrangements as to a Chairman.*

It was agreed that the most convenient arrangement would be the usual one that the senior Minister of the country in which a meeting of the Council was held should preside at that meeting, no permanent chairman being appointed.

(4) *The provision of the necessary executive machinery and such staff as the Council may require, and the appointment of a Secretary.*

It was agreed that it would probably be most convenient for the permanent organisation to be in four sections, French, Italian, American, and British, and that the Secretary of the Council should be the Head of one of these sections and should be responsible for convening the Heads of the other sections, arranging with them for the preparation of information to be made upon identical lines; and that the four sections meeting in this way should draw up an agreed statement of the problem requiring to be settled by the decisions of the Council itself and should attempt to suggest alternative decisions which would suffice to solve that problem.

It was pointed out that this arrangement, while doubtless requiring the existing organisations of the different countries to be strengthened in certain cases by the addition of extra staff, would reduce such additional appointments to the smallest dimensions and would avoid the establishment of a large new organisation duplicating and overlapping with those which already exist.

Mr. J. A. Salter, on the proposal of M. de Fleuriau, was asked to undertake the duties of Secretary, this arrangement being provisional and subject to confirmation by the Council at its first meeting.

(5) The printed forms prepared for the preliminary work necessary to present the problem requiring to be dealt with by the Council were circulated. It was agreed to leave these forms and the presentment of the information upon them to the Secretary in conjunction with the Heads of the Allied sections forming the permanent organisation.

(6) It was decided that the Secretary should draft an announcement for publication outlining the functions of the Council to submit to the first meeting of the Council. This announcement should follow generally the form of the announcement made in connection with the establishment of the Naval Allied Council.

(7) *The Appointment of Ministers on the Council.*

Signor Crespi announced that he understood that he himself and Signor Bianchi would be the Italian Ministers, and Mr. Crosby announced that Mr. Stevens had been designated by the American Government as their representative. As France had already designated M. Clementel and M. Loucheur and Great Britain Lord Robert Cecil and Sir Joseph Maclay, this completed the representation upon the Council.

(8) *Date of the next Meeting.*

It was decided that the first meeting of the Council itself should be convened for the nearest convenient date to March 1st.

VI.

MINUTES OF SESSIONS OF COUNCIL AND
REPORTS OF ACTION OF EXECUTIVE.

[As approved by the Council.—April 23, 1918.]

ALLIED MARITIME TRANSPORT COUNCIL

Minutes of First Session at Lancaster House, London.

March 11—14, 1918.

Present:

Members of the Council—

Lord Robert Cecil (*in the Chair*).
 M. Loucheur, } France.
 M. Clémentel, }
 Signor Crespi, } Italy.
 Onorevole Salvatore Orlando, }
 Hon. Raymond B. Stevens, United States.
 Sir Joseph Maclay, Bart., Great Britain.

Mr. J. A. Salter, *Secretary to the Council*.

There also attended, with the representatives of the respective countries either throughout the discussion or for the discussion of particular subjects:—

France—

M. Claveille, M. Vilgrain, M. de Fleuriau, M. J. Monnet, M. de Lubersac,
 M. Revillon, M. du Halgouet, M. Kahn, M. Pilliard, M. Charpentier,
 M. Serruys, M. Paysan, Capt. Blétry, M. Mantoux.

Italy—

General Dal'Olio, Signor Bianchi, Signor Berrini, Professor Attolico,
 Lieutenant Farina.

United States of America—

Mr. Rublee, Commander McBride, Commander Foley, Mr. Dow, Mr.
 Shearman, Mr. D. W. Morrow, Mr. Field, Mr. Greene, Mr. Dutton.

Great Britain—

General Nash, Sir Alan Anderson, Mr. John Anderson, Mr. C. Hipwood,
 Sir E. Wyldbore Smith, Colonel Young, Captain Clement Jones,
 Mr. Harwood, Mr. Chapman.

It will be convenient, after a statement of the general time-tabled session, to give the results of the Council's discussions under the different subjects without following the exact chronological sequence as they passed from one subject to another.

Time Table of Session.

Monday, March 11.

Morning.—Minutes of the Conference of the 15th February. Name, constitution, and functions of the Council, and of their permanent organisation, press notice, general tonnage deficit, Italian coal.

Afternoon.—Supply of English coal to France, Dutch tonnage.

Tuesday, March 12.

Morning.—Constitution of the Council, press notice, Dutch tonnage, tanker and refrigerator tonnage.

Afternoon.—General tonnage deficit, Italian and French coal, Allied ship-building, War risks insurance, neutral tonnage.

Wednesday, March 13.

Afternoon.—Dutch tonnage, war risks insurance, supply of coal to France and Italy.

Evening.—Report to Supreme War Council as to Dutch tonnage in relation to American military requirements.

Thursday, March 14.

Morning.—Coal to Italy and France.

THE Chairman welcomed the representatives of the different Allied countries, and explained the circumstances in which the Council had been created in accordance with the decisions of the Paris Conference of December 1917.

The minutes of the preliminary Conference of representatives of the four countries at the Foreign Office on the 15th February, 1918, were read and accepted as correct, and the specific questions dealt with in those minutes were discussed with the following results:—

1. *Name of Council.*

The Council accepted the proposal that the name of the Council should be "*The Allied Maritime Transport Council.*"

2. *The statement of the Functions and Scope of the Council.*

While not dissenting from the description of the functions of the Council proposed at the Conference of the 15th February, as shown in the minutes (appendix No. 1, paragraph 4 (b)), M. Clémentel suggested to the Council that it was undesirable that any formal statement should be adopted in replacement of the resolutions of the Paris Conference. He proposed that those resolutions should remain the basis of the Council's work. The Council concurred in this view.

Sir Joseph Maclay said he wished to make it clear that he understood the statement in the Paris Conference decision that "each nation shall manage and supervise the tonnage under its control" as meaning the "tonnage from time to time under its control," and not as meaning that the present quantity or proportion of tonnage in an Ally's service would be maintained under its control. It was agreed that this was the correct interpretation.

3. *Press Notice.*

At the same time the Council approved the publication of the press notice (appendix No. 2) describing the functions of the Council.

4. *Arrangements as to Chairman.*

After some discussion as to the alternative methods of electing a permanent chairman or of the chair rotating between the representatives of the different countries, the Council adopted the proposal of the Conference (appendix No. 1, paragraph 4 (c)), viz., that the senior Minister of the country in which a meeting of the Council was held should preside at that meeting.

5. *The Appointment of a Secretary.*

The Council appointed Mr. J. A. Salter as Secretary to the Council.

6. *Provision of the Executive Machinery and Permanent Staff of the Council.*

The Council decided that in accordance with the proposal of the Conference (appendix No. 1, paragraph 4 (d)) the permanent organisation should be in four Divisions—American, French, Italian, and British—the Secretary of the Council being the head of the British Division and responsible for convening and presiding over meetings of the heads of the other Divisions and for arranging with them for the preparation of information, &c., to be made upon identical lines. It was decided that the four Divisions meeting in this way should draw up an agreed statement of the

problems requiring to be settled by decisions of the Council itself, and should attempt to suggest alternative decisions which would suffice to solve these problems.

The above six items were the subject of proposals by the Conference of the 15th February.

The following items, which had not been discussed at that Conference, were also dealt with by the Council:—

7. Consideration of Provisional Balance Sheet of Import Requirements and Carrying Power of Tonnage Available.

Forms had been circulated (see appendix No. 3) showing in detail the import requirements of each of the Allied countries, and the tonnage under their control available to meet them. The Chairman pointed out that these statements were at present incomplete. No figures in a sufficiently final form for inclusion were available for America, and the Italian information was also incomplete. Moreover, though the British figures allowed for a reduction already made in British requirements of 4,000,000 tons as compared with 1917, a similar revision had not been made in the other programmes, and doubtless further examination would show some possibilities of reduction. On the tonnage side he pointed out that no allowance had been made for the carrying power of any additional neutral vessels (*e.g.*, Dutch and Swedish) or interned vessels (*e.g.*, German vessels now interned in Chile). For the moment the estimates could only be used to give the Council a general indication of the scope of the deficit which they would have later to deal with, this deficit, subject to the qualifications mentioned above, being equivalent to a deficit of 10,000,000 tons of imports into the three European Allied countries from sources of an average distance, or a deficit of 2,200,000 tons deadweight tonnage continuously employed throughout the year.

M. Loucheur called attention to the fact that in the tonnage statement vessels under 1,600 gross tons had been excluded, and this gave a somewhat false impression, particularly in relation to the carriage of French coal. He also pointed out that considerable additional information had been furnished since the preparation of the forms, and it would, perhaps, be possible to give the Council a closer idea of the actual deficit. It was decided to refer these two questions to a committee of officials to report upon the following day. A committee was appointed accordingly, and their report is given in appendix 4. They recommended in effect that the smaller tonnage should be included in the forms, but distinguished from the larger tonnage. They also reported that it was not practicable to arrive at a closer estimate of the general deficit without several weeks' work, and recommended the Council to accept the present figure provisionally as the best estimate possible at the time. The Council accepted both recommendations, and instructed the Secretary to arrange for the forms to be prepared accordingly for the use of the Council at their next meeting.

8. Supply of Coal to Italy and France.

Lord Robert Cecil reported that the previous Conference of representatives of France, Italy, and Great Britain had left the question of the supply of coal to Italy in the following position.

It had been agreed that the supply of 600,000 tons of coal a month to Italy was the absolute minimum necessary to meet her requirements. It had also been agreed that it was essential that the maximum proportion of this quantity should go in whole or in part by rail in order to save the strain upon tonnage and the risk involved in the long sea passage from the United Kingdom to Italy. With this object, and having regard to the probable maximum transporting capacity by rail, the following provisional monthly programme had been recommended:—

- 150,000 tons of British coal to go by long sea route from the United Kingdom to Italy.
- 100,000 tons of British coal to be shipped to Blaye, and to proceed thence either by rail all the way or by rail to Marseilles or other South French port and thence by short sea route to Italy.
- 240,000 tons of French coal to be railed from French southern mines to Italy or to Marseilles or other French port for short sea shipment.
- 110,000 tons of British coal to be sent to Rochefort or the Gironde to be railed thence through France to Italy or to South France for the short sea route.

Of the total quantity of 450,000 tons proceeding under the above scheme in whole or in part by rail, it was contemplated that 270,000 tons would go by rail all the way to Italy, and that 180,000 tons would be shipped from Marseilles or other South French ports.

The Council at once agreed—

- (a.) That 600,000 tons per month represented the absolute minimum quantity it was necessary to send to Italy, and
- (b.) That the maximum quantity should be sent in whole or in part by rail, and that the quantity to be sent by long sea route should if possible not exceed 150,000 tons allowed for in the above plan.

It was, however, pointed out that economy in tonnage would be effected, and a smaller strain on railway transport involved if (apart from the 150,000 by long sea route and the 100,000 *viâ* Blaye) the whole of the remaining 350,000 tons were French coal, the vessels contemplated as assignable for the conveyance of the 110,000 tons to Rochefort and the Gironde being used to compensate France for the supply of the extra quantity of French coal.

With agreement so far reached the Council were faced with the following problems:—

- (a.) Whether the railway facilities were, or could be made, sufficient to guarantee a monthly supply of 350,000 tons of French coal in addition to 100,000 tons of British coal *viâ* Blaye—270,000 tons to go by rail to Italy, and 180,000 tons to Italy by short sea route.
- (b.) What, if any, arrangements it was necessary to make to increase the importation of coal into France in order to replace 350,000 tons to be supplied by her to Italy, and
- (c.) How the tonnage was to be arranged for—
 - (i.) Shipment to Italy by long sea route;
 - (ii.) Shipment to Blaye;
 - (iii.) Short sea shipment from South France to Italy; and
 - (iv.) The importation of any extra coal into France.

With regard to (a), *i.e.*, the railway facilities, the Council asked M. Claveille, Signor Bianchi, and General Nash to consider the question and report to them. Their report is attached (appendix 8). It was understood from M. Claveille that the 450,000 tons could be transported in the immediate future in accordance with the above plan, but that in view of the assignation of some 11,000 waggons to the American army, the probability of their requirements increasing, and the fact that the Americans had not so far been able to provide tonnage to import the considerable number of waggons awaiting shipment in America, together with the consequences of the Italian campaign, it would be necessary to supplement the number of waggons in France by special measures. This need not, and could not, however, affect the question for the next month or two.

With regard to (b), the Council decided that, in view of the serious statements by M. Loucheur and M. Clémentel, supported by General Nash, as to the immediate importance of maintaining the strategic coal reserves in France, the supply to Italy of 350,000 tons of French coal in the ensuing month should be replaced by an equivalent importation extended over a somewhat longer period.

With regard to (c), the question of the provision of tonnage, the Council directed a committee of shipping representatives of the different countries to report as to the method in which tonnage should be found to replace the 350,000 tons of French coal to be supplied to Italy. The final report of this Committee is attached (No. 5). It was generally to the effect that the British tonnage previously destined to carry the 110,000 tons of coal to Rochefort and the Gironde for Italy could be used to ship to nearer ports in France in the 6 weeks, ending about the 1st May, about 150,000 tons. The shipment of the remaining 200,000 tons in Atlantic vessels proceeding to France with a coal cargo before going across the Atlantic would, they estimated, involve a loss of imports to the Allies of about 70,000 tons from the United States.

It was decided that so far as possible any Dutch tonnage that could be diverted into Allied import service should be utilised to compensate for the loss involved in the execution of the above programme.

The Italian representatives pointed out that while the above programme contemplated the supply of 600,000 tons a month no less than 350,000 tons of this

was French coal, which was of lower calorific quality than the British, and they also stated that they must emphasise the fact that their real minimum requirements were not 600,000 but 690,000 tons a month. In this connection General Dal'Olio made a statement as to the Italian position, which is attached (appendix No. 7).

M. Loucheur presented a statement (attached, appendix No. 6) to the effect that France would be responsible for delivering 350,000 tons of the best quality French coal between the 15th March and the 15th April, on the understanding that an equivalent quantity (with any adjustment necessary in view of difference in quality) should be supplied to France in replacement, and arranging for—

- (a.) A Franco-Italian Committee in Paris to watch the actual supply of French coal day by day, and to inform the Secretary of the Council; and
- (b.) A further meeting of experts in London before the 3rd April to prepare proposals for the supplies after the 15th April next.

It was also agreed that the respective Governments should communicate with their Ministers at Berne with a view to securing the consent of the Swiss Government to the transit of a quantity not exceeding 90,000 tons a month viâ the Simplon on the specific guarantee that the whole of this quantity would be used for civilian purposes.

The suggestion was made that some reduction in the quantity of tonnage estimated to be required for lifting 180,000 tons a month from South France to Italy (140,000 tons deadweight continually employed) could be effected if—

- (a.) Arrangements were made to secure the necessary berths, and rapid dispatch at both the French and Italian receiving ports; and
- (b.) If the coal could all be delivered at Genoa instead of being despatched, as it was in some cases, to the southern ports (Naples and Leghorn, &c.).

With regard to (a), the French and Italian representatives undertook to make the necessary arrangements. With regard to (b), it was suggested that South Italy could be compensated for a larger supply of the French coal to North Italy by the allocation of a larger proportion of the 150,000 tons going by the long sea route to the south instead of to the north. Signor Bianchi pointed out that the difficulty about this proposal was that the coal proceeding from South France, with the exception of the 100,000 tons going by Blaye, would be French and not British coal, and it was essential that North Italy should have a large proportion of British coal for services for which French coal was not suitable. He promised, however, to investigate the question further.

It was agreed that it was essential that the French coal supply to Italy should be of the best possible quality, and also that improvement should be made if possible in the quality of coal supplied by Great Britain to France, as it was clearly desirable that, so far as possible, coal of inferior quality should be consumed in localities near its source of production, and that the coal requiring to be transported, whether by sea or rail, should have the maximum calorific value for the bulk and weight transported.

Summary of Decisions.

The Council decided that the following programme should be put into effect:—

- (a.) France undertakes to supply 350,000 tons of French coal to Italy in the month from the 15th March to the 15th April.
- (b.) The Allies to ship 350,000 tons of British coal to France (mainly Dunkirk and Rouen) in vessels not at the time in the French coal trade, and as nearly as possible within six weeks of the 15th March.
- (c.) The French coal supply to be of a quality equal to that of the British coal, an adjustment, whether by way of an increase in the quantity of French coal supplied or a reduction in the compensating coal, to be made to the extent to which it proved inferior.
- (d.) So far as possible the compensating coal so to be supplied to France to be shipped in small vessels or other vessels not in the Atlantic import service, and Great Britain to endeavour to ship 150,000 tons in tonnage of this kind. The remainder to be supplied by the diversion of large vessels before proceeding across the Atlantic, vessels being chosen from among those in the service of the different Allies.

- (e.) The above arrangement was conditional upon Dutch tonnage in American ports being quickly available to compensate for the loss of Atlantic imports through diversion, and a recommendation to be made to the Supreme War Council that half the Dutch tonnage in those ports should be allotted to meet such imports (see No. 9 (b)).
- (f.) The permanent organisation of the Council to work out a co-operative Allied plan for the supply of the necessary tonnage for the shipment of the other coal to Italy, viz., from the United Kingdom to Italy, United Kingdom to Blaye, and from South France to Italy, the arrangements as regards the first two routes being as before the primary responsibility of Great Britain and Italy, but the other Allies co-operating particularly in regard to the third route.
- (g.) A committee to be composed of representatives of the Italian Government, of the French Ministry of Public Works and the French Ministry of Munitions to be appointed and be responsible for watching at Paris the actual expedition of coal to Italy day by day, and to keep the Secretary of the Council informed of the quantities actually despatched.
- (h.) A meeting of officials representing the four countries to be held in London before the 3rd April next, to prepare a programme for the supply of coal after the 15th April.
- (i.) A communication to be made to the Swiss Government as to the use of the Simplon route (see above).

The further consideration of the French coal supply (after the 15th April) was to take into account further information which was being obtained as to the exact extent of consumption and requirements, with due regard to the possible economies mentioned by General Nash, viz., better working of the vessels in the summer, decreased summer civilian consumption, increase in French production (which M. Loucheur stated might possibly be raised by 2,000—3,000 tons a day), and any advantage that might be received by an improvement in the quality of the British coal shipped to France, and, on the other hand, to any possible effects of a German offensive.

9. Dutch Tonnage.

(a.) *Negotiations for the Acquisition of Dutch Tonnage.*

The Chairman outlined the negotiations up to date with reference to the acquisition of surplus Dutch tonnage, amounting to about 800,000 tons deadweight. He explained that the *modus vivendi*, which aimed at employing the 4/500,000 tons deadweight lying idle in American ports pending settlement of negotiations, had broken down, owing to pressure exercised by the Germans which made it impossible for the Dutch to send out from Holland a ship for each ship which arrived carrying cargo for the Belgian Relief from America to Holland. It was necessary to come to an immediate decision, because it was still open to the Dutch to accept the agreement proposed to them on the 4th January, which included a provision that the vessels should be kept out of the war zone. At that date it would have been possible to substitute the Dutch tonnage handed over for other tonnage now being used outside the danger zone, but that was a lengthy process, and the need for obtaining Dutch tonnage was now urgent. He stated that in these circumstances the British Government, after consultation with representatives of the different Allies, had made a communication through their Minister at The Hague to the following effect (appendix No. 10):—

- (1.) The British Government would be prepared to recommend to the Allies that if the Dutch Government would agree to allow their vessels to be used immediately without restrictions in the danger zone, the Allies will undertake at the end of the war to replace any Dutch vessel lost by war risk in the danger zone as now determined.
- (2.) The Allies would undertake before the 15th April to place 50,000 tons of wheat at the disposal of the Dutch Government in the United States ports, and another 50,000 tons later on at a South American Atlantic port.

An answer being requested from the Dutch Government by the 18th March.

The representatives of the different countries expressed their approval of this action.

M. Clémentel then raised the question as to the action to be taken if the Dutch Government were unwilling to come to an agreement, and the Allied Governments had, therefore, to proceed to requisition. He pointed out that they would very likely be forced to adopt this attitude through German pressure, and personally he was strongly of opinion that the terms conceded in that event should be substantially as generous as if the agreement proposed had been effected, in view, particularly, of the necessity of safeguarding the feeding of the Belgian and French populations in Belgium and Northern France. The Council generally agreed in this view.

(b.) Allocation of Dutch Tonnage.

The Council discussed the question of the immediate allocation of the Dutch vessels when acquired, particularly those now in American ports, and, therefore, immediately available for loading Allied imports.

Mr. Stevens pointed out that the American military programme for 1918, recently adopted by the Supreme War Council, and the requirements for necessary imports into America during 1918, would take all American tonnage now available, including any share America might obtain of Dutch and other neutral tonnage, and also including new construction, at least up to the 1st July. He further stated that the estimate of necessary imports for 1918 had been greatly reduced as compared with 1917. M. Clémentel said he wished to express M. Clemenceau's very strong opinion as to the extreme importance of not interfering with the transport of the further American troops decided upon by the Supreme War Council. After some discussion it was decided to recommend to the Supreme War Council that in view of the very serious deficit of Allied carrying power in relation to Allied requirements, and with particular reference to the loss of American imports which must result from the diversion of Atlantic vessels to France under the programme arranged above, at least half of the Dutch tonnage now in American ports should be allotted at once for one voyage for Allied imports (see appendix No. 9).

10. Relation of Council and its Staff to the various Executives, and their authority with regard to Oil Fuel and Tank Tonnage and Meat and Refrigerated Tonnage.

The Italian representatives raised the question of whether refrigerator and tank tonnage came within the scope of the Council's functions.

The Council agreed that these special types of tonnage were as much within the scope of their authority as other tonnage, and that it was as much their duty, therefore, to consider import programmes of meat and oil as of other commodities.

The exact way in which they would exercise their authority needed special consideration in conjunction with the Executives and Departments now dealing with these commodities. It was recognised that oil fuel and meat presented certain special features, and that the scope and functions of the executives or other bodies dealing with various classes of imports, and their relation to the Council and its staff, must vary to some extent with the particular circumstances of each class of importations.

The Secretary was instructed to prepare, in conjunction with the heads of the several Divisions of the permanent organisation, a comprehensive report as to the relations of the Council and its staff to the several Executives for consideration by the Council at its next meeting. This report was to be written after consultation with representatives of the various Executives, and of the Departments concerned with commodities for which Executives are not yet in existence, and to include proposals both as to the division of work between the staff of the Council and the Executives, and as to steps, if any, requiring to be taken to secure the establishment of new executives or alterations in the functions of existing ones.

The French representatives had given notice that they wished to discuss the general question of the relation of the Council to the Executives, but M. Clémentel announced that he would prefer that the discussion of this subject should be deferred till the next session of the Council.

11. Shipbuilding in Allied Countries.

M. Loucheur made a suggestion as to the utilisation in French shipyards of any surplus steel, which was not being immediately used for either British or American

shipbuilding, in order to increase the total Allied output of tonnage. Allied co-operation as regards the actual building was also suggested.

Sir Alan Anderson stated that there was at present no probability of any such surplus as regards the British shipbuilding programme, but machinery was being set up in Paris which would enable such a suggestion to be carried out should it prove possible later on. It was suggested that skilled French and Italian labour might be transferred to United Kingdom shipyards. This, however, was considered by Signor Orlando to be impracticable.

The position appeared to be that, while there were obvious advantages in distributing the actual shipbuilding as much as possible between the four Allies, to lessen the danger of delay from strikes, accident, &c., the difficulties of tonnage and danger from submarines made it advisable to move shipbuilding materials, more particularly steel, as little as possible.

It was understood that a Committee of the Naval Council was dealing with the whole question of supplies and their proper allocation, and it was decided to leave the whole matter to them.

12. *War Risk Insurance.*

M. Loucheur made a suggestion that the very high cost of freight and insurance might be reduced if the Governments concerned could jointly undertake the war insurance risks. Such an arrangement would, moreover, benefit the exchange.

The matter was referred to a Committee. The sense of their report (see appendix 11) was that the matter, being almost a purely financial one, it should be referred to the Inter-Allied Finance Council, and if they approved it should be investigated by a small Allied technical Committee.

13. *Date of Next Meeting.*

It was decided that the next meeting of the Council would probably be in about a month or five weeks' time, and that the main duty of the Secretariat before that date would be to examine the import programmes in view of the drastic reductions necessitated by the tonnage deficit.

(Signed) CLÉMENTEL.

Paris, April 23, 1918.

Appendix No. 1.

Minutes of Meeting held at the Foreign Office on the 15th February, 1918, in connection with the establishment of the Inter-Allied Shipping Organisation decided upon at the Paris Conference of December 1917.

1. A Conference of representatives of France, Italy, the United States of America, and Great Britain met at the Foreign Office on the 15th February, 1918, at the invitation of Lord Robert Cecil, to consider the establishment of the Inter-Allied Shipping Organisation decided upon at the Paris Conference in December 1917.

There were present :—

M. de Fleuriau,	} France.
M. Monnet,	
Signor Crespi,	} Italy.
Professor Attolico,	
Mr. Crosby, United States of America (at request of Ambassador Page).	
Lord Robert Cecil,	} Great Britain.
Mr. Salter,	

2. Lord Robert Cecil, who took the chair, explained that he had invited the Conference in order to arrange for the first meeting of the new Council and for the discussion of certain preliminary questions which it was desirable to agree upon before the Council itself met, and in particular to make provisional arrangements for the staff required in connection with the work of the Council.

3. Signor Crespi raised the preliminary question as to the meaning and effect of a resolution adopted by the Supreme War Council since the Paris Conference as to the establishment of a Committee to co-ordinate tonnage and supplies. It was, however, considered that this resolution should not be interpreted in such a way as to be inconsistent with the establishment of a new Council in the form contemplated by the Paris Conference.

4. The following questions were considered, and provisional decisions arrived at.

(a.) *The Adoption of the Name of the New Organisation.*

The name "Allied Maritime Transport Council" was decided upon. Mr Crosby stated that he must point out that the United States of America were not technically an Ally, and he desired this remark to be recorded in the minutes. He concurred, however, in the adoption of the name for the Council.

(b.) *Functions and Scope.*

The functions of the new Council and the scope of its duties were discussed. Mr. Crosby raised a preliminary question as to the relation between the new Council and the one over which he presided as to the allocation of finance. He pointed out that the two limiting factors to imports were tonnage and finance, and that unless satisfactory co-ordination was effected between the two bodies there was some danger that one might deal with programmes of imports without the knowledge that the other might have been dealing with the same programmes or be about to do so in a conflicting manner. It was pointed out that tonnage was perhaps more likely to be the more serious and more absolute limiting factor, but it was realised that close relations between the two bodies would be essential. This would be effected partly through the different Executive Committees and partly by the secretaries of the two bodies keeping in close touch.

It was agreed to recommend the following to the Council as a convenient description of their functions and duties, though, as M. de Fleuriau pointed out, the wording of the report of the Paris Conference must, in case of doubt, remain as the binding document at least until the meeting of the Council itself:—

"The purpose of the Allied Maritime Transport Council is to watch over the general conduct of Allied transport, and while leaving each nation responsible for the management and supervision of the tonnage under its own control, to secure the necessary exchange of information and co-ordination in policy and effort on the part of the four Governments of France, Italy, the United States of America, and Great Britain in adjusting their programmes of imports to the carrying capacity of the available tonnage (having regard to naval and military requirements), and in making the most advantageous allocation and disposition of the tonnage under their control in accordance with the urgency of war needs.

"For this purpose the Council will obtain through its permanent staff the programmes of import requirements drawn up by the Inter-Allied Executive Committees which are established or to be established on the model of the Wheat Executive (with such modifications as may be necessary in the different cases) for each of the main classes of essential imports, and take these as the basis. It will also be responsible for obtaining through its permanent staff the fullest information as to the tonnage available to the respective Governments, for examining the imports programmes furnished by the Executives in relation to the carrying power of the available tonnage, for ascertaining the extent of any deficit, and for considering the means whereby such a deficit may be met, whether by a further reduction in the programmes of imports or by the acquisition, if practicable, of further tonnage for importing work. If the Council agrees that reductions in any of the different programmes of imports to a defined extent are necessary, the Ministers will so report to their respective Governments, with a view to secure that the necessary decisions and action are taken in their respective countries and the necessary modifications are made in the programmes produced by the several Inter-Allied Executive Committees."

(c.) *Arrangements as to a Chairman.*

It was agreed that the most convenient arrangement would be the usual one that the senior Minister of the country in which a meeting of the Council was held should preside at that meeting, no permanent chairman being appointed.

(d.) *The provision of the necessary Executive Machinery and such Staff as the Council may require, and the appointment of a Secretary.*

It was agreed that it would probably be most convenient for the permanent organisation to be in four sections—French, Italian, American, and British—and that the Secretary of the Council should be the head of one of these sections, and should be responsible for convening the heads of the other sections, arranging with them for the preparation of information to be made upon identical lines; and that the four sections meeting in this way should draw up an agreed statement of the problem requiring to be settled by the decisions of the Council itself, and should attempt to suggest alternative decisions which would suffice to solve that problem.

It was pointed out that this arrangement, while doubtless requiring the existing organisations of the different countries to be strengthened in certain cases by the addition of extra staff, would reduce such additional appointments to the smallest dimensions, and would avoid the establishment of a large new organisation duplicating and overlapping with those which already exist.

Mr. J. A. Salter, on the proposal of M. de Fleuriau, was asked to undertake the duties of secretary, this arrangement being provisional and subject to confirmation by the Council at its first meeting.

(e.) *Printed Forms for Preliminary Work.*

The printed forms prepared for the preliminary work necessary to present the problem requiring to be dealt with by the Council were circulated. It was agreed to leave these forms and the presentment of the information upon them to the Secretary in conjunction with the heads of the Allied sections forming the permanent organisation.

(f.) *Secretary to Prepare Draft.*

It was decided that the Secretary should draft an announcement for publication outlining the functions of the Council to submit to the first meeting of the Council. This announcement should follow generally the form of the announcement made in connection with the establishment of the Naval Allied Council.

(g.) *The Appointment of Ministers on the Council.*

Signor Crespi announced that he understood that he himself and Signor Bianchi would be the Italian Ministers, and Mr. Crosby announced that Mr. Stevens had been designated by the American Government as their representative. As France had already designated M. Clémentel and M. Loucheur, and Great Britain Lord Robert Cecil and Sir Joseph Maclay, this completed the representation upon the Council.

(h.) *Date of the next Meeting.*

It was decided that the first meeting of the Council itself should be convened for the nearest convenient date to the 1st March.

Appendix No. 2.

PRESS NOTICE.

Allied Maritime Transport Council.

The Foreign Office and the Ministry of Shipping make the following announcement:—

At the Paris Conference of December last it was decided to create an Allied Maritime Transport Council, consisting of two Ministers each of France, Italy, and Great Britain and a representative of the United States of America, to supervise the general conduct of Allied maritime transport.

Since this decision was reached the necessary preparatory work has been proceeding, and the following representatives, appointed by their respective Govern-

ments, have now met for the first formal meetings of the Council, which commenced at Lancaster House, London, on the 11th March, and are still proceeding:—

France—

M. Clémentel, Minister of Commerce and Industry.
M. Loucheur, Minister of Munitions.

Italy—

*Signor Crespi, Minister of Supplies.
*The On. Salvatore Orlando, Commissioner for Mercantile Marine Construction.

United States of America—

The Hon. Raymond B. Stevens, Vice-Chairman of the United States Shipping Board.

Great Britain—

Rt. Hon. Lord Robert Cecil, K.C., M.P., Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (*Chairman*).

Rt. Hon. Sir Joseph P. Maclay, Bart., Shipping Controller.

Secretary to the Council: Mr. J. A. Salter.

Address: Lancaster House, London, S.W. 1.

The following representatives were also in attendance:—

Accompanying the French Delegates—

M. Claveille, Minister of Public Works;
M. Vilgrain, Under-Secretary of State for Supplies;
and Messieurs Monnet, Blétry, Charpentier, Kahn, Pilliard, Sarruys, and Ulrich.

Accompanying the Italian Delegates—

Signor Bianchi, Minister of Transport;
General Dall'Olio, Minister of Munitions;
Prince Borghese, Italian Embassy;
and Professor Attolico, C.B.; M. Berino; Colonel Campolmi; Lieutenant Farina; and Engineer Mosca.

Accompanying the American Delegate—

Messrs. G. Rublee, L. H. Shearman, D. W. Morrow, J. D. Greene, J. A. Field, L. H. Dow, and G. D. Dutton, and Commanders L. B. McBride U.S.N., and Paul Foley, U.S.N.

The purpose of the Council is to supervise the general conduct of Allied transport, in order to obtain the most effective use of tonnage for the prosecution of the war, while leaving each nation responsible for the management of the tonnage under its own control.

With this object the Council will secure the necessary exchange of information, and will co-ordinate the policy and action of the four Governments of France, Italy, United States of America, and Great Britain, in adjusting their programmes of imports to the carrying capacity of the available Allied tonnage (having regard to naval and military requirements), and in making the most advantageous allocation and disposition of such tonnage in accordance with the urgency of war needs.

The Council will have at its service a permanent organisation consisting of four sections (French, Italian, American, and British); the head of the British Section being Secretary to the Council. The Council will obtain through its permanent staff the programmes of import requirements for each of the main classes of essential imports, and full statements as to the tonnage available to the respective Governments. It will examine the import programmes in relation to the carrying power of the available tonnage in order to ascertain the extent of any deficit, and will consider the means whereby such a deficit may be met, whether by a reduction in the import programmes, by the acquisition, if practicable, of further tonnage for importing work, or by the more economical and co-operative use of the tonnage already available.

* These representatives attended at the first meeting. The formal appointments will be announced later.

The Members of the Council will report to their respective Governments, with a view to securing that the decisions and action required to give effect to any recommendations made by the Council are taken in their respective countries.

Appendix No. 3.

Statistical Forms Circulated to the Council.

Forms 1 and 2 were distributed to the heads of the four national sections; Forms 3 to 6 were circulated to all representatives attending the Council meetings. Form 6 alone is now reproduced, but short notes regarding the other forms are given below :—

Form 1.—Detailed statement of actual imports into France, Italy, and Great Britain respectively during 1917 compared with the present programmes for 1918.

Form 2.—Summarising the statistics in Form 1 under groups of supplying countries, each group consisting of countries about equidistant from the importing countries.

Form 3.—Setting out the aggregate imports to be made during 1918 from each group of countries, and calculating the amount of tonnage required.

Form 4.—Showing the allocation of the tonnage in the service of France, Italy, and Great Britain respectively as on the 1st January, 1918.

Form 5.—Ditto for the mean tonnage expected to be available for the import work of each country during 1918, due allowance having been made for expected new building on the one hand and losses by enemy and other action on the other hand.

Form 6 (reproduced below).—Setting out in the form of a balance-sheet the tonnage required for the present import programmes (see Form 3), as against the mean tonnage available during the year (see Form 6), and thence estimating the tonnage deficit.

ALLIED MARITIME TRANSPORT COUNCIL.

FORM 6.

STATEMENT showing Tonnage Required and Tonnage Available for Import Work during 1918.

Tonnage Required, as shown by Form 3.	G.T.	D.W. (1,000 tons.)	Tonnage Available, as shown by Form 5.	G.T.	D.W. (1,000 tons.)
France		3,815	United Kingdom		6,975
Italy		3,300	France		
United States of America			Italy		
United Kingdom		8,240	Allowance for tonnage assistance to France, Italy, and the United Kingdom not included above	(b)	6,180
Other Allies			Difference being deficit of tonnage		2,200
		15,355			15,355

It has not been possible to obtain particulars of French tonnage in sufficient detail and in time to admit of proper examination before the meeting. The Italian tonnage particulars have not yet been presented in a form which enables them to be set out on Forms 4 and 5, and it has been thought better to await the further information from Italy before attempting to do this, and meanwhile to include both Italian and French tonnage with the estimate of the amount of importing work done for the European Allies by vessels not included above—see (b). A comprehensive estimate of the three items included in (b) has been made on the basis of the information at present available to the Ministry of Shipping. It requires further examination, but the total deficit may be taken as approximately correct.

NOTE.—The general effect of the above statement is that the tonnage estimated as available for the service of the three European Allies (excluding any neutral or internerd tonnage idle at the beginning of the year, which may be brought into employment, and any assistance from America) was 2,200,000 tons d.w. less than the amount required to meet the three countries' stated import requirements, and that this is equivalent to a shortage of 10,000,000 tons on these requirements. While this estimate may be taken as approximately correct for the total deficit, the distribution of the deficit between the three countries as shown above must be taken as quite provisional, and of course the import programmes on which the deficit is calculated are subject to considerable revision.

Appendix No. 4.

Meeting on Monday, March 11, 1918, of Committee appointed by the Allied Maritime Transport Council to consider form of presentment of Allied Tonnage available and required.

Present:

M. Monnet,	}	France.
M. Revillon,		
Captain Blétry,		
Captain Pilliard,		
M. Seitert,	}	Italy.
Lieutenant Farina,		
M. Mosca,		
Professor Field, United States of America	}	Great Britain.
Mr. Palin Elderton,		
Mr. Henry,		
Mr. Browett,		

The Committee agreed—

1. That the statements of "tonnage required" in the various groups, as shown on Form 3, should, where necessary, be amplified to show the total tonnage required, whether ocean-going or not, so that the Council might have before them a tonnage statement showing the total tonnage of all sizes required to convey the imports to the various countries.

2. That as a result of paragraph 1, the "tonnage available" on the other side of the account will require to include for each country a statement of the vessels of less than 1,600 gross tonnage and their employment.

3. That pending a further investigation of the tonnage allowance to be made in the case of each country in respect of the importing work performed by tonnage neither owned nor controlled by that country, it is not possible to present the tonnage problem to the Council in a more detailed manner than is done on Form 6, and that while certain modifications may be found to be necessary when the examination of the further French tonnage figures is finished, and the Italian and United States tonnage figures are available in such forms as to enable them to be embodied in the statements, the tonnage deficit of 2,200,000 tons deadweight, as estimated by the statisticians of the British Ministry of Shipping, may be taken by the Council as representing approximately the deficit of the three Allies—France, Italy, and the United Kingdom—this tonnage deficit, representing a deficit of about 10,000,000 tons of imports, as compared with the stated requirements of the three countries for 1918.

4. That while it may be possible to amend the British tonnage particulars in accordance with the decision in paragraph 1 in time for consideration at the present session of the Council, it will not be practicable to present the general tonnage problem in a more complete form on the present occasion, as the compilation of the various tonnage figures, and more particularly the investigation and agreement of the allowances to be made for importing work done by outside tonnage will require several weeks' work. As stated above, however, the final tonnage deficit, as shown on Form 6, may be taken by the Council as representing approximately the position with which the three Allies—France, Italy, and the United Kingdom—are faced in the year 1918.

Appendix No. 5.

ALLIED MARITIME TRANSPORT COUNCIL.

Meeting of Committee appointed by Council and held at British Ministry of Shipping on March 13, at 10 A.M.

The Committee considered the following memorandum referred to them by the Council:—

“ The Council had before them this afternoon the report of the Committee appointed to consider at what cost 150,000 tons deadweight could be found to give supplementary coal to France.

“ They desired the Committee to reassemble with a view to considering at what cost to other services a single supplementary supply of 350,000 tons of coal could be shipped to France (as far as possible to Dunkirk and Rouen) within some such period as 6 weeks from the present time; and, alternatively, at what lower cost this quantity could be shipped over a somewhat longer period.

“ The suggestion was made that the tonnage required for the Marseilles—Italy shipments might be somewhat reduced if all the coal went to Genoa and none to Naples and southern ports, this being rendered possible by the vessels which are proceeding via Gibraltar being sent to Naples instead of Genoa. It was pointed out by Signor Crespi that it was essential that North Italy should have a certain proportion of *English* coal (which might exceed the quantity being sent through Blaye). This side of the question will be examined on the arrival of Signor Bianchi, but, meantime, the Committee should have the point in mind.

“ M. Loucheur stated that in order to facilitate the use of trans-Atlantic vessels to take coal to France before proceeding across the Atlantic, the French Government would be prepared to make a sacrifice temporarily on the shipments of French steel from America.

“ The Council also decided, if practicable, to have a list of the vessels in the country (whether British, Allied, or neutral) which could be diverted if necessary in the above manner.”

The Committee reassembled accordingly.

Present:

Mr. Shearman,	}	United States of America.
Mr. Field,		
M. Monnet,		
M. Revillon,	}	France.
Captain Blétry,		
Captain Pilliard,		
Commander Michel Levy,	}	Italy.
Lieutenant Farina,		
Signor Mosca,		
Signor Galli,	}	Great Britain.
Mr. Hynard,		
Mr. Browett,		

It was agreed:—

1. That if the whole of the 350,000 tons of coal were shipped to France by trans-Atlantic tonnage, this would mean a delay of about 3 weeks to 350,000 tons deadweight of tonnage, which, in turn, would mean the loss (on the basis of a round voyage of about 75 days to the Northern Range) of about 110,000 tons of imports from North America. In other words, for every 3 tons of coal shipped to France by trans-Atlantic tonnage in this way, there would be a loss of 1 ton of imports from the States to the Allies.

It must be remembered, however, that this numerical loss does not in any way represent the whole of the cost to the Allies, inasmuch as diversions on this scale would entail very serious upsets to import programmes, and would inevitably involve such serious dislocation as to mean even greater losses of imports.

2. The United Kingdom representatives stated that, as a result of very drastic combing out of the coasting trade, it was hoped that tonnage would be available to carry to France during the next 6 weeks, to the 1st May, a supplementary supply of 150,000 tons of coal. This tonnage included the tonnage intended to carry 110,000 tons of coal to Rochefort and Gironde for Italy under the previous scheme, and it must be understood that the greater part of it can only be withdrawn temporarily from its own trades.

This would leave 200,000 tons (*i.e.*, 350,000 less 150,000) to complete the supplementary supply, and this would, on the basis indicated in paragraph 1, entail a loss of imports to the Allies of 70,000 tons from North America. It is for the Council to decide (1) whether this loss of imports can be faced, and (2), if so, in what proportions it should be borne by each country.

If it were practicable to maintain the above small tonnage in the French coal trade until the 1st June, it is estimated that it would carry a further 125,000 tons, or 275,000 tons altogether.

3. Lists of ocean-going vessels (*a*) in the United Kingdom ports, and (*b*) in French ports are now being prepared, and as soon as they are available will be examined to see which are the most suitable vessels to carry the balance of the supplementary supply of coal to France.

4. It is understood that there is a certain amount of tonnage trading between France and the United Kingdom which is in the general cargo trade outside special Government requirements, and may be capable to some extent of being diverted to the carriage of coal. The United Kingdom representatives undertook to examine this question at once.

The Italian Government representatives wished it to be clearly understood that notwithstanding any diversions of tonnage to effect this supplementary supply of coal to France, there should be no question that the supply of coal to Italy should reach the agreed figure of 600,000 tons of coal in the month (that is including the 350,000 tons of French coal).

Appendix No. 6.

Le nécessaire sera fait pour fournir à la France 350,000 tonnes de charbon anglais, en supplément des importations qui sont effectuées avec les moyens à sa disposition (y compris fournitures de l'Amirauté).

Cette fourniture devrait être progressive et en principe terminée le 15 avril, avec possibilité d'un retard de dix à quinze jours pour l'achèvement de la fourniture.

Une livraison de 350,000 tonnes de charbon sera faite par la France à l'Italie, échelonnée du 15 mars au 15 avril.

Le charbon proviendra des mines françaises du Sud-Est et sera de qualité équivalente à celle du charbon anglais; sinon, il y aura lieu à compensation. Il est de plus convenu que si une partie du charbon anglais est fournie aux ports de Bordeaux ou de Rochefort, les plus grands efforts seront faits par le Gouvernement français pour que le charbon anglais ainsi fourni soit transporté directement en Italie, sans pouvoir prendre, toutefois, d'engagement formel à ce sujet. Il va sans dire que les 100,000 tonnes environ de charbon qui sont actuellement transportées de Blaye vers l'Italie continueront à suivre cette voie.

Une réunion des experts des quatre nations aura lieu à Londres avant le 3 avril prochain pour arrêter les dispositions à appliquer à partir du 15 avril pour assurer la fourniture de charbon à l'Italie jusqu'au 30 juin prochain.

Un comité composé d'un représentant italien, d'un représentant du Ministère des Travaux publics français et d'un représentant du Ministère de l'Armement français suivra à Paris chaque jour les expéditions sur l'Italie et tiendra au courant le Secrétariat du Conseil allié des Transports maritimes.

(Signé) LOUCHEUR.

14 mars, 1918.

Pour réaliser le problème italien, il faut—

1. Assurer la fourniture directe de 150,000 tonnes par mois de la Grande-Bretagne à l'Italie.

2. Mettre 150,000 tonnes de bateaux en plus sur le trafic Angleterre—Rouen.
3. Mettre des wagons et des locomotives sur les transports charbons Italie—France (M. Claveille avec M. Bianchi).
4. Mieux employer le tonnage en ne transportant que des charbons de première qualité.

Appendix No. 7.

The Italian Minister of Transport wishes to make the following declaration:—

1. He prefers that the basis of the agreement for the supply of coal to Italy in a minimum quantity of 600,000 tons monthly to be increased as soon as possible to 690,000, should provide for the supply of 240,000 tons of French coal and 360,000 tons of English coal, as, for the needs of Italy, the English coal is more suitable than the French coal.
2. He declares that the Italian State Railways will do every effort in view of supplying the help of locomotives asked by France, to enable this country to carry through France the English coal bound for Italy, and will also take the necessary steps to comply with the request of M. Claveille, French Minister of Transport, for the exchange of railway trucks.
3. Should the coal supplied by the French mines not prove to give the same calories as the British coal, it will suit that the 240,000 tons of French coal will only correspond to 200,000 tons, and, therefore, instead of 600,000 tons of coal Italy would only get an equivalent of 560,000 tons.
4. That the programme so reduced is still subject to heavy reductions by inevitable difficulties of transport overland, through railway obstructions, and military transports.
5. That it is necessary for the above reasons to obtain passage through Switzerland of supplementary coal trains.
6. That on the basis of 600,000 tons, which by difference of quality might even be reduced to the equivalent of 540,000 tons, it is utterly impossible for Italy to feed her war industries and her already reduced railway system, and would, in effect, leave Italy in a dangerous situation.

The minimum quantity of British coal to be sent to Italy by the direct sea route must, therefore, be increased to 240,000 tons.

March 14, 1918.

Appendix No. 8.

Accord anglo-franco-italien au sujet des transports de charbons à faire par voie de fer en France à destination de l'Italie.

M. Claveille, Ministre des Travaux publics de France, expose tout d'abord que le Gouvernement français, se rendant compte des difficultés considérables que rencontre l'Italie pour ses approvisionnements de combustible, est d'accord avec le Gouvernement britannique pour remédier aussi complètement que possible à cette situation, et dans ce but il est décidé à faire transiter par la France une partie notable de ce charbon, malgré la gêne qui en résultera pour ses transports intérieurs.

M. Claveille rappelle qu'il a déjà indiqué la possibilité de faire transiter par la France 15,000 tonnes par jour, dont 9,000 tonnes seraient envoyées en chemin de fer en Italie, via Modane et Ventimille, et 6,000 tonnes seraient dirigées vers les ports de la Méditerranée (Marseille, Port-au-Bouc, Bône, St. Louis-au-Rhône, Cette et la Nouvelle) pour être transporté ensuite aux ports italiens par cabotage.

Il s'agit de se procurer le matériel roulant nécessaire.

A cet égard, M. Claveille fit observer qu'il était intervenu le 10 janvier, 1918, une entente ayant fait l'objet de la note ci-après:—

“ En réponse à la demande de matériel roulant qui a été adressée par M. Berini au Général Henderson, il fait remarquer qu'à la date du 1^{er} janvier, 1918,

la balance entre les wagons français se trouvant en Italie et les wagons italiens en France s'établissait par un excédent de 5,262 wagons français en Italie.

" On consent, pour venir en aide aux chemins de fer italiens à ce que, pour le moment, la balance entre le matériel français en Italie et le matériel italien en France continue à s'établir aux environs de 5,000 à 6,000 wagons en faveur des chemins de fer italiens.

" Tel est l'effort maximum qui peut être fait par les Gouvernements britannique et français, qui s'engagent d'ailleurs à hâter tous les moyens de rechargement des wagons destinés au ravitaillement de leurs armées en Italie.

" Il est entendu que si le programme de transport de charbons à destination de l'Italie est augmenté comme il en a été question le 9 janvier courant avec Sir Joseph Maclay, le matériel roulant et le personnel nécessaire pour faire face à cette augmentation seront fournis à la France et n'entreront pas en ligne de compte dans le chiffre ci-dessus."

Dans cet accord il était admis que, pour tenir compte des transports fait par l'Italie à destination ou en provenance de France et des transports de ravitaillement et autres nécessités pour l'entretien des armées britanniques et françaises opérant sur le front italien, l'échange des wagons se traduirait pour un bénéfice de 5,000 à 6,000 wagons en faveur de l'Italie. M. Claveille, voulant se placer dans le cas le plus favorable pour l'Italie, admet le chiffre de 6,000 wagons.

Le 1^{er} janvier, 1918, c'est-à-dire à peu près au moment où la note ci-dessus a été rédigée, le moyen des charbons italiens transités par la France s'élevait à 4,800 tonnes, se composant ainsi :—

Blaye-Bordeaux	3,000
Mine d'Alois	1,200
Mine de St. Etienne	600
Soit	4,800

ou 5,000 tonnes environ.

Aujourd'hui il s'agit de transporter 15,000 tonnes par jour, soit 10,000 tonnes supplémentaires. Avec ses wagons de 20 tonnes et une rotation moyen de six jours en France, ce transport exigera au moins 500×6 , soit 3,000 wagons de 20 tonnes, en ne tenant pas compte des wagons par cause de réparation.

Pour rester dans l'esprit de la note ci-dessus du 10 janvier dernier, le Gouvernement italien doit fournir les 3,000 wagons de 20 tonnes. Il est possible d'arriver à ce résultat en admettant que la balance de 6,000 wagons mentionnée dans cette note s'est réduite de 6,000 à 3,000 wagons, la moyenne étant faite par semaine. Bien entendu, avec cette condition il sera expressément convenu en outre que le Gouvernement italien restituera à la frontière unité pour unité des wagons houillers transportant le charbon en Italie.

La position des wagons étant ainsi réglée, il reste à examiner celle des locomotives et du personnel.

Pour les locomotives le Gouvernement italien a promis de fournir à la Compagnie P.L.M. 80 locomotives équipés. Cette compagnie ayant supporté la plus grande partie de l'effort demandé aux chemins de fer français, il convient de lui donner un secours nouveau en manière de traction. M. Claveille, sans fixer de chiffre à ce sujet, demande à M. Bianchi, Ministre des Transports italien, de mettre à sa disposition un certain nombre de machines supplémentaires avec le personnel de conduite et d'entretiens.

M. Claveille demande également que M. Bianchi fournisse au P.L.M. sur les lignes aboutissant à Modane et Ventimille un certain nombre d'agents de l'exploitation pour les trains et charbons italiens. Le personnel, devrait être considéré au point de vue de la responsabilité comme s'il appartenait aux chemins de fer français.

M. Claveille insiste enfin sur l'effort extrêmement important qui va être imposé aux réseaux français au fait de ces transports, et il compte sur toute la bonne volonté du Gouvernement italien pour faciliter leur tâche.

Dans ce qui concerne les opérations à faire dans les ports de la Méditerranée pour l'expédition et la manutention des charbons, M. Claveille déclare qu'il prendra les mesures utiles pour donner à l'Italie les places à quais, les terre-pleins et l'outillage indispensables à l'exécution rapide des opérations. Le Gouvernement italien pourra confier les manutentions à ses entrepreneurs français comme à Blaye, mais il devra fournir tous les manœuvres nécessaires.

M. Bianchi remercie M. Claveille de ses déclarations et précise les points suivants:—

1. Il fournira la main-d'œuvre à employer dans les ports de la Méditerranée pour le déchargement des wagons et le chargement des navires.
2. Il s'efforcera de donner satisfaction aux demandes de locomotives et de personnel d'exploitation formulées ci-dessus dans la plus large mesure possible.
3. Il accepte de faire restituer régulièrement les wagons houillers dans les conditions indiquées par M. Claveille.
4. En ce qui concerne la balance des wagons, tout en constatant que la réduction à 3,000 du chiffre des 6,000 indiqués plus haut causera une grande gêne au service des transports de l'Italie, il admet les propositions de M. Claveille après avoir pris l'avis de M. Berini. Mais il insiste auprès du Général Nash, représentant du Gouvernement britannique, pour que celui-ci lui fournisse des wagons en vue de combler le déficit, étant donné que ce transport de charbon par fer va économiser du tonnage et que tous les Alliés doivent faire un effort commun pour se partager les charges.

M. le Général Nash répond que cette question n'est pas nécessairement liée aux précédentes, mais que dans tous les cas les wagons anglais n'ont pas le même attelage que les wagons italiens; qu'ils ne peuvent pratiquement pas circuler sur les lignes italiennes, et que même la solution serait-elle favorable, elle ne pourrait utilement intervenir avant plusieurs mois, alors qu'il faut immédiatement venir au secours de l'Italie.

M. Bianchi indique alors qu'il y aurait un autre moyen de venir en aide de l'Italie pour son matériel roulant, et ce serait de lui donner les moyens de construire les wagons supplémentaires qu'elle est obligée de fournir en ce moment, et les matériaux nécessaires à l'entretien du matériel roulant. Pour 300 wagons il faudrait une fourniture de 18,000 tonnes de matériel.

Le Général Nash promet de faire étudier cette dernière question lorsque les éléments nécessaires lui auront été fournis.

Note annexe du procès-verbal de la réunion au 13 mars, 1918, à Londres.

M. Bianchi fait remarquer que, pour assurer l'exécution du programme de transport par fer de 9,000 tonnes par jour indiqué à la réunion du 13 mars, 1918, il faut tenir compte de ce que le débit de la ligne de Ventimille à Modane et de 23 trains et celui de la ligne de Modane à Turin de Savona. Il ajoute que, pour assurer avec certitude la totalité des transports de charbons prévue, il est nécessaire de limiter le nombre des autres trains de manière à ne pas dépasser la capacité des lignes qui vient d'être indiqué.

M. Bianchi fait observer que, pour tenir compte de ce que les trains n'ont pas toujours leur charge complète et de ce qu'il se produit inévitablement des irrégularités dans leur mise en marche, il serait nécessaire qu'en période normale la décomposition des trains fût la suivante:—

Sur la ligne de Ventimille à Savona:—

- 12 trains de charbons,
- 7 trains militaires, y compris ceux de Tarante,
- 3 trains de marchandises,
- 1 train de voyageurs.

Sur la ligne de Modane à Turin:—

- 8 trains de charbons;
- 5 trains militaires,
- 2 trains de permissionnaires,
- 2 trains de cessions italiennes,
- 2 trains de matériel vide,
- 1 train commercial,
- 1 train de voyageurs.

Il est pris acte de la déclaration de M. Bianchi; il lui est répondu, toutefois, qu'il pouvait être possible en tenant en main à ce que les trains ont une charge complète et une marche régulière de réaliser les 9,000 tonnes par jour avec un

nombre de trains de charbons légèrement inférieur à celui qu'il a indiqué par Ventimille et par Modane.

(Signé)

A. CLAVEILLE.
R. BIANCHI.
P. A. M. NASH.

Appendix No. 9.

Effect of the American Military Programme on the Supplies of the Allies.

The Allied Maritime Transport Council have had under consideration this week the available tonnage in Allied service in relation to the supply programmes.

The general position may be summarised by saying that the tonnage now in Allied control (excluding any additional neutral tonnage that may be obtained and any tonnage from America not used for her own requirements) will leave a deficit in the present supply programmes of the three European Allies of some 10,000,000 tons of imports, or 2,200,000 tons deadweight of tonnage.

This deficit remains after allowance for reductions already made in import programmes which will have serious results, and though it is possible that some further reductions can, under pressure of necessity, be still made, the Council are unanimous that no reduction of 10,000,000 tons can be made without results which will be disastrous to the prosecution of the war.

The Council have arrived at the conclusion that substantial assistance (though not adequate to meet the deficit) can only be derived from two sources :—

- (a.) The allocation of American tonnage for the use of Allied services.
- (b.) The acquisition of additional tonnage, particularly Dutch, of which the most important part is in American ports.

For instance, the Council have been faced with the extremely serious position of the Italian coal supplies, and have been unable to see any hope of solution except by the relief afforded by the use of the Dutch tonnage in America, and they are conscious that the Allied cereal position and the supply of other essentials such as nitrates are no less serious, and cannot be relieved if assistance is not forthcoming from tonnage under American control. Again, the American military purposes employ some 11,000 wagons in France which are taken from other uses vital to French and Italian requirements. Large quantities of wagons are ready in America and have not been transported to France.

In these circumstances, reference was made at the Council to the practicability of further American assistance, but Mr. Stevens made the very serious statement that, on present American calculations, the American military programme now adopted by the Supreme War Council and agreed by the American Government seems likely to absorb—

- (a.) All American tonnage existing and building not required for American imports; and
- (b.) All additional neutral tonnage which may be received by America. This in result includes the whole of the Dutch tonnage now in American ports.

If this proves to be the case the Council are certain that the results to the Allied supply programmes will be of the utmost gravity.

The whole position should, therefore, be considered by the Supreme War Council in the light of the tonnage situation. As a temporary measure, and in order to avoid the very serious military position that will result from a failure of the Italian coal supply, the Allied Maritime Transport Council recommend that not less than half the Dutch tonnage now in American ports should be placed for one voyage in the service of Allied supplies, so as to release corresponding tonnage for Italian coal.

March 13, 1918.

Appendix No. 10.

*Paraphrase of Telegram to His Majesty's Minister at The Hague,
March 8, 1918.*

Grave shipping situation confronts the Allies at present. Discussions with Dutch Delegates of proposals for employment of Dutch tonnage had led Allied Governments to hope that when these proposals came into force they would secure for Allied service outside the danger zone a large quantity of Dutch tonnage. If these hopes had been justified at the time, arrangements could have been made to withdraw other tonnage for the danger zone and replace it by Dutch vessels provided under the agreement. Continued delay of Netherlands Government in coming to an agreement has produced a situation in which this can no longer be done consistently with securing the most suitable employment of shipping during the forthcoming critical period. Although the terms of the general arrangement were agreed upon, *ad referendum*, in January last by British and Dutch Delegates in London, no further communication has yet been received from Netherlands Government, and the situation which has arisen renders it impossible for His Majesty's Government to await longer the conclusion of the general arrangement. The importance to the Allies of obtaining the employment of Dutch vessels, without restriction as to the waters in which they may sail, is so great that I am compelled to ask you to inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that owing to the long delay of the Netherlands Government in replying to our proposals, the necessity has arisen of requiring a modification in the original tonnage proposals for the purpose of ensuring that the employment of Dutch vessels shall be without restriction. In making this communication you are authorised to intimate unofficially that, in order that the request now put forward may be rendered acceptable, we hope to see our way to propose to the Netherlands Government, on behalf of the Allied Governments, that at the termination of the war any Dutch vessels lost in the existing danger zone through enemy attack while on charter to the Allies shall be replaced. It is also hoped that it may be found possible to make arrangements to place in a United States port 50,000 tons of wheat before the 15th April next, for the use of the Netherlands Government and to supplement this consignment by a similar quantity at a port on the South American Atlantic seaboard.

It is earnestly hoped that the Netherlands Government will see their way to accept these terms.

The Allied Governments attach so much importance to a speedy termination of a state of affairs, in which the German submarine campaign is receiving direct support by the idleness of a large number of Dutch vessels, that in the event of the Netherlands Government being unable to accept the present proposal they will be constrained to adopt other steps in order to bring these vessels into service.

Moreover, in view of the increasing urgency of the matter, His Majesty's Government must ask to be favoured with a reply on the 18th March next at the latest.

I have spoken to M. van Vollenhoven in the above sense.

Appendix No. 11.

WAR INSURANCE.

Meeting at Lancaster House, Wednesday, March 13, 1918.

Present:

M. Loucheur,	}	France.
M. Pilliard,		
M. Brichaux,		
Signor Orlando,	}	Italy.
M. Brizzolesi,		

Mr. D. W. Morrow, United States.

Mr. Hipwood, Great Britain.

M. Loucheur said that the French Government were much preoccupied with the increased cost of living, and the very greatly increased cost of all articles imported by sea. One of the principal causes was the high cost of freight and insurance.

Under the present system a certain amount of this was due to preventable causes, and if some system could be found for the Governments concerned jointly to take the war insurance risks and pool them, he thought the situation would be considerably eased. Such an arrangement would also benefit the exchange position, as at present France and Italy, for instance, had to pay large sums in cash for freight and insurance.

Mr. Morrow, on behalf of the United States, said the question was almost entirely one of finance, and should be dealt with by the Inter-Ally Council on War Purchase and Finance.

M. Loucheur said he did not suggest that a difficult question like this could be solved at once, but he thought that it ought to be investigated. He proposed, therefore, to place a memorandum containing his views before the Inter-Ally Council on War Purchase and Finance, and if they approved, he thought that the matter should be investigated by a small Allied technical committee.

Mr. Hipwood, on behalf of Great Britain, said that the British Delegation would be prepared to render any assistance in their power in investigating the subject.

ALLIED MARITIME TRANSPORT COUNCIL.

Report of Action taken March 15th to April 15th, 1918.

I have the honour to submit to the Council the following report as to action taken since the last meeting by the permanent organisation in execution of the Council's decisions and in pursuance of their general duty of assisting in the allocation and the most advantageous use of Allied tonnage by co-operative action, together with a further note as to other recent events and action which affect the work of the Council.

This report is merely a statement of facts designed primarily to show the way in which the decisions of the Council at the last Meeting have in fact been carried out.

Separate Memoranda are being produced with regard to matters requiring consideration and decision by the Council at its next Meetings.

J. A. SALTER,
Secretary of the Council.

(1) The Supply of Coal to Italy and France.

The Council decided that 600,000 tons were to be sent to Italy during the month, March 15th–April 15th, 150,000 tons being British coal by long sea route, 100,000 tons British coal via Blaye and 350,000 tons French coal. 270,000 tons of the above quantities were to go by rail to Italy and 180,000 by rail to South France and thence by sea. An amount of British coal equivalent to what France sent to Italy in the month was (with due allowance for quality) to be shipped in replacement in about six weeks from March 15th.

The execution of the above plan was seriously interfered with by the German offensive, which had the following two results:—

- (a) The recall of Allied troops from Italy interfered with the passage of French coal. This was originally estimated at 2,000–2,500 tons a day reduction for about a fortnight. This in itself would have reduced the 350,000 tons to about 310,000 tons. It was decided, however, and as the event proved rightly, to provide for the supply of French coal falling considerably below this figure. 100,000 tons of British coal destined for Gibraltar and the Mediterranean were consequently diverted to Italy, British and French Atlantic liners, &c., being sent to Gibraltar in replacement.
- (b) The advance of the Germans to within short distance of the Amiens–Montdidier line and the use of that line for the movement of Allied troops very seriously reduced the railage of coal from the Bruay Mines to Paris and other places south of Amiens. The situation so resulting has been closely examined.

COAL TO ITALY AND REPLACEMENT COAL TO FRANCE.

Plan.	Execution.	
1. 150,000 tons British coal by long sea-route from United Kingdom. (March 15–April 15.)	Shipped in— British ships	Tons. 210,251
	Italian ships	- 43,489
*2. 100,000 tons British coal via Blaye - -	Quantity sent	- 135,120
*3. 350,000 tons French coal. (March 15–April 15) -	„ „	- 229,853
Total	-	618,713

Plan.

Execution.

4. 350,000 tons of British coal (to be shipped March 15—April 30). Adjustments so far as the French coal sent from March 15—April 15 was less or more than 350,000, and as the quality differed from that of the British coal.
- The amount shipped in small British vessels, requisitioned and added to the French Coal Service, was 213,544 tons up to 15th April. A further quantity of 85,000 tons has been arranged for and should be shipped by the end of April. In addition to this total quantity of about 300,000 tons, a large quantity of additional coal has been carried to France in British vessels directed into the French coal trade from various sources, including the French general cargo trade. It is not possible at present to state exactly the amount of additional coal so carried, but these vessels should operate as a substantial help towards meeting the further problem resulting from the German offensive.
- *5. Of the 450,000 tons in 2 and 3 above, 270,000 was to go by rail all the way, 180,000 was to go by short sea-route from Marseilles or other S. French ports.
- 262,688 tons sent by rail, 102,285 tons sent by short sea-routes.

* The figures given under heads 2, 3, and 5 above, represent the amounts of British and French coal sent by rail or by the short sea-routes from France to Italy during the month to April 15th, as shown by daily reports sent from Paris to London. It is understood that these figures have yet to be agreed by the Franco-Italian Committee in Paris, and though approximately correct must be for the moment regarded as provisional.

The net result was that there was shipped and consigned to Italy during the month March 15—April 15, 618,713 tons of coal, 388,860 tons being British coal and 229,853 tons being French coal, as compared with the plan of 600,000 tons, of which 250,000 tons were to have been British and 350,000 tons French.

The execution of the above plan was approved by the Council conditionally upon American Dutch tonnage being provided to compensate for loss of Atlantic imports. It did not prove possible to obtain this tonnage, but it was decided to proceed with the general plan (with the modifications indicated above), notwithstanding the loss of this assistance.

The Committee of representatives of the Italian Government, of the French Ministry of Public Works, and of the French Ministry of Munitions, which M. Loucheur was asked by the Council to establish, has now been set up in Paris, and consists of the following representatives:—

Lieut. Lazzerini	Mission Militaire Italienne.
M. Ulrich	- - Chief Service Execution Technique Transports voie ferree.
Capitaine Barrillon	- Service Central Exploitation ports Maritime.
Capitaine Bletry	- - Chef Service Central des Combustibles au Ministere d'Armement.
Lieut. Oudot (Secretary)	- 4 ^{ieme} Bureau, Etat-Major.

Communications have been made to the Swiss Government regarding the use of the Simplon route, but it has not yet been found possible to make arrangements for the use of this route into Italy.

(2) Other Action and Events.

(a) Development of Executive Machinery and Permanent Staff.

The co-ordination of the several national divisions has been effected by the appointment of a number of committees. Details as to the arrangements are given in

Appendix 12. It is hoped that the staffs of the different divisions will be housed together in Lancaster House in May. In the meantime the arrangements to co-ordinate action have been working satisfactorily, though subject to the inconvenience of the several divisions being situated in different parts of London.

(b) Consideration of Provisional Balance Sheet.

Several discussions have taken place as to the way in which the deficit of ten million tons of imports, shown in the balance sheet, could be met. It has not been possible to produce a scheme covering this deficit for two reasons:—

- (i) The machinery for obtaining allied criticism of the different classes of imports through the Executives is not yet complete (*see* Appendix 20, page 96), and the different national requirements need more prolonged examination than has so far been practicable.
- (ii) It has not been possible to bring the American tonnage requirements, both for imports and the American military supply programme, under review, and the American Government has now announced that plans must be made on the assumption that no further assistance will be available from the tonnage under American control for imports into Allied countries this year. It has not been possible to make a scheme providing for the whole deficit to be borne by the three European Allies, in view of the extremely drastic character of the measures which would be required and the fact that no material is at present available for the close comparison of the European and the American situations. The resulting position is set out more fully in Appendix 16, page 83. In the meantime it may be remarked that the deficit, as previously shown, has been relieved by the acquisition of Dutch tonnage and by a fall in the submarine losses, while, on the other hand, the results of the German offensive, which cannot at present be measured, will affect the deficit in the opposite direction.

(c) Arrangements have been made for six Italian fast passenger liners of small cargo-carrying capacity, which were formerly bringing foodstuffs from the United States to Genoa, to be transferred for service between America and France for the conveyance of American troops, compensation being given to Italy by the allocation of extra British tonnage for the conveyance of food cargoes. This has resulted in a substantial economy of tonnage, and has also the further advantage of putting an end to the heavy calls upon bunker stocks at Gibraltar made by the vessels in question, which being fast passenger vessels have consumed coal altogether out of proportion to their cargo-carrying capacity.

(d) Steps are being taken to discontinue the arrangement under which French ships in the Eastern Mediterranean have been coaled by means of coal conveyed to Bizerta mainly in British vessels, and then transhipped into smaller French vessels for conveyance to Fleet Bases at Milo, Salonica, &c., this transhipment being a source of serious delay. It is proposed to arrange to send the coal direct from the United Kingdom to the Fleet, and by this means and by the use of hulks at the Fleet Bases (to obviate the detention of vessels there) a considerable saving of tonnage will, it is anticipated, be effected. Mr. Trinder was asked to visit Paris, on behalf of the Tonnage Committee, and reports that there is a good prospect of the scheme being put into operation.

(e) Arrangements have been made for Great Britain to put into the nitrate trade a number of neutral vessels not available in the war zone, with some British vessels unsuitable for Atlantic work. As the nitrate carried in these vessels would, if brought to Europe, have to be transhipped at a North American port, negotiations are proceeding with the American Government for the nitrate in question to be supplied for American consumption in exchange for the equivalent amount of American tonnage for the carriage of nitrate direct from Chile to Europe.

(f) Negotiations have been in progress for the use of a number of large French passenger vessels for trooping purposes. The necessity for at once carrying a large number of men from North Africa has delayed this arrangement being put into force, but it is hoped that a number of the vessels in question will be available for American trooping purposes in May.

(g) The American Shipping Board have reported that owing to the intended restriction of the United States imports from South America, it would be possible for them to allot certain additional vessels on Trans-Atlantic service, if certain arrangements could be made with regard to the coal supply of Brazil and the Argentine, and the employment of the Franco-Brazilian tonnage in the following route—United Kingdom—Brazil—U.S.A.—France. A plan to use Allied tonnage for this purpose is now being worked out, and it is hoped to give effect to it as the Brazilian tonnage becomes available.

(h) In addition a number of individual arrangements, *e.g.*, exchanges involving the use of single ships or the supply by one Ally to another of commodities at a particular port, have also been effected.

The above arrangements have for the most part been carried out, either through the Tonnage Committee or through the officials of the different shipping organisations in London.

(i) The memorandum with regard to the relation of the Council and of the Staff to the Executives, which the Secretary was instructed to prepare, is being circulated separately (*see* Appendix 20).

(j) The memorandum sent by the Council to the Supreme War Council with regard to the allocation of Dutch tonnage for European imports was considered by the latter Council, which passed a resolution to the following effect :—

“As the French Government have agreed not to discontinue the transport of 350,000 tons of French coal into Italy by the 15th April 1918, the Supreme War Council are of opinion that the Dutch shipping in American ports should be used, in the first place, for the indispensable requirements of the American Military Programme.”

Further representations were made to the American Government as to the importance of allotting 70,000 tons of this tonnage in compensation for the loss of Atlantic imports resulting from the Italian coal arrangements. It has not, however, proved possible to obtain any part of the tonnage for this purpose.

April 20th, 1918.

APPENDIX 12.

Note as to Permanent Organisation.

The permanent organisation consists of four National Divisions who will be housed together in Lancaster House with the exception of the British Division, the greater part of which must remain in the Ministry of Shipping.

The work of these four National Divisions is co-ordinated by one Main Committee which generally supervises the work of the whole Allied organisation, and three Sub-Committees dealing respectively with Tonnage, Imports, and Statistics, which, subject to the general supervision of the Main Executive Committee, co-ordinate the work of the several Divisions in detail.

1. Main Executive Committee.

The Main Committee consists of the following heads of the several National Divisions :—

Mr. J. A. Salter (Chairman).
M. Monnet (France).
Professor Attolico (Italy).
Mr. G. Rublee (U.S.A.).

The Main Committee may be generally described as the Executive of the Council. Its general responsibilities are to secure the necessary Executive action to give effect to decisions by the Council, to prepare information relevant to any question that the Council may desire to consider at any future meeting, to suggest definite

proposals for the approval of the Council, and in general to take such Executive action as is desirable and practicable, in pursuance of the general duty of assisting in the allocation and most advantageous use of Allied tonnage by co-operative action.

2. Tonnage Sub-Committee.

M. Revillon (France).
Lieut. Farina (Italy).
Mr. Shearman (U.S.A.).
Mr. Browett (Great Britain).

Functions :—

- (a) To arrange for the due execution of any decision of the Council involving the co-operative use or programming of tonnage.
- (b) To obtain and make available for general use statements showing the amount and disposition of the tonnage under the control of each Ally.
- (c) To examine proposals made by any country with a view to securing a more advantageous use of tonnage under the control of any Ally (whether by the better disposition, routing, or more co-operative use of the tonnage or the better assignment of cargoes in relation to import programmes), and so far as possible to arrange that agreed improvements shall be carried into effect.
- (d) To report to the Main Committee as to the due performance of the above duties.

3. Imports Sub-Committee.

M. Halgouet (France).
Professor Attolico (Italy).
Mr. Morrow (U.S.A.).

Functions :—

- (a) To arrange for the due execution of any decision of the Council as to import programmes, by communication as may be necessary with the respective Executives or through the National Divisions with the respective Governments.
- (b) To obtain (whether through the Executives or otherwise) and make available for general use statements showing in detail the import requirements (with sources of origin, &c.) of the different countries, with such further information as may be desirable in order to show the relative necessity of the different requirements.
- (c) To examine the import programmes as so obtained, whether through the Executives or otherwise, and to ascertain in what directions reductions can be made most equitably as between the different countries and with least injury to the prosecution of the war.
- (d) To report to the Main Committee as to the due performance of the above duties.

4. Statistical Sub-Committee.

M. Seitert (France).
Signor Pardo (Italy).
Mr. J. A. Field (U.S.A.).
Mr. Palin Elderton.

Functions :—

- (a) To propose appropriate and uniform methods for collecting and investigating data bearing on the work of the Allied Maritime Transport Council.
- (b) To examine and pass all data and statistical conclusions based thereon.
- (c) To keep record of all actions under (a) and (b).
- (d) To arrange for records to be kept showing the extent to which any decisions of the Council as to allocation of tonnage or rearrangement of supplies which are being complied with, and for that purpose to consider statistical principles which are to form the basis of such a record.
- (e) For the due performance of the above duties, the Sub-Committee will keep constantly in contact with the Tonnage and Imports Sub-Committees, and provide such statistical information and assistance as those Sub-Committees may require ; and will report to the Main Committee.

As approved by the Council—Aug. 29th, 1918.

ALLIED MARITIME TRANSPORT COUNCIL.

Minutes of Second Session at Paris, April 23-5, 1918.

Present :

Members of the Council—

M. CLEMENTEL (*in the Chair*).
 M. LOUCHEUR, France.
 Signor CRESPI, Italy.
 ONOREVOLE SALVATORE ORLANDO, Italy.
 Hon. RAYMOND B. STEVENS, United States.
 Lord ROBERT CECIL, Great Britain.
 Mr. J. A. SALTER, *Secretary to the Council*.

There also attended, with the representatives of the respective countries, either throughout the discussion or for the discussion of particular subjects :—

France—

MM. VILGRAIN, BOUISSON, J. MONNET, Cne. BLÉTRY, SERRUYS, CHARPENTIER, DE LUBERSAC, REVILLON, Cne. PILLIARD, SEITERT, MANTOUX.

Italy—

Signor BIANCHI, Professor GIUFFRIDA, Professor ATTOLICO, Ingegnere MOSCA, Lieutenant FARINA.

America—

Mr. RUBLEE, Commander McBRIDE, Colonel LOGAN, Mr. DOW, Mr. SHEARMAN, Mr. D. W. MORROW, Mr. FIELD, Mr. GREENE.

Great Britain—

Colonel YOUNG, Sir E. WYLDBORE SMITH, Mr. J. F. HENDERSON.

It will be convenient to print the Agenda and to give the results of the Council's discussions under the different subjects without following the exact chronological sequence as they passed from one subject to another.

AGENDA FOR SECOND SESSION, APRIL 23RD.

1. Minutes and report of action taken.
2. The French and Italian coal position, in view of the consequences of the German advance.
3. Statement of the general tonnage deficit for the year 1918.
4. Statement of probable imports to the end of August under present arrangements.
5. Relations with the Supreme War Council.
6. Relations with the Inter-Ally Council on War Purchase and Finance.
7. Relation of Council and Staff to the Executives.
8. The American position. (a) Military supply programme ; (b) Import programme.
9. Agreement as to chartering and allocation of neutral vessels.
10. Arrangements to prevent detention of vessels and arrest under legal proceedings.
11. Allocation of Allied tonnage to Belgian Relief Service.
12. Carriage of oil fuel in double bottoms of ordinary cargo steamers.
13. Date and place of next meeting.

The Chairman welcomed the representatives of the Allied countries to Paris, explaining that circumstances had rendered it impossible for the French Ministers to leave France, and the Council immediately proceeded to business.

1. The Minutes of the First Session were confirmed and signed. The Report of Action taken by the permanent organisation from March 15th to April 15th, 1918 was received, the Council expressing their thanks to the permanent organisation for the work accomplished.

2. *The French and Italian Coal Position in view of the consequences of the German advance.*

It will be convenient to deal separately with the French and Italian positions.

(a) *Italian position.*

It was agreed that the supply of 600,000 tons approved at the First Session for the month from March 16—April 15 should be continued for the next month.

A report submitted by the Commission Franco-Italienne des Charbons Italiens, covering the period 16th March—15th April was circulated and is printed as Appendix 13, page 75. M. Loucheur explained with reference to this report that notwithstanding the difficulties caused by the enemy offensive and the consequent pressure on or disorganisation of the railways, every effort had been made to keep the supplies to Italy up to the agreed amount, and he expressed the hope that the Italian Government had found their position improved, even if the French Government had been prevented by unavoidable difficulties from supplying the agreed amount to the full.

Signor Bianchi stated that there had been a very great improvement, though coal difficulties were still serious, and he mentioned that the number of locomotives, and wagons supplied by Italy was greater than was implied in the second paragraph in the résumé de la situation contained in Appendix 13.

Lord Robert Cecil called attention to the fact that the figures furnished by the Franco-Italian Commission and those stated in the Report of Action were apparently calculated on a different basis, and Signor Bianchi pointed out that some figures related to arrivals and others to shipments.

The Council decided that there must be a uniform basis for the statistics kept, and that for this purpose daily reports from the Franco-Italian Commission at Paris must be supplied to the Secretary of the Council in a form agreed by him.

(b) *French position.*

The Council had before them a Note as to the supply of coal to France, printed as Appendix 14, page 77. M. Loucheur explained that the enemy offensive in the North had entailed very serious consequences on the general coal position of France. The Pas de Calais mines had a normal output of 900,000 to 1,000,000 tons monthly. It must now be taken that while at present 300,000 tons a month might be available for consumption in the North for local and British purposes, the supply which had hitherto been railed South would be cut off, for the reasons (i) that on military grounds, to facilitate movements of troops and supplies, the railways must be kept clear of coal-traffic, and (ii) that the normal output had been already, and might be still further, reduced as a result of the German advance. The net result was that, allowing for the different calorific values of French and British coal, a supply of some 400,000 to 450,000 tons monthly of British coal would be required to restore the position. He acknowledged the assistance rendered by General Nash and Sir Richard Redmayne who had advised on the question of the general measures to be taken to meet the situation, and thanked Mr. Stevens for the telegram which he had sent to America pointing out the gravity of the position.

The report of the Franco-British Coal Committee (printed as Appendix 15, page 79) was referred to the permanent organisation to consider the possibility of arranging tonnage to meet the situation disclosed in the Report. In the meantime Lord Robert Cecil stated that Great Britain hoped for the next week or two to provide ships for all available coal, though she could not continue to do so without assistance when the larger quantities contemplated in the Report became available for shipment. He also promised consideration of two suggestions made by M. Loucheur (i) that an

examination should be made in England of the question whether tonnage could be economised by railway arrangements designed to secure that coal should be loaded at ports most convenient to France, and (ii) that the coal despatched should be cleaned as far as possible.

3. *Statement of the General Tonnage Deficit for the year 1918.*

4. *Statement of probable Imports to the end of August under present arrangements.*

5. *Relations with the Supreme War Council.*

These three items were considered together. The Council had before them—

- (a) A general statement of the import and tonnage position for 1918, printed as Appendix 16 (page 83).
- (b) A report by the Statistical Sub-committee to the Main Committee of the Council relating to import requirements and tonnage available, printed as Appendix 17 (page 86); and
- (c) A provisional British estimate made on the best available information as to probable imports to the end of August, printed as Appendix 18 (page 93).

Shortly put, the effect of these documents was to show that present programmes for 1918 exceed the carrying capacity of the available tonnage by 8,500,000 tons. This tonnage deficit is increased by further demands put forward at the Council in respect of Belgian relief and coal for France.*

A long discussion followed as to the steps which the Council should take to meet this grave situation. The discussion centred round three main points:—

- (i) The reduction of the programmes of import requirements;
- (ii) The possible sources of supplementary tonnage, *e.g.*, a reduction of the amount at present reserved for naval and military purposes; and
- (iii) The extension of the system of executives or programme committees with a view to an early scrutiny of the whole area of import requirements so as to make it possible to secure the necessary adjustments for the current year.

The decisions to which the Council came are embodied in the following resolutions which were unanimously adopted:—

* The French representatives handed in the following preliminary notice of a request for tonnage assistance, and added that they would forward a formal statement, with the reasons for the request, for consideration by the permanent organisation:—

“En plus du tonnage supplémentaire garanti :

1°. En exécution de l'accord du 3 Novembre 1917 (ravitaillement),

2°. En exécution d'accords spéciaux (accord Churchill, transports aciers avoines et transports d'aciers par transports de troupes Américains),

Il est indispensable que des moyens de transports soient donnés à la France pour assurer avant le fin du mois d'Août les importations suivantes qui ne peuvent être effectuées par le tonnage à la disposition de la France:—

	Par Mois.
	Tonnes.
Locomotives -	50,000
Nitrate	15,000
Fils de fer barbelés	15,000
Poudres et explosifs	- 5,000
	<hr/> 85,000

Resolutions.

"(i) The Allied Maritime Transport Council has considered and adopted the appended statement (*see* Appendix 16, page 83) of the general import and tonnage position.

(ii) In view of the gravity of the situation as disclosed by this statement, the Council consider it to be their duty to bring the position before their respective Governments with a view to immediate action.

It is clear to the Council that the deficit is so serious that it cannot be met without a reconsideration of the military and naval demands as well as the requirements of imports, particularly in view of the fact that any further drastic reduction of imports would have important military effects, as a large proportion of them are destined for military uses. The import of coal into France, for instance, so far from being capable of reduction, requires to be substantially increased as an immediate military necessity arising from the recent offensive, and the military necessity for maintaining and if possible increasing the supply of coal into Italy is well known.

The Council feel that if the deficit falls (as in the absence of a prearranged plan it must fall) in a relatively haphazard manner and at short notice upon the several services, whether import, naval or military, which demand tonnage, the resulting dislocation and disaster are likely to be much more serious than if anticipatory measures had been taken.

(iii) In these circumstances, the Council considers that the following action is necessary:—

(a) That a further drastic revision of the import programmes of the several countries should be undertaken, and that the necessary orders to this end should be given to the appropriate national and Allied bodies which are now entrusted with the duty of arranging reductions and adjustments of programmes.

Further, that in order that this work may be adequately performed, either Allied Executives or Allied Committees appointed specifically for the purpose of adjusting Allied programmes of imports should be constituted immediately to deal with such commodities as are not dealt with by existing Executives.

Further, that it is desirable that there should be an American representative on each of these Executives or Committees who would be a full member in the same sense as the representatives of the three European Allies.*

(b) That the permanent organisation of the Council should examine the possibility of rendering available for import work any vessels now engaged in colonial service and vessels hitherto regarded as unsuitable.

(c) That there should be an examination by the appropriate military authorities of the Allied Military Supply programmes (including the American programme), with a view to ascertaining in what ways the demands on mercantile tonnage could be diminished.

(d) That there should be a similar examination by the Allied Naval Authorities of the possibility of reducing the demand by the Allied Navies on mercantile tonnage.

(iv) Monthly statements of the actual imports into the four countries during the preceding months shall be furnished to, and made available for use by, the permanent organisation of the Council.

(v) The permanent organisation shall prepare for the information of the Council a regular monthly statement of the tonnage position.

(vi) For the revision of the import programmes indicated in paragraph 3 (a) above the Council approves the detailed procedure described in the following statement:—

Le Conseil Allié des Transports Maritimes reconnaît que la juste répartition du tonnage ne peut être assurée sans une étude approfondie et une discussion technique des programmes joints.

A cet effet, le Conseil décide de confier la préparation de ces programmes aux Executives existants ou aux Executives qu'il paraîtra expédient de constituer, soit à leur défaut, à des Comités dits "des programmes," qui devront être immédiatement constituées.

Dès que le liste de ces Executives ou Comités des Programmes aura été constituée par le Bureau permanent du Conseil, les Gouvernements associés s'engagent à en assurer le fonctionnement immédiat en désignant aussitôt leurs représentants.

Les Executives ou Comités des programmes sont invités à réunir et examiner d'urgence les demandes des divers Alliés et à présenter avant la date du 15 Juin un

* The American delegate did not record a formal vote on this point.

projet motivant le montant des importations allouées et recommandant les provenances les plus favorables à la meilleure utilisation du tonnage.

Les projets des Executives ou Comités des Programmes seront versés au Bureau permanent du Conseil qui pourra, le cas échéant, proposer l'action conjointe de plusieurs Executives ou Comités dont les programmes apparaîtront connexes.

Les programmes spéciaux des Executives ou Comités seront ensuite systématisés et groupés par le Secrétariat permanent pour être présentés sous cette forme au Conseil Allié des Transports Maritimes."

6. *Relations with the Inter-Ally Council on War Purchase and Finance.*

The Council had before them a memorandum on this question, printed as Appendix 19, page 94, and adopted paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of the recommendations with which the memorandum concludes as follows:—

- (a) There should be general interchange of information between the two Councils; copies of statements as to shipping on the one hand and as to purchases on the other being exchanged between the two Organisations.
- (b) It is desirable that, so far as practicable, the general scheme for classification of imports should be on similar lines for the two Councils although the War Purchases Council will want a much more detailed classification, and
- (c) The Secretariat of the Transport Council should keep in close touch with the London Office of the War Purchases Council.

They also decided that the War Purchases Council should be invited to appoint a liaison officer to act with the permanent organisation of the Council.

7. *Relation of Council and Staff to the Executives.*

The memorandum on this point, printed as Appendix 20, page 96, was considered, and clauses relating to the executives appear in paragraph 3 (a) of the Resolution adopted under the third point on the Agenda.

8. *The American Position.*

- (a) Military supply programme. (b) Import programme.

This question was dealt with in the general discussion on the third point of the Agenda.

9. *Agreement as to Chartering and Allocation of Neutral Vessels.*

An agreement as to the chartering and allocation of neutral vessels had been discussed at the First Session of the Council, and at a Conference at the Foreign Office on March 13th.

The terms of this agreement (printed as Appendix 21, page 102) had been agreed by the French and British representatives, while it was arranged that discussions should proceed with the American representatives with a view to its acceptance by them subject to certain modifications (*see* paragraph 1 of the agreement).

The Italian Government had at that time felt some difficulty in accepting the agreement as it stood. Subsequent discussions had, however, resulted in a satisfactory adjustment, and it was announced that the agreement might now be taken as fully accepted by the European Allies.

Lord Robert Cecil expressed appreciation of the action of the Italian Government in the matter.

10. *Arrangements to prevent Detention of Vessels and Arrest under Legal Proceedings.*

The Council had before them a memorandum on this question, printed as Appendix 22, page 103. It was generally agreed that the waste of tonnage due to legal proceedings was unfortunate, and M. Bouisson, pointing out that legislation would be required to amend the French law on the point, undertook to have the question examined by his legal advisers.

11. *Allocation of Allied Tonnage to Belgian Relief.*

The Council had before them a memorandum by Mr. Poland, Director for Europe of the Commission of Relief in Belgium, in regard to the tonnage requirements of the C.R.B., and an explanatory note thereon, printed as Appendix 23, page 104. M. Steegers, Belgian Minister of Works and Railways, was introduced to the Council, and was accompanied by Mr. Poland and by M. Louis Chevrillon, the Paris delegate of the Commission. M. Laroche also attended on behalf of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. M. Steegers had been specially delegated by his Government to bring the question of Belgian Relief before the Council, and he explained that he was instructed in addition to express the personal views of the King of the Belgians on the matter. He proceeded to emphasise the grave consequences—military, political, and moral—of a failure to provide the minimum food requirements of the occupied territory, pointing out that though the Paris Conference in December last had decided on a

priority for the foodstuffs required for the population of the occupied portions of Belgium and Northern France, the requisite supply had not been maintained. Mr. Poland endorsed M. Steegers' statement, and said that the ships under the control of the C.R.B. and of the Belgian Government being now insufficient to maintain the minimum supply, there was no alternative but to apply to the Council for the balance of the necessary tonnage.

M. Clémentel summarised the history of the Belgian Relief question culminating in the priority decision of the Paris Conference in December last, and expressed the view that the Council's plain course was to give effect to that decision.

A discussion followed as to the way in which this could be done. A proposal that the permanent organisation of the Council should be made definitely responsible for finding the necessary tonnage was objected to on the ground that the functions of the Council are advisory and not executive, and that the permanent organisation could not actually direct the vessels without the assent of the respective Governments. A second proposal that the question should be referred to a sub-committee (such as had dealt with the question of coal for Italy) found certain support, but was abandoned in favour of a third proposal, which was adopted in the following form:—

"The Allied Maritime Transport Council decides that all the articles necessary for the revictualling of the occupied districts in Belgium and Northern France shall be included in the programme of the Wheat Executive if that body consents, and shall be given the priority promised to them by the resolution of the Allied Conference of December 1917.

"The C.R.B. should carry out the greatest amount of the necessary transportation possible with its own tonnage and that of the Belgian Government. Any further tonnage necessary will be allocated by the Wheat Executive from the tonnage provided by the Associated Governments. The permanent organisation of the Transport Council is directed to arrange for such further tonnage as is necessary in order to assure the carrying out of this decision, subject to the assent of the Associated Governments."

At the last meeting of the Council M. Clémentel announced that Mr. Poland had on the previous day resigned his position as Director for Europe of the C.R.B., but had consented to withdraw his resignation on being asked in writing to do so by M. Clémentel. Lord Robert Cecil desired it to be recorded that the British Foreign Office appreciated to the full the great services rendered by Mr. Poland in connection with Belgian relief, that the Council had not intended by their resolution to seek to supersede him, and that they should congratulate themselves on his decision to continue his work.

12. *The Carriage of Oil in double-bottoms of Cargo Vessels.*

The Council had before them a memorandum on this question (printed as Appendix 24, page 109). Mr. Stevens explained that proposals were now being examined in America with a view to the better use of Allied tankers, *e.g.*, by re-routing, and he supported the conclusion of the memorandum that it is of the utmost importance that steps should be immediately taken to terminate the wasteful employment of double-bottomed cargo vessels for carrying oil by increasing the number or effective use of tankers for this purpose. The Council directed that a communication should be made to the Petroleum Conference expressing their sense of the importance of action to this end.

13. *Date and Place of next Meeting.*

It was decided that the next meeting of the Council should be held in London, the date to be fixed later, and that a brief communiqué as to the present session could be sent to the Press for publication on the 29th April.

During the course of the session M. Clémentel announced that since the date of the previous session in London the French Government had requisitioned the last ton of the last French ship hitherto unrequisitioned. Lord Robert Cecil stated that the British Government had been very glad to learn of this action, which would be of great assistance in the development of the work of the Council.

The following points were brought before the Council of which notice had not been given, and were referred to the permanent organisation for consideration:—

- (a) the building up of a stock of coal in Italy, and
- (b) the urgent French need of additional tonnage for the importation for military purposes of locomotives, rolling stock, &c. (*see footnote on page 70*).

Lancaster House,
London,
Aug. 29th, 1918.

(Signed) ROBERT CECIL.

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APPENDIX 13.

Commission Franco-Italienne des Charbons Italiens.

*Note sur l'Execution des Transports de Charbons pour l'Italie dans la période
du 16 Mars au 15 Avril 1918.*

Le 14 Mars 1918, à la séance du Conseil Allié des Transports Maritimes, il avait été entendu ce qui suit :—

“Le nécessaire sera fait pour fournir à la France, 350,000 tonnes de charbon anglais, en supplément des importations qui sont effectuées avec les moyens à sa disposition (y compris fournitures de l'Amirauté).

“Cette fourniture devrait être progressive et en principe terminée le 15 Avril, avec possibilité d'un retard de 10 à 15 jours pour l'achèvement de la fourniture.

“Une livraison de 350,000 tonnes de charbon sera faite par la France à l'Italie, échelonnée du 15 Mars au 15 Avril.

“Le charbon proviendra des Mines françaises du Sud-Est et sera de qualité équivalente à celle du charbon anglais ; si non il y aura lieu à compensation. Il est de plus convenu que si une partie du charbon anglais est fournie aux ports de Bordeaux ou de Rochefort les plus grands efforts seront faits par le Gouvernement Français pour que le charbon anglais ainsi fourni soit transporté directement en Italie, sans pouvoir prendre toutefois d'engagement formel à ce sujet. Il va sans dire que les 100,000 tonnes environ de charbon qui sont actuellement transportées de Blaye vers l'Italie continueront à suivre cette voie.”

En somme il devait être fourni du 16 Mars au 15 Avril à l'Italie 350,000 tonnes de charbon, en plus des 90,000 tonnes normalement transportées de Blaye sur Vintimille.

Mais à la suite des événements militaires survenus depuis le 21 Mars et en raison de leur répercussion sur les transports en France, il a été convenu en Angleterre que le programme de 350,000 tonnes serait réduit à 260,000 tonnes, tandis que 100,000 tonnes environ devaient être fournies directement à l'Italie par mer en plus des 150,000 tonnes déjà prévues par cette voie.

En réalité, la France a reçu dans cette période de 31 Jours en supplément des importations effectuées avec les moyens à sa disposition, 145,446 tonnes de charbons anglais.

Quant aux expéditions de France sur l'Italie, elles se sont effectuées dans les conditions suivantes :—

	Tonnes.	
Expéditions des Mines Fran- çaises - - -	226,000	{ Dont 120,000 tonnes sur Modane et Vintimille ; 106,000 tonnes sur les ports de la Méditerranée.
Expéditions des ports de la Gironde - - -	130,000	
Soit au total - - -	<u>356,000</u>	Sur Vintimille.

Dont 250,000 tonnes sur Modane et Vintimille ;
106,000 tonnes sur les ports de la Méditerranée.

Dans la même période, il est passé à Modane et Vintimille 254,000 tonnes ; il a été reçu par fer dans les ports de la Méditerranée 111,000 tonnes dont 106,000 ont été embarquées à destination de l'Italie de telle façon que les livraisons à l'Italie se sont élevées à :—

$$254,000 + 106,000 = 360,000 \text{ tonnes.}$$

Si l'on en déduit les 90,000 tonnes de Blaye, on voit que la France a livré à l'Italie, tant des Mines françaises que des ports de la Gironde :—

270,000 tonnes de charbon,

c'est à dire 10,000 tonnes de plus qu'il n'était prévu.

Etant donné la période troublée qui vient d'être traversée, on peut dire qu'un gros effort a été fait, d'autant plus que l'Angleterre n'a livré à la France, du 16 Mars au 15 Avril, que 145,500 tonnes, et que par conséquent, la France a fait à l'Italie des livraisons en avance de 125,000 tonnes sur les fournitures anglaises à la France.

Transports par Chemin de fer.—Pendant la période envisagée, le chemin de fer a évacué tout ce que les Mines ont chargé, c'est-à-dire 226,000 tonnes, soit une moyenne journalière de 7,290 tonnes. Le programme prévoyait :—

8,450 tonnes du 16 au 25 Mars.
6,650 " " 26 " 31 "
8,100 " " 1 " 15 Avril.

soit 245,900 tonnes.

La réduction à 6,650 tonnes pendant la période du 26 au 31 Mars a été rendue nécessaire par les transports d'Italie que ont diminué les possibilités de passage par Modane et Vintimille. Ces passages se sont trouvés réduits de 8,600 à 6,550 tonnes.

Ils ont pu être portés à 8,300 à partir du 1^o Avril et même à 8,900 depuis le 6 Avril, grâce à certaines mesures spéciales; réduction des ravitaillements anglais, réduction des envois de rames vides en Italie.

Ces mesures ont d'ailleurs permis de porter progressivement de 3,000 à 5,100 tonnes les expéditions des ports de la Gironde et de Rochefort sur Vintimille.

En réalité il est passé à Vintimille et Modane 254,000 tonnes du 16 Mars au 15 Avril (dont 130,000 environ de charbons anglais), soit une moyenne de 8,200 tonnes environ par jour.

Situation des Ports de la Méditerranée.—Le stock total dans les ports de la Méditerranée est passé de 37,342 tonnes le 15 Mars à 42,810 tonnes le 16 Avril. Les envois par fer ont donc dépassé légèrement, ainsi qu'il a été dit plus haut, les possibilités d'enlèvement par bateaux.

Il a été enlevé par bateaux italiens dans les dernières semaines dans l'ensemble des quatre ports de Marseille, Port de Bouc, Port St. Louis du Rhône et Cette :—

17,851 tonnes du 15 au 21 Mars.
24,059 tonnes du 22 au 28 Mars.
24,101 tonnes du 29 Mars au 4 Avril.
29,357 tonnes du 5 au 11 Avril.
24,479 tonnes du 12 au 18 Avril.

Des travaux en cours dans certains de ces ports permettront d'ailleurs à brève échéance de réaliser un tonnage quotidien de 6,000 tonnes, à condition toutefois que les installations de La Nouvelle soient utilisées.

Pour qu'on puisse, si la situation l'exige, utiliser à plein le débit de 6,000 tonnes, il faudra naturellement que le cabotage italien soit développé de manière à enlever 42,000 tonnes par semaine, c'est-à-dire environ 18,000 de plus qu'actuellement.

Situation des Ports de la Gironde et de Rochefort.—Ainsi que cela a été exposé, du 16 Mars au Avril, il a été expédié des ces ports sur Vintimille 130,000 tonnes de charbon anglais. Le chemin de fer a d'ailleurs fait face aux importations.

En effet, le 15 Mars la situation dans l'ensemble des ports de l'Océan était la suivante :—

						Tonnes.
Tonnage à flot (bateaux en Gironde ou en déchargement)	-	-	-	-	-	17,041
„ en stock	-	-	-	-	-	14,599
Total	-	-	-	-	-	31,640

Le 16 Avril ces stocks étaient réduits à :—

						Tonnes.
Tonnage à flot	-	-	-	-	-	13,894
„ en stock	-	-	-	-	-	6,418
Total	-	-	-	-	-	20,312

En somme les expéditions de charbon anglais sont à l'heure actuelle limitées par l'insuffisance des importations.

Résumé de la Situation.—Les chemins de fer français ont fait largement face aux transports qui leur ont été demandés, et les résultats obtenus sont d'autant plus satisfaisants que les réseaux français ont exécuté pendant la période considérée des transports militaires intenses pour lesquels un grand nombre de locomotives et de wagons ont dû être utilisés.

Il convient d'ailleurs d'ajouter que cet effort a pu être réalisé bien que les chemins de fer italiens n'aient pu de leur côté apporter l'aide de traction prévue et restituer régulièrement les wagons houilliers qui leur étaient passés.

Fonctionnement des Diverses Commissions Régulatrices.—Il a été constitué diverses Commissions (Commissions Régulatrices à Marseille et à Bordeaux, Sous-Commission à Cette) qui fonctionnent à l'heure actuelle en liaison entre elles et avec la Commission Franco-Italienne de Paris.

Le fonctionnement de ces diverses Commissions a donné de très bons résultats, en particulier la Commission Régulatrice de Marseille a pu dans de nombreux cas régler rapidement des déroutements qui ont permis de parer à des situations difficiles dans certains ports de la Méditerranée (*absence de bateaux*) en profitant de certaines disponibilités sur la ligne de Vintimille.

La Commission de Paris centralise tous les renseignements quotidiens qui permettent de tenir au courant au jour le jour le Secrétariat de Conseil Allié des Transports Maritimes.

Programme Actuel.—A l'heure actuelle et depuis le 6 Avril le programme quotidien d'exécution comprend :—

	Tonnes.	
Expéditions des Mines -	8,100	{ 4,300 tonnes sur les ports de la Méditerranée; 3,800 tonnes sur Modane et Vintimille.
Expéditions des ports de la Gironde et de Rochefort -	5,100	sur Vintimille.
Total - -	13,200	{ 8,900 tonnes sur Modane et Vintimille; 4,300 tonnes sur les ports de la Méditerranée.

Ce programme sera poursuivi jusqu'à nouvel avis et ne sera modifié que si de nouveaux accords interviennent.

Signatures :

BLÉTRY. LAZZÉRINI. BARRILLON. ULRICH.
 April 21st 1918.

APPENDIX 14.

Note as to Supply of Coal to France.

The general arrangements approved by the Council at their last meeting with regard to the supply of French coal to Italy from the United Kingdom, and the replacement of the French coal sent to Italy by British coal, are described in the Minutes and in the Report of Action (page) taken during the last month

Since the last meeting the position has been seriously altered as a result of the German offensive. The exact extent of the effect of the offensive is not yet known and is being closely investigated, but in the meantime it may be convenient to the Council to have a general statement of the position.

The main features of the present or possible position which have to be contemplated are as follows :—

(a) The railage of coal from the Pas de Calais coalfields to South of the Somme *viâ* the Amiens-Montdidier railway has stopped. Till about last week,

however, coal was in fact being railed by the lateral further West at the rate of about 80,000 tons a week. This quantity has, however, rapidly fallen, and for the last week appears to have been at only about one-third of this rate.

- (b) It is understood that it is of military importance that the Western lateral should be free if possible of coal transport in order to expedite military movements. It is therefore necessary to contemplate the complete stoppage of coal being railed South.
- (c) The position will be still more serious if the output of the mines is wholly stopped by the Germans, as in this event the coal requirements of the Northern area would require to be met by imported coal as well as the South.

On the best information it has so far been possible to obtain, it appears that the maximum amount of coal which has been transported by rail from the Pas de Calais area to South of the Somme has been 900,000 tons in the month. Prior to the commencement of the present offensive, this amount had been reduced to some 750,000 tons a month, 700,000 being French coal from the Pas de Calais mines and 50,000 being British coal imported through the ports of Calais and Boulogne. If the output of the mines is continued even to a much diminished extent, it would be possible to meet a part of the results of the stoppage of rail transport South by supplying the North to a greater extent from the Pas de Calais coalfields and diverting something like 130,000 tons of British coal hitherto going to the Northern ports. It is understood, too, that reductions in consumption can be made in various directions, and due allowance would, of course, be taken for any difference in quality between the French and British coal. It, of course, requires to be borne in mind that in addition to any further coal put into France to meet the above situation, there is also the extra "replacement" coal requiring to be imported as the result of the arrangements for the supply of French coal to Italy.

The supply of coal to Italy will doubtless fall below the 350,000 tons contemplated, in view of some interference with the railway transport between France and Italy, but it is, of course, of vital importance for the maintenance of the Italian coal supplies that coal should still proceed by this route to the utmost possible extent.

In the above circumstances the problem has ceased to be one of the provision of shipping alone, and the output of coal as well as the capacity of the ports requires careful consideration.

The problem requiring to be dealt with falls into two parts, (a) the emergency assistance for the immediate future, and (b) the arrangements for supply in accordance with a definite plan.

With regard to (a), it has been arranged that an absolute priority should be given for the moment for providing tonnage to lift all the coal that can be made available for shipment, and with, so far as practicable, a priority also in the allocation of coal to France as compared with other needs.

With regard to (b), it has been arranged that General Nash, with the assistance of a representative of the British Coal Controller and with expert advice as to French port capacity, should at once investigate the matter in conjunction with M. Loucheur and his experts with a view to ascertaining the essential needs of the situation. The conclusions of such an investigation must then, of course, be very closely considered in conjunction with shipping possibilities. It is, however, clear that with the situation changing so rapidly as it is at present, it is not practicable to do more for the moment than proceed on the emergency basis indicated above.

April 20th, 1918.

APPENDIX 15.

Report of Franco-British Coal Committee, appointed to consider the Requirements for the Export of Coal from the United Kingdom to France in certain eventualities.

Meeting held at Paris, 23rd April 1918.

Present :—

Lieut.-Colonel PETSCHÉ -	-	-	} Representing France.
Capitaine MACAUX -	-	-	
Capitaine PILLIARD -	-	-	
Capitaine BLETRY -	-	-	
Sir RICHARD REDMAYNE -	-	-	} Representing Great Britain.
Mr. LEA -	-	-	
Lieut.-Colonel P. C. YOUNG, R.E. -	-	-	

(1) Aggregate quantity of imported coal required in the area South of the Somme in the event of the supply from the Pas de Calais mines being entirely shut off.

(In this section all quantities of coal are given in terms of metric tonnes and average Pas de Calais coal.)

- | | Tons per
month |
|---|-------------------|
| (a) The aggregate quantity of coal passing by rail from the North to the South of the Somme prior to the recent offensive was | 750,000 |
| As a set-off against the loss of this coal, it will be possible to effect certain economies and to increase raisings in the area South of the Somme. | |
| (b) It will be possible immediately to increase the output from the Southern and Central coalfields by 40,000 tons per month; by the autumn a further improvement of output can be effected, making a total increase from these coalfields of 100,000 tons per month. During the summer months stocks are ordinarily built up against the increased consumption during the winter months. Assuming a figure of 100,000 tons per month, the building up of stocks will be interfered with to the extent by which the immediate increase falls short of this amount. It was agreed, however, that for the purpose of these calculations it would be reasonable to assume a deduction from the figure of import on account of increased raisings equal to | 100,000 |
| (c) By stricter control of coal consumption it is possible to effect certain economies. The measures proposed in France and in the United Kingdom were explained by the representatives of each country and compared. It was agreed that, in all the circumstances of the case, no more stringent measures than were already proposed were practicable, and that the reduction of import on account of greater economy in consumption must be placed at | 100,000 |
| (d) It was agreed that gas coal exported from England to France under arrangements already in force might be improved in quality. Sir Richard Redmayne was able to guarantee an improvement of 5 per cent. in the value of the quality of gas coal, and hoped to effect a gradual further improvement to 10 per cent., that is, to the position existing prior to the war. It was also agreed that, so much of the coking coal and of the Cardiff steam coal as consists of unwashed smalls could be improved by washing, that this had best be done in the United Kingdom, and would therefore be done there. The British representative promised an improvement in quality equal to 3 per cent. improvement in unwashed smalls. It was agreed that, for domestic purposes, more hard coal was desirable. The British representatives promised to do what was possible to give more hard coal, but | |

could give no guarantee. It was considered that, in this case, no reduction of quantity on account of improved quality could be assumed. For reduction of requirement by export of better coal from the United Kingdom on existing programme, it was agreed to take - - - - - 50,000 Tons per month.

- (e) The net result of the decisions arrived at in regard to these points was therefore to arrive at the following conclusions regarding the quantity of coal to be imported into the area South of the Somme in the event of the Pas de Calais mines being lost, in terms of average Pas de Calais coal.

Railed to the South of the Somme prior to the offensive - 750,000

<i>Deduct :—</i>	Tons per month.
On account of increased output in the South and Centre - - - - -	100,000
On account of greater economy in consumption -	100,000
On account of improvement in quality of English coal imported on existing programme -	50,000
	<u>250,000</u>

Net requirement of imported coal - - - - 500,000

(2) Having arrived at a requirement of imported coal in terms of average Pas de Calais coal, it is necessary to convert this into terms of British coal of the grades which will actually be imported. The French representatives proposed that this should be done in the manner shown in the statement below :—

Programme for the Importation of Coal in Substitution.

MONTHLY FIGURES.

Uses.	Durham.	Northumberland.	Welsh.	Total.
Gas Works -	90,000	—	—	90,000
Electricity Works -	40,000	—	20,000	60,000
Railways - -	25,000	—	60,000 ⁽¹⁾	85,000
Domestic -	—	70,000	—	70,000
Agricultural -	—	—	20,000 ⁽²⁾	20,000
Industry and Miscellaneous -	15,000	—	110,000	125,000
Total	170,000	70,000	210,000	450,000

⁽¹⁾ Of which 10,000 tons of briquettes.

⁽²⁾ To be supplied in briquettes.

It was pointed out that it would not be possible to supply Yorkshire household coal, but that Northumberland household coal could be supplied in lieu. This was agreed to, but it was accepted that no reduction in quantity could be effected on account of improvement in quality in the case of household coal, seeing that it was not practicable to modify the rationing scheme on account of the comparatively small improvement in the calorific value of the coal supplied. It was agreed on a comparison of the qualities of Durham coal and of Pas de Calais coal as a gas coal, that the former might be considered on the average 16·7 per cent. better than the latter. The volume of gas produced per unit of coal being as 315 to 270.

A basis was then sought for the comparison of the steam coals to be supplied from the United Kingdom with the steam coals supplied from the Pas de Calais. It was agreed after discussion that the best general basis of comparison would be the

calorific value of the two coals. This it was agreed might reasonably be placed at 8,200 to 7,200, making a difference of 13·9 per cent. in favour of the British coal. As, however, the users were accustomed to Pas de Calais coal, and not to British (South Wales) coal, it was agreed that the full economy practicable might not be realised in practice, and that for this reason the improvement in the quality of British coal should be assumed at 12 per cent. on a conservative estimate.

The net result of these decisions was to justify the proposals of the French representatives as is shown by the following comparative statement :—

	Quantity of Imported Coal proposed.	Equivalent Value in Terms of Pas de Calais Coal.
	Tons.	Tons.
Gas coal - - - - -	90,000	105,000
Household coal - - - - -	70,000	70,000
Steam coal - - - - -	290,000	324,800
Total - - - - -	450,000	499,800

It was pointed out, however, that a proportion of the coal exported from South Wales might be Swansea and not Cardiff coal, as had been assumed in these discussions. It was agreed that Swansea steam coal was inferior to Cardiff steam coal. It was therefore accepted that the quantity of Swansea coal would be reduced to a minimum, and that whatever quantity of Swansea coal was exported should be increased by 10 per cent. in quantity to make up for the inferiority in quality.

The net result of the discussion up to this point was, therefore, to place the requirement of imported coal in the area South of the Somme, in the event of the Pas de Calais mines being shut off, at 450,000 tons per month, made up as follows :—

	Tons.
Durham coal - - - - -	170,000
Northumberland household coal - - - - -	70,000
Cardiff coal - - - - -	210,000
Total - - - - -	<u>450,000</u>

Where Swansea coal is substituted for Cardiff coal, the quantity to be increased by 10 per cent.

(3) In the meantime a certain quantity of coal can be railed from the North of the Somme to the South of the Somme, and this amount may increase or decrease in conformity with the military situation. It was agreed that from the total quantity to be imported, a deduction might be made equal to 90 per cent. of the quantity brought by rail from the North to the South of the Somme, the 90 per cent. representing the approximate equivalent value of Pas de Calais and British coals.

(4) It was agreed in principle that all coal lately imported through Boulogne, Calais, and Dunkirk should be diverted to ports South of the Somme. It was pointed out that in practice the military situation might prevent coal being carried by rail from the Pas de Calais coalfields to the North, and that in practice, therefore, it might prove essential to continue the importation of a certain quantity of coal at Calais and Dunkirk. It was accepted, however, that so much as it is found possible in practice to divert from ports North of the Somme to ports South of the Somme might be taken as being part of the additional importation of 450,000 tons per month.

(5) Considerable difficulty was experienced in arriving at a figure of the importation required into the area North of the Somme in the event of the Pas de Calais coalfields being rendered useless to the Allies. This quantity must depend to a very large extent upon the military situation which then exists. It was agreed, however, that for the purposes of the present estimate the quantity required on French account should be placed at 75,000 tons of British coal per month, this to be taken as in addition to the coal required for British Army supply and for British "traction," whether on the Nord Railway or on British military railways.

(6) The French representatives presented a statement (printed on p. 83), showing the ports at which coal, being imported on the existing programme, is discharged, the ports at which it is proposed to discharge coal received in substitution of coal sent to Italy, and the ports at which they would propose to discharge 500,000 tons of coal imported against the loss of the Pas de Calais coalfields. As the proposals in this statement did not tally exactly with the results of the preceding discussion, a modified programme was prepared showing the ports at which they would propose to discharge 450,000 tons of English coal imported against the loss of the Pas de Calais coalfields. This was as follows:—

DISTRIBUTION AMONG PORTS OF DESTINATION.

							Tons.	
Fécamp	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,000	Channel Ports, 278,000 tons.
Rouen	-	-	-	-	-	-	150,000	
Havre							50,000	
Honfleur	-	-	-	-	-	-	20,000	
Trouville	-	-					10,000	
Caen	-	-	-	-	-	-	10,000	
Cherbourg	-	-	-	-	-	-	8,000	
Granville	-	-					10,000	
St. Malo	-	-					10,000	
Brest	-	-	-				5,000	
Lorient	-		-				4,000	Atlantic Ports, 172,000 tons.
St. Nazaire			-				20,000	
Nantes	-		-				10,000	
Les Sables	-	-	-				4,000	
La Pallice		-	-				20,000	
La Rochelle	-			-	-	-	15,000	
Rochefort	-			-	-	-	20,000	
Tonnay-Charente	-						6,000	
Mortagne-sur-Gironde			-	-		-	3,000	
Bordeaux	-			-	-	-	20,000	
Bayonne	-	-	-				50,000	

(7) The French representatives explained that they had ascertained from the Ministry of Public Works that there would be no railway difficulty in the way of clearing these quantities from each of the ports, also that these quantities could, in each case, be handled without any increase of the port facilities at present at the disposal of the French Authorities. It was agreed that so much coal as it is found possible to bring by rail from the North to the South of the Somme should be deducted from the quantity to be discharged at Channel ports, seeing that this coal would be used in an area served by these ports.

(8) It was agreed that, in order to ascertain whether these proposals could actually be carried into effect should necessity arise, the question of the provision of shipping must be considered by the Allied Maritime Council, and that a summary of the conclusions arrived at should therefore be presented immediately to the Secretary of that Council for their consideration.

(Signed) A. PETSCHÉ.

(Signed) P. C. YOUNG,
Lt.-Col., R.E.

Statement referred to in Paragraph 6 of Appendix 15.

Designation des Ports.	Importation de Charbon en Mars 1918. (Transit Italien Deduit.)	Tonnage correspondant au Programme de 1,400,000 Tonnes par Mois.	Importations pour le Transit Italien ou pour compensation des Charbons Italiens. — 400,000 Tonnes par Mois	Tonnage de Remplacement du Pas de Calais, Avertissement des Importations Anglaises du Nord, &c. — 500,000 Tonnes par Mois.	Total Général. — Programme de 2,300,000 Tonnes par Mois.
	Tonnes.	Tonnes.	Tonnes.	Tonnes.	Tonnes.
Dieppe	54,570	60,000	10,000	20,000	90,000
Fecamp	16,167	20,000	—	5,000	25,000
Le Havre -	77,778	80,000	—	55,000	135,000
Rouen et Duclair	568,265	580,000	60,000	160,000	800,000
Honfleur	12,992	20,000	5,000	20,000	45,000
Trouville	7,716	12,000	—	13,000	25,000
Caen	46,409	60,000	10,000	20,000	90,000
Cherbourg	41,353	42,000	10,000	8,000	60,000
Granville	7,811	10,000	5,000	10,000	25,000
St. Malo, St. Servan	40,460	50,000	25,000	15,000	90,000
Le Legue St. Briene	1,000	1,000	—	7,000	8,000
Morlaix	1,094	1,000	—	4,000	5,000
Brest	17,500	20,000	—	5,000	25,000
Lorient	15,547	16,000	—	4,000	20,000
St. Nazaire	113,569	120,000	—	20,000	140,000
Nantes	56,612	80,000	40,000	10,000	130,000
Les Sables d'Olonne	874	1,000	—	14,000	15,000
La Rochelle-Païlice	13,193	13,000	—	23,000	36,000
La Rochelle Ville	6,827	10,000	20,000	15,000	45,000
Rochefort -	21,154	25,000	40,000	10,000	75,000
Tonnay-Charente	7,532	10,000	20,000	6,000	36,000
Mortagne-sur-Gironde	135	—	—	3,000	3,000
Pauillac	11,540	12,000	—	3,000	15,000
Blaye	—	—	45,000	—	45,000
Bordeaux	76,114	90,000	110,000	20,000	220,000
Bayonne	27,726	30,000	—	60,000	90,000
Cotte	—	—	—	—	—
Marseille	26,950	27,000	—	—	27,000
Totaux	1,272,888	1,390,000	400,000	530,000	2,320,000

APPENDIX 16.

General Statement of the Overseas Import and Tonnage Position for 1918.

In order to judge the general situation from the point of view of tonnage in the service of the Allies, and of imports which Great Britain, France, and Italy need to bring in during the year 1918, the permanent staff of the Allied Maritime Transport Council have considered together :—

- (a) The programmes of imports of Great Britain, France, and Italy for the year 1918.

- (b) The average tonnage which these three nations estimate that they will have at their disposal during the same period for import work.
- (c) The amount of imports which it is estimated can be brought into these three countries by neutral vessels not under their control, by contributions from vessels primarily used for purposes other than imports, and by return and triangular voyages, &c.

Calculations based upon these different elements show the following results, in round figures :—

Programme of Imports for 1918 (in Tons of 2,240 Pounds), excluding Oil carried in Tankers, &c.	Total Deadweight Tonnage required (excluding Tankers).	Estimated Deadweight Tonnage available, directly or indirectly, for Imports of Allies (<i>see (b)</i> and (<i>c</i>) above) (excluding Tankers, &c.).	Deficit in Deadweight Tonnage (excluding Tankers).
Great Britain - 30,200,000 France - 33,300,000 Italy 16,500,000	80,000,000 16,340,000	14,450,000	1,890,000

It is estimated that this deficit of 1,890,000 deadweight tons of shipping, unless made up, will cause a deficit of roughly 8,500,000 tons in the imports contemplated by the programmes of the Allies for 1918, as stated above.

In explanation of the foregoing summarised statement, the following is submitted :—

I.—IMPORTS (excluding Oil carried in Tankers, &c.).

Great Britain, France, and Italy have furnished statements showing their programmes of imports for the year 1918. In the case of cereals the Wheat Executive has subjected the requirements of the several Allies to thorough Allied examination, and agreement up to the end of the present cereal year (August 31st, 1918) has been reached, but the other programmes, while having been the subject of examination and revision by the respective governments, have not yet been adjusted by joint Allied action.

Compared with the imports of 1917, 1916, and 1913, the programmes of imports for 1918, in tons weight, are as follows :—

	(1918.)	(1917.)	(1916.)	(1913.)
Great Britain	30,200,000	34,417,000	42,326,000	52,793,000
France - - -	33,300,000	32,202,000	39,000,000	45,500,000
Italy - - -	16,500,000	10,360,000	15,500,000	18,000,000

Grouped in broad classes of commodities, the 1918 import requirements of the Allies are made up approximately as follows :—

	Great Britain.	France.	Italy.
Food - - - -	13,600,000	6,300,000	4,700,000
Munitions - - -	4,400,000	5,400,000	2,000,000
Coal and iron ores	7,300,000	19,200,000	8,600,000
Raw materials, &c. -	4,900,000	2,400,000	1,200,000
	30,200,000	33,300,000	16,500,000

II.—TONNAGE.

*A.—Total Tonnage under Control of the Allies during the year 1918
(excluding Tankers).*

Making due allowance for losses by submarines and for new building in Great Britain, France, and Italy, the Allies estimate that they will have under their control during the year 1918 the following average deadweight tonnage :—

British flag	-	-	-	18,000,000
French flag	-	-	-	1,650,000
Italian flag	-	-	-	1,150,000 (approximate).
Neutral flag	-	-	-	1,400,000
Total	-	-	-	<u>22,200,000</u> (exclusive of tankers).

*B.—Tonnage reserved by the Allies for Military or Naval Use, or services other than
General Import Work.*

Out of the total of controlled tonnage, the three Allies have at present allocated for Naval and Military and other special services certain tonnage which, for the year 1918, is estimated as follows :—

GREAT BRITAIN.				Deadweight Tons.
Military services	-	-	-	2,205,000
Naval services	-	-	-	2,760,000
Colonial services	-	-	-	2,560,000
Unsuitable for import work	-	-	-	<u>7,525,000</u>
FRANCE.				
Military services	-	-	-	525,000
Naval services	-	-	-	95,000
Colonial services	-	-	-	<u>620,000</u>
Unsuitable for import work	-	-	-	
ITALY.				
Military services	-	-	-	184,000
Naval services	-	-	-	155,000
Colonial services	-	-	-	<u>339,000</u>
Unsuitable for import work	-	-	-	
Total of Reserved Services				<u>8,484,000</u>

It is recognised that the military and naval requirements can be determined only upon the advice of the military and naval organisations. Unless and until these requirements are redetermined, the Allied Maritime Transport Council must consider that the tonnage reserved for these purposes is to be maintained regardless of the fluctuations in sinkings or new building. The result of so treating the military and naval requirements is that losses in tonnage must necessarily fall upon that portion of the tonnage remaining for import work, even though a substantial proportion of the total import work consists of the conveyance of munitions and other articles exclusively required for military or naval programmes.

C.—The American Military Programme.

In the foregoing statement the tonnage of the United States has not been relied upon for the import needs of Great Britain, France, and Italy, for the reason that advice has been received from the American Government that they estimate that all the tonnage of the United States (including any that she may hereafter acquire or construct) except such portion thereof as she must use for her own indispensable imports and for such provision as she is already under obligation to make for the service of neutrals or the Allies, will be required to convey supplies, stores, construction material, railway equipment, &c., for the number of American troops which are being sent in accordance with the programme adopted by the Supreme War Council and accepted by the United States.

D.—Tonnage available for General Imports.

The total deadweight tonnage under control of Great Britain, France, and Italy, as shown in paragraph (A), is - - - 22,200,000
(exclusive of tankers).

The deadweight tonnage allotted to Military, Naval, and other services, as shown in paragraph (B), is - - - 8,484,000

Therefore, the deadweight tonnage under the control of the Allies remaining available for Allied imports during 1918, is - - - - - 13,766,000

In calculating, however, the carrying capacity of the tonnage available for importing work, it is necessary to make allowance on the one hand for tonnage under repair or otherwise out of action, and on the other for importing work done by neutral vessels not under Allied control, by vessels not used primarily for importing, and by vessels on return and triangular voyages, &c. After allowance for these factors, the mean deadweight tonnage available for importing work throughout the year 1918 may be taken at 14,450,000.

The import needs of the Allies having thus been set against the tonnage allocated to the carrying of those imports, with a resultant deficit of some 8,500,000 tons of imports, it is now necessary for the Council to find the means by which the problem of dealing with this deficit can be solved.

This problem, which is now before the Council, involves the consideration of the following demands upon tonnage:—

- (1) Military, naval, and other reserved services of Great Britain, France, and Italy, which it is estimated will require an average tonnage of 8,484,000 deadweight tons.
- (2) The programme of shipping supplies, stores, construction material, &c., in connection with the despatch of troops which are being sent in accordance with the military programme adopted by the Supreme War Council and accepted by the United States Government.
- (3) Programmes of imports, which exceed by 8,500,000 tons the carrying capacity of the tonnage remaining for importing work.

It is obvious that the problem of providing tonnage for imports of the European Allies can be solved only if all the demands upon tonnage are reconsidered jointly by the proper authorities of the Allies, with a view to securing such reduction and readjustment of those demands as will bring them within the carrying capacity of the total tonnage available.

23rd April 1918.

NOTE.—The Council at the Session in Paris of April 23–25 had requests for additional tonnage assistance, not allowed for in the foregoing calculations, in respect of—

- (a) Belgian relief, and
- (b) extra coal shipments to France as a result of the present German offensive.

These requests are now under examination, but seem likely to be responsible for an increase of the general tonnage deficit by some quarter of a million tons deadweight of shipping.

APPENDIX 17.

Report by the Statistical Sub-Committee to the Main Committee of the Allied Maritime Transport Council.

1. *Imports*.—Statements (I.) are annexed, showing the imports in 1,000 tons received in 1917 and the corresponding requirements for 1918 of France, Italy, and the United Kingdom. The imports are shown divided into groups of commodities.

Oil has been excluded so far as it is carried in tankers. The import requirements for cereals and nitrates agree with those given by the executives. We have included in the statements approximate imports for previous years.

2. *Tonnage*.—The tonnage available is shown for each of the three countries as at 1st January 1918 and 1st April 1918, or at the latest date available (Statements II.).

The figures relate to d.w. tonnage of steamships of all sizes, excluding tankers. Vessels unsuitable for overseas work and in use for colonies are deducted.

An estimate of the mean tonnage service available throughout 1918 has also been made, wherein we have assumed that naval and military services will be maintained, and that new vessels will be available in accordance with the latest building programmes. Allowance has been made for future losses through enemy action and marine risk and for tonnage undergoing repair. It has also been assumed in the United Kingdom statement that losses among vessels lent to France and Italy fall directly or indirectly on the United Kingdom. This method of showing the losses is not meant to imply that any such arrangement exists.

3. *Comparison of Imports and Tonnage available*.—A Statement (III.) has been prepared to enable a comparison to be made between the tonnage that would be required to carry the imports for which the various countries asked for 1918 and the mean tonnage available for 1918. In this comparison attention must be drawn to the following points :—

- (a) In arriving at the tonnage required we have worked from agreed lengths of round voyages, and have made the necessary allowances for such service as may be rendered by those vessels which do importing work to more than one of the countries in each round voyage, for such service as may be obtained from vessels not under control of a country, but yet bringing imports to that country, and for various other elements.
- (b) The “requirements” put forward for the various countries so far as they relate to certain commodities (*e.g.*, wheat), are agreed by executives, but in other cases are demands. In the case of the United Kingdom the original demands of the various responsible departments have already been reduced by about 6,000,000 tons.
- (c) The Statistical Sub-Committee has not undertaken to examine the requirements submitted by the executives or by the several Governments, but has confined its attention to the problem of presenting the total statement in accurate and intelligible form.

The Italian delegates ask for a special allowance in respect of the length of voyage for the Northern Range owing to the serious delay experienced by vessels between Gibraltar and Italy. This special allowance would amount to about 125,000 tons d.w. of shipping.

The other representatives feel that an investigation of the actual lengths of voyages of all vessels in the particular circumstances would not justify this addition when it is borne in mind that lengths of voyage have throughout been assumed to be shorter than they are at the present moment. This assumption is the same for all concerned, and it is to be expected that improvement in convoying and the effect of summer conditions will tend to diminish any difference that may exist. Lengths of voyage can be adjusted at a future date, but for the present calculations it has been agreed that the figures should be used on the basis of the lengths of voyages, &c., previously arranged, with a mere mention of the request made by the Italian delegates.

4. The combined deficit is now estimated at 1,890,000 tons d.w., which is less than the figure previously shown because losses to United Kingdom ships have been less than were then assumed, and there has been an acquisition of Dutch tonnage. There has, on the other hand, been an alteration in the Italian demands requiring more tonnage. In connection with the requirements for Italian imports it has been assumed that the overland import of coal via Blaye will continue.

A statement showing the French point of view has been received to-day which has been appended to the French tonnage Statement II. The deficit of 1,105,000 tons shown in that statement is not the deficit appearing in Statement IV. It is given for the purpose of drawing attention to the fact that much of the tonnage in the service of France is not permanently available for import work to France.* Of course, similar considerations apply to Italy and the United Kingdom.

5. *American Tonnage and Imports.*—It has been found impossible to incorporate figures for the United States in the Statements. Pending further information, Statement IV. has been put in by the American representative in default of more complete information.

SEITERT.

G. PARDO.

JAMES A. FIELD.

W. PALIN ELDERTON.

18th April 1918.

* The French representative, while admitting that there was not necessarily disagreement concerning other methods, already approved by the Allied Maritime Transport Council, of showing the estimate of a combined deficit, felt that he could only sign the report with a reservation in respect of the particular figure of 3,900,000 in Statement III.

Statement I.

UNITED KINGDOM.

Imports in 1,000 tons.

Commodity.	Imports.			Require- ments.
	1913.	1916.	1917.	1918.
	Tons.	Tons.	Tons.	Tons.
Cereals, human consumption -	8,094	7,532	7,003	7,500
„ animal „ - -	3,000	2,000	1,533	850
Peas, beans, and dried vegetables	176	105	110	120
Sugar - - - -	1,969	1,537	1,391	1,378
Meat - - - -	1,186	1,175	986	1,097
†Oils and fats -	1,904	1,724	1,283	1,401
Other foodstuffs -	3,502	2,924	2,010	1,251
Iron ore - - -	7,565	7,004	6,205	5,860
Pyrites - - -	782	951	854	820
Iron and steel, other metals and ores, guns, ammunition, &c.	3,624	3,605	4,251	2,821
Nitrates; chemicals, tanning substances, &c. -	636	681	592	792
Mineral oils and lubricating oils not imported in tankers	267	327	427	191
Wool - - - -	434	305	334	284
Cotton - - - -	971	969	736	702
Flax, hemp, jute, silk, and textile manufactures -	756	631	433	537
Timber and manufactures - - -	11,684	6,373	3,012	2,012
Hides, leather and skins - - - -	208	203	182	131
Toonacco - - - -	75	77	22	22
Paper and paper-making materials -	1,873	1,280	586	435
Miscellaneous, including certain munitions, &c., which cannot be separated in Trade Returns.	4,087	2,923	2,467	2,067
Total - - - -	52,793	42,326	34,417	30,271

† Includes castor oil.

ITALY.

Imports in 1,000 tons.

Commodity.	Imports.			Require- ments.
	1913.	1916.	1917.	1918.
	Tons.	Tons.	Tons.	Tons.
Cereals for human consumption	—	—	2,388	3,400
„ „ animal	—	—	290	720
Peas, beans, and dried vegetables	—	—	31	60
Sugar	—	—	60	50
Meat	—	—	101	250
Oils and fats	—	—	38	36
Other foodstuffs	—	—	95	112
Castor oil	—	—	1	1
Mineral oils	—	—	77	106
Iron ore	—	—	—	—
Pyrites	—	—	—	—
Iron and steel and other metals and ores, guns, ammunition, &c.	—	—	1,507	1,329
Nitrates, chemicals, tanning substances, &c.	—	—	243	671
Coal and coke	—	—	5,042	8,300
Wool	—	—	40	40
Cotton	—	—	180	180
Flax, hemp, jute, silk, and textile manufactures	—	—	31	39
Timber and manufactures	—	—	46	45
Hides, leather and skins	—	—	21	17
Tobacco	—	—	25	25
Paper and paper-making materials	—	—	30	20
Miscellaneous	—	—	863	1,087
Total	18,000	15,500	11,109	16,488

FRANCE.

Imports in 1,000 tons.

Cereals and pulses	—	—	2,510	3,993
„ for animal consumption	—	—	727	720
Sugar	—	—	601	226
Meat	—	—	301	290
Oils and fats	—	—	715	649
Other foodstuffs	—	—	1,118	425
Castor oil	—	—	78	78
Iron ore	—	—	—	—
Pyrites	—	—	—	—
Iron and steel and other metal and ores, guns, ammunition, &c.	—	—	5,495	4,634
Nitrates, chemicals, tanning substances, &c.	—	—	1,449	1,154
Coal and coke	—	—	17,279	18,624
Wool	—	—	71	63
Cotton	—	—	274	402
Flax, hemp, jute, silk, and textile manufactures	—	—	256	260
Timber and manufactures	—	—	238	231
Hides, leather and skins	—	—	57	38
Tobacco	—	—	35	91
Paper and paper-making materials	—	—	238	385
Miscellaneous	—	—	760	1,073
Total	43,500*	39,000*	32,202	33,336

* Totals taken from Ministère des Finances Documents Statistiques sur le Commerce de la France, December 1916, but oil fuel has been deducted.

Statement II.

UNITED KINGDOM.

Tonnage in 1918—Steamships all Sizes—Figures are in 1,000 Tons D.W.

	1st January 1918.	1st March 1918.
Tonnage under National Flag - - - -	19,045	18,705
Allocated to Naval Service - - - -	2,275	2,205
„ Military - - - -	2,755	2,760
„ France* - - - -	1,340	1,300
„ Italy* - - - -	577	550
Other Countries, &c. - - - -	574	635
In service of Colonies or unsuitable for general work - - - -	2,575	2,560
Repairing (excluding very short repair)	917	1,145
Deductions - - - -	11,013	11,155
Balance under National Flag - - - -	8,032	7,550
Chartered Neutrals - - - -	160	150
	8,192	7,700

* The figures given relate to vessels which at the moment are working for France or Italy, or are proceeding to those countries although not definitely allocated for more than a single voyage. The figures do not necessarily exactly correspond with those in French and Italian figures which are shown in forms to agree with their official returns. The total tonnage assistance is not confined to the vessels actually engaged on French, Italian, or other service at the actual moment. As regards some of the vessels in the "Other Countries" group, it was not certain at the moment when the account was made up to which Ally they would sail.

ITALY.

Tonnage in 1918—Steamships all Sizes—Figures are in 1,000 Tons D.W.

	1st January 1918.	1st April 1918.
Tonnage under National Flag - - - -	1,360	1,220
Allocated to Naval - - - -	42	} 138
„ Military - - - -	100	
„ Allies, &c. - - - -	—	
In service of Colonies or/and	131	155
Unsuitable for general work - - - -	117	103
Repairing - - - -	390	442
Balance under National Flag - - - -	970	778
Definitely allocated from British, other Allies, and Neutrals - - - -	614	635
	1,584	1,413

FRANCE.

Tonnage in 1918—Steamships all sizes—Figures are in 1,000 tons D.W.

	1st Jan. 1918.*	1st April 1918.		1st Jan. 1918	1st April 1918.
Tonnage under National Flag	1,750	1,706	Balance under National Flag	1,087	1,042
			Definitely allocated from British tonnage†	1,230	1,230
Allocated to Naval -	190	190	Definitely allocated from U.S.A. tonnage - - -	125	107
" " Military -	185	185	Definitely allocated from Neutral tonnage†	650	727
" " Allies, &c. -	13	13	Definitely allocated from various sources	80	80
In service of Colonies or/and unsuitable for general work -	95	95			
Repairing - - -	180	181			
	663	664		3,172	3,186

* Estimated where definite figures were not available.

† These figures exclude such vessels as are allocated to Naval and Military Services.

FRANCE.

Balance.	D.W.
Tonnage d.w. required - - - - -	4,285
Tonnage d.w. available under the control of France 3,100	
Estimate of average of Neutral vessels allocated for a single voyage by the W.E. - - - - 80	3,130
Deficit - - - - -	1,105

Note.—Attention must be drawn to the following points :—

	Estimate d.w.
(a) In addition to the tonnage d.w. available under the control of France, import work is done by—	—
(a) French sailing vessels - - - - - about	75
(b) Vessels allocated to Military Services on the return journey from Salonica - - - - -	50
(c) British vessels trading on the way outward between United Kingdom and France, and not included above	75
(d) Neutrals in service of Neutrals from Northern Europe trading to France - - - - -	10
(e) Some Japanese vessels engaged on regular lines to United Kingdom and other tonnage - - - - -	50
(f) And diversions for nitrates, &c. - - - - -	?

Above figures are an approximate estimate subject to constant revision, these facts being permanently investigated.

(b) From the tonnage at the disposal of Great Britain must be deducted and considered as participating from time to time in carrying wheat imports, ships which are allocated by England to carry into France her share of cereals according to the Agreement of November 3rd, 1917 (*see* page 16).

Statement III.

Figures in 1,000 tons d.w.

(ESTIMATE.)

1. Requirements.

France -	-	-	-	-	-	4,285	
Italy -	-	-	-	-	-	3,940	
United Kingdom -	-	-	-	-	-	8,115	
							<u>16,340</u>

2. Tonnage Available.

France -	-	-	-	-	-	3,900*	
Italy -	-	-	-	-	-	2,850	
United Kingdom -	-	-	-	-	-	7,700	
							<u>14,450</u>
Combined Deficit -	-	-	-	-	-		<u>1,890</u>

* See footnote to paragraph 4 on page 88.

Statement IV.*Memorandum on American Tonnage Requirements for 1918.*

The American requirements of tonnage, both for carrying necessary imports and for transporting military supplies, have within the past few days been thoroughly reconsidered. The details of the revised estimates have not yet been received by the United States representative on the Allied Maritime Transport Council. The result, therefore, can at present be reported only in general terms, as follows :

1. Minimum Necessary Imports into the United States for the year 1918 will require the continuous employment of some 2,380,000 deadweight tons of shipping.
The proposed 1918 minimum imports from overseas are some 25 per cent. less than actual imports for the fiscal year 1916-17.
It is not clear to what extent the figure of 2,380,000 deadweight tons allows for double service by American ships or for indirect assistance from vessels other than United States ocean steamers.
2. The military programme for 1918, to which the United States feels itself committed, can barely be accomplished by the use of all other tonnage actually or prospectively under American control, including vessels acquired from Japan and from neutral nations.

This estimate has been based on the following assumptions :—

That deliveries of new steamers in the United States will fulfil the latest predictions of the Emergency Fleet Corporation.

That American tonnage already allocated to the Allies shall remain in their service ; but that no further tonnage shall be assigned by the United States to the use of the Allies.

That the proposed reduction of United States imports will be effected.

That losses of ships will not be in excess of recent experience.

That the average turn around between America and France can be maintained at sixty days.

April 18th, 1918.

APPENDIX 18.

Statement of Probable Imports to the end of August.

It has not been possible to obtain full information as to Allied programmes of probable imports during the five months, April–August 1918.

For convenience a British estimate has been prepared on the best information available and is appended. It must be regarded as purely provisional and not as an agreed and comprehensive estimate.

UNITED KINGDOM.

Imports expected during the Five Months, April–August 1918.

Figures in 1,000 Tons.

	Northern Europe.	Western Europe and North Africa.	North America and Gulf.	Eastern Mediterranean	West Africa and Brazil.	South Africa and Argentine.	East Africa ; Middle, East, and West Coast of South America.	Far East and Australia.	Total.
Cereals and Pulses	—	—	2,525	—	—	560	160	70	3,315
Meat (excluding Preserved Meat)	25	—	300	—	—	80	—	50	455
Sugar	—	—	460	—	10	—	25	85	580
Other Food	100	105	280	100	225	50	175	30	1,065
Wood and Timber	340	165	200	—	13	—	3	—	721
Wool	—	—	—	—	—	15	7	75	97
Flax, Hemp, and Jute	50	8	—	—	—	—	90	35	183
Raw Hides Tanning Materials, &c.	2	15	75	5	2	40	25	15	179
Iron Ore	265	2,050	—	—	—	—	—	—	2,315
Other Ores and Metals	100	420	185	30	10	1	90	60	896
Finished Shell Nitrates, Phosphate Rock and other Munitions.	4	155	800	—	—	3	145	3	1,110
Steel Ships Plates, &c.	—	2	165	—	—	4	—	2	173
Mineral Oils	—	—	470	—	—	—	—	60	530
Paper and Papermaking materials	120	17	15	—	—	—	—	—	152
Cotton	—	—	110	45	—	—	5	—	160
Miscellaneous	30	110	105	10	5	—	10	30	300
Total	1,036	3,047	5,690	190	265	753	735	515	12,231
Imports that the tonnage available is capable of bringing.	1,450	3,175	5,690	190	265	753	735	650	12,908

Note.—The tonnage available in the first column is large because much of the tonnage on the routes concerned is kept there for export work (coal) under arrangement with Norway, &c. In the case of Western Europe a similar explanation holds. In the case of the Far East group the explanation is that owing to “dropped cargoes” vessels do not reach the United Kingdom with their full cargoes.

UNITED KINGDOM.

Imports expected during the Five Months April–August 1918. In British Vessels permanently available for United Kingdom Imports only.

Figures in 1,000 Tons.

Cereals and Pulses	—	—	1,500	—	—	520	150	65	2,235
Meat (excluding Preserved Meat)	—	—	280	—	—	75	—	55	410
Sugar	—	—	90	—	—	—	20	79	189
Other Food	20	10	260	90	210	45	160	35	830
Wood and Timber	70	10	190	—	10	—	—	—	280
Wool	—	—	—	—	—	14	5	75	94
Flax, Hemp, and Jute	10	—	—	—	—	—	80	30	120
Raw Hides, Tanning Materials, &c.	—	—	70	—	—	40	20	12	142
Iron Ore	50	190	—	—	—	—	—	—	240
Other Ores and Metals	20	35	170	20	10	—	80	62	397
Finished Shell Nitrates, Phosphate Rock, and other Munitions.	—	10	750	—	—	3	130	3	896
Steel Ships Plates, &c.	—	—	150	—	—	3	—	2	155
Mineral Oils	—	—	440	—	—	—	—	55	495
Paper and Paper making Materials.	20	—	10	—	—	—	—	—	30
Cotton	—	—	100	40	—	—	—	—	140
Miscellaneous	10	10	90	—	5	—	5	27	147
Total	200	265	4,100	150	235	700	650	500	6,800

FRANCE.

Imports expected during the Five Months, April–August 1918.

Figures in 1,000 Tons.

	Northern Europe.	Western Europe and North Africa.	North America and Gulf.	Eastern Mediterranean.	West Africa and Brazil.	South Africa and Argentina.	East Africa ; Middle, East, and West Coast of South America.	Far East and Australia.	Total.
Cereals and Pulses -	—	—	1,441	—	—	225	316	46	2,023
Meat -	—	12	68	—	—	47	—	—	127
Sugar -	—	—	100	—	—	—	—	—	100
Other Food - - -	—	155	31	—	116	14	140	12	468
Wood and Timber -	—	—	92	—	5	—	—	4	101
Wool -	—	5	6	—	—	—	—	15	26
Flax, Hemp, and Jute -	4	41	3	—	—	6	34	14	102
Raw Hides, Tanning Materials -	—	8	—	—	1	22	4	—	35
Iron Ore -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Other Ores and Metals -	2	789	1,051	—	—	—	14	53	1,909
Finished Shell Nitrates, Phosphate Rock, and other Munitions.	17	214	403	—	—	—	182	13	829
Mineral Oils -	—	9	—	—	—	—	—	—	9
Paper and Paper-making Materials -	118	—	24	—	—	—	—	—	142
Cotton -	—	3	166	—	—	—	5	—	174
Coal -	—	7,114	11	—	—	—	—	—	7,125
Miscellaneous -	3	29	51	—	—	6	—	—	89
Total -	144	8,379	3,447	—	122	320	695	157	13,264

ITALY.

Imports expected during the Five Months, April–August 1918.

Figures in 1,000 Tons.

Cereals and Pulses - -	—	8	687	—	8	317	713	8	1,741
Meat -	—	—	22	—	7	71	—	12	112
Sugar -	—	—	7	—	—	—	—	4	11
Other Food -	2	6	16	1	8	—	—	—	33
Wood and Timber -	—	2	7	—	—	—	1	—	10
Wool -	—	2	—	—	—	5	—	2	9
Flax, Hemp, and Jute -	—	3	—	—	—	—	5	—	8
Raw Hides, Tanning Materials -	—	—	—	—	—	4	1	—	5
Iron Ore -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Other Ores and Metals -	—	153	338	—	—	1	—	—	492
Finished Shell, Nitrates, Phosphate Rock and other Munitions.	—	90	55	2	—	—	40	2	189
Mineral Oils -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Paper and Paper-making Materials -	3	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	5
Cotton -	—	—	30	2	—	—	8	—	40
Coal -	—	2,905	—	—	—	—	—	—	2,905
Miscellaneous -	—	144	35	1	2	8	4	7	195
Total -	5	3,315	1,197	6	25	400	772	35	5,755

April 19th, 1918.

APPENDIX 19.**Memorandum as to the Relations between the Allied Maritime Transport Council and the Council for War Purchases and Finance.**

The Inter-Ally Council on War Purchases and Finance at their last meeting passed the following resolution :—

“The Council unanimously believe that it is necessary to establish a close co-operation between the Inter-Ally Council on War Purchases and Finance and the Allied Council on Maritime Transport. The respective secretariats of both organisations should prepare a draft of an agreement to be presented to each of the two Councils for approval.”

In the absence of Mr. Cook in Paris it has not been found possible to prepare a report with him, but in the meantime the following outline of the position has been discussed by the different Departments of the Transport Council's Organisation and agreed.

The dangers of conflicting decisions between the two Councils are probably not as great as might appear at first sight, and comparatively simple arrangements for accommodation are likely to be considered. The governing factors are as follows:—

(1) The Council for War Purchases is concerned with purchases in America and not in the world generally.

The general world shortage of tonnage with which the Transport Council is concerned does not, however, mean a shortage of tonnage in North America, and North America being the nearest important source of supply, the shorter the tonnage generally becomes, the more important is it that North America should be supplied with as many ships as she can load.

The position of the Shipping Department and of the Transport Council, therefore, will be generally that the amount of shipping space likely to be available in North America during any future time will be simply so much shipping space as there seems a reasonable hope of America being able to load with essential commodities, having regard to the difficulties of the actual supply of the article, of railway and of port facilities, and of finance.

The Transport Council, therefore, does not need to and cannot, as a result of the general shortage of tonnage, give an estimate of how many ships can be provided for North America, as they would do if the War Purchases Council were concerned with a distant market of supply, say Australia or India.

(2) It will be the point of view of the Transport Council that since in a last resort finance can be created by a Vote of Congress, whereas ships cannot, financial considerations ought to be subordinated to those of tonnage. This, however, for the reasons given in (1) above, does not mean that the Transport Council will say to the War Purchases Council, "We can provide so many ships, can you provide enough tonnage to fill them?" but, on the contrary, it means, "It is so impossible for the Transport Council to find ships for the more distant sources of supply, that it is of the utmost importance that finance should always be available for as many purchases of essential commodities as it is physically possible for the Supply Department to obtain in North America."

(3) The two Councils start in fact from the extreme opposite ends of a very long and intricate process, a process which may be roughly described as follows:—

The Transport Council, finding that there is a shortage of a given quantity of imports, and after a general survey of the character of the different national requirements, may arrange as between the different countries for a distribution of that deficit with perhaps some general indication as to the main classes of commodities, *e.g.*, food, munitions, &c., on which the deficit will fall. The National Organisations will then deal with the problem in greater detail.

In the case of Great Britain, for instance, the Cabinet Committee on the Restrictions of Imports would continue its work of cutting down the British import programmes on receipt of a communication from the Transport Council (as hitherto from the Ministry of Shipping). As to the extent to which reduction is necessary that Committee, however, whilst perhaps deciding, *e.g.*, that munitions should bear a further specified deficit, would not arrange the munitions programme in detail, with its allocation of purchases of, *e.g.*, guns and explosives as between the different sources of supply, still less would the Transport Council be attempting any such detailed task. The procedure would rather be that the Ministry of Munitions, having revised its programme as the result of the general arrangements indicated above, would be modifying its purchases in America and consequently its demand for finance for those purchases. At this, the last stage, the War Purchases Council is concerned.

Where purchase is being effected co-operatively through an Allied body, as in the case of the Wheat Executive, it is the Executive and not a National Department which would take this part in the procedure.

(4) The general position is therefore that the Transport Council's operations will react upon the War Purchases Council's via the National Organisations and the Department or via the Executives; and the Transport Council itself will never be making its programme out in anything like the detail in which the War Purchases Council will be. Where there is a Purchasing Executive, the Executive will be the real link between the two Councils, keeping in touch as it will on the one hand with the shipping arrangements and on the other with the purchasing arrangements.

In these circumstances, the procedure to secure co-ordination would appear to be as follows :—

- (a) There should be general interchange of information between the two Councils ; copies of statements as to shipping on the one hand and as to purchases on the other being exchanged between the two Organisations.
- (b) It is desirable that, so far as practicable, the general scheme for classification of imports should be on similar lines for the two Councils although the War Purchases Council will want a much more detailed classification.
- (c) The Secretariat of the Transport Council should keep in close touch with the London Office of the War Purchases Council, and
- (d) Apart from the general information as to each other's programmes secured by the above procedure, the Executives, keeping in touch, as they necessarily will, with the arrangements for shipping on the one hand and for purchases on the other, will regard themselves as responsible for seeing that conflicting decisions are not asked for.

April 20th, 1918.

APPENDIX 20.

Relation of the Council and its Staff to the Executives.

N.B.—*The word Executive is throughout the memorandum applied both to bodies like the Wheat Executive, which have real executive power and to others, like the Nitrate Executive, which prepare and criticise programmes but do not take executive action. It will be seen from the Resolutions printed on page 71 that the latter bodies are to be known as Programme Committees.*

Extract from Minutes of first session of the Council :—

"The Secretary was instructed to prepare, in conjunction with the heads of the several Divisions of the permanent organisation, a comprehensive report as to the relations of the Council and its staff to the several Executives for consideration by the Council at its next meeting. This report was to be written after consultation with representatives of the various Executives, and of the departments concerned with commodities for which Executives are not yet in existence, and to include proposals both as to the division of work between the staff of the Council and the Executives, and as to steps, if any, requiring to be taken to secure the establishment of new executives or alterations in the functions of existing ones.

The French representatives had given notice that they wished to discuss the general question of the relation of the Council to the Executives, but M. Clémentel announced that he would prefer that the discussion of this subject should be deferred till the next session of the Council."

It will be convenient before attempting to make specific proposals to set out some of the main considerations which require to be borne in mind.

1. It must be remembered that the Executives are not appointed by, and are not the direct servants of, the Council, and that in some cases they have and must have functions which do not in any way concern the Council. One of the main objects of the Wheat Executive, for instance, is to avoid the evils of competitive purchase by purchasing co-operatively. This part of the Executive's work is work with which in itself the Council is not concerned, as it does not affect either the quantity of cereals required or the amount of transport. It is important to bear this consideration in mind, because, while the Council will naturally desire such an organisation of Executives as will best meet its own purpose, the Council's needs are not, and cannot be, the sole determining factor. Other needs of Executive Departments, &c., have necessarily to be considered, and the Council may have to adjust its requirements to an organisation determined mainly upon other grounds. This will mean in effect that there will be a lesser degree of uniformity in the constitution of the different

Executives than would be the case if they had no other duties than those which came within the scope of the Council.

2. It is one of the main principles underlying the Paris resolutions that the criticism of import programmes which make demands upon shipping should be effected in the first instance by means of bodies consisting of experts in the different classes of imports, and not by bodies consisting of shipping representatives. At the same time it was of course contemplated that the import programmes so drawn up would have to be drawn up with a view to tonnage limitations, would be subject to criticism by the Council and its staff, and would have to be subsequently modified to accord with general decisions as to the allocation of tonnage.

3. One of the most fundamental difficulties of the Council's work is that ordinary tonnage is interchangeable between different supply services, so that in a sense nearly every supply service competes with every other service, and it is impossible to state with accuracy what would be the effect of a particular alteration in one service because it reacts in any one or more of a number of possible ways upon all other supply services. It would therefore be of great advantage that, so far as the character of a particular commodity requires a ship or shipping space of a particular kind which is not interchangeable, the machinery for dealing with that commodity should be such as to enable it to be separated out from the general problem of the allocation of ordinary tonnage, the sphere within which every service competes with every other service being thus reduced. This, as explained below, applies in practice to the important classes of commodities, meat and oils. This does not mean of course, that meat and refrigerated space, and oil fuel and tank tonnage would be removed from the purview of the Council or that in case of disputes appeals to the Council would be prevented. On the contrary, it is to be clearly understood that these commodities and the tonnage come within the general scope of the Transport Council like other commodities and other tonnage, but the Executives or other bodies dealing with these two commodities could work separately without competition with each other or with the other Executives.

4. It has at various times been suggested that imports should be covered by three or four main Executives, (1) a Food Executive, (2) a Munitions Executive, (3) a Raw Material Executive, with (4) possibly a separate Executive or other body for coal. Before discussing whether grouping in this fashion is desirable, it may be well to consider some of the special problems that arise in connection with the main classes of imports. It will be seen that one of the inherent difficulties is that some of the commodities will not fall in either of the above categories, and at the same time require to be considered as a whole.

(i) *Meat*.—The great bulk of meat is brought either in ships of a special type (refrigerator vessels) or in refrigerated space on ships also used for other purposes. While ships and space on ships of this character may be used for other cargoes, it may be taken as a working rule that they will be only used for refrigerated produce and meat. It must of course be remembered that bacon requires in some cases to be brought in refrigerated space, and in other cases can be brought in ordinary cargo space, and also that there are certain articles other than meat (butter for example) which require to be brought in refrigerated space, while, on the other hand, preserved meat (the supplies of which affect the quantity of imports of frozen meat) can be brought in ordinary cargo space. In spite of these exceptions, however, it may be taken generally as a working rule that the meat imports of the Allies must be determined not by the general tonnage position, but by the limits of refrigerated space. One thing that is vitally necessary, however, is that there should be a proper co-ordination of the Allied Import Programmes for military and civilian meat together. An effective Allied body including both military and civilian meat within its functions should work out their programme with the definite knowledge that (subject to certain reductions for butter, &c., and for further submarine losses) they could have a specific amount of refrigerator tonnage under Allied control. This would mean that so far as they could buy in the nearest market (North America as compared with the Argentine or Australia), they could increase their programme, and their programme would be a relatively firm one as not being subject to calls from other supply services or compelled to make calls upon such services. It is essential, however, that for such a scheme to work, the body in question should have within its purview military as well as civilian meat. This would be quite consistent with military meat having a definite priority up to an agreed point, but not with the establishment of two separate authorities dealing with the meat required for the two purposes.

It is essential that military and civilian meat should be included within one programme and should be interchangeable. The Allied civilian and military meat authorities require to buy as a whole in each market and draw up comprehensive programmes, and the allocation of shipping to the nearest source should be determined at any moment by the total amount of meat available at that source without regard to whether it ultimately goes into military or civilian consumption. If this system were arranged the ordinary cargo-carrying capacity of vessels which have refrigerated space could be regarded as subservient to the meat programme. Any such vessels could be allotted in accordance with the meat programme. They could then take such general commodities in their general cargo space as may be convenient, and the allocation of the general cargo steamers could be made with the knowledge that such and such general cargo space would be so available at the particular source of supply.

(ii) *Oil Fuel*.—In exactly the same way and for the above reasons it would be extremely convenient if oil fuel, the great bulk of which is brought in tank tonnage, could be similarly separated out from the main problem of the allocation of general cargo vessels, an Inter-Allied machinery dealing with the programme and supplies of this commodity and the vessels being routed in accordance with that programme. This would again be a substantial reduction of the difficult sphere within which every supply service is competing with every other. For it to be effective, however, it is essential that the one point at which there is an overlapping of general commodities, viz., the use of double bottoms on ordinary cargo vessels for the carriage of oil fuel should be discontinued. Separate proposals are being made on this subject (*see* Appendix 24, page 109).

(iii) *Cereals*.—There is in existence an effective Allied machinery—the Wheat Executive—which has had a long experience of executive working and in general meets the requirements of the Council. Not only are the criticism and allocation more effective because of the long experience the Executive has had, but the practical priority that has been accorded by general consent to cereals at any rate during the first half of this year has prevented the fundamental difficulty of the competition of this programme with other programmes arising in quite so acute a form as exists in other cases. It will, of course, be remembered that the Executive has important duties, such as co-operative purchase, which do not concern the Council itself, and also that it has a very wide scope governing all classes of cereals.

(iv) *Oil Seeds*.—An Oil Seeds Executive has been formed, but has never come into effective working. The problem presented by this class of commodity presents particular difficulties in relation to any proposal to group all food commodities under a food executive owing to the fact that it cuts across all three categories—food, munitions, and raw materials. Seeds are used for the production of margarine (food) and glycerine (munitions), and, in addition, there is the important question of the industrial interests concerned in the crushing of seeds and the manufacture of soap, &c., which makes the problem also one of raw materials and civilian interests. As seeds are purchased both from Allied and Neutral sources, the problem of avoiding competitive purchase needs to be met by an Allied body.

(v) *Sugar*.—The Sugar Executive was formed but has never begun to work. This is partly because of the much greater interest of Great Britain in sugar, which is a more important element in its general food supply than in the case of France and Italy, who have home-produced wine as a partial substitute. All the countries, however, including America, import sugar, and as it is purchased from neutral countries, there is the problem of competitive purchase. It is clear, too, that in some form or another sugar must also, from the point of view of the requirements of the Transport Council, be covered by Allied machinery.

(vi) *Coal*.—Coal presents a problem of particular difficulty. It is necessary to consider :—

- (a) Coal required for the Allied Navies.
- (b) Coal required for the internal consumption, both civilian and military, of Italy.
- (c) Coal required for consumption, both military and civilian, in France.
- (d) Coal required for bunker stations.
- (e) Coal required for South America, Norway, and other neutral countries.

Great Britain and North America produce their own coal. The problem is, apart from the variety of services affected, different from, *e.g.*, the cereal problem in that (a) coal is purchased in Allied countries, particularly Great Britain, where prices are fixed and the problem of competitive purchase does not need to be dealt with by an Executive; (b) there is no problem, as in the case of cereals, of shortage of the commodity itself; the only limiting factor is shipping, and the whole question therefore becomes a shipping problem; (c) the coal service has particular affinity from the shipping point of view with the ore service (*see* below). In these circumstances what is required is some form of machinery not necessarily permanent in character and not necessarily on the ordinary model of an Executive which will determine, subject to revision from time to time, the standard quantities to be received by the different importing countries, the problem thereafter becoming simply a problem of the allocation of ships.

(vii) *Ore*.—In the imports of ore Great Britain has an overwhelming interest, the seaborne imports into France, Italy, and America being relatively unimportant. In practice the ore service has to be worked in conjunction with the export of coal to France and Italy, the same vessels being normally employed to bring ore back on their return journey. It may be remarked incidentally that ore cuts across two of the main categories besides affecting the coal service, for while the great bulk of ore is used for munitions and other war purposes, it also has certain other uses, and as it is a raw material for ships which affect all services including food, it in a sense concerns every class of commodity.

(viii) *Paper*.—The imports of paper, while considerable in bulk, are not of great importance from the point of view of the Transport Council, because on the programmes as at present reduced the great bulk of paper and wood pulp imported is brought in the return voyages of vessels which have for other reasons to be sent with coal to Scandinavia. It may be remarked also that a large proportion both of wood pulp and of paper comes in vessels whose cargoes it is for other reasons difficult to control with exactness.

(ix) *Timber*.—With the exception of certain special classes of timber required, *e.g.*, for aviation the imports of timber while of great bulk are relatively of little importance (in view of the reduction in requirements and increase in home production) for the same reason as paper, *viz.*, the great bulk is brought in vessels returning from Scandinavia, &c.

(x) *Nitrates*.—A Nitrate Executive has been formed and is dealing with the problem of competitive purchase and allocation as between the different countries. As nitrates, however, are at the basis of the munitions programmes of each country, the exact programme and the limitations accepted from the tonnage point of view can hardly be settled without relation to a wider authority than the one covering nitrates alone and probably some form of Inter-Allied Conference on Munitions as a whole requires to be established to deal with the problem as well as the specific Executive upon Nitrates.

(xi) *Other Raw Materials*.—Of these the most important are cotton, wool, flax, hemp, and jute. The problem of including a large variety of articles, of which the above are only samples, although the most important, is particularly difficult. It is, for instance, much more difficult to measure the needs of Lancashire for cotton, with, *e.g.*, the perhaps corresponding though smaller need of France for silk, than to measure the relative needs of the two countries for the same articles, *e.g.*, cereals.

The National organisations which have in fact been dealing with the different commodities during the last three years of the war have also to be carefully considered. In practice in this country cotton has been looked after by an Association of persons connected with the trade under the general directions and guidance of the Board of Trade, while flax, hemp, and jute have been controlled and generally looked after by the War Office.

5. The problem described above has been discussed on several occasions by the heads of the several divisions of the council's staff, and individual members have had unofficial conversations with various members of executives and departments affected. It seemed very undesirable, however, to approach the executives or departments officially until the outline of a policy is clearly established. It was therefore decided to present this report, with the following tentative proposals, to the Council before proceeding further.

PROPOSALS.

(a) The Council should recognise that where Executives have functions outside that of arranging programmes (such as co-operative purchase, &c.) their constitution, &c. must be partly determined by those functions, and similarly that the very different circumstances which affect the import of different classes of commodities will necessarily result in the Executives dealing with them being of different character and scope. The Council should therefore not attempt to secure any exact uniformity in the constitution and functions of the Executives, but should be content if a suitable body is in existence and if that body effectively does the work (specified below) which the Council requires.

(b) The Council requires that the main classes of imports should be examined by an Allied body or bodies which will do the following work and report to the Council.

Functions of Executives.

(c) Obtain such information as is practicable and desirable to determine the requirements of each Allied country for the class of commodities dealt with, including past consumption and stocks.

(d) Secure effective Allied criticism of the requirements with a view to seeing that the general programme distributes the sacrifice entailed by any necessary shortage as equally as possible between the different countries, and in such a way as to be least injurious to the prosecution of the war.

(e) Prepare a programme for such period, or periods, and on such a basis as the Council may desire, the programmes both as between the different countries, and as between the different commodities dealt with by the several executives, being as nearly as possible comparable and uniform, and also being so designed as to enable them to be readily adjusted to tonnage calculations and to take due account of the varying strain imposed upon tonnage according as the country of shipment is near or distant.

(f) Forward the programmes so prepared to the staff of the Council with all such supplementary information as to stocks, &c., as may enable the Council to judge between the competing claims of other classes of imports for tonnage.

As regards the competing claims of different countries for their share of a given commodity, it is desirable that in every possible case the Executive should agree upon the distribution without appeals to the Council, the Council's main consideration being *e.g.*, the competing claims of cereals and munitions, not the competing claims of France and Great Britain for cereals.

(g) The programmes so prepared by the Executives to be sent to the staff of the Council, who would consider them in relation to the total tonnage available and attempt to arrange reductions with the Executives. So far as the authority delegated by the respective Governments to their representatives on the Executives or the views of their representatives as to the possibility of reduction render it impossible to meet the total deficit in this way, the Executive would furnish a report showing both as regards each country and for the programme as a whole the reasons against further reduction.

Further Procedure.

(h) The position so resulting to be considered by the Council with a view to recommending to the different Governments that they should endeavour to reduce their requirements either generally or in specified directions to a specified extent. The respective Governments would then deal with the question through their national machinery (the British Cabinet Committee on Restriction of Imports and any corresponding bodies in other countries); and any reductions so arranged would be dealt with in detail and incorporated in the programmes of the different commodities through the national representatives on the Executives.

(i) It would be expected, however, that the national representatives would have substantial authority to agree reductions to a considerable extent, and that, in the intervals of general reviews of the whole import programme by each country in the manner indicated in (vi) they would secure the assent of their respective Governments to particular modifications which may be necessary.

Constitution.

(j) It is desirable that American full representatives should be on each Executive in the same position as the representatives of the other countries.

(k) Subject to the above objects and general procedure being observed, no definite and uniform policy should be laid down as to whether the Executives should have other duties not concerning the Council, should be permanent bodies or periodical or occasional conferences of representatives.

Proposals as to particular Executives.

(l) *Meat*.—It is proposed to impress upon the several Governments that it is of great importance from the point of view of the Council that military as well as civilian meat shall be brought within the scope of the Meat Executive, which should be in a position to frame programmes for meat as a whole, and to arrange that meat shall be interchangeable as between the two services. This may mean a preliminary conference of Ministers or others representing both the civilian and military food supply services, with a view to deciding upon a policy as to the relative priority of military and civilian meat, and making any necessary changes in the authority and composition of the Executive. With these arrangements made, it would be possible for the Executive to make their programmes (subject to certain specified deductions for butter, &c.) on the basis of having all the refrigerator space under Allied control allotted in accordance with them.

(m) *Oil Fuel, Petroleum, &c.*—Subject to the release of double bottoms from the carriage of oil fuel (as to which see Appendix 24, page 109) the Petroleum Conference will presumably arrange programmes for the conveyance of oil fuel, and endeavour to make arrangements with the respective Governments for the provision of tank vessels in accordance therewith. If this proves possible, there will be no competition between oil fuel and the other commodities requiring ordinary cargo tonnage.

(n) *Cereals*.—The Wheat Executive of course covers this class of commodity and no proposals are necessary.

(o) *Oil Seeds*.—All that is necessary appears to be for the proposed Executive to be finally constituted, and to proceed with its work, and to make the necessary communications with the respective departments representing munitions and industrial interests, so far as they, in addition to the food interests primarily represented by the Executives, are concerned.

(p) *Sugar*.—It would appear desirable that the proposed Sugar Executive which has never yet commenced to work, should be asked to meet and produce programmes on the model of the other Executives.

(q) It would appear desirable that the above Executives for seeds and sugar as well as for cereals should proceed for the time being with the work in which the Council is primarily interested, viz., the arrangement of Allied programmes, without attempting to determine at this moment whether it is desirable that they should be either replaced by one Food Executive or co-ordinated by a Food Executive which would treat the above Executives as Sub-Executives reporting to itself.

(r) *Nitrates*.—An Executive already exists, and no comment is necessary except to remark that the nitrates being the basis of the munition programmes require to be brought into relation with the general Allied munition programme (see next item).

(s) *Other Munitions*.—It does not appear practicable to form Executives on the ordinary model to cover other munitions besides nitrates. It is, however, understood that the Munitions Departments of the several countries are now engaged in forming a central office to collect statistics as to the munitions programmes of the different countries, and to arrange periodical conferences by which these programmes would be agreed in main outline. It would appear sufficient for the purpose of the Council to accept programmes so arranged.

(t) *Coal*.—For the reasons indicated above, what is apparently required is some form of machinery not necessarily on the ordinary model of an Executive, which will consider, subject to revision from time to time, the standard quantities to be received by the different importing countries. For the time being it might be well for the Council itself to appoint a standing committee with a composition somewhat

similar to that of the Committee which is now considering the immediate French/Italian coal position with a view to reporting to the Council for a decision. Further consideration is being given to the question of arranging for the appointment of a permanent body who would consider the coal imports of France/Italy from the point of view of the essential needs of those two countries, and not, in the first instance, from the point of view of tonnage.

(u) *Paper, Timber, other Raw Materials, &c.*—The main articles concerned still left over are paper, cotton, wool, flax, hemp, and jute, and there are, of course, a considerable number of other articles of less importance from the point of view of shipping. These articles present special difficulties and later proposals will be made.

It has been thought desirable to present the above interim report to the Council before approaching the different Executives and departments officially. If the general outline suggested above is approved, the necessary negotiations will at once be commenced with a view to developing the assistance as rapidly as possible.

April 20th, 1918.

APPENDIX 21.

Agreement in regard to Neutral Tonnage.

The Governments of France, Italy, and Great Britain are agreed that the whole of the neutral tonnage ought to be put under Inter-Allied control to be employed in accordance with the resolutions of the Paris Conference of the 1st December 1917.

In order to secure the effective execution of this principle they have further agreed upon the following modifications in the present practice of dealing with the chartering of neutral ships:—

- (1) All future time-charters of neutral steamers will be made under the direction of the Inter-Allied Chartering Committee, acting for the Allied Maritime Transport Council, and on terms and conditions prescribed by that Council. The charters will be signed by firms nominated by the Associated Governments in proportions to be settled by agreement. Pending the conclusion of such agreement, the signing of the charters will be so arranged that the nominees of France, Italy, and Great Britain shall have as nearly as may be equal amounts of tonnage chartered to them direct from the owners. In the event of the United States Government subscribing to this agreement and joining the Committee, a further agreement will be necessary in regard to the proportions in which the charters will be made.
- (2) Every steamer so time-chartered will at once be relet to the Inter-Allied Chartering Committee, acting for the Allied Maritime Transport Council, for the period of the war or for the period of the charter if that should prove to be less than the period of the war. Every steamer so time-chartered, whichever of the nominees may have signed the time-charter, shall be employed during the period of the war as directed by the Allied Maritime Transport Council in accordance with the resolutions of the Paris Conference of the 1st December 1917.
- (3) Each steamer will be allocated for a round voyage, or, in the case of vessels in short voyage trades, for a period of three months, the period for which the allocation is made being determined by the Inter-Allied Chartering Committee, acting for the Allied Maritime Transport Council, at the time of allocation, and the sub-charter arranged accordingly.
- (4) All re-charters of steamers over 1,000 tons deadweight which have been allotted by the Inter-Allied Chartering Committee since the 15th February 1917, and all steamers under 1,000 tons deadweight allotted since the 9th May 1917 will come up for re-allocation and will be dealt with as in clauses 1, 2, and 3 above.
- (5) So far as possible neutral tonnage will be taken on time-charter or for consecutive voyages, and charter-parties for a single voyage will only be approved when it is recognised that a time-charter cannot be effected.

- (6) All allocations of tonnage made in accordance with the preceding paragraphs are subject to any revision which may be found necessary by the Allied Maritime Transport Council, established in accordance with the decisions of the Paris Conference of the 1st December 1917.
- (7) The Associated Governments will keep one another fully informed of all steps taken for the purpose of securing further neutral or ex-enemy tonnage.

APPENDIX 22.

Prevention of Arrest of Vessels.

1. It is obvious that in the general Allied interest it is highly desirable that the immobilisation of ships on account of legal proceedings should be prevented at all costs.

2. On grounds of public policy British courts will not permit the arrest of any British, Allied, or neutral ship which is in the service of any one of the Allied Governments. By this course of action British courts often deprive the British owner of any security he may have for prosecuting a legitimate claim without conferring upon him the immunity which the Allied or neutral owner secures owing to the policy of the courts.

In the case of France (and most continental countries) the liability in French courts of the French shipowner for damage done depends upon an action *in rem*; is limited to the value of his ship, and disappears altogether if the ship is lost before an opportunity for arrest and therefore for obtaining security occurs. The liability of the British shipowner is independent of anything that happens to his ship and is only subject to the statutory limitation of 8*l.* or 15*l.* per ton.

Consequently, while the French shipowner has always his personal remedy against the British shipowner, the latter, if he cannot arrest the French ship, must insure the amount of his claim against the possibility of the loss of the French ship, an insurance which with present risks at sea and legal delays may well prove prohibitive.

3. The granting of reciprocity in respect of freedom from arrest would therefore still leave the French shipowner in a more favourable position than the British owner. As compared with the present position he would be worse off to the extent that his claim against a British owner would have to be made in a British court subject to the statutory limitation of British law, instead of in a French court where the only limitation is the value of the ship.

4. It is understood that the French and possibly the other Allied Governments take the view that it is difficult to interfere with the rights secured to a plaintiff shipowner by their municipal law, even though such interference is admittedly in the interests of tonnage generally. The Ministry of Shipping are, however, of opinion that the interests of the Allied cause ought to be regarded as sufficient to override for the time being all interests of private citizens, and they cannot refrain from urging that while ships requisitioned by or in the service of Allied States occupy and assert a privileged position in British courts (often to the prejudice of British owners), ships requisitioned by the British Government and placed freely at the disposal of the Allies ought in the present state of affairs to receive not less favourable treatment in Allied States.

5. The Ministry of Shipping therefore desire to press upon the Allied Governments the desirability of following the example set by British courts in conferring immunity from arrest upon any ships in the service of any Allied Government.

April 20th, 1918.

APPENDIX 23.

**An Explanatory Note prepared by the Secretary to the Council on the following
Memorandum by Mr. Poland, Director for Europe, Commission of Relief in Belgium,
as to the Commission's Shipping Requirements.**

Appendix 23 sets out the case for additional assistance for Belgian Relief from the point of view of the Commission.

It will be seen that the Commission's needs are stated at 120,000 gross tons of cargo a month.

Towards the conveyance of this cargo they had under their control until recently 134,000 tons deadweight Belgian tonnage with certain American vessels in addition, and were also able to charter Neutrals to supplement the imports brought in these vessels.

Three factors have operated to make their position a serious one:—

- (a) They have sustained certain losses by War and Marine Risk which have reduced the Belgian tonnage to about 110,000 tons deadweight.
- (b) The American Government has announced that it must withdraw the American (Wagner) vessels.
- (c) The arrangements made between the different Allied Governments for the complete control of Neutral shipping have rendered the continued chartering of Neutral vessels under the old conditions no longer practicable.

The Commission put their need for additional assistance at 254,300 tons deadweight. This calculation makes an allowance for the 20 per cent. increase to build up stocks of bread grain, for 15 per cent. to represent the difference between the deadweight of cargo carried (*i.e.* with allowance of bunkers, &c.), and 20 per cent. allowance for protection (loss of time in docking, &c.).

A communication from America indicates that the Commission have felt recently that, with the approaching spring, the shipment might be reduced temporarily to 90,000 tons of food per month without causing any disaster, and that an additional 60,000 tons of shipping would require to be allotted to the Belgian Relief. The calculations apparently proceed upon the basis of allowing a two months' voyage without allowance for the factors mentioned above as increasing the deadweight necessary.

It would appear necessary that some allowance must certainly be made for those factors, though not necessarily quite so large a one as indicated in Mr. Poland's report, and the tonnage required, while less than the 254,000 tons mentioned in Mr. Poland's report, would appear to be considerably in excess of the 600,00 tons.

It must be remembered that the following decision is included in the report of the Paris Conference of December last:—

1° — C.R.B.

“Les Alliés déclarent placer en priorité de tous leurs approvisionnements, le ravitaillement des populations belges et françaises envahies, sur la base du programme de la C.R.B. tel qu'il a été précisé au cours des conférences tenues à Londres entre la C.R.B. et le Gouvernement anglais. Ils garantissent le tonnage nécessaire à l'exécution de ce programme, compte tenu des navires que la C.R.B. a présentement à sa disposition et de ceux qu'elle pourrait se procurer dans l'avenir, soit directement, soit avec le concours des Gouvernements alliés.”

April 20th, 1918.

**Memorandum by Mr. Poland for the Meeting of the Inter-Allied Maritime
Council, Paris, 22nd April 1918.**

The civil population of the occupied territories of Northern France and Belgium is, approximately, 9,600,000 people. Normally, Belgium imports two-thirds of her food supply, and France a large proportion. At the present time, practically all the native food resources of Northern France and the military zone of the Etapes in Belgium (Flanders) have been wiped out, except for 190 grammes per capita per day

of potatoes from native production and 100 grammes of indigenous flour, and the population of about 3,600,000 persons depends almost solely upon imported foodstuffs. In the remaining territory of the General Government, including about 6,000,000 people, through lack of fertilisers, work animals, &c., the native crops, as in France, have diminished to about 40 per cent. of pre-war production.

The Governments of France, Belgium, England, and the United States have given their solemn guarantee to the people of the invaded regions that they will be provided with at least sufficient foods to prevent starvation and the permanent physical deterioration of the race.

The Commission for Relief in Belgium and Northern France have been entrusted by the Governments with the responsibility of providing this necessary food.

In carrying out their duties, the Commission have prepared a programme of monthly imports, based upon the absolutely minimum living ration necessary to feed the civil populations according to this minimum standard. This ration, which takes into account all the native resources of the country, has been approved by the respective Governments. The imported products which it provides produce 60 per cent. of the entire food value of the people's monthly ration, and they cannot be reduced without incipient starvation resulting.

General Conditions.

	Tons.
The overseas importations require to provide the ration amount to 120,000 gross tons of cargo (Annex A) - - - - -	120,000
Allowance of 15 per cent. to obtain ship deadweight - - - - -	18,000
TOTAL MONTHLY DEADWEIGHT SHIP REQUIREMENTS - - - - -	138,000
Belgian requisitioned Relief tonnage (D.W.) monthly - - - - -	50,000
SHORTAGE TO BE MADE UP BY NEUTRAL CHARTERS OR OTHERWISE, MONTHLY	88,000
Permanent deadweight fleet requirements at 66 days per round trip (138,000 tons monthly) - - - - -	303,600
20 per cent. allowance for protection - - - - -	60,700
TOTAL DEADWEIGHT PERMANENT FLEET REQUIREMENTS - - - - -	364,300
Less permanent Belgian Relief fleet - - - - -	110,000
SHORTAGE TO BE MADE UP BY NEUTRAL VESSELS OR OTHERWISE - - - - -	254,300

The Commission have been able to arrange additional neutral charters as per list attached (Annex B) for one or two voyages, which nevertheless leave a shortage for the monthly periods ending:—

	Tons.
15th June - - - - -	55,000
15th July - - - - -	70,000
15th August - - - - -	60,000

as shown in Annex A.

Owing to the Commission's inability, in spite of appeals to the Governments, to secure charters during February and March, there is at present, due to lack of importations, a shortage of bread grains in the occupied territories equivalent to a complete deprivation of bread from overseas grain for 20 days. The situation confronting the people of Belgium and France is the most serious since the war began.

By a decision of the Inter-Allied Council which met in Paris December 5th last, it was established that the relief requirements of Belgium and France, both as to food and ships, should have priority over all other Allied requirements. This has been put in practice as to foodstuffs, but in regard to shipping, while the principle has been acknowledged, the respective shipping executives have not given effect to the decision.

It is, therefore, proposed at this meeting that the necessary steps be taken to render the decision practically operative.

To this end, on the first of each month, the Commission will be requested to furnish to the Inter-Allied Maritime Transport Council, London, a statement showing

its requirements, shipping arrangements, and deficiencies in tonnage and steamers for the succeeding three periods of 30 days, beginning with the 15th of the month.

The Inter-Allied Maritime Council will thereupon indicate to the Relief the steamers which may be used to complete its programme, by name, place, and date of loading.

April 18th, 1918.

ANNEX A. TO APPENDIX 23.

Overseas Foodstuff and Shipping Requirements.

Three Months—15 May to 15 August 1918.

"A."—Minimum Monthly Requirements from Overseas.

The following programme is in accordance with the monthly programme authorised by the Governments except that it has not yet been approved by the Governments to replace the loss of Holland purchases by overseas imports, which must be done unless the ration is to be correspondingly reduced.

Commodity.	Net Tons. Foodstuffs.	Gross Tons.	Remarks.
Wheat - - - - -	79,400	79,400	Includes 20 per cent. increase to build up stocks.
Flour - - - - -	2,000	2,000	
Maize - - - - -	9,000	9,000	
Barley - - - - -	1,000	1,000	For yeast making.
Bacon - - - - -	2,766	3,333	Includes 500 tons bacon and lard to replace in part eliminated Holland purchases.
Lard - - - - -	5,534	7,090	
Meat - - - - -	1,000	1,887	
Rice - - - - -	2,100	2,100	Includes 1,100 tons rice, beans, and peas to replace in part Holland purchases.
Beans and peas - - - - -	5,100	5,100	
Sugar - - - - -	1,200	1,200	
Soap - - - - -	1,300	1,300	
Coffee - - - - -	1,000	1,000	
Milk (condensed) - - - - -	1,700	1,700	
Cocoa - - - - -	600	600	
Totals - - - - -	113,700	116,710	
Lost space on 16,000 tons cased or barrelled goods and on 12,000 tons bagged goods -		3,000	

Total monthly cargo requirements, 119,710 tons; say, 120,000 tons.

"B."—Cargoes arranged and Ships required.

Period.	Deliveries at Rotterdam arranged. Tons.	Shortage under 120,000 tons.	No. of 5,000-ton Vessels required to eliminate Shortage.	For Loading in U.S.A. Date.
15 May to 15 June - - -	65,000	55,000	11	16 April to 15 May.
16 June to 15 July - - -	50,000	70,000	14	16 May to 15 June.
16 July to 15 Aug. - - -	60,000	60,000	12	16 June to 15 July.

ANNEX B. TO APPENDIX 23.

List of Neutral and other Steamers Loading U.S.A. for May, June, and July Delivery, Rotterdam.

Probable arrivals, May :—							Tons.
Nor.	" Bjornstjerne Bjornson "	-	-	-	-	-	8,050
S.	" Carlsholm "	-	-	-	-	-	4,935
N.	" Consul Cerfitzon "	-	-	-	-	-	4,000
Fr.	" Eole "	-	-	-	-	-	3,900
N.	" Jethon "	-	-	-	-	-	7,000
N.	" Tricolor "	-	-	-	-	-	6,700
N.	" Trafaljar "	-	-	-	-	-	3,500
Probable arrivals, June :—							
S.	" Herm "	-	-	-	-	-	5,650
N.	" Sandefjord "	-	-	-	-	-	9,000
S.	" Tasmanic "	-	-	-	-	-	6,525
Probable arrivals, July :—							
N.	" Bjornstjerne Bjornson "	-	-	-	-	-	8,050
Fr.	" Eole "	-	-	-	-	-	3,900
N.	" Torkenskjold "	-	-	-	-	-	6,000

Steamers due to arrive at Rotterdam, March 26th to July 25th, 1918.

Period.							Wheat and other Cereals.	General.
March 26 to April 10	-	-	-	-	-	-	51,971	12,319
April 11 to April 25	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,263	6,511
April 26 to May 10	-	-	-	-	-	-	26,170	4,705
May 11 to May 25	-	-	-	-	-	-	33,810	5,000
May 26 to June 20	-	-	-	-	-	-	29,400	5,200
June 11 to June 25	-	-	-	-	-	-	36,725	11,900
June 26 to July 25	-	-	-	-	-	-	22,500	20,500
							204,839	66,135
Total	-	-	-	-	-	-	270,974 tons net.	
Requirements	-	-	-	-	-	-	480,000	"
Shortage	-	-	-	-	-	-	209,026	"

Steamers due to arrive at Rotterdam, March 26th to April 25th, 1918.

Steamer.				Wheat and Rye.	Flour.	Maize.	Barley.	General (Net).
1st half :—								
March	29.—Herm	-	-	3,668	1,153	—	—	—
"	29.—Gotland XI.	-	-	—	—	—	—	5,024
"	20.—Ministre Naeyer VIII.	-	-	3,443	—	—	—	—
"	30.—Nordic	-	-	6,595	—	—	—	—
"	30.—Escaut III.	-	-	—	—	4,719	—	18
April	2.—Algerie VIII.	-	-	1,956	997	—	—	—
"	2.—Baron Bayens VIII.	-	-	1,088	3,599	—	—	—
"	4.—Bolmen	-	-	635	3,358	—	—	—
"	5.—Sandefjord III.	-	-	9,347	—	—	—	5
"	8.—Remier VI.	-	-	1,484	2,703	—	—	—
"	8.—Samland XI.	-	-	—	59	—	—	7,272
"	9.—Roland	-	-	1,881	—	—	—	—
"	9.—Gotaland	-	-	5,314	—	—	—	—
Metric tons				35,411	11,841	4,719	—	12,319

Steamer.	Wheat and Rye.	Flour.	Maize.	Barley.	General (Net).
2nd half :—					
April 16.—Leopold 2 VIII.	—	—	—	3,548	—
„ 17.—Gasconier IV.	3,963	300	—	—	—
„ 25.—Uber VIII.	—	—	—	—	2,963
Metric tons	3,963	300	—	3,548	2,963
Totals for April	39,374	12,141	4,719	3,548	15,282
Total	75,064 tons (net).				
Requirements	120,000 „				
Shortage	44,936 „				

Steamers due to arrive at Rotterdam, April 26th to May 25th, 1918.

Steamer.	Wheat and other Cereals.	Maize.	General (Net).
1st half :—			
April 30 - - Carsholm II.	4,935	—	—
May 7 - - Tunisie X.	—	2,882	—
„ 10 - - Comte de Flandres	—	2,903	—
Now at loading { Gouverneur de Lantsheere IV.	—	—	4,705
port { Bjornstjerne Bjornson II.	8,050	—	—
{ Trafalgar	3,500	—	—
{ Eole III.	3,900	—	—
Metric Tons	20,385	5,785	4,705
2nd half :—			
Now at loading { Adolf Deppe	2,750	—	—
port { Consul Corfitzon	4,000	—	—
{ Syrie X.	3,600	—	—
{ Liego X.	—	—	5,000
{ Colombier VII.	2,800	—	—
{ Tricolor	6,700	—	—
{ Atland	6,960	—	—
{ Jathon	7,000	—	—
Metric Tons	33,810	—	5,000
Totals for May	54,195	5,785	9,705
Total	69,685 tons (net).		
Required	120,000 „		
Shortage	50,315 „		

Steamers due to arrive at Rotterdam, May 26 to June 25, 1918.

Steamer.	Wheat and other Cereals.	General (Net).
1st half :—		
Cantoise IX.	4,700	—
Anvers X.	—	5,200
President Bunge VII.	5,450	—
Herm II.	5,650	—
Republica Argentina X.	4,600	—
Escaut IV.	6,000	—
Algerie IX.	3,000	—
Metric Tons	29,400	5,200

Steamer.	Wheat and other Cereals.	General (Net).
2nd half :—		
Gotaland II. - - - - -	5,000	—
Tasmanic - - - - -	6,525	—
Elizabeth van Belgic VII. - - - - -	6,200	—
Gothland XII. - - - - -	—	4,800
Baron Beyens IX. - - - - -	5,200	—
Sanderfjord IV. - - - - -	9,000	—
Samland XII. - - - - -	—	7,100
Remier VII. - - - - -	4,800	—
Metric Tons - - - - -	36,725	11,900
Totals for June - - - - -	66,125	17,100
Total - - - - - 83,225 tons (net).		
Requirements - - - - -	- 120,000	„
Shortage - - - - -	- 36,775	„

Steamers due to arrive at Rotterdam, June 26 to July 25, 1918.

Steamer.	Wheat and other Cereals.	General (Net).
Gasconier V. - - - - -	4,350	—
Tunisie XI. - - - - -	3,000	—
Leopold 2 IX. - - - - -	3,900	—
Ubier IX. - - - - -	4,000	—
Gouverneur de Lantsheere V. - - - - -	5,800	—
Bjornstjerne Bjornson III. - - - - -	8,050	—
Eole IV. - - - - -	3,900	—
Tabor - - - - -	6,000	—
Torkenskjeld - - - - -	6,000	—
Comte de Flandres VIII. - - - - -	2,600	—
	47,600	—
<i>Less—</i>		
General Cargo - - - - - 20,500		
Dead Freight - - - - - 4,600		
	25,100	20,500
Metric Tons - - - - -	22,500	20,500
Total for July - - - - - 43,000 tons (net).		
Required - - - - -	- 120,000	„
Shortage - - - - -	- 57,000	„

APPENDIX 24.

Carriage of Oil Fuel in Double Bottoms of ordinary Cargo Vessels.

From the point of view of the Transport Council, it would be of very great assistance if the call at present made upon the double bottoms of ordinary cargo vessels could be dispensed with for the following reasons :—

- (1) The effect would be to enable about 600,000 tons of additional other cargo to be shipped, and this would diminish the general deficit in imports by that quantity in the year 1918.
- (2) While the loading of a given quantity of oil fuel in double bottoms displaces at least as much other cargo, the shipment of that quantity in double bottoms is not worth as much from the point of view of the Admiralty as the shipment of a similar quantity in tank vessels. When the oil fuel arrives in double bottoms it requires to be distributed by tank vessels on this side of the Atlantic, which could otherwise be used for import work.

The effect of this may be roughly stated as meaning that a given quantity of oil fuel brought in double bottoms is only worth 70 per cent. of that quantity brought in tank vessels, *i.e.*, 100,000 tons of oil fuel shipped in double bottoms, while displacing at least 100,000 tons of wheat, &c., would only be worth 70,000 tons of oil fuel in tank vessels.

- (3) If oil fuel were restricted to tank vessels, the Allied Maritime Transport Council would be relieved of one extremely difficult factor in its general problem of allotting tonnage between different competing requirements. The fundamental difficulty of the Council's work is that ordinary cargo tonnage being interchangeable between different commodities, every supply service is, generally speaking, competing with every other supply service, and it will fall to the Transport Council to settle as between their competing claims. If, however, oil fuel is only brought in tank vessels and it could be adopted as a working rule that oil fuel would make no call upon ordinary cargo tonnage, just as other commodities than oil would, of course, make no call upon tank tonnage, one difficult commodity would be removed from this competition. The Petroleum Conference or other body dealing with Allied oil requirements could make their plans on the assumption that tank tonnage would be routed in accordance with them, and they would have a relatively certain knowledge of what tonnage would be available, and would be unaffected by the competition of other supply services.

The possibility, however, of discontinuing the use of double bottoms for the carriage of oil fuel depends upon the amount of tank tonnage which can be allocated for the carriage of the naval oil fuel as distinct from the carriage of oil fuel for industrial purposes under the British and American control respectively, and in view of the extreme complexity of arrangements under which petroleum in bulk is conveyed, this question is one of great difficulty.

It may be asked why the use of double bottoms for the conveyance of oil fuel is not at once discontinued in view of the above objections. The reason is that it is impossible to do so without reducing the fuel reserves of the Allied Navies below a point which the British and American naval authorities have fixed as a danger line. Assuming that from the 1st May the shipment of fuel in double bottoms was definitely stopped, but the tank tonnage available remained, as at present arranged, the fuel reserves of the Allied Navies in Europe would be no less than 218,000 tons below the danger line on the 1st October 1918, 346,000 tons below on the 1st January 1919, and 455,500 tons below on the 1st April 1919.

This state of affairs is impossible to contemplate.

It is suggested, therefore, that the Allied Maritime Transport Council should record in the strongest terms their opinion that every possible step should be taken to render available for Allied war purposes such an amount of tank tonnage as will enable the British Government to discontinue the use of double bottoms in so far as it shuts out other cargoes.

April 20th, 1918.

ALLIED MARITIME TRANSPORT COUNCIL.

Report of Action April 16th to July 15th 1918.

A Report of Action up to April 15th 1918 was submitted to the Council at its last meeting in Paris on April 23rd to 25th.

Since that date no meeting of the Council has been held. The permanent organisation has been continuing its work both in giving executive effect to the Council's decisions at the last meeting and also in pursuance of the general duty of assisting in the allocation and most advantageous use of Allied tonnage by co-operative action. In practice it has been found possible to continue this work without decisions of such difficulty and importance as to necessitate the meeting of the Council itself in formal session. The place of a formal meeting has, however, been largely met by frequent communication with the several Ministers. The permanent organisation has been in close touch with the British Ministers and Mr. Stevens in London; while M. Monnet and also Sir Joseph Maclay and myself have visited the French Ministers in Paris and Professor Attolico has consulted the Italian Ministers in Rome. In addition, in order to maintain closer relations with the American Government, Mr. Stevens arranged that Mr. Rublee and Mr. Morrow should go to Washington particularly in relation to the formation of the Programme Committees. The contact with the respective Governments has therefore in practice been maintained without a formal meeting of the Council. Tentative arrangements were made for such a meeting both towards the end of June and at the end of July, but the situation in France rendered it difficult for the respective Ministers to meet, and in view of the progress of the work as indicated below, it was decided that the necessity for a formal meeting was not such as to justify the different Ministers leaving their respective countries in the especially difficult circumstances of the period.

In view of the time that has elapsed, however, Ministers will probably desire to be informed in some detail of the actual work that has been done, and for this purpose the following report has been prepared.

Lancaster House,
July 16th 1918.

J. A. SALTER,
Secretary to the Council.

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Summary and Index of Report.

2. Italian Coal.

Programme	-	-	-	-	-	-	600,000 tons a month.
Supply 15th June-14th July	-	-	-	-	-	-	614,958 tons.
Average for 4 months	-	-	-	-	-	-	581,580 tons.

In addition the shipment of 150,000 tons for a special military reserve has been arranged.

3. French Coal.

Programme	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,740,000
Shipments June	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,260,000
Average shipments—April, May, June	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,428,000
Total Deficiency	-	-	-	-	-	-	935,000

Limiting factor has been capacity of French ports to receive coal; and there has also been difficulty in obtaining coal through shortage of output. Since the offensive of March 21st ships have been provided for every ton of coal which could be provided from the United Kingdom and received by the French ports.

4. Belgian Relief.

Emergency Supply.—America and Great Britain shared the responsibility for shipping about 26 emergency cargoes mainly from America, 10,000 tons of flour shipped from Great Britain, and about 12,000 tons rice and miscellaneous stores are being arranged.

Permanent Arrangements.—It has been agreed to give Belgian Relief the first call on the Swedish war-zone tonnage.

These arrangements should meet the Belgian Relief necessities adequately.

5. Special Allocations of Tonnage among Allies.

(a) In April, May and June 288,000 tons of cereals have been diverted to France and 457,000 tons to Italy in accordance with the procedure arranged to give effect to the 3rd November Agreement.

(b) Arrangements have been made to increase the British Liner Service to Italy by about 150,000 tons dead weight, and to make about 75,000 tons dead weight of Italian vessels in the cereal programme available for imports from America, the effect of these arrangements being to increase Italian imports from America by about 75,000 tons a month.

(c) The shipment to France of about 47,000 tons of nitrates and about 55,000 tons railway wagons and miscellaneous stores has been arranged for July and August.

(d) In April, May, and June 637,879 American soldiers were embarked, 330,956 being in British vessels.

6. Allocation of Pooled Neutral Vessels.

124 vessels have been allotted between the Allies under the arrangements of the Council. A general plan of allocation has been agreed.

7. Other Arrangements to effect Economy by Interchange of Shipping.

Co-operative use of Brazilian *ex* enemy vessels; of British and American refrigerator tonnage in relation to American trooping; and of French vessels for Allied bunkering purposes.

8. Programme Committees.

Establishment of 16 Programme Committees, covering whole range of imported commodities and arrangements for their co-ordination with the Council.

9. General Note as to Tonnage Position.

The dominating factor is the American Army programme. The limiting factor to America's supply of men is the available shipping to supply them. This means approximately that each 5,000 tons of imports saved enables 1,000 additional American troops to be maintained in France.

10. Council's Permanent Organisation.

Transference to Lancaster House and detailed organisation.

Detailed Report.

1. Meeting of the Council at Paris, April 23rd to 25th.

Draft minutes of the Meeting of the Council at its Second Session (April 23rd to 25th) were prepared and circulated to the respective Governments shortly after the meeting of the Council.

2. Italian Coal.

The programme of the normal supply of coal to Italy amounting to 600,000 tons a month, which was approved by the Council at its First Session on 15th March, was continued by decision of the Council on 23rd April.

The following table furnishes details of the coal actually supplied to Italy in accordance with these decisions, by months:—

— —	15th March to 14th April.	15th April to 14th May.	15th May to 14th June.	15th June to 14th July.
	Tons.	Tons.	Tons.	Tons.
Shipments of British coal by long sea route	227,372	246,545	161,194	281,500
Shipments of British coal <i>viâ</i> Blaye* - -	161,135	123,973	—	—
British coal passing Italian Frontier -	—	—	108,918	116,931
French coal passing Italian Frontier -	132,109	137,082	108,122	104,962
French coal on board at French Mediterranean ports.	104,802	88,169	111,943	111,565
	625,418	595,769	490,177	614,958

Total for the four months 2,326,322 tons; monthly average 581,580 tons.

* NOTE.—The Franco-Italian Committee in Paris, set up in accordance with the Council's decision, has supplied figures from 1st May onwards in respect of all coal supplies to Italy except those shipped direct from the United Kingdom by the long sea route. (The system of furnishing these particulars is described in Appendix 25 of this report.) The Committee's figures were therefore not available for the first month to the 14th April, or for the first half of the second month to the 14th May, and in these circumstances it has been agreed by the French and Italian representatives in London that the method of computation previously adopted in relation to the Italian coal supply should be continued for the period up to the 14th May, and the figures shown in the table have been accepted as fairly representing the situation over the whole period of four months.

It will be seen that in the months to 14th April and 14th May the Council's total of 600,000 tons a month was reached, because the shipments of British coal were considerably in excess of the amount of 250,000 tons a month agreed upon to be furnished under the original programme. This excess counterbalanced in these months the deficiency in French coal under that programme, this deficiency being primarily due to shortage of railway wagons, which reduced the supply of French coal from the 350,000 tons contemplated in the programme to about 225,000 tons a month. Difficulty was also experienced in securing coasting tonnage for conveyance of coal from the French Mediterranean ports. As will be seen, the shortage so caused was met by the allocation of extra shipping to increase the quantity sent from the United Kingdom by the long sea route from 150,000 to about 235,000 tons a month, the quantity of British coal shipped *viâ* Blaye being maintained at a figure considerably above 100,000 tons a month. It may be observed that these extra shipments of British coal could only be arranged at a considerable diversion of British liner tonnage to carry coal to the Mediterranean before proceeding across the Atlantic.

During the following month, May 15th to June 14th, there was a shortage of rather more than 100,000 tons on the total Italian requirement, although the shipments of British coal were not short of the agreed proportion. There was sufficient tonnage to maintain the totals of the previous two months, and the failure to do so was due to the difficulty in securing the necessary coal, the output of which in British mines had been diminished by the effect of a "combing out" of miners for military service and by other difficulties.

During the following month, June 15th to July 14th, some 14,000 tons of the arrears were made up, and it is hoped that it will be found possible to make up the balance of the arrears during the current month ending 14th August.

In addition to the normal requirement of 600,000 tons a month, Signor Bianchi, at the last session of the Council, referred to the necessity of establishing a military strategic reserve of coal in Italy. It was finally arranged, in June, that a military reserve of this character, to be additional to the normal supply, and to be kept entirely separate from that supply, should be formed up to the amount of 150,000 tons, and that, if possible, this quantity should be shipped during the six weeks to the end of July. Up to the 14th July Great Britain had shipped or allocated 115,000 tons of this strategic reserve, leaving a balance of 35,000 tons to be allocated to be shipped.

3. French Coal.

The normal requirements of France for imported coal have been increased by two factors, (a) the necessity of replacing the French coal sent to Italy as part of the Italian programme, and (b) the reduction in the output of the Pas de Calais coalfields and in the quantity railed from those coalfields to south of the Somme as a result of the German offensive.

The Franco-British Committee examined this question fully in Paris on April 23rd, and its detailed report is included as Appendix 15, page 79 in the Minutes of the Council. Its main recommendation was to the effect that on the assumption that 100,000 tons of coal could continue to be railed from the Pas de Calais coalfields to south of the Somme each month, and on the further assumption that French coal sent to Italy was fully replaced, France would still require an additional importation of 360,000 tons a month of British coal, towards which quantity could be counted any British coal which could be diverted to ports west and south of the Somme from the supplies hitherto sent to Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne.

This recommendation was referred by the Council to the permanent organisation to consider the possibility of arranging the necessary tonnage.

So far as tonnage could meet the situation it has, in fact, been fully provided, and it is important that it should be clearly realised that since the date of the first German offensive in March, sufficient shipping has been provided to lift every ton of coal that could be provided from the United Kingdom and received by the French ports. But, unfortunately, the supplies to France have fallen very seriously short of the total programme to an extent of not less than about 935,000 tons since April 1st through the following causes:—

- (a) The limitations of the French ports, and
- (b) The difficulty of obtaining coal in England from the English mines.

The first of these causes, *i.e.*, the capacity of the French ports to receive the coal, has, in fact, been the limiting factor, and it may be generally stated that whatever ships and whatever coal had been allotted to the French coal service, France would not have been able to receive more coal than she has, because she has been kept continuously supplied with the amount of coal and tonnage which she could handle at her ports. The difficulty at the ports has itself arisen mainly from the shortage of wagons and the dislocation of their distribution resulting from the movements of troops and supplies in connection with the recent operations, and to some extent also from the dislocation of inland water transport by barges, resulting from the same operations. There has at the same time, however, been very great difficulty in securing the amount of coal from British mines, chiefly through the effect of the process of combing out miners for military service, which is worst in the initial stages of the process, and sufficient coal to keep the French ports fully fed has only been obtained by diverting supplies to some extent from neutrals and also on some occasions by the supply of coal which was not of the first quality. In effect, however, the shortage of output of coal has only affected France hitherto in making a comparatively small proportion of the supply of inferior quality, because, serious as the shortage of output has been, the limiting factor of France's total supplies has been the capacity of her ports to receive the coal. The actual figures of supply are as follows:—

—				April.	May.	June.	Total.
				Tons.	Tons.	Tons.	Tons.
Programme	-	-	-	1,740,000	1,740,000	1,740,000	5,220,000
Shipments	-	-	-	1,495,000	1,530,000	1,260,000	4,285,000
Shortage	-	-	-	245,000	210,000	430,000	935,000

The gravity of the situation disclosed by these figures needs no emphasis. There is hope that the capacity of the ports will now improve and the current monthly import increase, but no hope can, of course, be offered that the arrears of the past can be made up.

4. *Belgian Relief.*

The Council decided at its meeting in April that the requirements of Belgian Relief should be included in the programme of the Wheat Executive with the consent of that body and should be given the priority promised to them in December 1917, and instructed the permanent organisation of the Council to arrange with the associated Governments for the provision of such supplementary tonnage as may be required to give effect to this decision.

The Wheat Executive accepted the responsibility thus proposed on condition that (a) they should have the right to scrutinise the programme, and also (b) that the necessary further tonnage was duly provided, no alterations being made in the arrangements previously in force as to the supply of articles other than cereals in the Relief programme. The first condition (a) did not prove to present practical difficulty, as on scrutiny the Wheat Executive felt able to accept the quantities included in the Relief programme. The provision of tonnage presented very great difficulties, which have, however, been ultimately overcome successfully.

It was agreed that the permanent solution of the problem of providing supplementary assistance was undoubtedly to be found in the allocation of neutral non-war-zone vessels, as such vessels would both be safer from interference from the Germans and also involve less loss to the Allied cause than war-zone vessels. In accordance with these principles it was agreed that Belgian Relief ought to have the first call upon the non-war-zone tonnage (amounting to a little under 200,000 tons d.w.) which was to be obtained under the Swedish Tonnage Agreement.

As this Tonnage Agreement had not, however, been completed in April and the tonnage forthcoming under it could only in any event be obtained gradually, a further problem of immediate supply arose.

It was estimated that before the Swedish tonnage could meet the situation fully it would probably be necessary to ship about 26 additional cargoes beyond what the Belgian Relief vessels could themselves convey, towards which about 10 were expected to be carried by occasional charterings of Swedish or other neutral vessels. Ultimately the following two proposals were made, and accepted by the American and British Governments: (1) That in the intermediate period America and Great Britain should each be responsible for transporting eight cargoes, and (2) that these two Governments should agree to meeting the problem permanently by giving Belgian Relief the first call upon the Swedish non-war-zone tonnage.

In practice these arrangements had to be supplemented by the following further action:—

- (a) Great Britain undertook to transport 10,000 tons of flour from England to Rotterdam. Nearly 9,000 tons have already been shipped, and the balance will be shipped very shortly.
- (b) Great Britain also agreed to transport from the United Kingdom to Rotterdam certain quantities of beans and peas, herrings, clothing, and miscellaneous articles amounting to some 12,000 tons, and 2,000 tons of rice, at present held by the Belgian Relief in the United Kingdom. The vessels that have been engaged in the carriage of the flour will be continued on the service for the transport of these further commodities, the shipment of which will be commenced immediately.

This action, however, was taken on the distinct understanding that it was only to meet a particular emergency and that in future supplies must be imported direct, and not *via* the United Kingdom, with the resultant extra strain on tonnage and extra risk. The Swedish Agreement having been subsequently concluded, the application of the policy assented to by the Governments concerned should meet the needs of Belgian Relief in future.

It should be added that the Belgian Government visited London in connection with the problem and that the progress of the business was expedited in London by the formation of a small Committee under General Smuts representing the British War Cabinet and in America by the direct interest both of President Wilson and of Mr. Hoover.

5. *Changes in Allocation of Tonnage as between the Allies.*

The following are the most important steps taken either through the Tonnage Committee and the Council or through the officials in the different national shipping

organisations in London in pursuance of the general purpose of the Council to secure the most advantageous allocation and use of Allied tonnage by co-operative action :—

(a) Under the agreement of 3rd November 1917, and as subsequently modified and supplemented, Great Britain has in practice accepted responsibility for supplementing deficiencies in tonnage required for transporting to France and Italy their agreed shares in the cereals programme.

The quantities of cereals so supplied in British tonnage to France and Italy in the three months now in question were approximately as follows :—

	April.	May.	June.	Total.
	Tons.	Tons.	Tons.	Tons.
France	109,000	75,000	104,000	288,000
Italy - - - -	92,000	207,000	158,000	457,000
Total - - - -	201,000	282,000	262,000	745,000

These quantities are diversions and do not include the quantities of cereals supplied in British ships previously time chartered to France or Italy.

(b) *Allocations to Italy.*—In addition to the allotments for coal (explained in paragraph 2) and for cereals as stated above, the following special arrangements have been made :—

- (i) Great Britain has agreed to increase her liner service (*see (d) below*) running to Italy with a view to shipping 50,000 tons a month of cargo (other than cereals) from the United States to Italy per month, and,
- (ii) In addition she has consented to the withdrawal of 75,000 tons d.w. of Italian tonnage from the cereal programme, which will increase correspondingly the amount of British tonnage requiring to be diverted to Italy in accordance with the wheat arrangements described in (a) above.
- (iii) In addition special shipments amounting to 70,000 tons of munitions, &c., have been made from the U.K.

The allocation of this extra tonnage was, however, conditional upon the loading facilities at both ends being sufficient to handle the ships. In view of the reports as to congestion at Italian ports, particularly Genoa, it appears very doubtful whether the extra amount of imports contemplated can be received in the near future.

(c) *France.*—At the last meeting of the Council France asked for special assistance for the shipment over three months of the following articles from America :—

Locomotives and railway wagons	-	-	-	50,000 tons per month.
Nitrates	-	-	-	15,000 „ „
Barbed wire	-	-	-	15,000 „ „
Powder and explosives	-	-	-	5,000 „ „
				<u>85,000</u> „ „

On examination the full quantities of railway wagons and locomotives did not prove to be available for immediate shipment, and the required rearrangement of tonnage could only be gradually effected.

The transport for nitrates requested has been arranged, approximately 47,000 tons having been diverted or arranged in British ships by July 15th. For the remainder a modified request for 100,000 tons of railway wagons and war material was made in June in substitution of the original estimate, and of this quantity about 33,000 tons have now been shipped with a further prospect of about 20,000 tons in August.

A further request was received for the shipment of 150,000 tons of oil seeds, but no considerable progress can be made with this until an examination by the Programme Committee.

(d) With a view to meeting these extra demands for shipment from France and Italy, and to facilitate the shipments of wheat in accordance with a necessarily varying programme, it has been arranged that the number of British liners going to France and Italy should be largely increased. Details of the reasons for this action and of the extent of the services are given in Appendix 26, page 122.

(e) The increase in the number of American troops asked for by the Supreme War Council and agreed to by the American Government has resulted in an extensive reallocation of shipping. The numbers of American troops actually embarked in British ships as compared with the total embarked during the last three months have been as follows :—

	April.	May.	June.
Embarked in British ships	50,084	135,662	145,210
Total embarkation	117,212	244,235	276,372

The greater part of the remainder were embarked in American vessels, certain assistance being also rendered by French and Italian vessels.

(f) A continuous and detailed joint examination of vessels on different Allied services has been in progress, and a considerable number of reallocations, amounting to about 80, have been made as a consequence.

6. Allocation of Pooled Tonnage.

Under the agreement reported at the last meeting of the Council and printed as Appendix 21, page 102, in the Minutes, future time-charters of neutral vessels were to be employed during the period of the war under the directions of the Council.

This agreement imposed a direct executive duty upon the permanent organisation of controlling the employment of a large block of tonnage under Allied control. This tonnage is estimated to amount ultimately to about 750,000 tons dead weight. The scheme comes gradually into operation, but 124 vessels have already been dealt with under the general directions of the permanent organisation, which agreed upon the following provisional working plan :—

1. Vessels up to 1,700 tons dead weight French coal trade.
2. Vessels between 1,700 and 3,000 tons dead weight. Coal to Bay, returning with ore under the ordinary principles.
3. Vessels between 3,000 and 4,500 tons dead weight. Coal to Italy, returning with ore under ordinary principles.
4. Vessels over 4,500 tons dead weight. Coal to Italy, then to Wheat Executive to load in America for the Allies.

The reasons for devising a plan of this character rather than attempting to decide the employment of each vessel as it was chartered in relation to the requirements of the Allies at the time are stated in detail in Appendix 27, page 123. The principles indicated in that Appendix have been agreed upon provisionally, though it is recognised that when the programmes of requirements have been approximately agreed it will probably be convenient to use this pool of tonnage as an adjusting factor over a wider range of services.

7. Other Tonnage Arrangements.

(i) Franco-Brazilian Agreement: Employment of Enemy Vessels.

The United States Government has put forward a proposal for the co-operative use of the 30 ex-German vessels covered by the Franco-Brazilian agreement. This proposal contemplates the use of this tonnage on the following triangular route :—

- (1) Coal, United Kingdom to Brazil.
- (2) Coffee, manganese, and other commodities, Brazil to United States, America.
- (3) War exports, United States, America, to France.

In this way the voyage in ballast across the Atlantic is avoided and a proportion of the United States tonnage operating between the United States, America, and Brazil will be released for transatlantic work.

The proposal, which has been carefully discussed by the Tonnage Committee, has been received sympathetically by the French Government, and as far as practicable has been put into operation.

(ii) Use of Refrigerator Space in the North Atlantic.

In order to transport American troops to France it has been necessary to divert a large number of British passenger-carrying vessels to the North Atlantic, and in spite of the fact that insulated vessels in the North Atlantic not suitable for trooping purposes have been diverted to other trades, there yet remains a considerable surplus

of refrigerator space on the troop-carrying vessels which the available supply of meat in North America is not sufficient to fill.

An analysis of the figures shows an excess of about 40,000 tons a month of refrigerator space as against the meat available for shipment.

At the same time the United States Government are insulating for operation in the North Atlantic more troop-carrying tonnage, which will be capable of lifting another 20,000 tons of meat a month. With a view to making the best use of this space proposals have been made to the United States Shipping Board that American army meat requirements should be carried in the available balance of insulated space on the British troop-carrying vessels, while the United States non-trooping refrigerator tonnage should, as far as suitable, be employed between the Plate and France and Italy.

This proposal is under consideration by the United States Government.

(iii) French Liners for Trooping Purposes.

As a result of the negotiations by the British Government arrangements have now been made whereby the French Government are putting a number of large passenger vessels into the American trooping programme. These vessels carry American troops to their maximum capacity on a passenger schedule rate, and the scale of rates is now being arranged between the American and French authorities; whatever space is left in the holds will be used for food cargoes to France.

(iv) Revised arrangements for bunkering tonnage operating in North Atlantic on French account.

Arising out of the examination of the French tonnage, it was found that France had a number of small vessels operating in the Atlantic unsuited to that trade, and that at the same time larger Atlantic vessels were to a considerable extent under the necessity to bunker in South Wales.

In these circumstances it has been proposed that it would be an economy of tonnage if the above-mentioned small vessels were withdrawn from the Atlantic service and formed into a bunkering fleet for the other Atlantic vessels, which would thus be relieved in a considerable measure from the necessity of coming to the United Kingdom to bunker.

The French Government have agreed to this proposal subject to the vessels—eleven in number—being normally free from the obligation to bring back ore to this country. An understanding has, however, been arrived at between the two countries whereby this exemption from ore obligation is interpreted as meaning that the vessel shall have priority in returning from the Bay in ballast, but that if, after taking into account all available tonnage for bringing back ore to the United Kingdom from North Spain, there is at any time a shortage of tonnage for this purpose, the French Government agree that these vessels shall load ore. In such cases account will be taken of the amount of coal lost to France by reason of this deviation, and Great Britain will make good such loss of coal by carrying an equivalent amount of bunker coal on British vessels to a French Atlantic port.

8. *Formation of Programme Committees and other Action to secure Revision of Import Programmes.*

The Council recommended the following action at its last session:—

- (a) The formation of Allied Committees to adjust all Allied Programmes of Imports;
- (b) The examination of vessels engaged in Colonial Service;
- (c) The examination of the Allied Military Supply Programmes; and
- (d) The examination by the Allied Naval Authorities of the demands made by the Allied Navies on Mercantile tonnage.

Special notes as to action under (b), (c), and (d) are included in Appendices 28, 29, and 30, pages 124–129. It will be well, however, to state here in some detail the action taken with regard to the formation of Programme Committees.

The Council's recommendations as to the formation of these Committees have been accepted by the French, Italian, and British Governments.

The American Delegate on the Council has been in communication with his Government with a view to a similar acceptance by that Government and the appointment of the necessary members. In view of the importance of the principles involved the American Government desired to give close consideration to the question

before making appointments, and one of the objects of Mr. Rublee's visit to America was to discuss the matter with the American Authorities. Though no formal decision has yet been received, the latest information justifies a hope that America will appoint full members of the different Programme Committees in the same way as the other Allied Governments in accordance with the recommendation of the Council.

In the meantime steps have been taken to secure the formation of the different Committees, arrangements being made for American representatives to be associated informally with different Committees pending a final decision of the American Government.

The British Government, in agreeing to the formation of the Committees, allocated the responsibility for appointing the British representatives, and in general making the arrangements on the British side, to the Departments respectively responsible for controlling the several commodities. In accordance with this principle the British War Office became responsible with regard to wool; Q.M.G. Stores horses and mules, hides and leather, flax, hemp and jute; the Ministry of Munitions for munitions, &c.; the Board of Trade for cotton, paper, tobacco, timber and miscellaneous commodities, and, jointly with the Ministry of Shipping, for coal and coke; the Ministry of Food for the several articles of food, including cereals, meat and fats, oil seeds and sugar.

The following Committees have now been formed, or are in course of formation :—

1. Wheat Executive.
2. Meat and Fats Executive.
3. Oil and Seeds Programme Committee.
4. Sugar Programme Committee.
5. General Munitions Council :—

Proposed Sub-Committees—(a) Technical Sub-Committee.
 (b) Aircraft Committee.
 (c) Chemical Committee.
 (d) Explosives Committee.
 (e) Non-Ferrous Metal Committee.
 (f) Steel Committee.

6. Nitrate of Soda Executive.
7. Hides, Leather, Skins, and Tanning Materials Committee.
8. Wool (including Hair and all products and by-products of same) Committee.
9. Flax, Hemp, and Jute (including manufactures) Committee).
10. Horses and Mules Committee.
11. Mechanical Transport. (This Committee will probably become a Sub-Committee of the General Munitions Council.)
12. Petroleum Conference.
13. Cotton Committee (Cotton and Cotton Textiles).
14. Paper Committee.
15. Tobacco and Matches Committee.
16. Coal and Coke Committee.

Of these 1, 2, 6, and 12 were in existence before the last meeting of the Council, while the others have been formed subsequently.

With the exception of the Programme Committees, which are also executives having other duties like the Wheat Executive, the committees normally meet at Lancaster House, and the closest association is maintained between all the committees and the organisation of the Council. So far the new committees have been mainly engaged in arranging the details of their constitution and procedure, and deciding upon the exact nature of the information required before they can proceed with their main work of adjusting programmes. It must be recognised that this work will be a lengthy and difficult process. In the meantime the policy which it is proposed to follow is indicated in Appendix 31, page 129.

9. Note on General Tonnage Position.

The following are the main features in the general tonnage position :—

- (a) The deficit in carrying power as compared with imports has been reduced by the conclusion of the Swedish Agreement in addition to the acquisition of the Dutch tonnage (allowed for in the last statement of the Council) and by some reduction in the submarine losses as compared with the previous estimates.
- (b) As reported in detail above, very large diversions of British tonnage have been made for the conveyance of cereals to France and Italy, for Railway material and Munitions to those two countries, and at the

same time the fitting of vessels for American troops, and the use of cargo space for this purpose have made a serious reduction in importing capacity. As a consequence mainly of these causes the imports into the United Kingdom were 700,000 tons less in June than in May.

- (c) The most important new factor in the prospective Allied tonnage position is the immense increase in the American Military Programme recently required by the Supreme War Council and consented to by the American Government.

It may be said generally that the execution of this Programme, so far as the carriage of personnel is concerned, can be effected by the continuance of the arrangements already made without further increasing the reduction in cargo-carrying power. The real problem is one of the carriage of supplies and of horses. This problem is now being investigated and further information is awaited from America.

It may be stated provisionally, however, that the transport of full supplies for the full army contemplated would apparently involve the employment of not less than 7 to 8 million tons dead weight as from the summer of 1919, the tonnage rising gradually in the meantime from the present 2 tons million dead weight to the above figure, and that in addition the transport of horses would involve the employment of over 1 to 1½ million tons dead weight for a year, falling thereafter to some 300,000 tons dead weight for replacement of wastage.

Towards the above figures, which are likely to be increased by the transport of certain constructional material, &c., can be set (a) the supply of material by the European Allies, whether under the brigading system or otherwise, and (b) the new American building, which each month goes a long way towards meeting the additional demands of the extra soldiers landed in France during that month.

It is understood that arrangements are being made by France and Great Britain to supply artillery and clothing in large quantities which would relieve the Supply Programme, but it cannot yet be stated to what extent.

These notes must be regarded as very provisional only and not expressing any agreed estimate, which is not yet possible, but it was thought necessary to attempt some indication of the scope of what is the most important new factor in the general tonnage situation.

Apart from the uncertainties of building and construction, it is clear that the whole tonnage situation must be regarded as very uncertain, in view of the possible consequences, and demands upon tonnage, that may result from the military situation.

On the assumption that the American position is such as, on the whole, neither a gift to nor a take from the European allies more tonnage than at present, and that no important new factors enter into the situation, it may be said generally that while the import programmes still show a large excess over carrying power, and this cannot be removed until the Programme Committees have proceeded much further with their work, information which has already been received indicates within no very wide margin of uncertainty the directions in which the balance is likely to be struck for this current year 1918.

Programme Committees have been informed that each 5,000 tons of imports saved means that about 1,000 additional American troops can be maintained in France.

10. *The Permanent Organisation of the Council.*

Since the last meeting of the Council Lancaster House has been brought into use. A central Secretariat and the American Division are already located there, and the French and Italian Divisions are in course of being transferred to the same building.

Experience has pointed to the necessity of certain developments in the organisation which are described in detail in Appendix 32, page 131. These developments will be submitted for the approval of the Council at its next meeting. In the meantime the organisation is proceeding upon the lines indicated.

11. *Relation of the Council to the Inter-Allied Council on War Purchase and Finance.*

In accordance with the Council's decision the Inter-Allied Council on War Purchases and Finance was invited to appoint a Liaison Officer, and Mr. G. M. Booth is now acting in this capacity.

Close co-operation between the organisations of the two Councils has been maintained and communications interchanged relating to the classification of imports, programmes proposed and actual purchases, &c.

12. *Carriage of Oil in Double Bottoms.*

A communication was made to the Petroleum Conference in pursuance of the Council's directions as to the importance of discontinuing the use of double bottoms of ordinary cargo ships for carrying oil.

A reply has been received stating that the matter was carefully considered at the recent meeting of the Petroleum Conference in Paris, and that it was found that in view of the increasing war requirements of petroleum products of all the Allies, the small amount of tank tonnage it is estimated might be saved by rearrangement of routing and source of supply, would not in any way compensate for the relinquishment of the transport of oil in double bottoms on the Transatlantic routes.

The following resolution was passed by the Petroleum Conference :—

“That the Conference, whilst in sympathy with the desires of the Allied Maritime Transport Council, is of the opinion that no alteration of the existing allocation of double bottoms used for the transport of Fuel Oil should be made until the stocks of Petroleum products have reached the danger minimum stocks required by each Government and that the Maritime Council be so informed.”

The Petroleum Conference have been requested to furnish information in regard to the Allied petroleum requirements, and when the programmes from all the Programme Committees are considered in relation to tonnage, the Council will have a further opportunity of raising with the Petroleum Conference, if necessary, the question of the use of double bottoms.

13. *Detention of Vessels under Legal Proceedings.*

A communication has been received from the Italian Government Commission that the Italian Government are prepared to come to an agreement with the Allied Governments for the purpose of considering legislation prohibiting the detention or arrest of vessels requisitioned by or in the service of any of the Allied Governments, subject to proper safeguarding of legitimate interests.

It is understood that the matter is being considered so far as the French Law is concerned by the competent French Authorities.

APPENDIX 25.

Note as to Responsibilities of the Franco-Italian Committee at Paris, the Italian Representatives, and the London Organisation, for keeping Statistics of Supply of Coal to Italy and France.

I. *Franco-Italian Committee at Paris.*—The Paris Committee is responsible for supervising the arrangements for :—

- (a) The supply of coal from the French mines for Italy.
- (b) The railage arrangements for both French coal and British coal *viâ* the Bay, whether it goes to Italy *viâ* Ventimiglia and Modane or to the South French ports.
- (c) The provision of sufficient berths, &c., for discharging the British coal landed in the Bay for transmission to Italy and for loading either British or French coal at South French ports.
- (d) Securing that the best qualities of French coal are supplied for Italy, and ascertaining the actual difference in the qualities of French and British coal.
- (e) Collecting and forwarding to the Secretary of the Allied Maritime Transport Council full statistics with regard to the above arrangements.

The information required under (e) will be telegraphed daily to London in the name of the Committee, will represent agreements between the French and Italian representatives, and will be regarded as authoritative on the points involved. It will consist of the following items :—

- (i) Daily quantities of British coal despatched by rail from Blaye and other Bay ports.

- (ii) Daily quantities of coal despatched from the French mines.
- (iii) Daily quantities of French coal passing the frontier between France and Italy.
- (iv) Daily quantities of British coal passing the frontier between France and Italy.
- (v) Daily quantities of French coal leaving South French ports for Italy.
- (vi) Daily quantities of British coal leaving South French ports for Italy.
- (vii) Daily stocks at each port in the Bay or South France.

II. *Italian Representatives*.—Will report quantities of British coal and of French coal respectively *received* by sea, whether by long or short route.

III. *London Organisation*.—Will be responsible for :—

- (a) Keeping a record of shipments from United Kingdom to Italy.
- (b) Keeping a record of shipments from United Kingdom to Blaye, &c., for Italy.
- (c) Keeping a record (in conjunction with Captain Pilliard) of the coal due and supplied in pursuance of any agreement to give replacement coal to France.
- (d) Co-ordinating the above statistics and furnishing to the Council periodical reports as to the execution of any decision of the Council with regard to the supply of coal to either Italy or France.

IV. The French Government will forward proposals to London on the question of allowing for the difference in calorific value of French and British coal.

APPENDIX 26.

Establishment of Regular Service of British Steamers between the United States and (a) France and (b) Italy.

The agreement of the 3rd November 1917 has imposed an obligation upon Great Britain to supplement deficiencies in the tonnage required to transport the agreed shares of France and Italy in the Cereals Programme, and the effect of this agreement has been to give rise to frequent requests to the British Ministry of Shipping to divert cereals-carrying tonnage to France and Italy.

These diversions have become so numerous and have frequently to be met at such short notice that it is often not practicable to meet the demands with the available tramp tonnage.

The objections to the sudden diversion of liner tonnage operating in a particular trade and normally carrying mixed cargoes, do not need to be emphasised, and in these circumstances, with a view to general convenience of operation, it has been decided to institute regular services of British vessels, operated under the British Liner scheme, between the States and France and Italy.

A number of vessels are already working in these services, which it is proposed shall be strengthened from time to time as opportunity offers and the need arises. In this way a machinery is set up which enables Great Britain to meet, as far as practicable—

- (a) The need of France for extra tonnage assistance for the carriage of locomotives, barbed wire, and explosives, as indicated by the French Representative at the second session of the Council; and
- (b) The need of Italy for assistance in the carriage of munitions and essential general cargo from North America.

The liners will, of course, also carry cereals and, where necessary, parcels for the British Army in France.

APPENDIX 27.

Note as to Proposed Principle of Allocation of Neutral Vessels brought into the pool under the direction of the Allied Maritime Transport Council.

The main facts to bear in mind are the following :—

(1) If national programmes were fully agreed and there were no national divergencies of interest, all the shipping under Allied control would doubtless be directed by a single Executive Authority which, in giving its orders, would have regard solely to the allocation of each vessel to the work on which, having regard to its type and position, it could be most economically employed.

(2) As programmes have not been fully agreed and brought into conformity with the carrying power of the available tonnage and obviously cannot be, at any rate in the near future, there remains an actual or possible divergence of national interest and views in certain cases. It is the object of the A.M.T.C. and its organisation for the examination of import requirements, &c., to arrange these differences by agreement. It is recognised, however, that divergencies may be too great or too serious for this to be possible in all cases.

This is the fact upon which the principle of the A.M.T.C., that in the last resort each country retains executive authority over its own tonnage, is based.

(3) By common consent, however, this principle is not applied to the small pool of neutral tonnage coming available for direct orders of the A.M.T.C. under the recent arrangements. This pool of tonnage is to receive actual and final executive orders from a single executive authority. That is to say, the intention is apparently that this tonnage should in fact be dealt with as Allied tonnage generally would be if there were no national divergence of interest and all executive power were concentrated in one authority.

If this is to be the case, however, it is clear that the tonnage in question must be used in such a way as not to involve such a question of divergence of national interest as is safeguarded by the proviso of the constitution referred to in paragraph 2.

As an illustration of this, it is obvious that an Ally which is supplementing the deficits of other Allies in specified services, *e.g.*, cereals, could not consent to the allocation of a "pool" vessel which would be suitable for such a service to a service not agreed as essential.

(4) A consideration of the detailed working of the A.M.T.C. presses this principle further. The general import requirements of the Allies are being examined by the Imports Committee in connection with the Executives, and must finally be reviewed by the Council. So far as the permanent organisation is concerned, it is the Imports Committee rather than the Tonnage Committee which considers whether the need of one Ally for one import is greater or less than the needs of another Ally for another import. The "pool" allocations, however, or plan of allocations, must clearly be dealt with under the Tonnage Committee, but that Committee, while eminently qualified to agree as to the most suitable employment of a vessel is not the appropriate body to consider the relative needs of different imports of different Allies. Moreover, to consider such competing needs (which involve such wide issues and must clearly be examined as a whole) in connection with the allocation of specific vessels would obviously be a procedure likely to involve considerable disagreement and difficulty, and in the end would be futile in view of the much greater bulk of adjusting national tonnage on which the fulfilment of programmes ultimately depend.

(5) It would seem to follow that "pool" vessels should be used solely for non-controversial services, *i.e.*, put into services which by common consent require more tonnage than the "pool" vessels will themselves supply.

It would obviously be convenient, in the application of this principle, to choose the services beforehand which satisfy this principle, and the most obvious services are French coal, Italian coal, with return cargoes of ore on the ordinary principles, and Allied cereals. These services between them clearly afford sufficient scope for the economical use of every vessel that will come within the pool and each of these services will necessarily require supplementing by other vessels beyond those which can be obtained by the pool. This supplement will be provided partly by French and Italian national tonnage and partly also as a final adjusting element by the addition of other Allied tonnage. If the pool is to be run in accordance with the principle

dictated above, it would appear clear that the adjustments should be made not upon the neutral pool of tonnage, but upon National and Allied tonnage.

(6) If these principles are adopted it will enable the neutral vessels coming into pool to be allocated as between the services mentioned above solely upon the criterion as to which of the services the particular vessel is most suitable for, having regard to her type and position, and without regard to the competing requirements of the several countries and the possible difference of views as to the full extent of the import programme of each commodity in question which must be fulfilled.

(7) With these principles adopted, the management of this small pool of neutral tonnage can proceed straight forward upon ordinary business lines and without involving discussions on particular cases as to the general interests of the different countries which obviously must be discussed and settled in a wider context.

(8) If, however, it proves necessary or desirable to use the small fleet under direct A.M.T.C. control in order to give special assistance to any immediate and urgent work for which the Council may desire to take responsibility, the necessary orders should be given to the Tonnage Committee in the form of a direction to favour particular services with this tonnage to a specified extent so as to avoid any discussion by the Committee of the general imports situation in relation to particular allocations.

13.5.18.

APPENDIX 28.

Note as to the Employment of Vessels engaged on Colonial Service.

I.—GREAT BRITAIN.

1. *Suitability.*

The question of bringing into Allied import or other service every suitable vessel is under constant consideration by the British Ministry of Shipping, and attempts to obtain all such vessels have been made. Certain vessels are, however, not available for the reasons indicated below.

2. *Colonial Tonnage.*

The question of diverting to direct war service tonnage engaged abroad in Colonial and other services has repeatedly engaged the attention of the British Ministry of Shipping, and, as a result of various measures that have been taken during the last 18 months, a very considerable proportion of the tonnage has been allocated to other services. For example, a large number of vessels have been taken out of the Indian and Far Eastern trades for the purpose of the Mesopotamian campaign, while since the outbreak of war tonnage to the amount of nearly 300,000 gross tons used on the Coast of Australia has been taken off for service overseas. It must be remembered, moreover, that these reductions in the tonnage abroad have been accompanied by very drastic reductions in the amount of tonnage operating between the United Kingdom and India and the United Kingdom and Australia, so that the Committees concerned have been doubly hit.

The British tonnage, which may be termed Colonial, falls into three groups: (1) Australasian trade, whether coasting or ocean; (2) Indian, Straits and Far Eastern trades; and (3) Canadian and American trades. Outside these groups there is practically no British tonnage engaged in any Colonial work.

With regard to the three groups in question, the following facts are to be noted:—

AUSTRALASIAN TRADES.

The employment of the vessels included in this group may be divided as follows:—

- (i) Coasting Australia.
- (ii) Coasting New Zealand.
- (iii) Australia—New Zealand.

- (iv) Australia—Fiji and Outer Islands.
- (v) Australia—Straits.
- (vi) Australia—China.
- (vii) Australia—Pacific Coast of America.
- (viii) Australia—S. and E. Africa.

The number of vessels of 1,600 gross tonnage and over engaged in these services at 31st May 1918 was 109, and of these vessels more than half are unsuitable for ocean-going work. Moreover, the vast majority of the vessels are on Colonial Register and Australia being a self-governing Dominion, His Majesty's Government under a general arrangement made with the Dominions does not exercise the power of requisition over these vessels. In effect the agreement is that this power shall rest ultimately with the Government in whose ports the vessels are registered.

Australia is a continent with an extended coast line and railway facilities that are quite inadequate to cope with the vital needs of the various States, unless aided by a considerable coastwise traffic. Communications must obviously be maintained between Australia and New Zealand and the Islands in the Pacific, while Australia is, of course, obliged to obtain certain imports from such places as the Straits, China, South Africa, North and South America.

As already indicated, a large amount of tonnage has been released from Australasian Trade for various war services, and, having regard to the factors referred to above, the Shipping Controller does not think that under present conditions it would be practicable to urge the diversion of any further appreciable quantity of tonnage. The Commonwealth Government is, however, now taking the whole matter energetically in hand, and a Controller of Shipping has been appointed in order to reorganise on the most economical tonnage basis and by reference to vital needs the various Australasian trades, and it is hoped that his efforts will enable some further vessels to be released for Allied service overseas.

3. *Indian, Straits and Far Eastern Trades.*

The tonnage in these trades has been reduced to a minimum, and the total number of vessels of 1,600 gross tonnage and over in all the trades on 31st May 1918 was 113.

The various services carried on by these vessels are as follows :—

- (i) Coasting India.
- (ii) Coasting China.
- (iii) India—Burmah.
- (iv) India—Straits and East Indies.
- (v) India—China and Japan.
- (vi) India—Australia.
- (vii) India—United States.
- (viii) India—West Indies.
- (ix) India—South Africa.
- (x) India—East Africa.
- (xi) India—Persia.
- (xii) India—Red Sea.
- (xiii) Coasting East Indies or China.
- (xiv) Coasting East Indies and Straits.
- (xv) Straits—Far East.
- (xvi) Straits—East Africa.
- (xvii) Coasting in Red Sea.
- (xviii) Coasting in Persian Gulf.

These services have been freely drawn upon to provide transport for the campaigns in Mesopotamia and Palestine. For example, early in 1917, 61 vessels belonging to the China Navigation, Indo-China Navigation and other local Chinese companies were requisitioned and withdrawn from these trades for Government Service in connection with the Mesopotamian Campaign, and at about the same time a considerable number of the British India Company's vessels were withdrawn from the Indian trade.

In order to make the best possible use of the tonnage which has been left in the trades and to enable the various services to be maintained as far as possible and with the greatest economy of tonnage, His Majesty's Government suggested to the

Governments of India, Singapore and Hong Kong that a representative of the British Ministry of Shipping should be appointed to organise these trades. This suggestion was acted upon, and in the autumn of 1917 an Agent of the Shipping Controller was appointed for India and the Far East. A wide-spread organisation has since been built up and influential Committees and Agents appointed at the principal ports, with the result that the otherwise inadequate amount of tonnage remaining in the trades is utilised to the best possible advantage, and it has even been found possible to release further vessels for Allied service.

It must be remembered, however, that of the steamers engaged in the trades in question, and particularly in the China Coastal Trades, a large proportion are passenger steamers of an age and type which would be quite unsuitable for oversea transport trades.

4. *Canadian and American Trades.*

The number of vessels of 1,600 gross tonnage and over engaged in these trades on 31st May 1918 was 77.

The majority of these vessels are engaged in the Canadian coasting trade and the other trades served as follows:—

- (i) North America—West Indies.
- (ii) North America—East and West Africa.
- (iii) North America—Pacific to Far East.
- (iv) Coasting Colon and West Coast of South America.
- (v) Coasting West Indies.

Nearly all the vessels in this group are on Colonial Register, and Canada being a self-governing Dominion, the same position in regard to the exercise of the power of requisitioning exists as in the case of Australia referred to above, and the Dominion Government has expressed the opinion that it is not practicable to make further reductions in the tonnage engaged in these trades, which is regarded as being at a minimum.

The whole question of the tonnage engaged in these Colonial trades will be discussed at the Imperial Conference this year, when it is hoped that useful proposals and decisions may be obtained.

II.—FRANCE.

Statement re The French Colonial and Intercolonial Tonnage Council.

The Statement herewith attached shows the pre-war and actual position of vessels engaged in Franco-colonial and intercolonial traffic and brings forth the reduction which each service has to bear.

Before the war, each shipping company engaged in colonial traffic used to employ French cargo-boats and chartered vessels according to the season and to actual requirements in addition to the vessels running regularly in those traffics.

At present not only is the French Colonial traffic deprived of the additional cargo-vessels and chartered steamers, but also regular liners have been greatly diminished.

A reduction in vessels therein employed has handicapped some of the French colonies to the extent of not allowing them to ship their crops owing to the lack of tonnage.

Notwithstanding this condition the French colonial traffic has not been allotted an additional single vessel for continual use since the beginning of the war and only at times has it been found possible to meet emergency requirements with some occasional ships.

The French Intercolonial traffic is actually carried on by a fleet of 5 steamers of a gross tonnage over 1,600 tons each as per list given at the end of attached statement (this does not include vessels under 1,600 tons gross).

It is therefore impossible to consider at the present time the withdrawal of a single ship from colonial and intercolonial traffic, and should the tonnage position improve, it would be most urgent for France to be able to place some vessels in that trade to lift most essential cargoes which are now lying in ports and greatly suffering damage.

1. *Indo-China Lines.*

	Ships Employed.	Total Tonnage.	Number of Voyages.
Pre-War Situation	18 "Messageries"	148,000 gross tonnage	50
Actual Situation - -	6 "Chargeurs"	57,000 " " "	15
Reduction - -	5 "Messageries" - -		
	19 Ships -	91,000 gross tonnage	35

2. *Madagascar-Réunion Lines.*

Pre-War Situation -	7 "Messageries" - -	58,000 gross tonnage	42
	6 "Havraise" - -		
	1 "Besson" - -		
Actual Situation	4 "Messageries" - -	23,000 " " "	12
	1 "Grosos" - -		
Reduction -	9 Ships - - -	35,000 gross tonnage	30

3. *New Caledonia Lines.*

Pre-War Situation -	8 "Messageries" -	42,856 gross tonnage -	13
Actual Situation -	Nil.		
Reduction - - -	Complete.		

4. *French West African Lines.*

Pre-War Situation - -	11 "Chargeurs" -	101,000 gross tonnage	144
	4 "Fabre" - -		
	4 "Fraissinet" - -		
	12 "Bordelais" - -		
Actual Situation - -	3 "Chargeurs" - -	34,000 gross tonnage -	64
	1 "Fabre" - -		
	4 "Fraissinet" - -		
	5 "Bordelais" - -		
Reduction - - -	28 ships	67,000 gross tonnage -	80

5. *West Indies—French Guiana Lines.*

Pre-War Situation -	15 "Transatlantique"	74,000 gross tonnage -	36
Actual Situation -	4 "Transatlantique"	22,700 gross tonnage -	12
Reduction - -	11 Ships - - -	51,300 gross tonnage	24

FRENCH INTER-COLONIAL LINES.

Actual Situation.

Ships of 1,600 tonnage (Gross Tonnage) and above.

S.S. "Antilles"—French Guiana—Martinique.

S.S. "Haiphong"—Indo-China.

S.S. "Persepolis" } Madagascar.

S.S. "Sidon" }

S.S. "Manche"—undergoing repairs at Saigon.

III.—ITALY.

Memorandum re Tonnage employed in Colonial Service.

The amount of tonnage employed by Italy in colonial service is so small that it is hardly worth considering.

It consists of one steamer of 3,360 tons dead weight from Benadir to Italy and one of 5,000 tons dead weight from Eritrea to Italy, and two small vessels, totalling about 1,500 tons dead weight, from Massaua to Port Said.

There are also two small steamers, totalling about 1,100 tons dead weight, on the service of Lybia.

It can also be mentioned that a certain number of steamers are employed in voyages to Lybia by the Military authorities, but these cannot be considered as being on colonial service.

The question of diverting any such tonnage to direct war service is there quite impracticable, and, on the contrary, Italy is instead faced with the problem of endeavouring to somewhat increase the number of vessels to employ in the service of the colonies.

IV.—UNITED STATES.

Tonnage controlled by the United States and in the Service of the Non-contiguous Territories of the United States.

A complete study of the above subject is now being made by the United States Shipping Board, the benefit of which we hope to be able to give to the Council at an early date. Meanwhile the following facts may be noted:—

(1) Tonnage operating between the United States and non-contiguous territories has been allocated to that service primarily to meet the needs of the United States and not because of the territorial requirements.

(2) There is no merchant tonnage, which is controlled by the United States, operating between United States non-contiguous territories and foreign countries.

(3) Steam merchant tonnage controlled by the United States and in the service of the territories for purely territorial purposes was on 15th June 1918 as follows:—

	Number.	Gross.	Dead Weight.
Assigned to Hawaiian Inter-Island Service - -	7	7,921	9,523
Assigned to Philippine Inter-Island Service - -	1	617	600
Chartered to Philippine Government - -	6	10,000	—

APPENDIX 29.**Military Supply Programme.**

The recent decision to form an Inter-Allied Munitions Council will secure the examination, as recommended by the Council, of a very large section of the Allied Military Supply Programme, and steps are being taken to keep in close touch with the development of the work of the Munitions Council.

The Associated Governments have had under consideration certain proposals with a view to securing greater co-operation of action in dealing with the supplies of the Allied Armies in France.

In so far as the two foregoing decisions fall short of securing Inter-Allied examination of all Military Supply Programmes it has been thought best to await the development of the work of the Programme Committees as opportunities may arise of associating the Allied Military Authorities with the Programme Committees where there are civilian and military demands for the same commodity.

APPENDIX 30.

Communication to the Allied Naval Council.

In pursuance of the Council's resolution that there should be an examination by the Allied Naval Authorities with a view to reducing the demand by the Allied Navies on mercantile tonnage, a communication was sent to the Allied Naval Council, which was considered by that body at its recent meeting in London.

The following conclusion was reached :—

“ Revision of Naval Requirements of Merchant Tonnage. ”

“ It was agreed that the request of the Allied Maritime Transport Council, that the Allied Naval Council should bring to the notice of the several Admiralties the extreme importance of seeing that calls on merchant tonnage are kept down to a minimum shall be complied with and that the greatest economy should be exercised in the use of ships now allocated to the Navies.

“ It was further decided that each Ministry of Marine should prepare a list of the merchant tonnage which is employed on its naval services, together with an explanation of the service on which employed and the method of operation, and forward the list to the Secretary of the Council for transmission to the Allied Maritime Transport Council. These lists will then be scrutinised by the Allied Maritime Transport Council, who will ask the several Ministries of Marine for such further information in regard to the same that may be required, and the several Ministries of Marine will discuss with the Allied Maritime Transport Council in the most co-operative spirit any suggestions regarding methods in which it may appear to be practicable to effect economy of tonnage.”

A list prepared by the French Ministry of Marine of the Auxiliary Fleet of the French Navy has been received, and the other lists are expected in due course. Steps will then be taken to examine the lists, and, if necessary, to communicate with the several Ministries of Marine, as suggested by the Allied Naval Council.

APPENDIX 31.

Allied Maritime Transport Council Memorandum as to supply Programmes in relation to allocation of Tonnage.

Programme Committees may find it useful to have the following Memorandum with regard to the relation of the programmes which they produce from time to time to the allocation of tonnage required to give effect to them.

It is intended that this Memorandum should be read in continuation of Memorandum “ A ” dated 25th May. As each Programme Committee produces an agreed programme in accordance with the principles described in Memorandum “ A ” and on the forms subsequently circulated, it should be forwarded to the Secretary of the Allied Maritime Transport Council, Lancaster House, S.W. 1, for consideration in conjunction with other programmes and in relation to the tonnage position as a whole.

It will be realised that the production of an agreed supply programme by a Programme Committee is only the first stage towards the decision as to the extent to which the tonnage requested can be allotted.

On receipt of all the programmes or of such a number as together represent the great bulk of the transport required, it is proposed that they shall be at once examined in relation to the estimated carrying power of the available tonnage by the administrative organisation of the Council. This organisation consisting of the members representing the different countries on imports and tonnage respectively and with such further advice as it may be practicable and desirable to obtain will both endeavour to ascertain to what extent a reduction of the total of the programmes is necessary and then make a provisional plan allotting this reduction as between the different commodities. In this work the organisation will normally regard it as their duty to make their suggestions in a form showing rather the reduction applicable to each supply programme as a

whole than the distribution of the reduction between the Allies, which is for the Programme Committee itself to consider.

After having arrived at a provisional plan of this character, each Programme Committee will be informed of the suggested percentage reduction on its programme as submitted and requested to consider and report what proposed redistribution of the commodity in question it would propose to arrange as between the different countries, and secondly, what would be the position of each country and of the Allied supply programmes as a whole on the assumption of such a reduction, with supporting information as to stocks, consumption, &c. The information so received from the Programme Committees will form the basis of a considered and comprehensive plan which the administrative organisation will submit to the next meeting of the Allied Maritime Transport Council. The Council itself, after such further consultation with representatives of the Programme Committees as may be desirable, will attempt to arrange a definite and comprehensive programme.

While the administrative organisation can, of course, in anticipation of the meeting of the Ministers of the Council only make tentative proposals for a plan of the above character, it is of the greatest importance that the Programme Committees should put them in a position to carry the development of the plan to the furthest possible stage in order that the final work left to be done at a formal meeting of the Transport Council may be reduced within manageable limits.

This procedure is proposed as the permanent procedure when the Programme Committee system is in full operation. Special consideration, however, requires to be given to the position now arising from week to week as a particular Programme Committee produces a programme either provisionally or finally agreed.

It is clear from the foregoing considerations that it is impossible that immediate effect should be given to any such programme by the allocation of the corresponding tonnage, as the result of such action would be to give a priority to the supply programme of the committee which happened to produce its programme first at the expense of other commodities without any balance between the two, which would defeat the main object of the Transport Council.

At the same time it must be expected that the complete establishment of a comprehensive programme must take some considerable time and that readjustments of the supplies as between the Allies upon the advice of the Programme Committees cannot be entirely suspended in the meantime.

The conditions under which it is most likely that tonnage adjustments may be made in conformity with the advice of a Programme Committee in the intermediate period before all the programmes have been adjusted are the following:—(1) Where the programme as a whole represents a considerable reduction upon the total of the previous national programmes, and in particular where the programme as a whole does not require transport exceeding the total tonnage already provisionally allocated or assured to the conveyance of the commodity in question, an agreed decision (with the assent of the representative of the country whose tonnage would require to be diverted) would *prima facie* constitute a case for the reallocation of tonnage. (2) In other cases, *i.e.*, where a programme involves an increase in the total tonnage allocated or assured to the commodity in question there is more chance of tonnage being provided if the commodity is one whose import—

- (a) involves little or no conflict of Allied interest,
- (b) if beyond any doubt the import in question up to the quantity asked would be required either within the period for which it is asked, or within a somewhat longer period during which it can be conveniently stored, and
- (c) if it is obvious that an increased importation will not result in any unnecessary consumption.

These conditions are obviously more nearly satisfied in the case of such commodities as munitions, nitrates and railway wagons than in those where either commercial considerations or the needs of the civilian population are involved.

It must, however, in any case be expected that any such readjustments of tonnage in anticipation of the general settlement must be upon a comparatively minor scale.

It is also desirable that Programme Committees should have the following general considerations in mind:—

- (1) The extent to which it proves possible to secure the allocation of tonnage in conformity with Programme Committees must necessarily depend in a

very large measure on the extent to which all four countries have really become integral parts of the organisation as a whole and are willing to allow both their tonnage and their import programmes to be subject to effective Allied criticism, and to assent to any consequent alterations both in the employment of tonnage and the arrangement of their import programmes which may be recommended. It must be recognised that so long as the only action resulting is in effect the diversion of tonnage belonging to one of the Allied countries, the action required must necessarily be provisional only and will be in the nature of *ex gratia* arrangements on the part of the Ally in question.

- (2) It must also be remembered that the National programmes as at present submitted taken together largely exceed the possible carrying power of Allied tonnage. Upon the last review the excess of such demands in the case of the European Allies amounted to about 15 per cent.
- (3) Moreover, since the date of this review, the American military programme has been immensely increased, with a corresponding increase in the American military supply programme. The extra strain thus thrown on tonnage much more than cancels the measure of relief due to the acquisition of Dutch tonnage and somewhat lower submarine losses.

APPENDIX 32.

Note as to Duties and Constitution of the Permanent Organisation of the Allied Maritime Transport Council.

The permanent organisation is the Executive of the Council.

Duties.—Its duties are :—

- (a) To secure the necessary executive action to give effect to decisions by the Council.
- (b) To prepare information relevant to any question which the Council may wish to discuss at future meetings.
- (c) To suggest definite proposals for the approval of the Council; and
- (d) To take such executive action as is desirable and practicable in conformity with the general policy of the Council and in pursuance of the general duty of assisting in the allocation and most advantageous use of Allied tonnage by co-operative action.

The general sphere of duties of the permanent organisation is coterminous with that of the Council, the difference between the decisions and action of the two depending upon the difference in authority. The permanent organisation will thus take action on any question within the sphere of the Council's duties as defined by the Paris resolutions, except so far as action would involve decisions of such importance as to require approval by the Council itself. Each main national representative in the permanent organisation (after communication with his Government when necessary) will be responsible for saying that any proposed action, in the view of his Government's representatives on the Council, requires the prior approval of the Transport Council in formal session, or may be proceeded with by the permanent organisation.

Constitution.—The governing body of the permanent organisation will consist of one representative of each country.

This body will be termed the Allied Maritime Transport Executive, the same name being for convenience applied to the organisation working under this body.

The permanent organisation will be as follows :—

1. There will be four national divisions, each responsible for the purposes of the Executive to its national member on the governing body and dealing with—

- (i) Tonnage.
- (ii) Import programmes,

with statistical and national staff working in connection with these sections as may be convenient.

2. The work of the four divisions will be co-ordinated by the following Executive Committees :—

- (i) Tonnage (or Traffic) Committee.
- (ii) Imports Committee.

The Tonnage Committee will be responsible for the following permanent duties :—

- (a) Arranging for the due execution of any decision of the Council or the Executive involving the co-operative use or programming of tonnage.
- (b) Obtaining and making available for general use statements showing the amount and disposition of the tonnage under the control of each Ally.
- (c) Examining proposals made by any country with a view to securing a more advantageous use of tonnage under the control of any Ally (whether by the better disposition, routing, or more co-operative use of the tonnage or the better assignment of cargoes in relation to import programmes), and, so far as possible, to arrange that agreed improvements shall be carried into effect.

The Committee will arrange through the Secretariat for any statistical work required in connection with the above duties by the national statistical staffs.

- (ii) Imports Committee.

The Imports Committee will be responsible for the following permanent duties :—

- (a) In general for seeing that such work as is required for the reduction of Import Programmes to within the carrying capacity of the available tonnage is duly effected through the relevant machinery both of the Council and the Programme Committees.
- (b) Watching the constitution of the Programme Committees to see that their number, composition, terms of reference (both on original appointment and later if any modifications are desirable) are such as to subserve the above purpose.
- (c) Seeing that the Programme Committee prepare and present the information as to their programmes in a uniform and suitable manner, and with this object for furnishing them with any necessary forms and making such communications to them as are desirable.
- (d) Obtaining such supplementary information as may be desirable in addition to what is furnished by the Programme Committees, including information as to articles which may at any time not be covered by a Programme Committee.
- (e) Preparing a plan (in association with such other persons as may be desirable) for a reduction of the total of the import programmes furnished by the Programme Committees to within the carrying capacity of the available tonnage; and for ascertaining from the Programme Committees the effect of any reduction involved in such a plan; with a view to submission of definite proposals by the Executive to the Transport Council.
- (f) Arranging that such statistical and other information as may be required for the execution of the above duties is collected and collated.

For the correspondence and statistical work involved in the above duties the Committee will work through the Secretariat.

Statistical Work.—The statistical work of the Executive will be in charge of a statistician, who will be a member of the Secretariat, will keep in touch with the Committees of the Executive, will co-ordinate the work of the national statistical staffs, and will arrange for the preparation such reports and summary statements as the Committees and the Secretariat may require.

3. In addition the work of the several Divisions and Committees will be co-ordinated by a central Secretariat which will be *non-national*.

All the members of this Secretariat, of whatever nationality they may be, will regard themselves as the servants of the organisation as a whole and not of any national division.

They will be organised under a secretary on ordinary office lines.

The duties of the Secretariat will be :—

- (a) To see that work involved in decisions of the executive is properly allotted as between the International Committees or National Divisions, and to remind the various persons concerned of any outstanding work requiring to be done and the date by which it is required.
- (b) To see that the work of the above bodies is duly co-ordinated, *e.g.*, that the Tonnage Committee is not doing work which is being simultaneously done by the Imports Committee or *vice versa*; and that nobody is working on a policy inconsistent with that of the Executive.
- (c) To conduct all correspondence in the name of the Executive; to collate information required by the several Committees; to keep minutes of the Committees; to take charge of all international papers (including minutes both of the Council and the Committees, correspondence, international files, and statistics).

For the purpose of (b) members of the Secretariat will attend the various meetings of the Committees, in the capacity of Secretaries, not members.

In general the Secretariat will be responsible not for policy but for the administrative work of giving due effect to decisions of policy.

It is desirable to supplement the above note as to the permanent organisation and its duties by the following special note as to work in the immediate future.

The main factor in the situation is that Programme Committees are only now being brought into existence, and it is impossible to arrange for the allocation of shipping in accordance with their programmes in the next few months. It is, at the same time, of the utmost importance that working programmes should be obtained and used as a guide to executive action as from the end of the cereal year onwards. The intermediate months must be regarded as an emergency period, shipping being allotted rather with a view to keep each country above danger point in each commodity so far as the position of shipping (which can only be diverted or used for other than already arranged programmes within narrow limits) render practicable.

GENERAL PLAN OF WORK FOR THE REST OF THIS YEAR.

A.—Imports Committee.

1. The first duty of the Imports Committee is to see that the Programme Committees are constituted as rapidly as possible; that their constitution is such as to enable them to give the technical advice required with regard to the respective commodities, and that they are properly linked to the Executive Departments of the respective Governments so as to secure the necessary authority for their recommendations.

2. The next duty of the Committee is to see that the Programme Committees are informed as to the exact nature of the information required for the purpose of the Council, and the form in which it should be presented. They will arrange with the Secretariat for any necessary correspondence for this purpose.

3. They will be responsible for obtaining the programmes from the different Committees. After ascertaining the total amount by which the programmes so obtained exceed the carrying power of vessels under allied control for the remainder of this year the Imports Committee will be responsible for making a scheme (after such consultation with Programme Committees as may be desirable) for so reducing the programme for any commodity or commodities as to bring the total imports within the total carrying power.

The Executive would then present to the Transport Council the plan as a whole (with any modifications that might seem desirable) with a summary of the replies of the Programme Committees.

4. In carrying out the above responsibilities, the Imports Committee will take the end of the cereal year as the date by which programmes must be reduced within the estimated carrying power of tonnage so that the allocation of tonnage can be determined, in the first instance, for the remainder of the year subject only to such adjustments as may afterwards be necessary as the result of later events, and as soon as possible a continuation programme for the next year.

5. In addition to the above duties, the Imports Committee will be responsible for seeing that proper information is obtained and collated as to the actual imports in comparison with the programmes; monthly reports being obtained from each country for this purpose as from the 1st January 1918. These reports must be similar in form and arranged in conformity with the categories of commodities shown in the Import Programme.

B.—*Tonnage Committee.*

Apart from the general duties of the Tonnage Committee indicated above the duty of the Tonnage Committee in the immediate future will be as follows:—

1. *Period for arrivals up to the end of August.*

- (a) The Tonnage Committee will deal with any questions that may arise as to the allocation of neutral vessels in the pool in conformity with the general principles set out in the approved memorandum and working plan.
- (b) They will make an investigation, in accordance with the decision of the last Council meeting, of the Tonnage in Colonial service.
- (c) They will consider proposals rendering practicable the withdrawal of vessels from more distant trades to the Atlantic.
- (d) They will arrange for the preparation and circulation of periodical reports as to the position of the programmes for which the Council have accepted special responsibility, *viz.*, Belgian Relief, Italian coal, French coal, using the Secretariat as may be convenient.

2. *The period after the end of August.*

When the reduced programmes within the estimated carrying power of tonnage have been agreed, the work of the Tonnage Committee will become mainly that of a Traffic Committee, its responsibility being to arrange with the respective Governments for the allocation of tonnage in such a way as to secure the imports in the agreed programmes.

In arranging this Tonnage Programme, the import requirements of each of the Allies will in the first place be met by the tonnage under the Ally's control (national and neutral) subject to (a) the assumption by one Ally of any specified responsibility for the whole or any part of a particular Supply Service, and (b) the interchange of vessels to secure the most economical use of tonnage.

LANCASTER HOUSE,
July 16th 1918.

ALLIED MARITIME TRANSPORT COUNCIL.

Report of Action, July 16th to August 15th, 1918.

In view of the forthcoming meeting of the Council in London on August 29th, a supplementary report is submitted stating action taken and the main events of importance in the period July 16th to August 15th, in continuation of the last report which covered the period from April 16th to July 15th.

Lancaster House,

J. A. SALTER.

August 16th, 1918.

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Summary and Index of Report.

Italian Coal.

Programme - - - - -	600,000 tons a month.
Supply 15th July to 14th August - - - - -	630,965 tons.
Average for five months - - - - -	591,457 tons.

(In addition to the shipment of 150,000 tons special military reserve.)

French Coal.

Programme - - - - -	1,740,000
Shipments—July - - - - -	1,489,000
Average shipments—April, May, June, July - - - - -	1,443,000
Total deficiency - - - - -	1,186,000

Belgian Relief.

Emergency Supply.—Great Britain has agreed to ship a further 5,000 tons of rice from Great Britain as an emergency measure to meet an immediate necessity.

Special Allocations of British Tonnage among Allies.

(a) In July 163,000 tons of cereals were diverted to France and 78,000 tons to Italy, in accordance with the procedure arranged to give effect to the 3rd November agreement.

(b) British Liner Services from United States to France; the British tonnage loading on this service in August will amount to approximately 66,000 tons d.w., and in September to 93,500 tons d.w.

(c) British liner service from United States to Italy; the British tonnage loading on this service in August will amount to approximately 51,500 tons d.w. and 47,800 tons d.w. have already been allocated for September loading.

(d) In July 305,000 American soldiers were embarked—188,000 in British vessels. The carriage of American soldiers in British vessels during the four months April–July 1918 has involved the loss of just over one million tons of imports.

Allocation of Pool Neutral Vessels.

A further 52 vessels (making a total of 176) have been allocated between the Allies in accordance with the general plan of allocation.

Programme Committees.

The personnel, &c., of the Programme Committees (subject to correction and modification) is printed in Appendix 34, pages 143–147.

Detailed Report.

1. *The Council.*

The President of the United States has appointed the Hon. George Rublee to be an additional representative of the United States on the Council.

Arrangements have been made for the Third Session of the Council to be held in London on August 29th, 1918, at Lancaster House.

2. *Italian Coal.*

The programme of the normal supply of coal to Italy amounting to 600,000 tons a month, which was approved by the Council at its first session on 15th March, was continued by decision of the Council on 23rd April.

The figures* for the period July 15th to August 14th are as follows:—

	Plan.	Execution.
	Tons.	Tons.
Shipments of British coal by long sea route - - - - -	150,000	305,337
British coal passing Italian frontier - - - - -	100,000	(approx.) 92,756
French coal passing Italian frontier - - - - -	170,000	108,520
French coal on board at French Mediterranean ports - - - - -	180,000	124,252
	600,000	630,865

The shortage of coal referred to in page 113 of the previous Report of Action has continued over the period now dealt with, as have also difficulties in the provision of railage across France. Every effort has, however, been made to ship the maximum quantity of coal direct.

It may be mentioned that *shipments viâ* Blaye amounting to 83,139 tons have been made during this period. These quantities would normally appear as arrivals in the report for the next month.

The position regarding the deficit on the programme total for the period since 15th March is as follows:—

Programme for four months ending 14th July - - -	2,400,000 tons.
Supplied - - - - -	2,326,322 „
Deficit - - - - -	73,678 „
It will be seen that of this deficit approximately - - -	31,000 „ has
been made good during the month ending 14th August.	
It is hoped to clear off the remaining deficit of - - -	42,670 „
during the coming month.	

Of the strategic reserve of 150,000 tons, a total of 139,720 tons have now been shipped or allocated, leaving the balance of 10,280 tons to be provided for. The figure 139,720 does not include a cargo of 6,714 tons shipped against this requirement and subsequently sunk. It is hoped to ship the remaining 10,280 tons at an early date.

3. *French Coal.*

The shipments during July amounted to 1,488,894 tons, against the provisional programme of 1,740,000 tons—deficit 251,106 tons. The remarks made on page 4 of the previous Report still hold good, and shipping has been provided for all the coal that could be supplied from the United Kingdom and received in French ports.

4. *Belgian Relief.*

Following upon the arrangements described in the previous Report, the United States and Great Britain have made special allocations of tonnage to meet the requirements of the Belgian Relief. These allocations, together with the non-war-zone Swedish tonnage, to the extent to which it has become available, and the special

* Exact figures for 13th and 14th August not being available approximate figures have been given.

shipments of flour, &c. from the United Kingdom to Rotterdam (referred to later), have enabled the Belgian Relief requirements for June, July and August to be approximately met on the basis of the Wheat Executive figures, the total deficiency for the three months amounts only to 19,133 tons or about 6,400 tons a month, against a requirement of 120,000 tons a month. The additional tonnage during these months has been found by the United States and Great Britain in practically equal shares, the actual figures being 57,660 tons by the United States and 59,850 tons by Great Britain.

With regard to special shipments from the United Kingdom it will be remembered that to meet urgent needs Great Britain undertook to transport 10,000 tons of flour and some 14,000 tons of beans, peas, rice, herrings, clothing, and miscellaneous articles held by the Belgian Relief in the United Kingdom. The whole of the flour has now been shipped, and the shipments of the other commodities are proceeding, although action has been delayed by a dock strike in Rotterdam.

The Belgian Relief Commission have recently made representations regarding their urgent need for rice, and it has been agreed that, in order to meet the emergency, a further 5,000 tons of rice (in addition to the 2,000 tons already agreed upon) shall be shipped from this country to Rotterdam in the British vessels put on the service for the carriage of the flour, &c. It has been made clear that this action has been taken solely to meet the urgent necessities of the destitute people in Belgium and Northern France, for whom no rice would be available in the United States until October next, and that there can be no further continuance of this method of meeting the Belgian Relief requirements, as it involves extra strain on tonnage and extra risk.

5. Pool Tonnage.

The number of vessels in the Pool has risen from 124 to 176, and they have been dealt with under the general directions of the Permanent Organisation in accordance with the working plan described on page 117 of the previous report.

6. Changes in Allocation of Tonnage as between the Allies.

(a) Under the agreement of 3rd November 1917 and as subsequently modified and supplemented, Great Britain has in practice accepted responsibility for supplementing deficiencies in tonnage required for transporting to France and Italy their agreed shares in the cereal programme.

The quantities of cereals so supplied in British tonnage to France and Italy in the month of July were approximately as follows:—

France	-	-	-	- 163,000 tons
Italy	-	-	-	- 78,000 tons
Total	-	-	-	- 241,000 tons

These quantities are diversions and do not include the quantities of cereals supplied in British ships previously time-chartered to France or Italy.

(b) Allocations to Italy.

The tonnage loading in August on the British Liner Service from the United States to Italy will amount to 51,295 tons d.w., and 47,800 tons d.w. have already been allocated for September loading. A cargo of sugar has been diverted from Great Britain to Italy.

(c) France.

The tonnage loading on the British Liner Service from the United States to France in August will amount to 65,870 tons d.w., and in September to 93,500 tons d.w.

As regards the request by France for the transport from the United States of 100,000 tons of railway waggons and war material referred to in the previous report, it is estimated that about 60,000 tons will have been shipped by the end of August.

Pending the examination by the Programme Committee of the French request for the shipment of oil seeds, arrangements have been made by which four British requisitioned neutral vessels engaged in the French coal trade are being sent to Dakar with coal for French needs and will thereafter load oil seeds to Marseilles.

During the past two months Great Britain has diverted more than 25,000 tons of sugar to France to meet the present shortage. Although no request for assistance in the matter of sugar had previously been made by France and although the diversion of tonnage has necessarily been made at the expense of other commodities, the urgency of the need was such as to necessitate the action taken.

(d) During the month of July the total embarkation of American troops was 305,000 and of this number 188,000 were embarked in British vessels.

The use of British tonnage for the transport of American troops to France involves the loss of about 40 per cent. of the cargo carrying capacity of the vessels so employed. The average amount of cargo shut out for each man carried is found to be about 2 $\frac{1}{10}$ th tons. During the four months April to July 1918, 518,950 American soldiers have been carried in British vessels, and this has involved the loss of 1,090,000 tons of imports.

6. *Other Tonnage Arrangements.*

(a) The use of refrigerator space in the North Atlantic. The proposal described on pages 117-8 of the previous Report has been further discussed with the United States Authorities, who are in agreement with the suggested principle of exchange, but prefer to postpone the conclusion of an arrangement until there is a surplus of American refrigerator tonnage in the Atlantic, which is not at present the case owing to delay in delivery of tonnage. In the meantime Great Britain is rendering the United States Government such assistance as is required in transporting meat for the American Army to France.

(b) *Vessels Sailing while not Loaded down to their Marks.*—The attention of the Tonnage Committee was drawn to the fact that certain neutral steamers allocated to the Wheat Commission and loading cereals for France from North America had sailed light of their marks, and that the French Government agents for these vessels, on being requested to take dead-weight cargo, had pointed out that these steamers were loaded solely for the carriage of foodstuffs and grain, and that they had no instructions to ship dead-weight cargoes.

The Committee were unanimously of opinion that this loss of carrying-power should be remedied, and the members agreed to call the attention of their respective Governments to the matter.

The French Government representative has since reported that the necessary steps have now been taken by his Government, and that, in fact, in the cases mentioned, the loading of the most economical proportion of heavy cargo was rendered more difficult by the necessity of getting vessels away to catch convoys.

7. *Programme Committees.*

Since the date of the previous Report, Mr. Herbert Hoover, the Food Controller of the United States, has visited Europe, and meetings of the Food Controllers of the associated Governments have taken place in London. An Inter-Allied Food Council has been established, to consist of the four Food Controllers, and an additional representative of each of the four countries, which will meet every three months or as often as may be necessary and within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by the respective Governments will agree upon a programme and methods of food imports embracing the needs of all the Allied countries, and will determine questions of common interest and policy. The Food Controllers further agreed to appoint two representatives each to form a body called the Inter-Allied Food Council Committee of Representatives having its headquarters in London under an independent Chairman. The functions of the Committee of Representatives include the co-ordination of the Programmes of the various Food Executives or Programme Committees and the consolidation of these programmes into a general Food Programme for all foods and all Allied countries, and the Committee will act as the channel of communication as to general policy between these executives and the Allied Maritime Transport Council and the Inter-Ally Council on War Purchases and Finance.

These decisions are welcome from the point of view of the Transport Council, inasmuch as the Council will now deal with one body as regards food instead of with four or more separate bodies each of them concerned with a separate section of the food supply.

Certain correspondence has taken place between the Council and the Inter-Allied Food Council and is printed as Appendix 33, page 140. A copy of this correspondence has been sent to the Munitions Council.

Representatives of the American War Industries Board are now in Europe for the purpose of discussing questions connected with Programme Committees and the formation of Inter-Allied Bodies with executive powers to deal with a number of commodities; and of arranging the appointment of American representatives on more of the committees.

It has been thought convenient to collect the information available up to the present as to the composition of the various Programme Committees, and this will be found in Appendix 34, pages 143-147, though it must be understood that the list is provisional and subject to correction.

Copies of two Memoranda which have been issued to Programme Committees are printed as Appendices 35 and 36, pages 148-150, and these in conjunction with the Memorandum printed on pages 129-131 of the previous Report complete the series up to the present.

Speaking generally, the Programme Committees have not yet completed their task of framing programmes for the remainder of 1918, but information which they have collected in the course of their work has proved of use on more than one occasion. The Committees will be asked to extend their work by framing programmes for the ensuing year at an early date. In the meantime, pending the receipt and collation of the programmes, the Council will probably wish to discuss the general principles on which their recommendations as to the allocation of tonnage between the different services shall be based. A Memorandum containing some suggested principles will be circulated separately.

APPENDIX 33.

Correspondence between Allied Maritime Transport Council and Food Council.

(a) LETTER FROM TRANSPORT COUNCIL TO FOOD COUNCIL.

30th July 1918.

I am directed by the Allied Maritime Transport Council to forward to you herewith, for the information of the Food Council, the following observations as to the tonnage position in relation to the Food Programmes which are now under consideration.

The procedure which will require to be followed after the programmes have been received, both from the Food Council and also from the Munitions Council and the Programme Committees covering other imported commodities, has been explained in Memorandum B., dated July 18th, 1918.

In view of the immense importance, however, of the Programmes covered by the Food Council to the whole tonnage programme, the Council may find it convenient at this stage and before the detailed examination of the programmes has been made, to have a preliminary note as to certain important factors that require to be taken into account. The Council will realise that it will save considerable delay and inconvenience both to themselves and to the corresponding bodies dealing with other commodities, as well as to the transport Council, if the work of reducing programmes to minimum requirements is carried as far as possible before the first formal submission of the programmes to the Transport Council.

I am to state generally with regard to the tonnage position that while it is true that world building has now reached world losses, this fact is due to the large excess of American building over American losses, and the American excess thus resulting is not available for general European imports in view of the needs of the American army. Taking the building of the rest of the world against the losses of the rest of the world, which for the above reason offers the more reliable index of the tonnage available for the European Allies, I am to point out that there is still each month a serious excess of losses over building, the excess of such losses amounting in the first six months of this year to $1\frac{1}{4}$ million tons dead weight.

Apart from this very general statement of the tonnage position, a simple criterion is afforded as to the value of effecting any given saving in tonnage, as against a loss from other points of view, by the fact that America can send, and the Military Authorities desire, more American Troops in France than the available and prospective tonnage is adequate to transport and supply. It follows, therefore, that any saving in tonnage directly increases the number of American Troops in France, and it may be stated with approximate accuracy that each 5,000 tons of imports saved means that a further 1,000 American soldiers can be supplied, and therefore sent to France, than would otherwise be possible.

If, therefore, the Food Council has at any time under consideration two alternative courses, one of which offers certain advantages from the point of view of finance, or the comfort of the civilian populations, while the other offers the prospect of saving tonnage, it will be possible to measure the cost to the Allied cause of taking the first course by reckoning that for each extra 5,000 tons of imports involved in it there must be a reduction in the number of American soldiers in France by 1,000.

The Food Council now has the great advantage of knowing precisely what has been the consumption in each country of each important food commodity during the past year. In view of the continued shortage of tonnage, and the special reason indicated above for economising to the utmost possible extent, I am to express the hope that the Council will find it possible to take the record of total actual consumption during this last cereal year as setting the maximum limit to the proposed programme for the ensuing year. This does not, of course, necessarily mean that there would be no increase in any particular commodity, but that if such an increase is necessary it should be used to relieve the requirement for some other commodity as compared with last year's consumption. The application of this principle would of course mean the continuance of imports on the basis of last year, subject to a reduction or

increase where there has been any improvement or reduction in home production, and with such further adjustments in relation to stocks as are required to keep these above, but not unnecessarily above, the point of danger.

Apart from reducing total requirements for food in the different countries to a minimum, the Council will also doubtless have in mind the necessity of arranging programmes in such a way as to involve the smallest strain upon tonnage, whether by drawing supplies from the nearest source or by obtaining them in such a form as to involve least bulk and weight in relation to food value.

It will of course be realised that this letter is only intended to give a very general indication of the tonnage position and of certain principles which are being suggested to all the various bodies now considering programmes of Allied imports. It is now addressed to you in the hope that the consideration of the food programmes from the commencement in the light of the above suggestions may reduce and facilitate the work of subsequent re-adjustment of programmes between the Transport Council and the Food Council in relation to the total tonnage available and the demands upon it from all other sources.

J. A. SALTER.

The Secretary,
Food Council.

(b) RESOLUTION OF FOOD COUNCIL COMMUNICATED TO TRANSPORT COUNCIL.

Resolution.

31st July 1918.

The letter of the Allied Maritime Transport Council of to-day having been laid before the Food Council, the Council wishes to state that while it agrees with the absolute necessity of minimum use of tonnage, and has in itself been created for this purpose, yet the basis of calculation on imports to England, France, and Italy upon the foundation of last year's imports, less increase of production, simply means a repetition of the food difficulties of last year. We wish to state emphatically that the morale of the people will be most seriously endangered by such a basis of imports. The Food Council puts forward as a more constructive basis the employment of the same ship ton mileage during the coming year.

30th July 1918.

(c) LETTER FROM TRANSPORT COUNCIL TO FOOD COUNCIL.

5th August.

I am directed by the Allied Maritime Transport Council to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 31st July conveying a copy of a resolution passed by the Food Council on July 30th with reference to the Transport Council's letter of the same date.

The Transport Council much regret that the Food Council express dissent from the suggestion that, in the framing of the food programmes for the ensuing year, the total consumption during the past year should be taken as setting the maximum limit, *i.e.*, that the imports should be not greater than what is required in combination with home production, to allow consumption in total on the same scale as during the last year (with such variations as may be desirable as between different commodities or countries) and to keep stocks above, though not unnecessarily above, the point of danger.

The Transport Council feel bound to repeat their opinion that in view of the tonnage position this is a reasonable principle to adopt in framing the food programmes, and think it may be convenient to the Food Council to state, at this early stage, that they can offer no prospect whatever of being able to arrange tonnage upon the principle suggested by the Food Council.

I am to observe that—

(1) The application of the principle suggested by the Transport Council would not involve the repetition of such difficulties as arose last year from any local or general depletion of stock rendering distribution impracticable.

The principle suggested is that imports should be such as not to allow for actual *consumption* on a bigger scale. (It will be observed that the principle as defined in the Transport Council's letter differs in this respect from the

reference to it in the Food Council's resolution.) It is not of course the wish of the Transport Council that stocks should be reduced to such a point as to cause actual privation of some of the necessities of life in certain areas.

(2) The general tonnage position has been indicated generally in the Council's previous letter. In a shipping position rendered more difficult by the large net losses of tonnage available for European service and by the effect of the American Army programme, the one substantial factor of relief was the better harvests in the three European Allied countries and in the nearest source of America. If the principle of the Food Council were accepted this one factor of relief would operate solely to the advantage of food and would not only mean that no assistance would be given in supplying the American Army, but that the imports of the European Allies other than food would in addition be reduced in correspondence with the net losses of European tonnage. This is, in the opinion of the Transport Council, a situation which it is impossible to contemplate.

In the above circumstances the Transport Council will not feel justified in asking the military and munitions authorities to reduce their demands upon tonnage (with a consequent reduction of the numbers of American soldiers available for next year's campaign) in order that such tonnage may be allocated to food as to enable and encourage consumption upon a more generous scale than during the past year.

The Secretary,
Food Council.

J. A. SALTER.

APPENDIX 34.

PROGRAMME COMMITTEES.

Members and Expert Assessors, Meeting Place, Secretary, and Address.

	France.	Italy.	U.S.A.	U.K.	Meeting Place.	Secretary, Address, and Telephone Number.
FOOD COUNCIL - -	M. BORET.	Signor CRESPI.	The Hon. HERBERT HOOVER.	The Right Hon. J. R. CLYNES.	—	Mr. F. L. TURNER, Trafalgar House, Waterloo Place, S.W. 1. Gerrard 9600.
Committee of Representatives (Independent Chairmen, Sir JOHN BEALE).	Major R. FILLIOUX. M. M. GENESTAL.	Professor ATTOLICO. Mr. J. NIMMO.	Mr. J. P. COTTON. Mr. L. P. SHELDON.	Major the Hon. WALDORF ASTOR. Sir W. H. BEVERIDGE, K.C.B.	Trafalgar House, Waterloo Place, S.W. 1.	
Wheat - -	Major R. FILLIOUX.	Professor ATTOLICO.	Mr. L. P. SHELDON. Mr. G. S. JACKSON.	The Right Hon. the EARL OF CRAWFORD AND BALCARRES. Sir GEORGE SALTmarsh.	Trafalgar House, Waterloo Place, S.W. 1.	Dr. GERTRUDE C. DIXON, Royal Commission on Wheat Supplies, Trafalgar House, Waterloo Place, S.W. 1. Gerrard 9600.
Meats and Fats - -	M. DESTOMBES. Major R. FILLIOUX.	Professor ATTOLICO. Lieutenant AMADIO.	Mr. J. P. COTTON. Mr. L. P. SHELDON.	Captain J. R. BROOKE.	Palace Chambers, Westminster, S.W. 1.	Mr. G. N. PHARAZYN, Ministry of Food, Palace Chambers, S.W. 1. Vic. 9860—Ext. 76.
Oils and Seeds - -	M. DESTOMBES. Major R. FILLIOUX.	Professor ATTOLICO. Dr. GIANNINI Lieutenant AMADIO.	Mr. J. P. COTTON. Mr. G. S. JACKSON.	Mr. E. F. WISE, C.B.	—	Mr. IBBETSON JAMES, New County Hall, S.E. 1, Hop. 5060—Ext. 428.
Sugar - -	Major R. FILLIOUX.	Professor ATTOLICO. Lieutenant AMADIO.	Mr. J. P. COTTON. Mr. G. S. JACKSON.	Lord BLEDISLOE. Sir ROBERT LYLE.	14, Great Smith St., S.W. 1.	Mr. A. H. GLADWELL, Royal Commissioner on Sugar Supply, 14, Great Smith St., S.W. 1. Victoria 6960.
Wool, hair, products and by-products of same.	M. DANTZER. M. EUGENE MOTTE. M. LORTHOIS.	Professor ATTOLICO or Dr. GIANNINI. On. MARZOTTO (Civil). Colonel RIGGI. Captain MASSARI (Military).	Mr. A. M. PATTERSON. Mr. F. K. NIXON.	Sir ARTHUR GOLDFINCH. Lieutenant-Colonel F. V. WILLEY.	Lancaster House.	Mr. F. J. BARNES, India House, Kingsway, W.C. 2. Holborn 2301.

NOTE.—It will be understood that occasionally the representation of one or other of the four countries was varied, and that the representative originally nominated sometimes attended by deputy, or was accompanied by assessors.

—	France.	Italy.	U.S.A.	U.K.	Meeting Place.	Secretary, Address, and Telephone Number.
Jute, flax, hemp and articles manufactured from these materials.	M. DANTZER. M. LOEDEICHH.	Professor ATTOLICO or Dr. GIANNINI. Lieutenant HALENKE (Civil). Colonel RIGGI. Captain MASSARI (Military).	Mr. A. M. PATTERSON. Mr. F. K. NIXON.	Sir ARTHUR GOLDFINCH.	Lancaster House.	Mr. G. MALCOLM, Imperial House (R.M. 2b), Tothill Street, S.W. 1. Victoria 8540—Ext. 208.
Leather, Hides, Skins & Tanning Materials.	M. MAUGER. M. DADILLON. Two Experts.	Professor ATTOLICO or Dr. GIANNINI. Commander F. BOCCA (Civil). Colonel RIGGI. Lieutenant PASININI (Military).	Mr. H. W. BOYD.	Sir ARTHUR GOLDFINCH.	Lancaster House.	Dr. E. C. SNOW, Imperial House (R.M. 2D.) Tothill Street, S.W. 1. Victoria 8540—Ext. 167.
Paper and Papermaking Materials.	M. SIMYAN, accompanied by M. ADELINÉ. M. DARBLAY.	Dr. GIANNINI. Ing. BURGO. Professor LEVI.	Mr. LUCIUS P. ORDWAY. Mr. A. D. WHITESIDE.	Mr. H. A. VERNET.	Lancaster House.	Mr. G. R. HALL CAINE, Paper Control Department, 23, Buckingham Gate, S.W. 1. Victoria 6185.
Tobacco and Matches -	M. MAYER.	Professor ATTOLICO. Ing. COLOMBI.	Mr. LUCIUS P. ORDWAY. Mr. A. D. WHITESIDE.	Mr. LANCELOT H. SMITH.	Lancaster House.	Mr. A. J. COX, Tobacco and Match Control Board, 1, Gt. George Street, S.W. 1. Victoria 5023.
Cotton - - -	M. DANTZER.	Dr. GIANNINI. Signor G. MYLIUS.	Mr. A. M. PATTERSON.	Mr. S. J. CHAPMAN.	Lancaster House.	Mr. J. A. TODD, Board of Trade, Gwydyr House, S.W. 1. Victoria 3840.
Timber - - -	General CHEVALIER. Lieutenant SEBASTIAN.	Dr. GIANNINI. Lieutenant DE CHANAZ.	Mr. LUCIUS P. ORDWAY. Mr. A. D. WHITESIDE.	Sir JAMES BALL.	Lancaster House.	Mr. E. BATCH, Timber Supply Department, 80, Newman Street, Oxford Street, W. 1. Museum 4240—Ext. 117.
Petroleum Conference -	Senator BERANGER. The MARQUIS DE CHASSELOUPE-LAUBAT. Colonel DIVE. Lieutenant BENARD.	Professor ATTOLICO. Lieutenant FARINA..	Commander PAUL FOLEY, U.S.N. Mr. L. I. THOMAS. Mr. CHESTER NARRAMORE.	Sir JOHN CADMAN (Chairman). Mr. JAMES GRAHAM. Mr. G. H. ASHDOWN. Mr. B. A. KENBALL- COOK.	12, Berkeley Street, S.W. 1.	Mr. ALEX FRASER, 12, Berkeley Street, S.W. 1. Mayfair, 6661.
Coal and coke - - -	Captain PILLIARD.	Lieutenant FARINA. Cav. GALLI.	Major DUNNING. Mr. A. D. WHITESIDE.	Sir GUY CALTHROP. Mr. B. A. KENBALL- COOK.	—	—

INTER-ALLIED MUNITIONS COUNCIL.

	Representatives.	Standing Committee.	Secretariat.	Tonnage.
FRANCE	M. LOUCHEUR (Chairman). M. DUNESNIL. Control-General MAUGLÈRE. Ingenieur-en-chef MERCIER. Right Hon. W. S. CHURCHILL, M.P. Sir CHARLES ELLIS, K.C.B. Mr. W. T. LAYTON, C.B.E. Major-General Sir W. FURSE, K.C.B., D.S.O. H. E. Signor NAVA. H. E. Signor CHIESA. Signor QUARTIERI. Lieut.-General Marquis CHAVERINO. Dr. A. PIRELLI. Mr. E. R. A. STETTINIUS. General L. C. B. WHEELER. Mr. L. L. SUMMERS.	Lieutenant-Colonel DE GRAILLY. Sir CHARLES ELLIS, K.C.B. Brigadier-General MOLE. Mr. P. L. ORDWAY.	Captain RENE BAZIN. M. SIMIAND (Statistics). Mr. P. HANSON, C.B. Captain JUNG. Major O'LAUGHLIN.	Captain PILLIARD. Mr. W. T. LAYTON (Chairman). Mr. BURTON CHADWICK. Mr. M. S. BIRKETT (Secretary). Mr. TYSON. Lieutenant FARINA. Mr. E. A. PIERCE. Mr. F. NIXON.

COMMITTEES (INTER-ALLIED MUNITIONS COUNCIL).

	France.	Italy.	U.S.A.	U.K.
Artillery and Small Arms (Programme Committee and Technical Sub-Committee).	General MOCHOT. General PAYEUR (Chairman). Colonel MERCIER. Captain DE JARNY (Joint Sec.).	Lieut.-General Marquis CLAVERINO. Brigadier-General GARRONE. Colonel REVELLI. Colonel GUERRITORE. Commander LANDI. Lieutenant PAGETTI (Technical). Colonel RIGGI. Commander FALK. Commander BOCCIARDO. Lieutenant AGHIB. Captain DE MEO.	General C. B. WHEELER. Mr. PAUL MACKALL. Mr. PAUL MACKALL (Chairman).	Major-General Sir W. FURSE. Major-General Sir F. R. BINGHAM (Technical). Sir JAMES STEVENSON. Brigadier-General LYON. Mr. W. T. LAYTON. Mr. P. HANSON (Joint Secretary) Major DEWAR (Secretary). Mr. W. J. JONES.
Steel	Lieutenant-Colonel CUVELETTE.			

APPENDIX 34—*continued*.
COMMITTEES (INTER-ALLIED MUNITIONS COUNCIL)—*continued*.

—	France.	Italy.	U.S.A.	U.K.
Non-Ferrous Metals - -	Commander HAUSER. Lieutenant MICHEL. Lieutenant SAUVAGE.	Lieutenant AGHIB. Lieutenant SAGLIO.	Mr. LINCOLN HUTCHINSON.	Sir E. W. MOIR (Chairman). Sir L. W. LLEWELLYN. Major DEWAR (Secretary). Mr. J. C. GRAY (Assistant Sec.). Mr. C. L. BUDD. Sir KEITH PRICE. Sir JAMES STEVENSON. Major LEFEBURE.
Explosives and Filling - -	General PAYEUR. Contrôleur-General MAUCLERE. M. L'HEURE.	Signor QUARTIERI. General VALENTINI. Commander VILLAVECCHIA. Colonel PENNA. Lieutenant CARDOSO. Senator CIAMICIAN. Signor QUARTIERI. Commander VILLAVECCHIA. Colonel PENNA.	Colonel FREIS. Captain ZANETTI. Captain MAYO SMITH.	Major CORBETT. Major LEFEBURE. Mr. DICKINSON.
Chemicals - - -	General OZIL (Chairman). General TAFFENET.	Lieutenant CARDOSO. Colonel GARGANO. Colonel PUGNANI. Lieutenant CASTELLI. Colonel RIGGI. Signor FIRELLI. Major BNSA. Signor ROLLA.	General ROCKENBACK. Colonel BROWNING. Colonel GRANT.	Colonel HOLBROOK. Colonel FOSTER.
Mechanical Transport - -	Colonel JOUQUET. Colonel PUGEAUD. M. MUNICH.	Colonel GARGANO. Colonel PUGNANI.	Brigadier-General M. L. WALKER.	Colonel HOLBROOK (Chairman). Mr. ALEX. WALKER. Lieutenant BARRACLOUGH (Sec.). Sir JOHN EAGLESOME.
Rubber - - -	Sous Int. EXBRAYAT. Captain ESCHALLIER. M. J. SEE.	Lieutenant CASTELLI. Colonel RIGGI. Signor FIRELLI.	Mr. LINCOLN HUTCHINSON.	
Gum, Varnish, and Rosin -	Sous Int. EXBRAYAT. Captain ROTHIER. M. CHIMINES. Captain GRIFFITHS.	Major BNSA. Signor ROLLA.	Mr. LINCOLN HUTCHINSON. Mr. WHITESIDE.	

SUB-COMMITTEES (INTER-ALLIED MUNITIONS COUNCIL).

Abrasives, Lead, Aluminium, Antimony, Nickel, Platinum.	Major HAUSER. Lieutenant SAUVAGE.	Lieutenant SAGLIO.	Mr. LINCOLN HUTCHINSON.	Sir L. W. LLEWELLYN. Colonel FOSTER.
Copper, Spelter, Brass - -	Lieutenant MICHEL. Major HAUSER.	Lieutenant SAGLIO.	Mr. LINCOLN HUTCHINSON.	Sir L. W. LLEWELLYN. Mr. BUDD.
Bismuth, Carbide, Graphite, Mica.	Lieutenant MICHEL. Major HAUSER. Lieutenant SAUVAGE.	Lieutenant SAGLIO.	Mr. LINCOLN HUTCHINSON.	Sir L. W. LLEWELLYN. Sir JOHN EAGLESOME.

Tin	-	-	-	-	Colonel RIGGI.	Mr. G. ORMSBY. Mr. J. HUGHES. Mr. LINCOLN HUTCHINSON. Mr. MACKAIL, Mr. E. A. PIERCE. General W. C. LANGFITT. General ENGAR RUSSELL. Counsil-General R. F. SKINNER. Mr. LINCOLN HUTCHINSON.	Sir L. W. LLEWELLYN. Mr. W. A. TENNANT. Sir L. W. LLEWELLYN. Mr. F. W. HARBORD. Sir L. W. LLEWELLYN. Sir JOHN EAGLESONE. Colonel C. D. R. WATTS.
Electrodes, Ferro Ferro Vanadium. Wolfram	-	-	Chrome,	-	Lieutenant SAGLIO. Lientenant SAGLIO. General ANGELOZZI. Colonel MALVANI. Colonel PENNA. Lientenant FARINA.		Sir E. WYLDRORE SMITH (Chairman). Honourable HERBERT GIBBS. Colonel KENPSTER. Mr. N. A. ALSTON. Major STOMM (Secretary). Major FRYE.
Steel	-	-	-	-	Commander VILLAVECCHIA. Professor BRIZI.		
Nitrates	-	-	-	-			
Agricultural Chemicals	-	-	-	-		Mr. L. L. SUMMERS. Mr. L. P. ORDWAY.	

COMMITTEES AND DELEGATES IN LIAISON.

Tanks	-	-	-	-	General LEVI. Colonel GRILLO. Captain LAZZERINO.	General W. W. ATTERBURY. Major SLADE.	Colonel STERN. Major-General Sir P. NASH. Brigadier-General THORNTON. Colonel P. C. YOUNG.
Railway Transport	-	-	-	-	Professor GRASSI. Major BENZA.	General PATRICK. Colonel DUNWOODY.	Sir A. DUCKHAM. General ELLINGTON. Mr. GIBSON. Colonel GEAL. Brigadier-General SYKES. Colonel BUZZARD. Major GUEST. Major JONES.
Aircraft (Technical)	-	-	-	-	General BONGIOVANNI. Colonel COSTANZI. Captain CACCIA.	General FOOLLOIS. Colonel EMBICK. Colonel GRANT.	
Aircraft (Military)	-	-	-	-			

NOTE.—The representatives on the Inter-Allied Munitions Council are here given as in November 1918.

APPENDIX 35.

Allied Maritime Transport Council Memorandum as to Executive and Programme Committees.

At the Paris Conference of December last the question of Allied imports and tonnage was considered, and with a view to making the most advantageous use of the available shipping it was agreed by the Allies that "America, France, Italy, and Great Britain will all tabulate and make available to each other a statement showing in detail and as nearly as possible in the same form each class of requirements for which tonnage is needed, and, secondly, the tonnage available and likely to be available through new building, &c. These requirements having been classified (showing the source of supply, &c.) and having been adjusted (a) to secure a reasonably uniform standard of adequacy both as between classes of commodities and as between countries, and (b) to bring the total within the carrying capacity of the Allies as a whole, will form the basis on which the general allocation of tonnage will be determined."

As a result of decisions taken at that Conference the Allied Maritime Transport Council was formed, consisting of Ministers from each of the three chief European Allies with a delegate from America, and was charged with the duty of examining the use of all tonnage under Allied control with a view to allotting it to the services most essential to the prosecution of the war. The Council's powers are limited to making recommendations for action to the respective Governments, who retain final control over the movements of their own ships.

As there is a general shortage of shipping when set against import requirements, it was realised that the Council's recommendations would necessarily involve decisions not only (a) on the relative importance of the various import requirements, but also (b) on the relative needs of the several Allies for a particular commodity. It was therefore further decided at Paris, for the purpose of obtaining the best opinion as to the total amount required of a particular commodity and as to its distribution among the Allies, that Allied bodies (Programme Committees) should be formed for the different main requirements (food, munitions, raw materials, &c.) on the model of the Wheat Executive, America being associated with these bodies. It was contemplated that the formation of expert Allied bodies of this nature would greatly simplify the work of allotting tonnage, as considered programmes for each article would be rendered available, and that where the total of all the programmes exceeded the carrying capacity, the Transport Council would be able to discuss possible reductions of programmes with the Committees before proceeding to make recommendations to the Allied Governments as to what reductions must be made.

It may be conveniently stated here that the Transport Council will work in close co-operation with the Inter-Ally Council on War Purchase and Finance, documents being interchanged between the two Councils, and that it is understood that the latter Council are strongly in favour of the appointment of Programme Committees to assist them in their task of considering imports in relation to finance.

At their last session in Paris on April 23rd—25th, the Transport Council adopted a statement as to the general tonnage and import position for 1918, showing that the import programmes of the three European Allies for 1918 exceeds the carrying capacity available by some 8½ million tons. It is, therefore, urgently necessary that these import programmes should be revised and reduced. Except in the case of cereals, meats and fats, and nitrates, the demands of each Ally for a particular commodity have not been criticised by a joint Allied body dealing with that commodity. The Council accordingly felt that it was imperative for the Allied Governments to proceed at once with the formation of joint expert bodies which should investigate the demands for commodities other than cereals and nitrates. A copy of their Resolution* is enclosed, attention being particularly called to paragraphs 3 (a) and 6.

The associated Governments are anxious that the Programme Committee should be instituted and commence their effective work at the earliest possible date.

From the point of view of the Transport Council, the work which it is hoped the Programmes Committees will undertake may be provisionally described as follows:—

(i) To obtain such information as is necessary to determine the requirements of each Allied country for the commodity or class of commodities with which the Programme Committee is concerned, including past consumption and stocks.

* See page 71, Minutes of Second Session.

(ii) To secure effective Allied criticism of the requirements, so that the Programme distributes the sacrifice entailed by any necessary shortage as equally as possible between the different countries, and in such a way as to be least injurious to the prosecution of the War.

(iii) To prepare a programme for such period, or periods, and on such a basis as the Council may desire, the programmes of all being as nearly as possible comparable and uniform, and also being so designed as to enable them to be readily adjusted to tonnage calculations in view of the varying strain imposed upon tonnage according as the country of shipment is near or distant. (Appropriate forms are being circulated by the A.M.T.C.)

(iv) To forward the programmes so prepared to the Council with all such supplementary information as to stocks, &c., as will facilitate a decision between the competing claims of imports for tonnage.

(As regards the competing claims of different countries for their share of a given commodity, it is desirable that in every possible case the Programme Committee should agree upon the distribution without appeals to the Council, the Council's main consideration being, *e.g.*, the competing claims of cereals and munitions, not the competing claims of France and Great Britain for cereals.)

(v) To discuss possible reductions of programme with the Council and its permanent organisation, when forecasts of available tonnage show a deficiency as compared with the total of all programmes. The present position being that a reduction of imports is inevitable, it is proposed, as soon as the total requirements of the Programme Committees have been examined afresh in relation to the tonnage expected to be available during the rest of this year, to make a provisional plan for reduction which will bring the total imports within the capacity of the tonnage, and to ask the several Programme Committees what redistribution they would make among the Allies on the assumption of such a reduction and what would be the position of each country as a result, having regard to its stocks, &c.

25th May 1918.

APPENDIX 36.

Allied Maritime Transport Council Memorandum as to Relation of Import Programmes to Tonnage and to the American Army.

The procedure which it is proposed to adopt, on receipt of the programmes from the different Programmes Committees, in order to adjust imports to the carrying power of the available tonnage, has been explained in Memorandum B, dated 18th July 1918.*

It may, however, be convenient to Programme Committees, while they are still framing their programmes and before forwarding them to the Allied Maritime Transport Council, to have some general indication of the relation of tonnage to the problems they are considering and of the effect on the Allied cause of any extra or reduced demand which alternative policies may entail.

The general tonnage position may be roughly summarised by saying that while world building now exceeds world losses, this is due to the increased American building, and all new American building must be absorbed by the Additional American Military requirements. In considering European imports, therefore, it is necessary to consider the relation of world losses and world building without allowing for relief to the situation from American building. Excluding America, world losses continue to exceed world building to a serious extent; in the first six months of this year the excess of such losses amounted to about $1\frac{1}{4}$ million tons deadweight. Against this must be set the reduced demand on shipping which may be expected to result from improved harvests.

In view of the numerous factors of uncertainty it is difficult to forecast the tonnage position with precision. One dominant fact, however, suffices to give a criterion by which Programme Committees may assess the value of shipping consideration in framing their policy.

As Mr. Hoover stated at the Food Controllers' Conference on July 23rd, the limiting factor to the increase of the American Army is the shipment of supplies.

* Printed as Appendix 31 of previous report of action (page 129.)

America will send as many troops to France as the available shipping suffices to supply.

The actual shipment of the men is a manageable task. The whole problem is supply. It may be roughly estimated that every man sent to France entails the shipment of some 5 tons of supplies or the continuous employment of about 1 gross tons of shipping.

Wherever therefore a Programme Committee has two alternative courses, one of which may present certain advantages from the point of view of finance or increasing the comfort of the civilian population, while the other would affect a saving in tonnage, they can roughly estimate the cost to the Allies' cause of adopting the first course by reckoning that every 5,000 tons saved in imports into Europe means 1,000 additional American troops in France.

Lancaster House,
24th July 1918.

ALLIED MARITIME TRANSPORT COUNCIL.

Minutes of Third Session at Lancaster House, London, August 29-30, 1918.

Present :

Lord ROBERT CECIL (*in the Chair*).
 Sir JOSEPH MACLAY, Great Britain.
 M. CLEMENTEL, France.
 M. LOUCHEUR, France.
 Signor CRESPI, Italy.
 Signor VILLA, Italy.
 Hon. RAYMOND B. STEVENS, United States.
 Hon. GEORGE RUBLEE, United States.
 Mr. J. A. SALTER, *Secretary to the Council*.

There also attended with the representatives of the respective countries either throughout the discussion or for the discussion of particular subjects :—

France—

MM. TARDIEU, VILGRAIN, J. MONNET, Cne. BLÉTRY, KAHN, BÉRENGIER, GILLET, MICHEL LEVY, MAY, CANGARDEL, SERRUYS, CHARPENTIER, Cne. MAX LAZARD, DE LUBERSAC, REVILLON, PILLIARD, SEITERT, MANTOUX.

Italy—

Professor ATTOLICO, Comm. GULLINI, Comm. LAVIOSA, Ing. MOSCA, Lieutenant FARINA, Professor PARDO.

America—

Hon. OSCAR T. CROSBY, Mr. J. P. COTTON, Mr. CHANDLER ANDERSON, Mr. L. L. SUMMERS, Colonel JAMES A. LOGAN, Colonel J. B. CAVANAUGH, Mr. CHARLES DAY, Mr. L. H. SHEARMAN, Mr. D. W. MORROW, Mr. JOHN R. GORDON, Commander PAUL FOLEY, Commander L. B. MCBRIDE, Mr. JAMES A. FIELD, Mr. H. L. GRAY, Mr. JEROME D. GREENE, Mr. L. I. THOMAS.

Great Britain—

Lord READING, Lord BUCKMASTER, Sir JOHN BEALE, Sir SAM FAY, Mr. G. M. BOOTH, Mr. GRAEME THOMSON, Mr. JOHN ANDERSON, Mr. B. A. KEMBALL-COOK, Captain CLEMENT JONES, Mr. BROWETT, Mr. HYNARD.

Secretariat—

Mr. J. F. HENDERSON, M. ANDRÉ L. SIMON, Mr. J. E. HIGHTON, Mr. O. C. CHAPMAN, Miss K. LAIRD COX.

1. The Minutes of the Second Session were confirmed and signed; and the Reports of Action for the periods April 16th–July 15th and July 16th–August 15th were accepted.

2.—(a) *General Statement of Import and Tonnage Position for 1918.*

The general statement printed as Appendix 37, pages 156–160, was presented.

It was explained that the European Allies started the cereal year 1918–1919 with some two million tons deadweight of shipping less for their needs than they had at the beginning of the previous year, and that this must obviously cause a considerable reduction in imports. It had been hoped that better harvests might have enabled food imports to be reduced, but the Food Council's programme asked for an increased importation of 4½ million tons. The programmes for munitions and raw materials

were not completed, but it was not anticipated that these programmes would in total ask for less than last year. A serious deficit would therefore have to be dealt with apart from the question of any inadequacy of American tonnage to meet the American Army Supply programme.

(b) *Military Programmes.*—In the discussion which followed, and which was attended by M. Tardieu and Lord Reading, Mr. Stevens expressed the view that the Council had not been entrusted with the task of examining the details of any military supply programme whether American or not. It was pointed out, however, that the Council were deeply concerned in the extent to which military supply programmes made demands upon tonnage, as the allocation of tonnage for such programmes was necessarily a factor of the first importance in considering the allocation of tonnage available for other services; and in particular the extent to which tonnage would be required for American supply in the next year was the biggest new factor in the whole Allied tonnage and supply position.

It was subsequently reported that a conference of Ministers had agreed that a communication should be made direct to the American Government by the European Governments inviting the responsible Ministers and officials of the American Government to come to London for the purpose of discussing with the Allied Authorities the various questions connected with the supply of the American Army.

3. *Food Programme for the Cereal Year 1918-19.*—The Chairman read the memorandum printed as Appendix 38, page 160. After considerable discussion, in which M. Vilgrain (Sous Secrétaire de Ravitaillement) and Sir John Beale (Chairman of the Food Committee of Representatives) took part, in addition to the members of the Council, the Council accepted the recommendations of the Executive as stated in the memorandum with the omission of the words shown in brackets in paragraph 9 of Appendix 38.

The decision of the Council was thus to the following effect :—

“The Programme of importations to be commenced on the purely provisional basis of the quantities covered by the priority figures [18·5 million tons excluding military oats], it being fully understood that the figures will be reconsidered as soon as full information is available. As far as military oats are concerned the old programme of importation must continue until the matter has been further considered.”

The Council decided to recommend the allocation of tonnage in accordance with this decision, and with the proportions as between the different Allies as recommended by the Food Council, subject to the conditions stated in the memorandum.

4. *Importation of Civilian Commodities.*—Having regard to the general tonnage position, the Council resolved that “With regard to the programmes of civilian commodities generally, until further order, actual recorded consumption of the past year should be taken as setting the maximum limit for programmes of importation for the next year. This principle is not to be understood as preventing a different distribution as between the different Allies or a greater importation than last year where a country has used up stocks and must have a larger importation to avoid a reduction of consumption. This principle is to be communicated to Programme Committees in order to set the maximum limit to the programmes they prepare for the Council.”

5.—(a) *Coal Situation.*

(b) *Appointment of a Coal Programme Committee.*

(c) *Railway Cars in France and Italy.*

(a) M. Loucheur called attention to the gravity of the present coal position in Europe and to the fact that notwithstanding the provision of the shipping required there was a serious shortage of coal in France, accounted for partly by the congestion of French ports and partly by failure of supply in Great Britain. He stated that he had had an interview with the British Coal Controller, who had explained the situation in Great Britain, but he desired to call attention to the small percentage which French and Italian requirements bore to the consumption of coal in Great Britain.

Signor Villa stated that the present importation of 600,000 tons a month was low in relation to Italian needs and also that the coal actually arriving in Italy was not always of the quality required for special purposes, and he hoped that it would be possible to make arrangements for Italy to receive the minimum amount of the special sorts of coal required.

(b) It was agreed to proceed with the formation of the Coal Programme Committee and that it should be responsible not merely for drawing up programmes but also for keeping in touch with the execution of the programmes, and M. Loucheur nominated Captain Pilliard as the French representative. It was pointed out that the question of the sorts of coal required by Italy could properly be considered by the Coal Programme Committee.

(c) A letter from the Inter-Allied Transportation Council recommending an increase of the amount of coal sent by direct sea route from this country to Italy from 250,000 tons to 350,000 tons a month, in order to relieve the French railways and release railway wagons in view of present military necessities, was considered.

Mr. Salter stated that the original programme for the supply of coal to Italy contemplated the despatch of 150,000 tons a month by long sea route, but that this amount had been raised to approximately 250,000 tons a month owing to the inability of France to send coal from France to Italy up to the original programme. He pointed out that to send an additional 100,000 tons of coal per month by the long sea route to Italy would necessitate the use of more than 150,000 tons of shipping, and that it would contribute much more to the permanent solution of the difficulty if any extra shipping which could be employed were employed in bringing wagons from North America rather than in conveying coal to Italy.

The Council agreed that in the present circumstances it is not possible to contemplate an increase in the amount of coal sent by direct sea route to Italy, but that every effort should be made to increase the shipment of railway wagons to France.

6. *Permanent Organisation of the Council.*—The scheme printed as Appendix 32, pages 131–134 of the Report of Action, April 16th–July 15th, was considered and approved.

7. *Invitation from the Munitions Council that the Maritime Transport Council should appoint a Delegate to attend the Meetings of the Munitions Council.*—A letter from the Munitions Council was before the Council stating that M. Loucheur had been appointed by the former Council to represent them at the meetings of the latter Council. In response to the request from the former Council it was proposed by Lord Robert Cecil that M. Loucheur should be invited to represent the Maritime Transport Council at the meetings of the Munitions Council. M. Loucheur expressed his readiness to undertake this duty.

8. *Representation of Japan on the Council.*—It was proposed and unanimously agreed that an invitation should be extended to the Japanese Government to join the Council.

9. *Tonnage for Swiss Needs.*—The Swiss Government had represented that in view of the extension of control by the Allied Governments over neutral vessels, they were no longer able to charter tonnage for their essential requirements. A memorandum on the question (printed as Appendix 39), page 169, was considered and discussed, and the Council resolved (1) that the Allied Governments should accept the responsibility for what the Council agreed to be Switzerland's minimum requirements; (2) that the assumption of this responsibility should be in conjunction with a satisfactory arrangement as to other negotiations the Allies may desire to conclude with Switzerland; (3) the foregoing resolutions should be communicated to the Allied Governments with the recommendation that they shall take immediate steps to carry Resolution 2 into effect; and (4) that the proposal that the German Government should share the responsibility for the provision of tonnage (from vessels interned in Spanish or Dutch ports)—which the Swiss Government believed the Germans were prepared to do—should not be encouraged.

10. *Carriage of Oil Fuel in Double Bottoms.*—It appeared from statements which were made by representatives of the Petroleum Conference that there is now reason to think that the use of double bottoms for the carriage of oil fuel could be considerably reduced or entirely discontinued if the American Government found it possible to allocate tankers for continuous service on the Atlantic route instead of for single voyages as at present, and if new tankers now completing in America could be added to this service. The Council recorded their strong opinion of the importance of the discontinuance of the use of double bottoms for the conveyance of oil and agreed upon a resolution expressing their sense of the great importance of American tankers being allocated for continuous service instead of for single voyages only.

11. *Arrest of Vessels in Foreign Ports.*—A statement was made of the steps taken by the British Ministry of Shipping to prevent the arrest and detention of vessels in neutral ports as the result of legal proceedings, and it was agreed that a memorandum on the question should be furnished to representatives of the French and Italian Governments with a view to an early arrangement for preventing the detention of British vessels in the ports of either country.

12.—(a) *Provisional measures required for the allocation of tonnage during remainder of 1918.*

(b) *Italian request for coal and pig iron.*

(c) *French request for arrangements to be made to ensure the transport of steel and raw material from the present date to middle of October.*

Signor Crespi handed in a memorandum calling attention to the Italian need for additional imports, and it was decided to refer the memorandum to the Executive for consideration and action. A similar course was adopted with regard to the French request.

13. *Congestion of Port Said and Italian Ports.*—Sir Joseph Maclay called attention to the fact that shipping was delayed by congestion at Italian ports and that while an improvement had been effected at Genoa, the improvement was not being maintained. Signor Villa explained that the Italian Government had taken steps by the appointment of special Commissioners and also by the use of military labour to secure improvements.

As regards the accumulation of stores at Port Said, M. Clementel explained the arrangements made by the French Government under which vessels destined for Salonika would proceed on the triangular route—France, Salonika, Port Said, France—for the purpose of dealing with the accumulations.

14. *Date and Place of Next Meeting.*—Signor Crespi proposed that the next meeting should be held in Rome, but agreed that as American Ministers and Officials were likely to be in London during September in connection with the American Supply Programme, it would be more convenient that the next meeting should be held in London. It was accordingly decided to hold the next meeting in London about the 30th September and to meet at Rome at a later date.

ROBERT CECIL.

Lancaster House, London,
30th September 1918.

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APPENDIX 37.

General Statement of Tonnage and Import Position as on July 31st, 1918.

At the second session of the Allied Maritime Transport Council, held at Paris on April 23rd-25th, the permanent staff of the Council submitted a statement of the position for the calendar year 1918 for the three European Allies showing (1) the provisional programmes of imports for the year; (2) the total deadweight tonnage required; (3) the estimated deadweight tonnage available; and (4) the apparent deficit in deadweight tonnage so resulting, which amounted to 1,890,000 deadweight tons of shipping.

The tonnage of the United States and their requirements were not included in this statement, as full information was not available, and the American Government stated generally that they were relying upon all their tonnage, including any thereafter required or constructed, for their own indispensable imports, for such provision as they were already making for the European Allies, for the service of neutrals, and for their rapidly expanding military programme.

To meet the grave situation thus presented, the Council recommended an examination of the employment of tonnage on Colonial, Naval and Military work, and that a revision be made of the demands for such services and also for the importation of munitions, food, and other civilian requirements.

For the last purpose the Council recommended the immediate extension of Programme Committees to cover all imported commodities, adding that it was desirable that there should be an American representative on each of these Committees who would be a full member in the same sense as the representatives of the three European Governments.

These recommendations have been accepted by the four Governments concerned, and the Programme Committees are divided generally into three classes:—

- (1) Munitions Committees under the Munitions Council.
- (2) Food Committees under the Food Council.
- (3) Raw Material Committees.

These have already been organised and have made, or are now engaged in making, joint programmes of the various commodities required. Details as to their work and as to the constitution of the Committees are given in the last Report of Action.

Since the last meeting of the Council the most important events have been a great increase in the American Military Programme and the production of the Food Council's Programme for the next cereal year. The Munitions Council is still working at its programme, and the programmes of the other Committees are in various stages of completion.

It is clear that the effect of the increased American Military Programme must react with most important results upon the Import Programmes and tonnage arrangements of all four countries. The information available at present is not sufficient to enable any complete balancing of tonnage resources and liabilities. As the programmes are completed these balances will be effected, and the Programme Committees will be used as an instrument for continually compressing and distributing the imports as between the different services and the different countries in accordance with the main principles of the Council, viz., to allot tonnage so as to increase the war effort to the maximum and to distribute the consequent sacrifices as fairly as possible among the different countries.

In order that the Transport Council and the several authorities concerned with the preparation of demands upon tonnage may have a clear idea of the tonnage available, the permanent organisation of the Council has prepared and submits the following provisional tables showing tonnage of the Allied and Neutral world and its employment on July 31st, 1918:—

TABLE I.—EMPLOYMENT OF ALLIED AND NEUTRAL TONNAGE^{2, 6}, 31 JULY 1918*Seagoing Steam Merchant Vessels of 500 gross tons and over* ^{2, 3}.(All figures in thousands of deadweight tons⁵.)

Employment of Tonnage.	TONNAGE UNDER FLAG OF						Total.
	Italy ³ .	France.	United Kingdom.	United States ⁴ .	Other Allies ² .	Neutrals ² .	
<i>I. Employed in import service¹ of four principal allies :—</i>							
(a) In import service of Italy	780	47	1,159	74	240	360	2,660
(b) " " France	49	814	1,979	144	475	580	4,041
(c) " " United Kingdom ⁷ .	—	86	8,060	123	270	270	8,809
(d) In import service of United States.	—	—	445	1,624	100	800	2,969
Total - - -	829	947	11,643	1,965	1,085	2,010	18,479
<i>II. Employed in other merchant service :—</i>							
(a) In coasting service of flag nation.	62	17	366	1,431	685	230	2,791
(b) In colonial service of flag nation ⁸ .	2	39	1,752	120	10	290	2,213
(c) In service of other allies or neutrals.	4	8	173	161	1,688	2,465	4,499
(d) In enemy interests - -	—	—	—	—	2	35	37
Total - - -	68	64	2,291	1,712	2,385	3,020	9,540
<i>III. Employed in non-merchant service :—</i>							
(a) In military service of flag nation.	80	101	2,227	2,002	8	—	4,418
(b) In naval service of flag nation ⁴ .	40	195	2,513	351	—	—	3,099
(c) In other military or naval service (mainly transportation of American troops ⁷).	41	23	537	—	37	10	648
(d) In other non-merchant service.	—	4	—	—	—	—	4
Total - - -	161	323	5,277	2,353	45	10	8,169
<i>IV. Unemployed or employment unknown⁹ :—</i>							
(a) Repairing or remodelling	175	321	1,729	171	?	?	?
(b) Otherwise unemployed -	14	2	—	128	?	?	?
(c) Employment unknown	—	15	—	—	?	?	?
Total - - -	189	338	1,729	299	960	1,160	4,675
Grand Total - - -	1,247	1,672	20,940	6,329	4,475	6,200	40,863
Tankers of four principal allies, included above.	34	24	1,620	1,310			
Total tonnage of four principal allies, excluding tankers.	1,213	1,648	19,320	5,019			

Notes.

¹ This table is believed to be reasonably accurate for tonnage under the flags of the four principal allies. Other figures are approximations based on a considerable body of information. A revision will be circulated in September.

² Under "Other Allies" are included Japan, Russia, Brazil, Greece, Portugal, and Belgium. Under "Neutrals" are included Norway, Holland, Sweden, Spain, and Denmark. Available data for lesser maritime countries are at present too incomplete for inclusion; the aggregate tonnage thus excluded is perhaps 500,000 tons.

Figures for "Other Allies" and "Neutrals" include some seagoing steam merchant vessels under 500 gross, but this amount is offset by incompleteness of records on larger vessels.

³ Final Italian figures have been received too late to be incorporated in this table, but the necessary corrections are slight. Figures given above include 19,000 deadweight tons of vessels under 500 gross, and exclude 8,000 tons of new completions in July. The tonnage at 31 July is, therefore, not 1,247,000 but 1,236,000.

⁴ American figures do not include certain vessels in coasting service and certain vessels of merchant type built or converted for and owned by the navy, of whose movements the U.S. Shipping Board does not keep itself informed. A similar qualification with respect to vessels in naval service applies in the case of the other principal Allies, though probably in lesser degree.

⁵ Deadweight figures of Italian, French, and American tonnage are, as heretofore, based largely upon records for individual vessels. Deadweight figures for British tonnage, hitherto estimated, are now based on records covering most vessels over 1,600 gross tons. For tonnage of "Other Allies" and "Neutrals" deadweight figures are not on record, but have been estimated at gross plus 50 per cent. The same ratio has been used elsewhere for individual vessels on which deadweight figures are unobtainable, except where another ratio was suggested by known facts.

⁶ In addition to the tonnage included in this table, about 1,050,000 tons of enemy vessels are interned in neutral ports, distributed approximately as follows:—

	Tons.
Argentina - - - - -	110,000
Chile - - - - -	280,000
Spain and Spanish Islands -	300,000
Northern European Neutrals -	80,000
Dutch East Indies - - -	260,000
Other Countries - - - - -	20,000

⁷ *Tonnage in import service.*—Tonnage employed between two countries is ordinarily counted as half on the import service of one, and half on the import service of the other; but where the tonnage on a route is determined by the requirements of one of the countries concerned, the whole has been treated as in the import service of that country; and in intermediate cases a reasonable allowance has been made.

Of about 1,000,000 tons of British liners in the North Atlantic, approximately 40 per cent. of the cargo space proves to be sacrificed to the carriage of troops. Accordingly 60 per cent. of this tonnage is accounted in the import service of the United Kingdom and 40 per cent. in other military and naval service.

⁸ *Tonnage in colonial service.*—British tonnage indicated as in colonial service includes mainly vessels trading to and from Canada, India, and Australasia, and not touching the United Kingdom, much of it on colonial registers; and a smaller amount trading elsewhere abroad.

⁹ *Tonnage unemployed or employment unknown.*—Tonnage of "Other Allies" shown as "unemployed or employment unknown" includes some 525,000 tons of Russian vessels locked up in the Black Sea and Baltic Sea. Most of the rest is probably under repair.

Tonnage repairing or remodelling is larger than estimated in earlier months, partly because of fuller information (still incomplete) on vessels undergoing repair, partly because the reduction in sinkings by enemy action has been accompanied by an increase in tonnage damaged but not sunk.

United States tonnage "unemployed" comprises chiefly new vessels not yet assigned to service.

TABLE II.—ADJUSTMENTS IN ALLIED AND NEUTRAL TONNAGE, FOR THE 7-MONTHS
PERIOD FROM 1 JANUARY TO 31 JULY 1918.

Seagoing Steam Merchant Vessels of 500 Gross Tons and over.

(All figures in thousands of deadweight tons.)

Adjustments in Tonnage.	TONNAGE UNDER FLAG OF						Total.
	Italy.	France.	United Kingdom.	United States.	Other Allies.	Neutrals.	
<i>I. Losses, 1 January–31 July:—</i>							
(a) By enemy action - -	177	183	1,873	144	118	300	2,795
(b) By marine risk - -	25	22	226	119	76	52	520
(c) By other causes - -	-	-	-	34	-	-	34
Total - - - -	202	205	2,099	297	194	352	3,349
<i>II. Gains, 1 January–31 July:—</i>							
(a) By construction - -	52	-	1,302	1,454	403	122	3,333
(b) From other sources - -	-	-	-	8	-	-	8
Total - - - -	52	-	1,302	1,462	403	122	3,341
Net loss or gain, 1 January–31 July -	- 150	- 205	- 797	+ 1,165	+ 209	- 230	- 8
<i>III. Transfers and sundry adjustments.</i>							
(a) Transfers to foreign flag	-	1	12	7	334	804	1,158
(b) Transfers from foreign flag	5	13	559	580	1	-	1,158
(c) Sundry adjustments: net -	- 5	- 22	+ 4	+ 16	-	-	- 7
Net - - - -	-	10	+ 551	+ 589	- 333	- 804	- 7
Net change, 1 January–31 July -	- 150	- 215	- 246	+ 1,754	- 124	- 1,034	- 15
Tonnage under national flag, 1 January 1918.	1,397	1,887	21,186	4,575	4,599	7,234	40,878
Tonnage under national flag, 31 July 1918.	1,247	1,672	20,940	6,329	4,475	6,200	40,863

This table is believed to be reasonably accurate for adjustments in tonnage under the flags of the four principal Allies, and for losses by enemy action for all countries. Other figures are approximations.
Notes 2–5 under Table I. apply also to this table.

TABLE III.—ADJUSTMENTS IN ALLIED AND NEUTRAL TONNAGE, FOR THE MONTH OF JULY 1918.

Seagoing Steam Merchant Vessels of 500 Gross Tons and over.

(All figures in thousands of deadweight tons.)

Adjustments in Tonnage.	TONNAGE UNDER FLAG OF						Total.
	Italy.	France.	United Kingdom.	United States.	Other Allies.	Neutrals.	
<i>I. Losses during month :—</i>							
(a) By enemy action - -	14	20	207	41	17	21	320
(b) By marine risk - -	20	1	17	15	22	2	77
(c) By other causes - -	-	-	-	1	-	-	1
Total - - -	34	21	224	57	39	23	398
<i>II. Gains during month :—</i>							
(a) By construction - -	-	-	223	263	63	6	555
(b) From other sources - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total - - -	-	-	223	263	63	6	555
Net loss or gain during month - -	- 34	- 21	- 1	+ 206	+ 24	- 17	+ 157
<i>III. Transfers and sundry adjustments.</i>							
(a) Transfers to foreign flag - -	-	-	1	-	34	12	47
(b) Transfers from foreign flag - -	-	-	12	34	1	-	47
(c) Sundry adjustments : net - -	-	- 22	-	+ 15	-	-	- 7
Net - - -	-	- 22	+ 11	+ 49	- 33	- 12	- 7
Net change during month - - -	- 34	- 43	+ 10	+ 255	- 9	- 29	+ 150
Tonnage under national flag, beginning of month.	1,281	1,715	20,930	6,074	4,484	6,229	40,713
Tonnage under national flag, end of month.	1,247	1,672	20,940	6,329	4,475	6,200	40,863

See notes under Table II.

It may be useful to add to this presentation the following notes as to the present tonnage position :—

- (1) The most important factors in the present tonnage position are that world building (including American) now exceeds world losses, but that Allied or world building (excluding American) is still less than losses. As the excess of American building over losses is, on the most favourable computation, less than the increased demands for the American Army, it follows that the tonnage available for the needs of the rest of the world, and in particular for the European Allies, is smaller and is still diminishing.
- (2) As the Council meets, the new cereal year 1918-19 is about to begin, and it will be convenient, therefore, to make a few notes as to the prospect for this cereal year as compared with last. The tonnage under the control of the European Allies is about 2 million tons deadweight less than at the beginning of the cereal year 1917-18. The acquisition of Dutch vessels, and agreements with Norway, Sweden, and Denmark (off-set by the obligations for Belgian relief, Swiss needs, &c., which have been or are likely to be assumed as the result of those agreements), may be taken to have given the European Allies a net gain of about $\frac{1}{2}$ million tons deadweight. The carriage of American troops now means a loss of

imports equivalent to the loss of about $\frac{1}{2}$ million tons deadweight. The net result remains, therefore, that if no more tonnage were allotted to America, the European Allies would have for their needs some 2 million tons deadweight less than the tonnage available one year ago.

- (3) The only substantial prospect of relief was that afforded by the better harvests. The Food Council's programme as presented, however, (see Appendix 38), (page 160-168) asks for an increased importation of $4\frac{1}{2}$ million tons.

The Munitions Council have not completed their programme, but they have sent a warning that change in the character of warfare must mean an increased importation *per capita*.

- (4) Reference has already been made to the increased American military programme (see Appendix 40) (page 170), which is recognised by all the nations as a vital need to bring about an early victory. The American Government has estimated that in addition to the ships of the European Allies now transporting troops it will require for the supply programme of these increased military forces (in addition to the vessels of the American Government, including their new building) a further amount of tonnage, starting with about 1,200,000 tons deadweight and reducing gradually to about 200,000 tons deadweight in February next. While the detailed demands upon tonnage have not yet been presented to the Allied Maritime Transport Council, it will be recognised at once by all that this vital new factor will necessitate a most careful review of the programmes of all of the associated Governments and a closer co-ordination of all tonnage resources.
- (5) Some savings, difficult to calculate exactly, are doubtless to be allowed for improved convoy arrangements, reduced losses, and the shipment of a larger proportion of imports from the nearest source (the North Atlantic), and it may be hoped that the abnormal winter of last year will not be again repeated.

On the other hand, the railage, loading and shipment of over one million tons a month of Army supplies in North America, which were not coming last year, and the risk of serious shortage of coal, both in America and in the United Kingdom, may cause delays to shipping.

- (6) No indication has been received of any substantial change in the demands on shipping in respect of Naval needs or of Military demands of the Secondary Expeditions, except that a demand, the final extent of which cannot yet be estimated, is now being again made for tonnage for Russia.
- (7) It is clear, from the general notes above, that the need for compression of programmes must be extremely drastic. The process will take time, and action taken at present must be provisional. It is suggested, however, that the principle given to the Food Council (*viz.*, that actual recorded consumption during the last year should be taken as setting the maximum limit to programmes, with allowance for home productions) should be applied at least to commodities required for civilian consumption. It is clear that compression beyond this point will, in fact, be necessary unless the military effort is to be impaired, the general formula being that each 5,000 tons of imports saved will enable about 1,000 additional American soldiers to be maintained in, and, therefore, sent to France.

26th August 1918.

APPENDIX 38.

Programme of Food Council for Year 1918-19.

1. The attached papers include copies of correspondence between the Allied Maritime Transport Council and the Food Council, and of the Food Programme with explanatory memoranda.

2. The programme shows a total requested increase of about $4\frac{1}{2}$ million tons on the actual importation figures for the cereal year 1917-18.

3. It is understood that the following statement was made by the different countries as to the cereal crops this year compared with last year:—

Increases.

									Tons.
U.K.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	950,000
France	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	453,000
Italy	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	509,000
Total									1,912,000
									} for the three countries.

In the case of the U.K., however, it was indicated that failure in other crops made the total harvests of only about the same feeding value as last year.

These statements of the harvests are much less favourable than previous indications of the prospects, and estimates at this date are necessarily only provisional. Even as the estimates stand, however, it is to be noted that the increased importation of $4\frac{1}{2}$ million tons is made in conjunction with large admitted increases in the cereal harvests.

4. The great increase of nearly $1\frac{1}{4}$ million tons in military oats clearly requires investigation, as it is not known that the British and French armies or their horses are likely to increase. The Food Council have been asked to investigate this, and it is, of course, important that the Transport Council should know whether allowance is made for any supplies to the American Army directly or indirectly.

5. The Memorandum accompanying the Programme indicates an intention to deal with any deficit on the full programme by dividing that programme over each country into a Priority and a Balance Importation. The Priority is as follows :—

	U.K.	France.	Italy.	Total.
	10.54	4.22	3.74	18.5

this priority excluding Military Oats.

6. This means in effect that if the scheme is accepted and the respective Governments agree to allot tonnage in accordance with it, the importations would be constantly kept as nearly as possible in accordance with the above ratios. The remainder of the Programme is divided as follows :—

	U.K.	France.	Italy.	
	4.63	2.72	1.17	.

these different ratios being worked to the extent, if any, to which importations exceed the priority quantities.

7. It is quite clear that the application of the principle of the Allied Maritime Transport Council (viz., that importations should not be more than at the *maximum* such as to enable consumption during the ensuing year to be on the same scale as during the past year) would not admit within several millions of tons of the importations requested in the full programme. Whether or not it would give importations equal to the priority figures depends upon the actual realisation of harvests in the different countries, and home meat, &c.

8. It is clearly impossible for the Transport Council to guarantee any absolute quantity of importations in the absence of further information as to the harvests and (still more important) as to the requirements of the American Army. On the other hand, it is understood to be essential that the Food Council should have some immediate indication of their probable imports, as important and urgent executive action (such as regulations as to milling extraction, decisions as to the amount of feeding stuffs to be provided to the farmers and, therefore, as to the policy of slaughtering cattle, and also as to the method and extent of rationing) has to be taken at once.

9. In these circumstances it is suggested that the Council should recommend that the programme should be commenced on a purely provisional basis and [subject to

adjustment in the light of harvests and other competing demands for tonnage] on the basis of the quantities covered by the priority figures [a definite warning being given to the Food Council that while no quantities can be guaranteed the Council is not able to see any prospect of arranging importations on a more liberal scale than the above].*

10. A supplementary statement as to American Food Imports is included in the attached papers, but there is no arrangement in the Food Council's general scheme for an American priority on the same basis as that specified for the European Allies, and with the same implication that it is not to be exceeded unless the other priorities are also exceeded. The Transport Council will doubtless consider it of importance that the American import programme should be worked into the general programme on the same basis as the others.

11. In present circumstances it must be clearly realised that the acceptance of the priority system as a basis for the allocation of ships must involve the diversion of British ships to supplement deficient importations into France and Italy.

12. It is understood that in view of paragraph 11 the acceptance of the principle as a working basis by the British Government would in any case be on the understanding that—

- (a) the arrangement must be regarded as provisional and voluntary and subject to cancellation if necessary ;
- (b) that a satisfactory agreement is arrived at as between the different Allies as to their putting a specified quantity of tonnage into the Food Programme and/or carrying defined quantities of food in their own ships ; and
- (c) that the continuance of the arrangement will necessarily be subject to the inclusion of America on equal terms at an early date.

13. If the above policy is recommended by the Transport Council and accepted by the different Governments, arrangements are at once necessary to give executive effect to the new policy. In effect, this policy means the extension of the arrangements which have been in force as regards the importations of cereals to all Food within the priority figures.

14. The administrative arrangements of the Transport Council to give effect to the above policy must necessarily depend to some extent upon the Food Council's organisation. If, as presumed, the Food Council arranges for the machinery to follow the lines already adopted for cereals, the demands for tonnage for all Foodstuffs would be centralized through a Freight Committee of the Food Representatives' Committee.

15. Within the Transport Council's organisation the Tonnage Committee would be primarily responsible for insuring the executing of paragraph 12 (b). It should include Executive Officers with authority, on behalf of the respective Governments, to give or reserve assent to any proposed diversion of national tonnage, and to make consequent arrangements with the Freight Committee.

16. The above arrangements being made, the Shipping Department of the Food organisation would deal on executive questions of detail with the actual Shipping authorities of the four countries resident in London as to the execution of their several parts of the common plan.

August 27th, 1918.

(a) CORRESPONDENCE WITH FOOD COUNCIL.

For earlier correspondence with the Food Council, *see* pages 140-142 of Report of Action for July 16th to August 15th.

LETTER FROM FOOD COUNCIL to TRANSPORT COUNCIL.

SIR,

19th August 1918.

IN accordance with the instructions received from the Inter-Allied Food Council, the Committee of Representatives have considered the programmes for the Cereal Year 1918-19 put forward by the various Food Executives, and have consolidated them into a general programme for all foods for all European Allies. This programme has now been accepted by the Food Council, but subject to revision in December next when the harvests of the Allied Countries will be known.

* See paragraph 3, pages 160-161.

Copies of the programme, as accepted by the Food Council, are enclosed for the consideration of the Allied Maritime Transport Council, together with an explanatory memorandum by the Committee of Representatives.

The Food Council also considered the question of priorities, and the enclosed memorandum, prepared by the Committee of Representatives and accepted by the Council, shows the procedure which it is proposed should be adopted and put into execution as from 1st September in connection with the programme.

The Committee of Representatives think it necessary to draw special attention to the following points:—

- (1) The total proposed increase of $4\frac{1}{2}$ million tons on the actual importation figures of the cereal year 1917-18 is largely due to increased Allied Military demands, particularly of meat and oats.
- (2) As regards Cereals, the increased importation is considered as essential in order to prevent, as far as possible, any recurrence of the shortage which has been experienced from time to time in France and Italy during the present cereal year, and the reduction of stocks which has occurred in the United Kingdom.
- (3) In connection with the Oilseeds importation Programme, the Committee of Representatives have asked the Oilseeds Executive to distinguish between the requirements of oilseeds and oil for human and animal consumption, and the requirements for military and industrial purposes. The figures given in the accompanying programme represent the total requirements of each Ally for all purposes. The Oilseeds Executive estimate that the minimum needs, which may be considered as representing human food, are as follows:—

							Tons.
United Kingdom	-	-	-	-	-	-	852,000
France	-	-	-	-	-	-	403,500
Italy	-	-	-	-	-	-	73,000

- (4) The Committee of Representatives will, as soon as the necessary figures are available, provide the Allied Maritime Transport Council with statements showing:—
 - (a) The crops of feeding stuffs in each country not included in the importation programme.
 - (b) Cereal stocks in each country at the beginning and end of the cereal year 1917-18.

The Committee of Representatives desire me to suggest that a Conference with representatives of the Allied Maritime Transport Council might be arranged at an early date, in order that any questions arising out of the programme may be discussed.

The Secretary,
Allied Maritime Transport Council.

J. BEALE,
Chairman.

Enclosures in Letter from Food Council.

(i) *Programme of Allied Imports for Cereal Year 1918-19.*

1. The Committee of Representatives have had numerous long discussions with members of the various Executives since they met the Allied Food Council on the 30th July.

The Committee have criticised the proposals of the various Executives as fully as possible in the time available, but in view of the shortness of the time the programme must necessarily be regarded as subject to revision. This applies particularly in the case of oilseeds.

The Committee have not criticised the requirements of oats to be imported for army needs.

With these cautionary words, the Committee put forward the programme attached to this report.

2. The Committee are of opinion that the programme may be regarded as containing minimum breadstuff figures: with the one exception that it would be possible to make a further reduction if it were permissible to entrench on the reserve

stock in the United Kingdom, or to make less provision for building up stocks in France and Italy. The Committee, as a whole, express no opinion on this point, but it is right to say that the Representatives of the United Kingdom would strongly resist any such proposal as dangerous for this country, and as not being in the best interest of the Allies as a whole.

The figures included in the programme for animal feeding stuffs are based on a considerable reduction of the original demand put forward by the United Kingdom. The figures were reached after exhaustive enquiry and detailed argument, and are regarded by the Representatives of the United Kingdom as the bare minimum.

It is suggested that the Council should request the military representatives of the various countries to confer together as to the requirements put forward for importation of oats for military purposes. It seems clear that the supplies available for importation fall short of the total demand by some 700,000 tons.

In considering the Meat Programme, two difficulties at once become apparent; the amount of preserved meats included in the demands was at least 70,000 tons in excess of the available supply and the amount of frozen meats included in the demands was some 200,000 or 250,000 tons in excess of the supply.

It was agreed that the bulk of the deficiency of preserved meats had to be accounted for by a reduction of the civilian demands put forward by the United Kingdom, since the other countries have no demand for civilian purposes. The total demand was not unreasonable, as it amounted to 80,000 tons as against 120,000 tons imported in the year 1917-18, but Military demands must have precedence. It is proposed to reduce the demand by 55,000 tons only, since 2,000 tons a month are required for the purpose of feeding men employed in certain important industries.

The Committee suggest that the Military authorities of the four countries should be asked to consider how the remaining deficiency of 15,000 tons should be shared. In framing their programme the Committee have assumed that the requirements of the United Kingdom and Italy will each be reduced by 5,000 tons and that the American demand will be reduced by an equivalent, resulting in an additional export from that country of 5,000 tons.

It is possible that the Meat Programme will be further reduced by 15,000 tons, owing to supplies not being available to meet the requirement of 15,000 tons of canned roast pork put forward by France.

After prolonged discussion the Committee decided that it would be reasonable to ask America to take such steps as would reduce the total deficiency of frozen meat to be borne by the three importing countries to 210,000 tons.

It was also decided to recommend to the Council that this deficiency should be met by reducing the United Kingdom requirement by 100,000 tons, the French requirement by 30,000 tons, and the Italian requirement by 80,000 tons, and that the conditions should be laid down that the first 30,000 tons of any further deficiency that may have to be met should be borne by France, and that the United Kingdom should be entitled to benefit by the first 50,000 tons of any excess supply that may be available. The Representatives of the United Kingdom agree to their apportionment on the understanding that the programme as a whole, including feeding stuffs, is accepted.

It was agreed that each country should be entitled to increase its requirements of pigmeat by the amount by which its frozen or preserved meat requirement has been reduced.

In view of the severe limitation of available supplies of frozen and preserved meat, the possibility of a further reduction in available supplies and the large amounts required for Army rations, the Committee suggest that the Food Council should request the Military Authorities of the various countries to meet and discuss the position with a view to a possible diminution of the military requirements now or in the future.

They further suggest that the competent agricultural authorities of the Allied countries should be requested to confer as to agricultural policy, and particularly as to the question of the maintenance of herds and the provision of feeding stuffs.

No special comment is required with regard to the programme of lard, butter, cheese, &c.

The programme of miscellaneous requirements has been divided into two categories. The requirements included in Class "B" are distinctly less urgent than those in Class "A," but the Committee have not ruled them out, as they regard it as probable that the importation of the proposed quantities will, in practice, be

effected in tonnage space which would not otherwise be used for more important commodities.

5. The figures included in the Sugar Programme must be regarded as provisional until the crops are known.

6. The Oilseed figures must also be regarded as provisional and as only partially having relation to food requirements. The Committee have asked the Oilseeds Executive to state what proportion of the importation is required for human food, for animal food, and for munitions and industrial purposes respectively.

16th August 1918.

(b) PROGRAMME OF IMPORTATION, 1918-19, COMPARED WITH ACTUAL IMPORTATION, 1917-18 OR 1917.

Thousands of Tons.

	United Kingdom.		France.		Italy.		Total.	
	1918-19.	1917-18.	1918-19.	1917-18.	1918-19.	1917-18.	1918-19.	1917-18.
1. Cereals for human consumption :—								
(a) For bread : Wheat	4,130	4,292	1,203	2,381	1,952	1,990	7,285	8,663
Maize, barley, rye, and rice.	1,574	494	1,571	248	1,390	403	4,535	1,145
(b) Not for bread :—								
Products of oats and maize.	120	286	—	216	—	365	120	867
Rice - - -	250	518	180	—	—	—	430	518
Total cereals for human consumption.	6,074	5,590	2,954	2,845	3,342	2,758	12,370	11,193
Pulses - - -	200	274	130	41	60	6	390	321
2. Other cereals :—								
Cereals for munitions—								
Maize - - -	120	120	100	100	—	—	220	220
Barley - - -	105	105	—	—	—	—	105	105
Rye - - -	75	75	—	—	—	—	75	75
Cereals for industrial purposes, maize.	120	70	—	—	10	—	130	70
Cereals for brewing -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Cereals for animal feeding (Civil) :								
Oats - - -	500	320	412	—	—	—	912	320
Maize - - -	750	530	—	—	—	—	750	530
Cake - - -	450	60	—	—	—	—	450	60
Total cereals for all purposes.	8,394	7,144	3,596	2,986	3,412	2,764	15,402	12,894
3. Meat :—								
Fresh and frozen - -	594	655	334	248	250	95	1,178	998
Preserved - - -	116	205	28	21	55	6	199	232
Pigmeat - - -	605	530	88	48	6	—	699	578
Total meat - - -	1,315	1,390	450	317	311	101	2,076	1,808
4. Fats :—								
Butter - - -	76	75	—	3	6	—	82	78
Margarine - - -	—	32	—	—	—	—	—	32
Cheese - - -	160	135	—	6	12	—	172	141
Lard - - -	168	90	10	20	60	28	238	138
Condensed milk - -	146	150	—	13	16	1	162	164
Total fats - - -	550	482	10	42	94	29	654	553

(Thousands of Tons.)

	United Kingdom.		France.		Italy.		Total.	
	1918-19.	1917-18.	1918-19.	1917-18.	1918-19.	1917-18.	1918-19.	1917-18.
5. Miscellaneous Foods, Class A. :—								
Pork and beans (military).	59	50	—	—	—	—	59	50
Dried fruits - - -	78	30	—	60	—	—	78	90
Tea - - - - -	163·2	175	8·4	4	—	—	171·6	179
Coffee - - - - -	—	2·5	130	170	50	46	180	218·
Cocoa, raw - - -	82	15	40	70	8	6	130	91
Canned and cured fish -	16	100	—	70	66	48	82	218
Eggs - - - - -	18·4	30	—	10	—	—	18·4	40
Dried milk - - -	4	3	—	36	—	—	4	39
Not specified - -	—	—	100	—	—	—	100	—
Total Miscellaneous Foods, Class A.	420·6	405·5	278·4	420	124	100	823	925·5
6. Sugar - - - - -	1,286	1,620	532·5	300 (est.)	85	56·2	1,903·5	1,976·2
7. Oilseeds :—								
Seed nuts - - - -	1,080·5	1,100	750·8	466	100	49	1,931·3	1,615
Vegetable oils - - -	188·2	110	35	126	40	19	263·2	255
Animal - - - - -	198·5	90	30	55	26	12	254·5	157
Total oilseeds and oils.	1,467·2	1,300	815·8	647	166	80	2,449·0	2,027
8. Miscellaneous Foods, Class B. :—								
Syrup - - - - -	24	20	—	—	—	—	24	20
Canned fruits - - -	20	7	—	6	—	—	20	13
Honey - - - - -	20	10	—	1·6	—	—	20	11·6
Jam - - - - -	20	8	—	2	—	—	20	10
Total Miscellaneous Foods, Class B.	84	45	—	9·6	—	—	84	54·6
9. Military oats - - -	1,650	1,410	1,260	547	720	437	3,630	2,394
Grand total, Foodstuffs	15,166·8	13,796·5	6,942·7	5,268·6	4,912	3,567·2	27,021·5	22,632·3

1. The programme does not record certain comparatively unimportant articles of Food which were imported in 1917-18, and will no doubt be imported in 1918-19; a certain quantity of which may be brought under control.

2. For purposes of comparison the actual importation in 1917-18 has been inserted where known as in the case of cereals and meat for the United Kingdom; in other cases the actual importation in the year 1917 has been used.

(c) ESTABLISHMENT OF PRIORITIES.

The Committee of Representatives, having considered the draft resolution as to priority referred to them by the Food Council, found it impossible to frame a complete priority scheme that would be accepted as fair by the representatives of each of the countries concerned.

An amended proposal was submitted by the Chairman, which, while preserving the principle of priority, gives greater freedom to the different countries to adjust their supplies according to their special needs.

The heads of the scheme are attached, and it is submitted for acceptance by the Food Council, on the understanding that there will be an opportunity for general revision of the programme in December.

The Representatives of the United Kingdom make the reservation that they would consider it a reasonable ground for revision of the arrangement if it appears in December that their country is likely to receive in 1918-19 a less total importation of food and feeding stuffs than was actually received in 1917-18.

The United States Representatives also put on record that they regard it as a vital necessity to the prosecution of the war and the safety of America's Armies in Europe that the human feeding in Allied countries should proceed upon a basis of comfort and maintenance of morale, that they hold the view that no imports to preserve animal life, except dairy interests, should transgress upon the breadstuff, meat, fats and edible oil imports in any country, and that any revisions of programmes should be based upon this principle.

HEADS OF SCHEME FOR ADJUSTMENT OF TONNAGE DEFICIENCIES.

1. A definite amount of priority tonnage to be allocated to each country, up to a total of 18·5 million tons for the three countries together, distributed as follows:—

—	U.K.	France.	Italy.	—
Priority Tonnage - - - - -	10·54	4·22	3·74	18·50
Balance of Programme (exclusive of military Oats) - - - - -	2·98	1·46	·45	4·89
Total Programme - - - - -	13·52	5·68	4·19	23·39

2. It is not necessary to examine in detail the amount of import of each commodity the scheme would secure, but it is sufficient to say that as regards the United Kingdom a proportion of sugar, oilseeds and feeding stuffs is included in the first priority. In the case of both France and Italy, the scheme will give an absolute priority to the whole requirement of cereals for human consumption and meats and fats, and in the case of France will leave a margin of 81 million tons of priority tonnage for sugar, oilseeds, &c.

3. The balance of the programme to be carried out for each country in proportion of its share of the balance.

4. All articles included in the programme to count against priority tonnage. The Committee of Representatives to proceed to make a careful schedule of articles bought in return tonnage which are specially excluded. Articles not in the programme to be also carefully scheduled.

5. Any country can at its own election choose any commodity for transportation within the agreed programme of August 12th, subject to an equitable division of available supplies, including an equitable division of diluent cereals.

6. A net deficiency in the delivery of the above agreed shipments in any period to any one country shall be compensated at the earliest moment by a reduction in shipments to other countries until the accumulative position of all shall be restored to the basis indicated above.

7. In order clearly to demonstrate the progress of imports a monthly statement shall be issued to each of the four Governments showing the actual imports and source of each group of commodities, together with a showing of the deficiency or surplus below or above the monthly tonnage indicated above, with cumulative figures of deficiencies or surpluses from month to month, beginning September 1918.

To make the principle clear, it is desirable to see how this method of repartition and priority would work out on the assumption that the ruling of the Allied Maritime Transport Council is applied to and accepted by the United Kingdom. The food importation into the United Kingdom in the year 1917/18 amounted to 12·39, and on balance the total crops are approximately the same in feeding value in both years. The United Kingdom would have a priority importation of 10·54 million tons, and a balance importation of 1·85 million tons, making the total of 12·39. France, a priority importation of 4·22 million tons, and a balance importation of 90 million tons—a total importation of 5·12, and Italy a priority importation of 3·74 million tons, and a balance importation of 30 million tons—a total importation of 4·04. The total importation would, therefore, be 21·55 million tons as against 20·24 million tons in last year, the United Kingdom receiving the same in each year, France an excess of 04 over last year and Italy an excess of 91.

13th August 1918.

(d) SUPPLEMENTARY STATEMENT AS TO AMERICAN FOOD IMPORTS.

*Principal Food Imports into United States which use (chiefly) Water Transportation.
In 1,000 Metric Tons.*

(Compiled from Monthly Summary of Commerce and Finance.)

	1915.	1916.	1917.	Ten Months ended 30 April 1918.
Sugar - - - - -	3,250,500	3,437,500	3,228,600	2,204,100
Cuba, &c. - - - - -	2,391,000	2,502,000	2,235,000	1,597,000
Hawaii - - - - -	570,800	524,900	567,200	398,800
Porto Rico - - - - -	288,700	410,600	426,400	208,300
Cocoa, crude - - - - -	104,300	109,700	176,400	137,200
British W. Indies - - - - -	20,800	18,500	21,500	17,000
Dominican Republic - - - - -	20,500	22,100	24,600	15,800
Brazil - - - - -	17,800	14,400	36,100	34,200
Ecuador - - - - -	15,700	20,100	31,900	25,000
British W. Africa - - - - -	980	13,700	35,000	32,600
Considerable from Venezuela.				
Coffee - - - - -	556,000	528,000	582,100	423,900
Chiefly from S. America ; some from Central America.				
Tea - - - - -	48,000	47,300	57,300	63,300
Of which from Japan - - - - -	23,800	23,700	23,800	23,300
Balance chiefly from China and British East Indies.				
Rice - - - - -	131,200	112,600	135,200	143,900
Beans and lentils - - - - -	18,300	31,700	117,400	84,000
Peas (dried) - - - - -	21,800	25,400	46,600	44,900
Bananas at 100 lbs. per bunch - - - - -	1,730,000	1,601,000	1,596,000	1,266,000
Dates - - - - -	12,000	7,700	9,100	2,500
Copra - - - - -	49,000	71,800	165,900	178,700
Nuts, except copra - - - - -	43,200	50,500	71,400	58,200
Flax seed - - - - -	372,100	331,600	237,800	251,700
Of which from Argentine - - - - -	281,000	221,300	43,300	130,500
Balance mostly from Canada.				
Coconut oil - - - - -	28,600	29,100	73,800	90,900
Palm oil - - - - -	15,600	13,200	15,600	7,100
Soya bean oil - - - - -	9,700	65,800	119,900	124,800
Chiefly from China and Japan.				
Spices - - - - -	30,000	35,000	33,800	29,000
Total imports of principal foods into U.S. -	6,420,000	6,488,000	6,666,000	5,101,700

NOTES ON TABLE.

Sugar.—The American sugar ration is the same (practically) as the English ; the import of sugar is partly in uncontrolled or sailing tonnage.

Bananas.—There have been attempts to restrict this trade, which is largely West Indian. The Food Administration has nothing to say for its continuance.

Vegetable Oils.—These imports have been recently cut down. They are essential to continue U.S. exportation of oils and fats (including substitutes). The existing stocks are satisfactory.

Coffee.—This import is large, but represents a national habit which has an important relation to national morale.

A large part of all eastern importation is done in uncontrolled tonnage and sailing tonnage.

Some of these imports are used for purposes other than food, and restrictions of all imports lie with the War Trade Board.

August 22, 1918.

APPENDIX 39.

Estimated Tonnage for Swiss Requirements.

The Swiss Government are pressing the Allied Governments, through the Allied Maritime Transport Council, to accept a definite responsibility for the provision of tonnage for their minimum requirements.

Hitherto the arrangements have been as follows:—

- (a) A list of articles which the Allied Governments have been prepared to licence for importation into Switzerland on purely blockade grounds. This list has amounted to some 80,000 tons per month, but has carried with it no implied responsibility whatever as to tonnage.
- (b) For the imports within the above limit the Allies have agreed to the Swiss Government's chartering tonnage to the extent of 55,000 tons per month, if the tonnage can be secured.
- (c) The arrangements made by the British Government for the Swiss Loan made the loan vary with the amount of imports Switzerland has in practice been able to obtain.

The highest figure named in this sliding scale arrangement amounted to 50,000 tons per month. This figure of 50,000 is, moreover, the figure which H.M. Minister in Berne has consistently advised as representing Switzerland's real requirements.

- (d) As part of the above quantities the U.S.A. entered into an agreement to provide Switzerland with 240,000 tons of cereals this year. This was a terminating obligation now almost discharged.

Small shipments only were made in the first part of this year, but large shipments are now being effected, over 100,000 tons of American shipping being now employed in this service.

- (e) The Swiss Government have represented, and with some reason, that in view of the extension of control to neutral vessels under recent arrangements, it is useless to leave them in their position of being merely permitted to charter tonnage up to a specified quantity. It is, in fact, impossible for them to obtain tonnage unless it is provided for them by the Allied Governments. The principle, therefore, which is suggested, is that the Allied Maritime Transport Council should accept responsibility for arranging with the Allied Governments to provide the tonnage for what proves on examination to be Switzerland's minimum requirements.

Non-war zone tonnage can be used for this purpose, and perhaps it would be the most convenient course to divide the responsibility between America and Great Britain, as in the case of the Belgian relief.

- (f) It is, however, felt that if the Allies are according this important privilege to Switzerland of accepting definite responsibility for the provision of tonnage, such an arrangement should be made after careful consideration of any other negotiations now pending between the Allies and Switzerland.

For this purpose Mr. Stevens has arranged for Mr. McFadden to find whether the American Government desires to make any stipulation—*e.g.*, for the purpose of supplies in Switzerland for the American Army. The British Foreign Office is similarly appointing someone to ascertain whether Great Britain desires to make any stipulations in connection with the Loan arrangements, blockade, or provision of supplies, &c.

One question in which the Allied Maritime Transport Council is particularly interested, which should doubtless be considered in this connection, is the use of the Simplon tunnel for the carriage of coal from Switzerland to Italy.

- (g) One more question of policy requires consideration in connection with the above arrangement. The Swiss representatives intimate that they understand the German Government to be willing to share the respon-

sibility with the Allies for providing tonnage for Swiss needs, and it is necessary to consider whether the Allies (without whose concurrence such an arrangement could not be carried out) should encourage it or not. The main factors to be taken into consideration are the following:—

1. The German ships in question would probably be vessels interned in either Spanish or Dutch ports.

2. So far as tonnage was in fact forthcoming, it would of course relieve responsibility from the Allies, and to that extent would be an advantage. Moreover, refusal to assent to this arrangement would to some extent increase the responsibility of the Allies for giving help which Switzerland could claim would have been forthcoming from Germany but for the Allies' objection.

3. On the other hand, the tonnage in question would probably not come into service for a very considerable time. The vessels would require repairing, which might take six months or more, and in any case the vessels likely to be obtained would be very few.

4. It may be considered undesirable for the sake of the few vessels in question to give Germany the moral advantage that such an arrangement would imply, and to lose the moral effect of saying that we can look after Switzerland without Germany.

5. The actual execution of the arrangement would probably lead to considerable difficulties. At each stage the Allies would have to make stipulations as to the flag under which the vessels sail, their crews, bunkering, and supervision of the vessels in allied and neutral ports. At each stage Germany would represent to Switzerland that the allied objections were interfering with Germany's desire to assist Switzerland.

6. It would be a privilege to Germany to get her vessels repaired with neutral money, and doubtless with allied assistance, and to get allied consent to allow them to sail openly at sea.

7. The arrangement would give Germany money to improve her exchange certainly in Switzerland, and possibly also in Spain, which would be used to the serious disadvantage of the Allies.

8. The present political position in Spain is also a factor to be considered.

9. There is also the general consideration that if Germany now finds it worth while to assent to some such arrangement as advantageous to herself, there is the presumption, not necessarily conclusive, that it is not to the advantage of the Allies to consent to it.

M. Sulzer has gone to Switzerland, but expects to return in about a fortnight, when it should be possible to conclude the arrangements.

August 28th, 1918.

APPENDIX 40.

American Military Programme.

Since the beginning of March, when the matter became of the first urgency, until the end of July, 1,030,732 men of the American Army have been conveyed to France, and conveyance is at present arranged on the basis of adding 300,000 a month.

(Of the above number, approximately 459,339 have been carried in American vessels, 537,381 in British and 34,012 in Italian, and the British Government has undertaken to continue the present rate of assistance up to and including December

of this year. The number given for American vessels includes some troops carried in French ships, but details are not available.

The loss of cargo involved in conveying the British proportion of the above numbers amounts to 250,000 tons of imports a month, which is equivalent to the loan to America of about 500,000 tons deadweight. This loss has been at the expense of food and munitions.

The carriage of horses and supplies is a more serious problem.

Apart from considerable quantities of stores provided from France and the United Kingdom, and the cargo space on certain of the Italian and Russian vessels carrying troops, the conveyance of supplies hitherto sent has been effected by means of American vessels.

The American Government now have about 1,600,000 tons deadweight cargo capacity in the Army Supply (Atlantic) Service, and the stores delivered in recent months have been as follows:—

Tonnage discharged March/July 1918 (short tons), including Coal, &c., carried Cross Channel.

	March.	April.	May.	June.	July.	
	236,966	397,969	487,199	607,374	641,849	

Definite information as to the full programme is not yet available, but at the request of the Versailles Council, General Bliss obtained from the War Department, U.S.A., a statement that the President had approved a programme of 80 divisions in France by June 30, 1919, provided that, *inter alia*, cargo tonnage could be obtained from Great Britain to supply deficiencies of American shipping. The figures in the cable are not quite clear and explanation has been sought, but on the most reasonable interpretation the demand made is for cargo tonnage to the extent of 1,217,755 tons in August, dropping to 209,641 tons in February next, after which American tonnage will be able to take care of the cargo programme.

Assuming this interpretation of the figures to be correct, it is obvious that a very formidable problem is added to those which the Programme Committees and the Allied Maritime Transport Council have to consider.

August 28th, 1918.

APPENDIX 41.

REQUEST FOR COAL AND PIG-IRON FOR ITALY.

Republique Française,
Paris,
le 18 Août 1918.

Le Chef du Secretariat du
Comité Interallié de l'Armement et
des Munitions.

A. M. le Secrétaire de
l'Allied Maritime Transport Council,
Lancaster House,
Londres, S.W. 1.

Je suis chargé de vous faire parvenir, pour le Conseil interallié des Transport Maritimes la copie ci-jointe de la résolution adoptée par le Conseil interallié de l'Armement et des Munitions (Comité des délégués permanents—séance du 16 Août 1918). J'ai l'honneur de vous prier de demander au Conseil des Transports Maritimes de donner son avis favorable en vue d'assurer le transport de 105,000 tonnes de coke et d'antracite de Grande-Bretagne en Italie, d'une part, de 74,000 tonnes de fonte des Etats-Unis en Italie, d'autre part dans le courant de la fin de l'année 1918.

Ces tonnages de combustibles et d'acier sont en surplus sur programmes déjà présentés au Conseil des Transport Maritimes.

RENÉ BAZIN.

Resolution as to Pig-Iron for Italy.

The Steel Committee has forwarded for the consideration of the Council the demand of Italy for additional assistance from either Great Britain or the United States. Great Britain has arranged to supply 56,000 tons before the end of the year, but in view of the very great reduction in output in Italy the Italian representatives have requested an additional 148,000 tons.

The Inter-Allied Munitions Council is of opinion that these quantities are urgently needed to enable Italy to carry out her munitions programme, and as a result of the discussions which have taken place between the representatives concerned, is of opinion that in order that the blast furnaces of Italy may not be put out of action and the labour dispersed, the whole of this deficit should not be met in the form of pig-iron, but that if possible Italian capacity should be kept in being.

The Council is, therefore, of opinion that 74,000 tons should be met by the supply of fuel from Great Britain in addition to the monthly allocation of coal already arranged. The Coal Controller has undertaken to find this fuel either in the form of South Wales coking coal or of anthracite. The former should form as large a proportion of the total tonnage as possible, which will amount to approximately 105,000 tons. The balance of 74,000 tons should be supplied from the United States, as it would be uneconomical of shipping for this quantity to be supplied from Great Britain and replaced from America.

The Council wishes to direct the attention of the International Maritime Council to this consideration, and to urge that every effort should be made to supply sufficient shipping to transport this *additional* coal from the United Kingdom and pig-iron from the United States. It is, of course, essential that the tonnage for the existing programme should be fully maintained.

The Council also wishes to direct the attention of the Inter-Allied Finance and Purchasing Council to this matter, and to urge that financial approval should be given at once to the provision both of the supplies of steel and pig-iron already arranged and of these additional supplies to Italy. The Council wishes to emphasise that these arrangements are essential to the carrying out of Italy's war effort.

CHARLES E. ELLIS.
LELAND L. SUMMERS.
A. MOLA.
L. DE GRAILLY.

ALLIED MARITIME TRANSPORT COUNCIL.

Report of Executive, August 16th to September 15th, 1918.

In continuation of the last report, which covered the period July 16th to August 15th, the Allied Maritime Transport Executive submit the following report of action taken from August 16th to September 15th.

Lancaster House.

J. A. SALTER.

Summary and Index of Report.

Italian Coal. (Paragraph 1.)

	Tons.
Programme - - - - -	600,000
Supply, 15th August to 14th September -	603,314
Average 6 months - - - - -	593,433

French Coal. (Paragraph 2.)

Provisional programme - - - - -	1,740,000
Supply, August - - - - -	1,394,140
Average 5 months - - - - -	1,443,606

Belgian Relief. (Paragraph 3.)

Owing to a strike of dockers at Rotterdam during August there has been a deficit of 30,000 tons in the anticipated September arrivals. This deficit will be met by the combined efforts of the United States and Great Britain.

Special Allocations among Allies. (Paragraph 4.)

(a) During August 313,000 American soldiers were embarked.

(b) British Liners from U.S.A. to France: September loading, 102,200 tons; October, 102,000 tons.

(c) British Liner Services from the United States to Italy: September loading, 62,895 tons; October, 45,315 tons.

(d) *Cereals*.—In August 244,000 tons have been diverted to France and 105,000 tons to Italy.

Allocation, Neutral Tonnage. (Paragraph 5.)

A total deadweight tonnage of 453,856 is now operating in the Pool out of an ultimate total of about 750,000 tons.

Other Tonnage Arrangements. (Paragraph 6.)

Action has been taken to improve the use of sailing tonnage, to relieve the congestion at Port Said, and to utilise certain small French Bay ports hitherto idle for want of suitable tonnage.

3,319 out of the 10,000 railway wagons to be sent to France to relieve the Italian railway position have so far been shipped.

The method of employment of 30 *ex-enemy* vessels acquired by Brazil has been generally agreed.

General Tonnage Position.

Tabular statement given in Appendix 44, pages 179–184.

Appendices 42 and 43, pages 176–179.

Copies of the more important letters sent on behalf of the Council.

(a) *Allied Food Programme*.—Correspondence conveying Council's decisions is printed in the Appendix.

(b) *Japan* has been invited to join the Allied Maritime Transport Council.

Meeting of Council.

The Council met on August 29–30th. The action taken in execution of its decisions is included in the report.

I. *Italian Coal.**

The programme for the supply of coal to Italy continues at 600,000 tons a month, and the figures for August 15th to September 14th are as follows :—

	Plan.	Execution.
	Tons.	Tons.
Shipments of British coal by long sea route - - - - -	150,000	295,804
British coal passing Italian frontier - - - - -	100,000	97,932
French coal passing Italian frontier - - - - -	350,000	104,578
French coal on board at Mediterranean ports - - - - -		105,000
	600,000	603,314

Attention is called to the fact that whereas 136,000 tons of British coal have been shipped to Blaye for Italy, only 98,000 have been railed across the frontier.

II. *French Coal.*

The shipments during August amounted to 1,394,140 tons against the provisional programme of 1,740,000 tons, a deficit of 245,860 tons. Since the last report the coal available for shipment in this country has become rather more plentiful and shipments are accordingly increasing.

III. *Belgian Relief.*

During the period covered by the report the main action has been taken in relation to a deficit of some 30,000 tons in prospective September arrivals for Belgian Relief caused by a strike of dockers at Rotterdam, which stopped work at that port for the greater part of August. This deficit has been met by the combined efforts of the United States and Great Britain, and the tonnage arranged for the Belgian Relief during the months of September, October, and November should be sufficient to meet the stated requirements. The successful working of this programme depends of course on the efficient working of the available tonnage, and steps are being taken to watch closely the movements of the Belgian Relief tonnage, with a view to seeing that there is no avoidable delay either at Rotterdam or in the United States, and that the average length of the round voyage is kept within the limit of 65 days. On this basis the requirements of the Belgian Relief should be met.

IV. *Special Allocations among Allies.*

(a) During August 313,000 American soldiers were embarked, of which 103,985 were carried in American and French tonnage, 198,589 in British, and 10,426 in Italian.

(b) British Liner Services from the United States to France. British Tonnage loading on this service in September amounts to 102,200 tons deadweight, and in October it will amount approximately to another 102,000 tons deadweight.

(c) British Liner Services from the United States to Italy show a loading for September of 62,895 tons deadweight, the allocations for October amount to about 45,314 tons deadweight.

(d) *Cereals.*—In August 244,000 tons have been diverted to France and 105,000 tons to Italy.

V. *Pool Tonnage.*

The operation of vessels under the direction of the Council in the Neutral Pool continues on the same lines, and a total deadweight tonnage of 453,856 out of an ultimate total of about 750,000 tons deadweight has now come under the scheme.

VI. (a)—*Other Tonnage Arrangements—Use of Sailing Tonnage.*

A scheme has been considered for the most advantageous use of the sailing vessels which have hitherto been employed in carrying wheat from Australia to the North Pacific coast of America, the necessity for this employment having disappeared.

* The previous report of action contained certain approximate figures. In the light of exact figures subsequently ascertained, the figure for the execution of the plan for the period July 15th—August 14th is 628,731, as against the approximate figure 630,965; the figure for the deficit is 44,947 as against the figure 42,670. The deficit carried forward to the period September 15th—October 14th is 41,633.

It has been unanimously decided that in consequence of the seriousness of the coal position in South America (Plate and West Coast), and also at Sierra Leone and Dakar, the following scheme provided the best employment for the vessels :—

- (1) A triangular run from the States to Australia (with oil and general cargo), from Australia to the West Coast of South America with coal, and from thence to the States with nitrate.
- (2) A triangular route from the States, from the U.S.A. to South Africa (if from the Gulf with oil—otherwise with general cargo), from Durban to Dakar or Sierra Leone with coal, and from the West Coast of Africa to the States with mahogany or other West African produce.
- (3) A fleet of sailing vessels to carry coal from South Africa to the Plate, returning in ballast.

It is stated that the exportable surplus of coal from Durban amounts to about 100,000 tons a month.

(b)—Congestion at Port Said.

The extremely unsatisfactory condition of Port Said owing to the considerable congestion of French transhipment cargo there (about 70,000 tons) has been under consideration.

The following measures have been taken by the French Government :—

- (1) No more shipments are to be made from the Far East to Port Said, the French Pacific liners returning to Marseilles instead of returning from Port Said to the East.
- (2) Available French vessels in the Mediterranean are being sent there to clear the local stores, and the Ministry of Shipping has allocated a 8,000-ton vessel, with the possibility of sending another.
- (3) The local situation as regards labour and appliances will be improved.

(c)—Shipment of Cars from U.K. to France.

(a) A considerable amount of American tonnage employed on American Army requirements in France being held up for want of coal, it was decided that in order to avoid waste of shipping, some of these vessels should load the railway wagons being allocated by this country to France, and arrangements were made for this to be done.

(b) A total of 2,665 wagons have, inclusive of those carried by the above arrangements, being lifted up to date. In addition 654 have been carried by the train ferry service in the period August 10th—September 12th. The total shipped, therefore, is 3,319.

(d) Franco-Brazilian Agreement—Employment of ex-Enemy Vessels.

Following the proposals put forward by the United States Government for the co-operative use of the 30 ex-German vessels covered by the Franco-Brazilian Agreement, the French Government has agreed in general to the proposals made by the American Government with the following counter-proposals :—

1. Out of the 30 vessels forming part of the Franco-Brazilian Agreement of December 1917, three would be employed in the traffic Brazil/France, in order to satisfy the French Government needs in Brazilian merchandise.

2. In order to make the 32 voyages mentioned in Article 15 of the Franco-Brazilian Agreement, eight vessels will have to be maintained permanently in the traffic from Brazilian ports, but France would be prepared in conjunction with the United States to request the Brazilian Government to allow the cargoes to be loaded in Brazil to be shipped to the United States instead of to Europe. Should this be acceptable to the Brazilian Government, eight vessels would be put in the triangular route Brazil/U.S.A./France, France/Cardiff in ballast, Cardiff/Brazil with coal for Brazil.

The American Government would put a certain number of vessels in this same triangular route, the quantity of which would be so calculated as to compensate France for the loss of tonnage through extra delay for the trip Brazil/U.S.A. plus time for loading and unloading.

3. Nineteen vessels remain, of which some have not yet been delivered. The French Government cannot undertake to put these vessels on the above-mentioned

triangular route permanently, but would be prepared to put them on this traffic temporarily as and when delivered with the same compensating tonnage to be furnished by the United States.

It would be understood that these vessels could be withdrawn from this traffic by the French Government, and in this case the tonnage furnished by the United States would be reduced in proportion to the Brazilian ships withdrawn.

In answer to this counter-proposal the American Government has stated that at the present time they are not in a position to give the French Government replacement tonnage in compensation for loss of time through the diversion on the round voyage, and the French Government has agreed not to claim the replacement for the time being with the understanding that the United States will, as soon as they are able to do so, put some tonnage at the disposal of France in order to offset the above-mentioned delays.

APPENDIX 42, 43, 44.

- (a) Letter from the Transport Council to the Food Council.
 - (b) Do. do.
 - (c) Letter from the Food Council to the Transport Council.
 - (d) Letter to Japanese Ambassador.
 - (e) Provisional Statement of Allied and Neutral Tonnage for August 1918.
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APPENDIX 42.

(a) LETTER FROM TRANSPORT COUNCIL TO FOOD COUNCIL.

SIR,

5th September 1918.

I HAVE to inform you that I laid before the Allied Maritime Transport Council your letter of the 19th ultimo enclosing a general Food Programme for the three European Allies for the cereal year 1918-19, together with the explanatory memorandum by the Committee of Representatives and the further Memorandum with regard to distribution as between the Allies.

After considerable discussion at which the Chairman of the Committee of Representatives was present, the Council decided that it was not possible for them to come to a final conclusion as to the total importation of foodstuffs in the new cereal year for which they would be justified in endeavouring to arrange tonnage in view of the incompleteness of the information as to (a) this year's harvests, and (b) some of the main competing requirements for tonnage; in particular the American Army Supply Programme and the Munitions Programmes of the three European Allies.

In these circumstances they decided to recommend to the respective Governments that the programme should be commenced provisionally and on the basis of the quantities covered by the priority figures, it being fully understood that the figures would be reconsidered as soon as full information is available.

With regard to military oats, they decided to recommend that the old programme of importation should continue until the matter has been further considered.

The Transport Council expressed the hope that the Food Council will find it practicable to arrange for the inclusion at the earliest possible date of the American Food Import Programme in the general programme on the same basis as the others.

In view of the fact that in present circumstances the provisional acceptance of the priority system as a basis for the allocation of ships must, in fact, involve the diversion of British ships to supplement deficient importations into France and Italy, the British representatives on the Council assented to the above recommendation on the understanding that (a) the arrangement must be regarded as voluntary and subject to cancellation; (b) that a satisfactory agreement is arrived at between the different Allies as to their putting a specified quantity of tonnage into the Food Programme and/or carrying defined quantities of food in their own ships; and (c) that the continuance of the arrangements will necessarily be subject to the inclusion of America on equal terms at an early date.

The Transport Council also had under their consideration the administrative arrangements to be made to give effect to the above policy. They recognise that their

own organisation must necessarily depend to some extent upon the organisation adopted by the Food Council.

If the Food Council arranges for the machinery to follow generally the lines already adopted for cereals, the Transport Council presume that the demands for tonnage for all foodstuffs will be centralised through a Freight Committee of the Food Representatives Committee. In that event the Council would arrange that their own Tonnage Committee would be primarily responsible for making the arrangements indicated in (b) of the preceding paragraph, and they would endeavour to arrange that the Committee should include executive officers with authority on behalf of the respective Governments to give or reserve assent to a proposed diversion of national tonnage and to make consequent arrangements with the Freight Committee. They would contemplate that, the above arrangements being made, the Shipping Department of the Food Organisation would deal on executive questions of detail with the actual shipping authorities of the four countries resident in London as to the execution of their several parts of the common plan.

I should be glad to be informed whether these administrative proposals are convenient from the point of your organisation.

(Signed) J. A. SALTER.

(b) LETTER OF TRANSPORT COUNCIL TO FOOD COUNCIL.

SIR,

6th September 1918.

WITH reference to my letter of yesterday's date respecting the Food Council's Programme for the cereal year 1918-19 and the decisions of the Allied Maritime Transport Council with regard to the provision of tonnage, I have to inform you that, on the best estimate that is at present practicable, the total arrivals of foodstuffs in the three European Allied countries during the four months September to December 1918 inclusive (having regard to the Transport Council's decision and to the present disposition of tonnage) are likely to amount to about $6\frac{1}{4}$ million tons, excluding Military oats, or 7 million tons including Military oats.

I am to observe that, apart from the ordinary factors of uncertainty to which any estimate of future importations is necessarily subject, any estimate made at this moment is liable to be affected by the important discussions expected to take place during the next month with regard to the American Military Supply Programme.

I am to suggest, however, that in the meantime you should arrange for the preparation of an export programme based upon the probable arrivals in the three European Allied countries during the four months in question on the basis of the above estimate, and showing countries of origin and quantities of each commodity.

J. A. SALTER.

(c) LETTER OF FOOD COUNCIL TO TRANSPORT COUNCIL.

SIR,

13th September 1918.

I AM directed by the Committee of Representatives to acknowledge receipt of your letters of the 4th and 6th instant with reference to the Programme of Food Importation for the Cereal Year 1918-19.

With regard to the former letter the Committee of Representatives have given careful consideration to the matter, and they desire me to convey to the Allied Maritime Transport Council their observations on the recommendations and proposals therein contained.

They have noted the recommendation :--

"That the programme should be commenced provisionally and on the basis of the quantities covered by the priority figures,"

and they accept it on the understanding that the figures are subject to review at any time on the motion of any country as circumstances may render this necessary. It may be mentioned that some members of the Committee consider that an increase in the figures will shortly be required.

The Committee entirely concur in the suggestion of the Transport Council that the demand for tonnage should be dealt with by a Freight Committee on lines similar

to those now adopted for cereals. The Committee of Representatives had already decided to set up a general Freight Committee which will deal with questions of freight in connection with all food imports, and it is desired that this Committee shall work in close co-operation with the Tonnage Committee established by the Allied Maritime Transport Council. It is understood that the Council are willing that they should be represented at meetings of the Freight Committee. The Committee of Representatives observe the proposal of the Allied Maritime Transport Council for securing that each country should undertake a specified share in carrying food.

The Committee have noted the statements in your letter of the 6th instant as to the limitation of imports during the four months September to December 1918 inclusive, and will defer commenting on them until they have had an opportunity of further considering the matter. They are communicating with the military authorities on the question of the limitation of the import of military oats during those months, but although it is possible that by some unifying of the oats rations in the Allied Armies a reduction in the requirement may be effected, the Committee feel that the proposed figure of 750,000 tons will be insufficient.

J. F. BEALE.

APPENDIX 43.

(d) LETTER TO JAPANESE AMBASSADOR.

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

10th September 1918.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that, at their recent session in London, the Allied Maritime Transport Council decided unanimously to send an invitation to the Japanese Government to be represented on the Council.

I enclose herewith, for your information, a copy of a short memorandum adopted by the Council at the first meeting as a correct description of their objects and proposed methods of work, and I shall be happy to furnish any further information on the subject that may be desired.

The Council at present consists of two Ministers each of France, Italy, and Great Britain, and two delegates from the United States of America. It meets in any of the three capitals of the European Allies that may be convenient, and it has a permanent organisation situated in London.

The Council has no executive power to allocate tonnage, but is advisory to the several Governments. It endeavours to ascertain the manner in which tonnage may best be utilised in the common interest, seeking to eliminate services not essential to the war, and to secure more complete Allied co-operation in the use of available tonnage.

In order that the Council may make recommendations to the Allied Governments with a full knowledge of the facts, Allied Programme Committees have been created whose function is to ascertain the import needs of, and make an import programme for, each Ally. It is hoped that it will thus be possible, by a joint Allied examination having regard to the common interest, both to ascertain the total import requirements of all the Allied countries and then to adjust them to the carrying capacity of the total available tonnage.

At the time when the Council was formed, each of the four countries now represented on it had already requisitioned its own tonnage, and had itself made arrangements for the allocation of that tonnage as between its military and civilian requirements and the needs of any of the other Allies.

It was clear, however, that if opportunities of economising tonnage were not to be lost, the Allied tonnage and supply position required examination by the Allies as a whole and not merely by each of them separately, and it was for this purpose that the Council was formed. At the same time the system of control already put in force by each of the four Allies in question over its own tonnage greatly facilitated the practical execution of any common plan for the re-allocation of tonnage on which the Allies might agree.

As it is a part of the constitution of the Council that each country retains the executive control over its own tonnage, it follows that recommendations of the Council which affect the allocation of ships belonging to a particular Ally are conditional upon the assent of that Ally. The experience of the Council has shown, however, that in spite of this reservation it is practicable to make arrangements

by agreement which do secure a better and more economical distribution and allocation of tonnage.

The Council would be glad to be informed whether the Japanese Government decide to accept the invitation hereby conveyed to them.

ROBERT CECIL.

Memorandum enclosed in letter to Japanese Ambassador.

The purpose of the Allied Maritime Transport Council is to watch over the general conduct of Allied transport, and, while leaving each nation responsible for the management and supervision of the tonnage under its own control, to secure the necessary exchange of information and co-ordination in policy and effort on the part of the four Governments of France, Italy, the United States of America, and Great Britain in adjusting their programmes of imports to the carrying capacity of the available tonnage (having regard to naval and military requirements), and in making the most advantageous allocation and disposition of the tonnage under their control in accordance with the urgency of war needs.

For this purpose the Council will obtain through its permanent staff the programmes of important requirements drawn up by the Inter-Allied Programme Committees which are established or to be established on the model of the Wheat Executive (with such modifications as may be necessary in the different cases) for each of the main classes of essential imports, and take these as the basis. It will also be responsible for obtaining through its permanent staff the fullest information as to the tonnage available to the respective Governments, for examining the imports programmes furnished by the Programme Committees in relation to the carrying power of the available tonnage, for ascertaining the extent of any deficit, and for considering the means whereby such a deficit may be met, whether by a further reduction in the programmes of imports or by the acquisition, if practicable, of further tonnage for importing work. If the Council agrees that reductions in any of the different programmes of imports to a defined extent are necessary, the Ministers will so report to their respective Governments with a view to secure that the necessary decisions and action are taken in their respective countries and the necessary modifications are made in the programmes produced by the several Inter-Allied Programme Committees.

APPENDIX 44.

(e) PROVISIONAL STATEMENT OF ALLIED AND NEUTRAL TONNAGE FOR AUGUST 1918.

GENERAL NOTES.

This is the second of a series of provisional tonnage statements which will be issued about the 15th of each month, followed by a revision a month later.

Subject to such revision, the tables shown are believed to be reasonably complete for tonnage of the four principal Allies, except as noted, and for losses by enemy action for all countries. In other respects the figures are based upon a considerable body of information, and are fairly complete, except for small vessels. Table I., showing employment of tonnage, is subject to most reservations.

Under "Other Allies" are included Japan, Russia, Brazil, Greece, Portugal, and Belgium. Under "Neutrals" are included Norway, Holland, Sweden, Spain, and Denmark. Available data for lesser maritime nations are at present too incomplete for inclusion. The aggregate tonnage thus excluded is perhaps 500,000 tons, most of it employed in the service of neutrals.

Deadweight figures for Italian, French, British, and American vessels are based largely upon records for individual vessels. For tonnage of "Other Allies" and "Neutrals" deadweight records are at present incomplete, and the figures presented are gross plus 50 per cent. The same ratio has been used elsewhere for individual vessels on which deadweight figures were unobtainable, except where another ratio was suggested by known facts.

(PROVISIONAL.)
TABLE I.—EMPLOYMENT OF ALLIED AND NEUTRAL TONNAGE, 31ST AUGUST 1918.
Seagoing Steam Merchant Vessels of 500 Gross Tons and over.

(All figures in thousands of deadweight tons.)

Employment of Tonnage exclusive of Tankers.	Tonnage under Flag of						To
	Italy.	France.	United Kingdom.	United States.	Other Allies.	Neutrals.	
I. EMPLOYED IN IMPORT SERVICE OF FOUR PRINCIPAL ALLIES :—							
(a) In import service of Italy	772	2	1,241	111	195	336	2,657
(b) " " France	...	900	1,815	139	415	550	3,819
(c) " " United Kingdom	18	64	7,460	33	251	318	8,144
(d) " " United States	151	900*	433	588	2,072
Total in Import Service of Four Principal Allies	790	966	10,667	1,183	1,294	1,792	16,692
II. EMPLOYED IN OTHER MERCHANT SERVICE :—							
(a) In coasting service of flag nation	54	19	285	863	475	219	1,915
(b) In colonial service of flag nation	1	37	1,555	66	10	236	1,905
(c) In coasting or colonial service of other principal allies.	648	613*	406	225	5,237
(d) In merchant service of other allies or neutrals	1,267	2,078	36
(e) In enemy interests	36	...
Total in other Merchant Service	55	56	2,488	1,542	2,158	2,794	5,093
III. EMPLOYED IN NON-MERCHANT SERVICE :—							
(a) In military service of flag nation	88	75	2,153	2,003	4,319
(b) In naval service of flag nation	35	192	1,756	207	5	8	2,203
(c) In other military or naval service (mainly transportation of American troops).	42	24	632	40*	69	26	833
(d) In other non-merchant service (mainly cable repairing).	...	4	25	13	42
Total in Non-Merchant Service	165	295	4,566	2,250	74	47	7,397
V. UNEMPLOYED OR EMPLOYMENT UNKNOWN :—							
(a) Repairing or remodelling	129	288	1,344	160*	90	133	2,144
(b) Otherwise unemployed	49	2	...	150*	68	591	860
(c) Employment unknown	...	21	838	457	1,316
Total Unemployed or Employment Unknown	178	311	1,344	310	996	1,181	4,320
Total Tonnage, exclusive of Tankers	1,188	1,628	19,065	5,285	4,522	5,814	37,502
TANKERS, EXCLUDED ABOVE	48	24	1,620	1,330	30	166	3,218
TOTAL TONNAGE, INCLUDING TANKERS	1,236	1,652	20,685	6,615	4,552	5,980	40,720

TABLE III.—ADJUSTMENTS IN ALLIED AND NEUTRAL TONNAGE FOR THE EIGHT-MONTH PERIOD FROM 1ST JANUARY TO 31ST AUGUST 1918.

Seagoing Steam Merchant Vessels of 500 Gross Tons and over.

(PROVISIONAL.)

(All figures in thousands of deadweight tons.)

Adjustments in Tonnage.	Tonnage under Flag of						Total.
	Italy.	France.	United Kingdom.	United States.	Other Allies.	Neutrals.	
I. LOSSES, 1st JANUARY—31st AUGUST :—							
(a) By enemy action - - -	178	213	2,075	212	135	341	3,154
(b) By marine risk. - - -	20	24	267	129	87	55	582
(c) By other causes - - -	1	...	41	46	88
Total Losses - - -	199	237	2,383	387	222	396	3,824
II. GAINS, 1st JANUARY—31st AUGUST :—							
(a) By construction - - -	61	...	1,576	1,782	470	169	4,058
(b) From other sources - - -	7	...	35	16	58
Total Gains - - -	68	...	1,611	1,798	470	169	4,116
NET LOSS OR GAIN, 1st January—31st August -	-131	-237	-772	+1,411	+248	-227	+292
III. TRANSFERS AND SUNDRY ADJUSTMENTS :—							
(a) Transfers to foreign flag - - -	...	1	19	25	354	818	1,217
(b) Transfers from foreign flag - - -	5	23	566	605	18	...	1,217
(c) Sundry adjustments : <i>Net</i> - - -	...	-22	-5	+16	-10	...	-21
Net Transfers and Adjustments -	+5	...	+542	+596	-346	-818	-21
NET CHANGE, 1st January—31st August - -	-126	-237	-230	+2,007	-98	-1,045	+271
TONNAGE UNDER NATIONAL FLAG, 1st JANUARY 1918 - -	1,362	1,889	20,915	4,608	4,702	6,999	40,476
TONNAGE UNDER NATIONAL FLAG, 31st AUGUST 1918 - -	1,236	1,653	20,685	6,615	4,604	5,954	40,747

TABLE IV—SUMMARY, BY MONTHS AND QUARTERS, OF LOSSES AND GAINS IN ALLIED AND NEUTRAL TONNAGE -
FOR THE PERIOD FROM 1ST JANUARY TO 31ST AUGUST 1918.

(PROVISIONAL.)

Seagoing Steam Merchant Vessels of 500 Gross Tons and over.

(All figures in thousands of deadweight tons.)

Period.	Italy.			France.			United Kingdom.			United States.			Other Allies.			Neutrals.			Total.		
	Total Losses.	Total Gains.	Net Loss or Gain.	Total Losses.	Total Gains.	Net Loss or Gain.	Total Losses.	Total Gains.	Net Loss or Gain.	Total Losses.	Total Gains.	Net Loss or Gain.	Total Losses.	Total Gains.	Net Loss or Gain.	Total Losses.	Total Gains.	Net Loss or Gain.	Total Losses.	Total Gains.	Net Loss or Gain.
January -	22	8	- 14	49	...	- 49	324	108	-216	21	98	+ 77	42	50	+ 8	56	24	- 32	514	288	- 226
February	38	3	- 35	16	...	- 16	368	144	-224	24	141	+ 117	24	50	+ 26	75	24	- 51	545	302	- 183
March -	65	8	- 57	22	...	- 22	319	263	- 56	52	182	+ 130	41	50	+ 9	87	24	- 63	586	527	- 59
1st Quarter -	125	19	-106	87	...	- 87	1,011	515	-496	97	421	+ 324	107	150	+ 43	218	72	- 146	1,645	1,177	- 468
April -	6	11	+ 5	33	...	- 33	340	164	- 176	51	201	+ 150	28	20	- 8	27	21	- 6	485	417	- 68
May -	30	13	- 17	32	...	- 32	313	281	- 32	56	276	+ 220	11	95	+ 84	35	12	- 23	477	677	+ 200
June -	3	17	+ 14	32	...	- 32	241	198	- 43	52	302	+ 250	9	32	+ 23	50	39	- 11	387	588	+ 201
2nd Quarter -	39	41	+ 2	97	...	- 97	894	643	-251	159	779	+ 620	48	147	+ 99	112	72	- 40	1,349	1,682	+ 333
July -	35	8	- 27	21	...	- 21	224	233	+ 9	57	260	+ 203	39	63	+ 24	26	6	- 20	402	570	+ 168
August -	32	...	- 32	254	220	- 34	74	338	+ 264	28	110	+ 82	40	19	- 21	428	687	+ 259
Total for Period -	199	68	- 131	237	...	- 237	2,383	1,611	- 772	387	1,798	+ 1411	222	470	+ 248	396	169	- 227	3,824	4,116	+ 292

TABLE V.—ADJUSTMENTS IN ALLIED AND NEUTRAL TONNAGE FOR THE MONTH OF AUGUST 1918.

Seagoing Steam Merchant Vessels of 500 Gross Tons and over.

(PROVISIONAL.)

(All figures in thousands of deadweight tons.)

Adjustments in Tonnage.	Tonnage under Flag of						Total.
	Italy.	France.	United Kingdom.	United States.	Other Allies.	Neutrals.	
I. LOSSES DURING MONTH :—							
(a) By enemy action - - - - -	...	30	203	66	17	38	354
(b) By marine risk - - - - -	...	2	41	8	11	2	64
(c) By other causes - - - - -	10	10
Total Losses - - - - -	...	32	254	74	28	40	428
II. GAINS DURING MONTH :—							
(a) By construction - - - - -	220	338	110	19	687
(b) From other sources - - - - -
Total Gains - - - - -	220	338	110	19	687
Net Loss or Gain during Month - - - - -	...	- 32	- 34	+ 264	+ 82	- 21	+ 259
III. TRANSFERS AND SUNDRY ADJUSTMENTS :—							
(a) Transfers to foreign flag - - - - -	7	4	26	5	42
(b) Transfers from foreign flag - - - - -	9	26	7	...	42
(c) Sundry adjustments, net - - - - -	...	+ 10	- 9	...	- 10	...	- 9
Net - - - - -	...	+ 10	- 7	+ 22	- 29	- 5	- 9
Net Change during Month - - - - -	...	- 22	- 41	+ 286	+ 53	- 26	+ 250
TONNAGE UNDER NATIONAL FLAG, BEGINNING OF MONTH - - - - -	1,236	1,674.	20,726	6,329	4,552	5,980	40,497
TONNAGE UNDER NATIONAL FLAG, END OF MONTH - - - - -	1,236	1,652	20,685	6,615	4,605	5,954	40,747

ALLIED MARITIME TRANSPORT COUNCIL.

Draft Minutes of the Fourth Session held at Lancaster House, London, S.W. 1, September 30th, October 1st and 2nd, 1918.

Present :

Lord ROBERT CECIL (*in the Chair*).
 Sir JOSEPH MACLAY, Great Britain.
 M. LOUCHEUR, France.
 Signor VILLA, Italy.
 Signor CRESPI, Italy.
 Hon. RAYMOND B. STEVENS, United States.
 Hon. GEORGE RUBLEE, United States.
 Mr. J. A. SALTER, *Secretary to the Council*.

The Hon. Newton D. Baker, United States Secretary of War, was present during the discussion of the Supply Programme of the American Army.

There also attended with the representatives of the respective countries, either throughout the discussion or for the discussion of particular subjects :—

France—

MM. TARDIEU, DE FLEURIAU, J. MONNET, Cnè. BLÉTRY, GILLET, MICHEL LEVY, MAY, SURRUYS, CHARPENTIER, MAX LAZARD, DE LUBERSAC, DU HALGOUET, REVILLON, PILLIARD, MANTOUX.

Italy—

Signor NAVA, Com. PIRELLI, Professor ATTOLICO, General MOLA, Lieutenant FARINA, Ing. MOSCA, Professor PARDO.

American—

Hon. OSCAR T. CROSBY, Mr. E. R. STETTINIUS, Mr. L. P. SHELDON, Mr. PAUL D. CRAVATH, Mr. J. P. COTTON, Mr. L. L. SUMMERS, General FRANK T. HINES, Mr. CHARLES DAY, Mr. D. W. MORROW, Mr. JOHN R. GORDON, Lieut.-Col. L. P. AYRES, Mr. L. I. THOMAS, Commander PAUL FOLEY, Commander L. B. MCBRIDE, Mr. JAMES A. FIELD, Mr. J. D. GREENE.

Great Britain—

Lord READING, Mr. CHURCHILL, Sir JOHN BEALE, Sir JOHN CADMAN, Admiral TOTHILL, Mr. G. M. BOOTH, Sir E. WYLDBORE SMITH, Mr. GRAEME THOMSON, Mr. JOHN ANDERSON, Mr. B. A. KEMBALL-COOK, Mr. W. T. LAYTON, Mr. PHILIP HANSON, Captain CLEMENT JONES, Mr. HURCOMB, Mr. BROWETT, Mr. HENRY.

Secretariat—

Mr. J. F. HENDERSON, M. ANDRÉ SIMON, Mr. J. E. HIGHTON, Mr. O. C. CHAPMAN, Mrs. ARNOLD-FORSTER, Mr. BULLWINKLE, Mr. DAVIS.

1. The Minutes of the Second Session were confirmed and signed; the General Report covering the six months from March 15th to September 14th, 1918,* and Report of Action for the period August 16th to September 15th were accepted.

The Statement of the World Tonnage position as at August 31st, 1918, (included in the Report of action for the period Aug. 16th—Sept. 15th) and a statistical estimate of the importing capacity of tonnage in the cereal year 1918-19 (printed as Appendix 45) were also presented and accepted.

- | | |
|------|--|
| 2. { | <i>American Military Programme; and American Co-operation in Allied Machinery.</i> |
| | <i>Memorandum as to Policy to govern the Allocation of Tonnage in Cereal Year 1918-19.</i> |
| | <i>General Statement of position.</i> |
| | <i>Food Programme.</i> |
| | <i>Munitions Programme.</i> |
| | <i>Other Services.</i> |

* *Note.*—This report has not been included among these documents.

OVERSEAS TONNAGE GAINED & LOST-AUG.1914-JE.30.1918

BUILT CAPTURED TRANSF. PUR. **ENEMY ACTION, INT.** MAR. FISH TRANSF. SALES

	GAIN	LOSS		5847	9140
BRIT. EMP.					
NORWAY	GAIN 243	LOSS 1448			
FRANCE	GAIN 460	LOSS 980			
ITALY	GAIN 368	LOSS 883			
OTHERS	GAIN 881	LOSS 1134			
HOLLAND	GAIN 537	LOSS 720			
DENMARK	GAIN 136	LOSS 317			
SPAIN	GAIN 40	LOSS 193			
SWEDEN	GAIN 110	LOSS 247			
JAPAN	GAIN 843	LOSS 293			
U.S.A.	GAIN 709	LOSS 4088			

THOUSANDS OF GROSS TONS

The Memoranda printed as Appendices 46 and 47 (pages 192–202), were considered.

Lord Robert Cecil made a statement summarising the present position. He explained that provision had to be made during the ensuing year for the four main allied requirements—Food, Munitions, Raw Materials, and the transport of American Troops and Supplies to Europe. On present estimates the tonnage at the disposal of the European Allies was insufficient to meet the requirements of the European Allies for the three former services, and therefore it was in relation to an already serious deficiency that the question of further assistance towards the Supply Programme of the American Army had to be considered. American tonnage was steadily increasing, and though inadequate at present for her Army Supply Service, might exceed the minimum needs of that service by the spring or early summer of next year. In these circumstances it might be possible to divert some portion of the tonnage under the control of the European Allies to the American Supply Service in the immediate future if the European deficit could be met by American assistance later in the cereal year.

Lord Robert Cecil proceeded to recall the objects for which the Council had been established, and asked for an assurance that the United States Government was prepared to participate in the fullest sense in the work of the Council and of the Allied bodies associated with it.

Secretary Baker, in a speech which is reprinted in full in Appendix 48, pledged the United States Government to full participation in the work of the Council and of the other associated Allied organisations, as described in the Resolutions printed below, and the explanatory memorandum on pp. 194–5, subject to the reservation, which is there made and is inherent in the constitution of the Council, that America, like the other Allies, will retain, in the last resort, ultimate control of her own tonnage.

The two following resolutions, relating to the co-operation of the United States, were unanimously adopted :—

(a) *That America should, with the European Allies, table her programmes of imports for joint consideration by the Allied Programme Committees, and her tonnage for similar joint consideration by the Allied Maritime Transport Council, and enable her representatives on these bodies to consider adjustments in the programmes of her imports and the allocation of her tonnage.*

(b). *That, in order (1) to secure in the immediate future additional tonnage for the American Army Supply Service, and (2) later to meet the accumulated European deficit and to supply commodities vitally needed by any one of the four countries, America, like the European Allies, should be guided in the arrangement of her import services and the disposition of her tonnage by the information and recommendations of the Programme Committees and the Transport Council, with the definite intention of utilising this Allied machinery in order to achieve the objects unanimously agreed on by the Paris Conference, viz. :—*

- (i) *to make the most economical use of tonnage under the control of all the Allies,*
- (ii) *to allot that tonnage as between the different needs of the Allies in such a way as to add most to the general war effort, and*
- (iii) *to adjust the programmes of requirements of the different Allies in such a way as to bring them within the scope of the possible carrying power of the tonnage available.*

These resolutions were to be read with and interpreted in the light of the explanatory memorandum on pp. 194–5.

With regard to the general policy to govern the disposition of tonnage during the next 12 months, a number of resolutions were adopted which may conveniently be grouped as follows :—

Munitions in Winter : Food afterwards.

(c)—*That, during the later Autumn and Winter, a general preference shall be given to the transport of munitions and army supplies as compared with food.*

(d) *That, when necessary, but as late as possible without running undue risk of actual shortage of food, a similar preference shall be given to the transport of food in the spring or early summer.*

M. Loucheur explained that the Munitions Council had, in the first instance, drawn up a programme amounting to 22 $\frac{3}{4}$ million tons, but that this had been reduced to 18 million tons by drastic cuts. It was the strong view of the Munitions Council that as much as possible of this programme should be carried out during the next six months.

Mr. Churchill having pointed out that it was essential that the Munition Authorities should be enabled to make their plans on the basis of a definite importation, it was decided to request the Executive to submit a report on the matter. The report of the Executive, printed as Appendix 49 (pages 202-5), was adopted by the Council, *the Executive being thus directed to work so far as is found practicable in the next six months towards importations of munitions in priority over food, while in the immediate future giving special priority in loading to any classes of munitions importations which the Munitions Council regard as especially urgent and important.*

The Italian representatives having drawn attention to the difficulties likely to arise in Italy owing to the limited capacity of Italian ports if imports of food and munitions were not evenly distributed, *the Executive were directed to adjust the shipments as between food and munitions, &c., so as to keep importations as even as possible in Italy throughout the year, shortages in munitions ready for shipment at any time being compensated for by increased shipments of food, &c., so far as may be desirable for the above reasons.*

(e) *Reduction of Stocks.—That, in view of the prospect of substantial improvement in the whole Allied tonnage position by next summer, and in order to avoid reducing the shipment of essential commodities required for actual consumption during the year up to August (particularly munitions), all Supply Departments should be asked to effect a reduction of stocks until they approximate towards the end of August to the quantities required for actual distribution.*

(f) *Food.—That 18·5 million tons of importations of all articles included in the food programme, except military oats, should be confirmed as the figure for the year.*

In recommending this figure the Council had before them from the Food Council the definite statement of the British Representatives that, on their present estimates, which allow for a substantial increase in the slaughtering of cattle and pigs and for the restriction of imported foodstuffs to the needs of the dairy herds, the present British proportion of the 18·5, viz., 10·5, will not prove a possible figure.

Recognising the possibility that the policy recommended (viz., working on the basis of 18·5 and shipping less than the proportion of that quantity during the earlier months) may result in a really serious food position later in the cereal year, the Council agreed—

(g) *That if the food position at the end of the winter or later shows such a course to be necessary in order to avoid food shortage, food shipments shall have priority in excess of the proportion due on the 18·5 basis at the expense of tonnage allotted to other services.*

(h) *That for the purpose of considering the tonnage available for other services the total importations of food (and all other articles included in the food programme), including all miscellaneous foodstuffs and military oats, should be provisionally estimated at 22 million tons.*

With regard to military oats, the Council had been informed by the Food Council that it had not yet been possible to arrive at an agreement with the Military Authorities as to the amount, and in these circumstances, pending a final decision, the Council authorised importations to continue on a provisional basis which will result in an importation by the end of December of between 900,000 and 1,000,000 tons.

(i) *Munitions.—That in estimating what is available for the European munitions imports it should be provisionally assumed that any tonnage assistance rendered to America, whether by the allocation of ships or the supply of artillery, will be returned within the cereal year, thus leaving 18 million tons for European munitions, including ore, pyrites, phosphate rock, railway material, and lubricating oil, but that it should be recognised that this requires reconsideration after examination of the munitions programme, and in particular of the arrangements there proposed for supplies to the American forces.*

Mr. Churchill desired it to be placed on record that the programme of 18 million tons did not contain any provision for the manufacture by Great Britain of shell for the American Army, and that any steel or explosive required for such a purpose must be supplied in American tonnage over and above the programme. Mr. Stettinius assented.

(j) *Raw Materials.*—That the principle provisionally approved at the last Session for raw materials, viz., that actual recorded consumption of last year should be taken as setting the maximum limit for programme for the ensuing year, should continue to be applied.

Supply Programme for the American Army.

(k) *That the Council should not recommend at this moment any reduction in the embarkation of American soldiers in spite of the grave condition of the European import programmes, but should be prepared to recommend such a reduction, if necessary, in the embarkations of next year in order to meet any crisis that may arise in the imports of food or other supplies at the time.*

(l) *That the Council, having before it the following provisional allocations of tonnage for arrival from September to December inclusive, viz.,*

Food, including military oats, 7 million tons,

Munitions and raw materials, 9 million tons,

recommends that approximately 500,000 tons be diverted from the above allocation for the American Army programme for October, November, and December, including the 200,000 tons already arranged, but in addition to any further space that can be provided by the release of double bottoms.

The exact quantity of tonnage to be allotted to the American Army Supply Service was to be subject to further consideration in the light of later information as to the immediate needs of the American Army in relation to the requirements of other Services.

Secretary Baker observed that these resolutions (k) and (l) would be regarded as subject to the general sense of his speech, and that in the last resort the carrying out of the 80 Division Programme must depend on the amount of tonnage available in Europe and America.

(m) *Coal.*—That the strongest recommendations should be made to the British Government as to the immense importance to the entire Allied supply position of increasing the production of coal.

(n) *Publicity.*—The Council recorded their opinion that in view of the severe sacrifices that must in any event be entailed if the American military programme is continued, a full statement of the position should be issued to the public of the four countries, this statement emphasising the fact that it is the supreme importance of increasing the Allied forces in France which is the reason for the sacrifices asked for, and that these sacrifices are likely to be required only during the winter and spring, the supply position being thereafter in all probability greatly improved.

3. *Carriage of Oil in Double Bottoms.*—The Chairman of the Petroleum Conference made a statement showing the deficit on programme which would follow from the discontinuance of the carriage of oil in double bottoms if additional tanker tonnage could not be supplied by America. The Fourth Sea Lord of the British Admiralty explained that it was impossible for the Allied Navies to contemplate such a reduction of the oil fuel reserve as would result from the discontinuance without compensation of the use of double bottoms. Mr. L. I. Thomas stated that information just received from America indicated that further tanker tonnage had been allotted to the American Military and Naval Services, and that this should, in his opinion, tend to reduce the use of double bottoms in the period October to December.

It was pointed out that the use of double bottoms had a direct immediate bearing on the supply programme of the American Army, and the Council again recorded their strong opinion as to the importance of discontinuing their use.

4. *Association of other Allies with the Council.*—The memorandum printed as Appendix 50 (page 206), was considered, and it was decided to invite the Belgian, Brazilian, Portuguese, and Greek Governments to nominate a liaison officer to keep in touch with the Executive of the Council.

5. *Transport of Italian Recruits from America.*—The memorandum printed as Appendix 51 (page 206), was considered. The Council approved the recommendation of the Executive that the transport of the Italian troops from the United States should be considered and dealt with on international lines, drawing, when necessary, from the Allied pool, the Italian boats remaining of course in the pool with the addition of two further vessels.

6. *Conveyance of Horses from the Argentine to France.*—This subject was brought forward by M. Tardieu, and was referred to the Executive.

7. *Appointment of a Freight Committee of the Munitions Council.*—M. Loucheur announced that it had been decided to appoint a Freight Committee to sit in London, consisting of Mr. W. T. Layton (Chairman), Captain Pilliard, Lieut. Farina, and a representative of the United States to be nominated.

8. *Provisional Statement as to Import Position.*—A statement was presented.

9. *Formation of a Raw Materials Council.*—This subject was raised by Signor Crespi, and was referred to the Executive for report before or at the next meeting of the Council.

10. *Division of responsibility among the Allies for the execution of Programmes.*—The Executive reported that in the execution of programmes for which they are responsible they proposed to work on the principle of arranging with each country to accept a definite responsibility for carrying out a specified part of the programme in its own vessels. This principle was accepted by the Council.

11. *Date and Place of next Meeting.*—It was provisionally decided to hold the next meeting at Rome about the middle of November.

SCHEDULE OF APPENDICES.

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APPENDIX 45.

Statistical Estimate of Importing Capacity of Tonnage in the Cereal Year 1918-19.

The statistical representatives of the national sections of the Allied Maritime Transport Council, in co-operation with the statistical officers of the Council, have carefully considered the tonnage likely to be available for importing into Italy, France, and the United Kingdom during the cereal year 1918-1919, and have unanimously agreed that the total sea-borne imports of these countries in this period may be fairly estimated at 70,000,000 tons weight, exclusive of oil carried in tankers; or 71,500,000 tons if military oats shipped direct to armies on foreign soil, although not technically imports, be included.*

This total includes allowances for (a) 25,200,000 tons to cover the imports of coal into France and Italy; and (b) 7,500,000 tons of ore, 3,500,000 tons of timber and paper-making material largely from Scandinavia and the Bay, 1,250,000 tons of sundry foodstuffs, and 500,000 tons of sundry raw materials from various sources, all of which come mainly as back-haul cargo on routes where outward-bound cargo (chiefly coal) determines the amount of tonnage employed, or as a result of agreements with neutrals, &c. Any reduction in the coal imports would permit of only a comparatively small increase in imports of other goods, and would tend to involve a reduction in the import of ore. Reduction in the imports of the other items mentioned would not release appreciable tonnage for other imports.

Excluding these special classes, the imports of goods for which shipping is more or less interchangeable may be estimated at 33½ million tons, including all military oats.

The estimate is based on past experience with appropriate allowance for such changes in conditions as may affect the problem. To avoid misunderstanding it may, however, be mentioned that *inter alia* it has been assumed—

- (1) That the present tonnage assistance by America to the European Allies be continued but not increased.
- (2) That the services rendered by tonnage under the control of Italy, France, and the United Kingdom to America, Switzerland, and Belgium be continued but not increased.
- (3) That coal be supplied to France according to the programme for the cereal year, and to Italy as in the past four months.

The estimate given is naturally subject to revision as more complete data become available, and in particular as fuller estimates of sources of imports for the cereal year 1918-19 are received from the Programme Committees.

SEITERT.
BREZZOLESI.

JAMES A. FIELD.
W. PALIN ELDERTON.
J. S. DAVIS.

Lancaster House,
17 September 1918.

* Or 72,500,000, including 1,000,000 tons of foodstuffs, other than military oats, included in the Food Programme which are shipped direct to forces abroad.

APPENDIX 46.

Short Report with special reference to Supply Programme for American Troops.

The Council must consider at its meeting on September 30th the main policy which is to govern the allocation of tonnage in the cereal year 1918-19. This will involve—

1. The consideration of the American Army Programme.
2. The consideration of the Imports of the European Allies.

As will appear, these two must be considered together.

America, Great Britain, France, and Italy, at the Paris Conference of December 1917, accepted the principle of co-operating in order to make the most economical use of all Allied tonnage, and agreed so to allot this tonnage as to add most to the general war effort, and so to adjust programmes of requirements as to bring them within the carrying powers of the available tonnage. The Allied Maritime Transport Council was formed to aid in achieving these objects and specifically to restrict importation with a view to liberating the greatest amount of tonnage possible for American troops

I.—TONNAGE AVAILABLE FOR IMPORTS INTO GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE AND ITALY.

The experts of the Council representing all four countries have arrived at a unanimous estimate of the carrying power of the available tonnage of Great Britain, France, and Italy (*see* Appendix 30). The substance of the estimate is that the total imports (excluding oil fuel) which may be brought into the three European Allied countries, if no further assistance is given by the European Allies to the American Army movement, and no further assistance is given by American ships to the European Allies, amounts to 70·5 million tons, or including military oats and military food sent direct to forces abroad—

$$72\cdot5 \text{ million tons } \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{for Coal} \quad - \quad - \\ \text{Raw Materials} \quad - \\ \text{Food} \quad - \quad - \\ \text{Munitions} \quad - \end{array} \right\} \text{ for European Allies.}$$

After eliminating requirements of coal, there is left for imports into the three European Allied countries :—

$$47\cdot3 \text{ million tons } \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{for Raw Materials.} \\ \text{Food.} \\ \text{Munitions.} \end{array} \right.$$

It is on the basis of this figure that the tonnage policy of the Allies must be determined.

II.—IMPORTS INTO GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE AND ITALY.

A. *Raw Materials*.—The Transport Council has, during its last session, decided that until further order actual recorded consumption of Raw Materials during the past year should be taken as setting the maximum limit for imports during the coming year.

This category includes timber and paper (which is mainly brought in non-transferable tonnage), wool, cotton, flax, hemp, jute, leather, tobacco and a large number of miscellaneous articles.

For these imports, the Allied programmes are not sufficiently complete to enable a final decision, but considering the extent to which these materials are used for military as well as civilian purposes, and the principle set forth above, it is necessary to allow $7\frac{1}{2}$ million tons, including some 4 million tons conveyed in non-transferable tonnage, for the imports of this category, thus leaving to be divided among Food and Munitions a total of 39·8 million tons.

B. *Food*.—The Transport Council at its last session recommended provisionally (and subject to re-consideration at the session of September 30th) that the year's food

import programme put forward by the Food Council at 23,500,000 tons should be reduced to 18,500,000.

As far as military oats are concerned, the old programme of importation is being continued pending further consideration by the Military authorities.

The provisional figure adopted for food (18·5) plus the imports of oats and certain sundries can be reckoned at 22 million tons, thus leaving 17·8* million tons for Munitions (including phosphate rock, railway material and lubricating oil).

C. Munitions.—While the full munitions programme is not yet before the Council it is understood that it will amount to approximately 22 million tons, leaving a deficit on programmes of imports, some of them such as food already so reduced that the Allied countries claim that they cannot meet their absolutely essential needs, of a little over

4,000,000 tons.

It has not yet been ascertained to what extent the above estimate allows for the provision of artillery and ammunition to the American Armies.

III.—AMERICAN ARMY SUPPLY PROGRAMME.

The American Military Programme of 80 Divisions in France by July 1919 recommended by the Supreme War Council creates a serious supply problem. Secretary Baker and General Hines have produced an estimate that the American Government requires a supplement to their own tonnage amounting to 1,200,000 tons from August 1918, reducing month by month to 200,000 tons in February 1919 and then ending.

Expressed in terms of imports into the European countries, the demand put forward by America represents the transport of an extra 2,000,000 tons, involving the further reduction of Allied imports by that amount, but it is not yet known how far the arrangements now being made in Paris to supply artillery and ammunition from France and Great Britain to the American Armies will affect the above estimate.

This estimate allows for the absorption of all American new building until March in the army service, and for the withdrawal for the same service of considerable tonnage now in other American services.

IV.—The difficulties which therefore must be met are—

- (a) an immediate American deficit; and
- (b) an Allied deficit for the whole cereal year which develops to its worst point in the later part of that year.

The solution of these two problems, if dealt with independently, would be impossible, but their association makes it possible for the European Allies and America to hope by joining resources to surmount them.

By meeting the immediate American needs, the Allies will inevitably reduce food imports from America and will throw the burden of their deficit on to the later part of the cereal year.

After her immediate deficit has been met by Allied contribution, America (by comparison with the European Allies) should have available tonnage, as shown by the estimate presented by Secretary Baker and General Hines, which can be utilised to meet the accumulated European deficit and to supply food and commodities which the Allies need. It is only because of their confidence in the American position that the Allies can make their contribution now.

In these circumstances, it is clearly necessary that America, like the European Allies, should put into full execution the Agreement of the Paris Conference, and this means in practice that—

- (a) America should with the European Allies table her programmes of Imports for joint consideration by the Allied Programme Committees and her tonnage for similar joint consideration by the Allied Maritime Transport Council, and enable her representatives on these bodies to consider adjustments in the programmes of her imports and the allocation of her tonnage.

* See footnote on p. 200.

(b) That in order to secure (1) in the immediate future additional tonnage for the American Army Supply Service, and (2) later to meet the accumulated European deficit and to supply commodities vitally needed by any one of the four countries, America, like the European Allies, should be guided in the arrangement of her Import Services and the disposition of her tonnage by the information and recommendations of the Programme Committees and the Transport Council, with the definite intention of utilising this Allied Machinery in order to achieve the objects unanimously agreed on by the Paris Conference, viz. : —

- (1) To make the most economical use of tonnage under the control of all the Allies,
- (2) To allot that tonnage as between the different needs of the Allies in such a way as to add most to the general War effort, and
- (3) To adjust the programmes of requirements of the different Allies in such a way as to bring them within the scope of the possible carrying power of the tonnage available.

These resolutions are intended to be read with and interpreted in the light of the fuller statement of the working principles of the Allied Machinery printed below.

V. If these principles are accepted, we recommend the following further resolutions :—

1. That the Council should not recommend at this moment any reduction in the embarkation of American soldiers in spite of the grave condition of the import programmes as indicated above, but should be prepared to recommend such a reduction, if necessary, in the embarkations of next year in order to meet any crisis that may arise in the imports of food or other supplies at the time.

2. That in view of the severe sacrifices that must in any event be entailed if the American military programme is continued a full statement of the position should be issued in the name of the Council and through the respective Governments to the public of the four countries, this statement emphasising the fact that it is the supreme importance of increasing the Allied forces in France which is the reason for the sacrifices asked for, and that these sacrifices are likely to be required only during the winter and spring, the supply position being thereafter in all probability greatly improved.

3. That the Council, having before it the following provisional allocations of tonnage for arrival from September to December, inclusive, viz. :—

Food, including Military Oats, 7 million tons,
Munitions and Raw Materials, 9 million tons,

recommends that approximately 500,000 tons be diverted from the above allocation for the American Army programme for October, November, and December, including the 200,000 tons already arranged, but in addition to any further space that can be provided by the release of double bottoms.

4. That the Council arrange to meet in about six weeks to consider a further report on the American Army Programme in connection with the detailed reports of the Programme Committees and the Munitions Council.

NOTE.—This abbreviated report should be read in conjunction with the explanations given in the fuller Memorandum printed as Appendix 47 (pages 196–202). It was thought desirable, however, to summarise in a short document the main features of the position with special reference to the American problem.

27th September 1918.

Fuller STATEMENT of Working Principles of ALLIED MACHINERY.

The European Allies desire to make it clear that the reduction in their tonnage threatens them with the definite prospect of a shortage of munition supplies, and of food in the latter part of the cereal year. This shortage will be rendered more serious and will be felt earlier if tonnage is now allotted by them for the American Army service. In practice tonnage can now only be so allotted by leaving behind breadstuffs in America, and a shortage of bread, apart from sufficient assistance by

America later, appears inevitable. The European Allies therefore cannot take the responsibility of diverting tonnage from food supplies without adequate assurance for the future. At the same time, looking at the Allied position as a whole, it appears right that during the winter (when the recent harvests are still in hand) a preference should be given in the allocation of tonnage to the conveyance of army supplies and munitions which must be brought in now if they are to help the fighting of the early summer. It follows that a similar preference must, as and when it proves necessary, be given later in the year to food. The European Allies are anxious to consider America's problem as their own on the basis of full and equal partnership, and on this basis are now allotting tonnage for the American Army service. This can only safely be done if America will similarly identify herself with the European Allies and regard their problem also as her own. This means in practice identifying herself with the Allied machinery of the Allied Maritime Transport Council and the associated Allied bodies with the definite intention of having her programmes of imports and her services requiring tonnage tabled for joint Allied consideration with those of France, Italy, and Great Britain, and of making her tonnage with that of the three European Allies available to meet the most important needs of any of the four countries.

The executive control of her ships would of course be reserved for America as for the other countries. But what is desired is that America, like Great Britain, should (subject to the reservation of that ultimate right) co-operate in the general Allied machinery with the definite intention of making her ships, like the others, available where it is agreed that the need is from time to time the greatest.

In order that the Allied co-operation may be effective it is necessary that the representatives of the several countries on the different Programme Committees should—

- (a) produce their full programmes ;
- (b) be fully informed of their Governments' policy and be able to discuss the programme in relation to the other programmes, and within reasonable limits assigned by their Governments, assent to modifications of the programme ;
- (c) that so far as any Government feel bound to take a different view as to their own requirements in relation to those of the other Allies, they should normally express that dissent through their representatives on the Committees and not, except in extreme cases, by dissenting later from a recommendation of the Committee to which their representatives had assented ;
- (d) that in any case each Government should only make their final decision after careful consideration of the report of the Programme Committees and of their representatives on them ; and
- (e) that, subject to such dissent and to the ultimate executive power over their own ships, each country should definitely declare their intention of arranging the allocation of their vessels in accordance with the general programmes of the four countries as a whole, as and so far as they may be agreed by the different representatives.

The European Allies feel that from every point of view the full acceptance of such a principle and method of co-operation by America, based upon the needs of the four countries as they develop, is a more satisfactory assurance for the future than an arrangement in the nature of a bargain based upon the extent of the assistance now given. They feel bound, however, in reviewing the ensuing cereal year as a whole, to state that they have not been able to effect a reduction in their own programmes below the total importations which can be conveyed on present estimates in the tonnage now under their control. That is, in arranging the immediate allocation of tonnage to America or the provision of such commodities as artillery and munitions which necessitate importation, the European Allies are doing so in the belief that the application of the above principles will be likely to result in approximately as great an allocation of tonnage assistance to Europe later in the cereal year. Later it is of course hoped that the prospective improvement in the general Allied tonnage position, resulting from the large increase in American building, will, under the operation of the above principles, enable the Allied supplies generally to be raised above the dangerous level to which they must necessarily be kept down for the present.

APPENDIX 47.

Allocation of Tonnage in the Cereal Year 1918-19.

I.—GENERAL NOTE.

The Council will require to consider at the session commencing on September 30th the main policy which is to govern the allocation of tonnage in the Cereal Year 1918-19. This will involve the consideration of—

- (a) The programme for the American Army.
- (b) Food Imports.
- (c) Munitions Imports.
- (d) Imports of Raw Materials, &c.

II.—STATISTICAL ESTIMATE OF CARRYING CAPACITY.

The policy to be adopted in determining the limits of the different programmes of importations must necessarily be based upon the best possible estimate of the carrying power of the available tonnage.

The Statistical Departments of the four countries associated with the Allied Maritime Transport Council have been engaged in a careful investigation, and have agreed upon an estimate of the position.

Actual experience may always, of course, be either better or worse than any estimate however carefully made. An estimate of this kind results from the consideration of a vast number of complex factors on any one of which any single person may take a more or less favourable view, but such factors tend to cancel out.

The estimate, as presented, represents the unanimous view of the professional experts of all the four countries, and as such the Executive consider that it must clearly be accepted as the best, and, indeed, only possible, basis on which to consider policy. It is necessary to emphasise the character of the estimate, and the international authority behind it, because of the nature of the situation which it discloses. The substance of the estimate may be briefly summarised as follows:—

After allowing for the requirements of the Fleets and of the several existing military expeditions, the maintenance of bunker supplies, the minimum requirements of Colonies, such definite obligations as Belgian Relief, the conveyance of coal to Norway in return for tonnage (which must be regarded at least in the first instance as irreducible demands upon shipping), it is estimated that the total imports (excluding mineral oils other than lubricating oil, but including military oats and military food shipped direct to the forces) which may be brought into the three European Allied countries (on the assumption that the allocation of tonnage as between America and the European Allies remains as at present), amounts to—

$$72\cdot5 \text{ million tons } \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{For Coal} \\ \text{,, Raw Materials} \\ \text{,, Food} \\ \text{,, Munitions} \end{array} \right\} \text{ for the three European Allies,}$$

including 25·2 million tons of coal for France and Italy, certain commodities mainly conveyed in tonnage not transferable to other imports, viz., 3½ million tons of timber and paper and 7½ million tons of ore, 1¼ million tons of sundry foodstuffs, and ½ a million tons of sundry raw materials.

From the point of view of the Transport Council the problem can be conveniently narrowed by the immediate exclusion of coal on the basis of accepting the above figures. The Council has agreed that the supply of coal to Italy cannot be reduced below the minimum figure of 600,000 tons a month, and any variation in the French provisional figure would have a comparatively small effect on other imports. This leaves—

$$47\cdot3 \text{ million tons } \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{For Raw Materials} \\ \text{,, Food} \\ \text{,, Munitions} \end{array} \right\} \text{ for the three European Allies,}$$

including military oats and the above-named non-transferable imports. It is on the basis of this figure that policy requires to be determined.

III.—NOTE ON FUTURE TONNAGE POSITION.

On the best view that can be formed the whole Allied tonnage position will be very substantially improved by the summer of 1919. By that date America's building on the estimate of Secretary Baker and General Hines should amount to twice the present rate and be still increasing. This factor is of the first importance in considering the policy of allocation throughout this cereal year, as it should enable stocks of all kinds to be run down to a point which would otherwise be unjustifiable.

IV.—RAW MATERIALS.

It is neither practicable nor necessary for the Council to consider in detail at this session the Import Programmes of the different raw materials. The programmes and relevant information are not sufficiently complete for the purpose. Moreover the possible variation in the imports is not so great as to affect very substantially the major decisions as to allocation between Food, Munitions, and American Supplies. $3\frac{1}{2}$ million tons of timber and paper and half a million tons of sundry raw materials may be at once set aside because, as indicated in the statistical estimate, they are brought in tonnage not transferable to other imports. The other main commodities under this category are Wool, Cotton, Flax, Hemp and Jute, Leather, and Tobacco. The Council at the last session decided that until further order actual recorded consumption of raw materials during the past year should be taken as setting the maximum limit for imports for the ensuing year. No substantial reduction upon the imports implied by this principle is practicable. In view of the extent to which the raw materials in question are used for military as well as civilian purposes at least a further $3\frac{1}{2}$ million tons (to include various miscellaneous commodities) must be allowed, making the total of this category 7·5. In any case the variation from this figure would not be of the first importance.

This would leave—

39·8 million tons $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{For Food} \\ \text{,, Munitions} \end{array} \right\}$ for the three European Allies.

V.—FOOD IMPORTS.

The general position remains as stated in the memorandum circulated to the Council at the last session (Appendix 38, pages 160–168 of the Minutes) which the Executive ask to be read in conjunction with this memorandum. The Council decided that the programme was to be commenced on the purely provisional basis of the quantities covered by the priority figures (18·5 million tons excluding military oats), on the understanding that the figures would be reconsidered as soon as full information was available. As far as military oats are concerned, the old programme of importation was to continue until the matter has been further considered.

No information of importance has been received affecting the amount of the harvests, nor has the Food Council concluded its investigation into the question of military oats.

The Executive, however, desire to call attention to the following main facts of the position :—

- (a) The total importations in the past year, including military oats, amounted to $22\frac{1}{2}$ million tons, or $20\frac{1}{4}$ million tons excluding military oats.
- (b) The provisional estimates of cereal harvests give increases amounting to 1,912,000 for the three countries, though in the case of the United Kingdom it was indicated that there had been a comparative failure in other crops.
- (c) In one important respect the food position is more favourable than last year. At the critical period of that year there was a shortage of wheat in North America. This year there will be a large exportable surplus ready for immediate shipment if emergency arises, and a very large volume of tonnage in the Atlantic capable of being rapidly used for cereal transport in case of absolute necessity.
- (d) The general principle adopted by the Council has been that importations this year should not be more than at the most to enable consumption to be on the same scale as during the past year.

If it proved possible to limit all articles in the food programme, including military oats, such oilseeds, &c., as are used for other than food purposes, plus any foodstuffs

as come in without regulation and outside the programme to, say, 22 million tons, this would leave—

17·8* million tons { both European munitions and
any supplied by Europe to America.

VI.—MUNITION IMPORTS.

The postponement of the Munitions Council until 28th September has unfortunately prevented the preparation by the munitions authorities, and consideration by the Transport Executive, of the full munitions programme, and it is not possible, therefore, to state how serious the deficit in that programme will be. It is, however, understood that the total programme (including phosphate rock and provision for the supply to the American forces of French and British artillery and ammunition) will amount to about 22 million tons.

This leaves a provisional deficit of—

4·2 million tons { allowing for provision of artillery
and munitions to America but not for
further direct allocation of tonnage.

VII.—SUPPLY PROGRAMME FOR AMERICAN ARMY.

The enlarged American troop movement recommended by the Supreme War Council and approved by the President of the United States would require for supply tonnage (according to estimates submitted by Secretary Baker and General Hines) a supplement to American tonnage amounting to 1,200,000 tons from August 1918, reducing month by month to 200,000 tons in February 1919, and then ending.

This amount of tonnage would transport about 2,000,000 tons d.w. of cargo, and its allocation to the supply programme of the American army would, therefore, involve a further reduction of about that quantity of imports to the European Allies.

The estimate is based upon—

- (a) An allowance of 30 lbs. a day per man of stores from the United States, and
- (b) 250,000 tons a month in addition for constructional material.

It allows for the absorption of American new building in the Army Programme, and also for the withdrawal of a considerable amount of tonnage for the same purpose from other American services.

The Executive would desire to make the following observations:—

- (a) The 30 lbs. a day per man is necessarily a rough estimate. It is in addition to commodities, *e.g.*, coal, forage, or timber obtained from the United Kingdom or France.
- (b) On the other hand no allowance appears to have been definitely calculated for the conveyance of horses, which is an important factor.
- (c) It is observed that the calculations allowed for bunkering for the round voyage in America. This, though now necessary in view of the reduced production of coal in the United Kingdom, means a great waste of cargo-carrying capacity.
- (d) While the estimate is incomplete for the above reasons the net conclusion does not appear to give an excessive estimate of the requirements of the American Army raised to 80 Divisions by July 1919.
- (e) It is understood that the Munitions Council is now considering large supplies of artillery of France and Britain to America. These arrangements, if concluded, would increase the import requirements of France and Great Britain and correspondingly relieve the requirements of America for transport from the U.S.A.

For the above reasons the Executive do not consider that it is possible to deal with the Programme as a whole, but that consideration must be confined to the immediate future.

It does, however, appear clear that whatever be the case for a further period the American Government have a serious need for more tonnage than is now at their disposal during the next few months, especially during October and November.

* See footnote on p. 200.

- (f) Arrangements have been made to provide Allied tonnage to the extent of 200,000 tons for loading in September and October with a further increase up to, say, 50,000 tons if the allocation of further tankers enables the use of double bottoms for oil fuel to be discontinued. It should be noted that the provision of this tonnage, unless replaced within the cereal year, would diminish *pro tanto* the amount of importation allowed for in the earlier part of this memorandum.
- (g) The estimate which shows a deficit of American tonnage to the end of February shows a surplus from March onwards which amounts to over three-quarters of a million tons by July and should increase continually afterwards.
- (h) It is impossible to state the exact way in which Allied tonnage should be distributed so as to give maximum assistance to the war efforts between American Army Supplies, American Import Services, European Army Supplies and European Import Services except after a detailed examination of each service one by one by the Allies as a whole. This, of course, is precisely the purpose for which the Allied Maritime Transport Council and the associated Allied machinery, and the Food Council and Munitions Council, and the Programme Committees were formed.

VIII.—RECOMMENDATIONS.

In view of the general position indicated above, the Executive make the following recommendations :—

Munitions in Winter : Food afterwards.

(1) *That during the later Autumn and Winter a general preference shall be given to the transport of munitions and Army supplies as compared with food.*

(2) *That, when necessary, but as late as possible without running undue risk of actual shortage of food, a similar preference shall be given to the transport of food in the spring or early summer.*

These recommendations are made in view of the fact that, during the winter, stocks will be relatively high, as the harvests will not have been consumed, whereas shipments of munitions and Army supplies are required at that period, in order to assist the fighting in the spring and summer.

It is recognised that the extent to which the suggested policy can be applied will be limited by a number of traffic and practical considerations ; *e.g.*, the congestion that might arise from stoppage of wheat exports from U.S.A. and the importance of using the St Lawrence Ports while they are still open.

Reduction of Stocks.

(3) *That in view of the prospect of substantial improvement in the whole Allied tonnage position by next summer, and in order to avoid reducing the shipment of essential commodities required for actual consumption during the year up to August (particularly Munitions), all Supply Departments should be asked to effect a reduction of stocks until they approximate, towards the end of August, to the quantities required for actual distribution.*

The most important commodities to which this principle will apply are nitrates, cereals, sugar, and oil seeds. Its application should be easier because of—

- (a) The increasing production of nitrates in France and the United Kingdom, and
- (b) The existence of a large stock of wheat in the near source of North America ready for immediate export if a crisis occurs, and a great volume of tonnage in the North Atlantic capable of being used if necessary for emergency shipments, the position in 1918 being in these respects much more favourable than last year, and enabling a reduction of stocks in Europe to be made with much less risk.

In pursuing this policy the Supply Departments can do so with the prospect of—

- (a) Having emergency shipments of cereals in the spring if necessary, even at the cost of reduced embarkation of American troops at that date.
- (b) Increased shipments of sugar in the summer and autumn and thereafter adequate shipments of cereals.

Raw Materials.

(4) *That the principle provisionally approved at the last session for raw materials, viz., that actual recorded consumption of last year should be taken as setting the maximum limit for programmes for the ensuing year, should continue to be applied.*

Food.

(5) *That 18·5 million tons of importations of all articles included in the Food Programme, except Military oats, should be confirmed as the figure for the year.*

In recommending this figure the Executive have before them from the Food Council the definite statement of the British Representatives that, on their present estimates, which allow for a substantial increase in the slaughtering of cattle and pigs and for the restriction of imported foodstuffs to the needs of the dairyherds, the present British proportion of the 18·5, viz., 10·5, will not prove a possible figure.

Recognising the possibility that the policy recommended (viz., working on the basis of 18·5 and shipping less than the proportion of that quantity during the earlier months) may result in a really serious food position later in the cereal year, the Executive recommend—

(6) *That if the food position at the end of the winter or later shows such a course to be necessary in order to avoid food shortage, food shipments shall have priority in excess of the proportion due on the 18·5 basis at the expense of tonnage allotted to other services.*

(7) *That the importation of military oats should still be continued provisionally on the basis of the old programme pending a full report of the whole situation.*

(8) *That for the purpose of considering the tonnage available for other services the total importations of food (and all other articles included in the Food Programme), including all miscellaneous foodstuffs and military oats, should be provisionally estimated at 22 million tons.*

Munitions.]

(9) *That in estimating what is available for the European Munitions imports it should be provisionally assumed that any tonnage assistance rendered to America, whether by the allocation of ships or the supply of artillery, will be returned within the cereal year, thus leaving 17·8* million tons for European munitions, including ore, pyrites, phosphate rock, railway material, and lubricating oil, but that it should be recognised that this requires reconsideration after examination of the munitions programme, and in particular of the arrangements there proposed for supplies to the American forces.*

Coal.

(10) *That the strongest recommendations should be made to the British Government as to the immense importance to the entire Allied supply position of increasing the production of coal.*

It should be pointed out that the importation of coal from America, which has been suggested for the American Army in France, and even its importation in the form of double bunkering of vessels, is extremely wasteful. The conveyance of 5,000 tons of coal from America involves the shutting out of 5,000 tons of other stores and (supply tonnage being the limiting factor to the American Military Programme) this involves the loss of 1,000 American soldiers in France. As against this, 5,000 tons of coal can be produced in a year by 20 men. Some allowance must, of course, be made for the tonnage required for conveyance of coal from the United Kingdom to France, but the advantage of supplying coal from the United Kingdom remains very great.

American Army Supply.

(11) *That the action taken in the allocation of 200,000 tons of shipping (with increases to 250,000 tons if double-bottom shipments are discontinued) in September and October be confirmed, and that the Executive be instructed to endeavour to arrange to increase the allocation to a total of about 500,000 tons up to the end of the year in addition to any space which can be made available by the release of double bottoms,*

* In view of later information from the Munitions Council showing that the programme of importations of nitrates from the distant source of Chile is to be reduced, it is considered that the figure 17·8 can be raised to 18.

American Co-operation.

(12) *That these arrangements be subject to adequate assurances from America as to co-operation with the Allies through the Allied Maritime Transport Council, as indicated in Appendix 46 (pages 192-194).*

The European Allies desire to make it clear that the reduction in their tonnage threatens them with the definite prospect of a shortage of munition supplies, and of food in the latter part of the cereal year. The shortage will be rendered more serious and will be felt earlier if tonnage is now allotted by them for the American Army service. In practice tonnage can now only be so allotted by leaving behind breadstuffs in America, and a shortage of bread, apart from sufficient assistance by America later, appears inevitable. The European Allies therefore cannot take the responsibility of diverting tonnage from food supplies without adequate assurance for the future. At the same time, looking at the Allied position as a whole, it appears right that during the winter (when the recent harvests are still in hand) a preference should be given in the allocation of tonnage to the conveyance of army supplies and munitions which must be brought in now if they are to help the fighting of the early summer. It follows that a similar preference must, as and when it proves necessary, be given later in the year to food. The European Allies are anxious to consider America's problem as their own on the basis of full and equal partnership, and on this basis are now allotting tonnage for the American Army service. This can only safely be done if America will similarly identify herself with the European Allies and regard their problem also as her own. This means in practice identifying herself with the Allied machinery of the Allied Maritime Transport Council and the associated Allied bodies, with the definite intention of having her programmes of imports and her services requiring tonnage tabled for joint Allied consideration with those of France, Italy, and Great Britain, and of making her tonnage with that of the three European Allies available to meet the most important needs of any of the four countries.

The executive control of her ships would of course be reserved for America as for the other countries. But what is desired is that America, like Great Britain, should (subject to the reservation of that ultimate right) co-operate in the general Allied machinery with the definite intention of making her ships, like the others, available where it is agreed that the need is from time to time the greatest.

In order that the Allied co-operation may be effective it is necessary that the representatives of the several countries on the different Programme Committees should—

- (a) produce their full programmes ;
- (b) be fully informed of their Governments' policy and be able to discuss the programme in relation to the other programmes, and within reasonable limits assigned by their Governments, assent to modifications of the programme ;
- (c) that so far as any Government feel bound to take a different view as to their own requirements in relation to those of the other Allies, they should normally express that dissent through their representatives on the Committees and not, except in extreme cases, by dissenting later from a recommendation of the Committee to which their representatives had assented ;
- (d) that in any case each Government should only make their final decision after careful consideration of the report of the Programme Committees and of their representatives on them ; and
- (e) that, subject to such dissent and to the ultimate executive power over their own ships, each country should definitely declare their intention of arranging the allocation of their vessels in accordance with the general programmes of the four countries as a whole, as and so far as they may be agreed by the different representatives.

The European Allies feel that from every point of view the full acceptance of such a principle and method of co-operation by America, based upon the needs of the four countries as they develop, is a more satisfactory assurance for the future than an arrangement in the nature of a bargain based upon the extent of the assistance now given. They feel bound, however, in reviewing the ensuing cereal year as a whole, to state that they have not been able to effect a reduction in their own programmes below the total importations which can be conveyed on present

estimates in the tonnage now under their control. That is, in arranging the immediate allocation of tonnage to America or the provision of such commodities as artillery and munitions which necessitate importation, the European Allies are doing so in the belief that the application of the above principles will be likely to result in approximately as great an allocation of tonnage assistance to Europe later in the cereal year. Later it is of course hoped that the prospective improvement in the general Allied tonnage position, resulting from the large increase in American building, will, under the operation of the above principles, enable the Allied supplies generally to be raised above the dangerous level to which they must necessarily be kept down for the present.

American Trooping Programme.

(13) *That the Council should not recommend at this moment any reduction in the embarkation of American soldiers in spite of the grave conditions of the import programmes as indicated above, but should be prepared to recommend such a reduction, if necessary, in the embarkations of next year in order to meet any crisis that may arise in the imports of food or other supplies at the time.*

Public Statement of Position.

(14) *That in view of the severe sacrifices that must in any event be entailed if the American military programme is continued a full statement of the position should be issued in the name of the Council and through the respective Governments to the public of the four countries, this statement emphasising the fact that it is the supreme importance of increasing the Allied forces in France which is the reason for the sacrifices asked for, and that these sacrifices are likely to be required only during the winter and spring, the supply position being thereafter in all probability greatly improved (see Appendix 56, pages 223 to 228).*

In making the above recommendations the Executive realise that, if adopted, they will cause certain hardship to the consuming public, injury to many interests, and grave anxiety to controlling Departments. In view, however, of the supreme importance both of increasing the American Forces in France to the maximum number at the earliest possible date and of fully equipping these Forces so that they may attain the maximum fighting value in the summer of next year, they have not felt justified in recommending the only alternative course, viz., the reduction of the American Military Programme on account of the shortage of tonnage.

27th September 1918.

APPENDIX . 48.

Speech of the Hon. Newton D. Baker, United States Secretary of War, at the Meeting of the Allied Maritime Transport Council, October 1st, 1918.

The purpose of sending the 80-Division Programme of soldiers to France is, of course, to help win the war. The determination of the 80-Division Programme in the United States was made after a very prolonged study, in which we undertook to arrive at the maximum military effort which the United States could make within the time allowed, and it was determined by careful consideration that, if tonnage could be supplied, if certain arrangements could be made about artillery and munitions, the 80 Combatant Division Programme was a possible programme. And it was therefore adopted as the definite aim of the United States, subject to there being found the necessary tonnage and to arrangements being made as to the necessary artillery and munitions.

This Council, of course, is concerned only with the transportation end of that undertaking. I think it can be said, however, that arrangements are in course of making on the other limiting factors of that programme, of such a character as to

make it fairly likely, perhaps I may say certain, as far as human things can be certain, that the 80-Division Programme can be carried out if the transportation and cargo tonnage can be provided.

Now, of course, the United States realises that to get additional tonnage out of the available tonnage at the disposal of the European Allies imposes serious hardships, calls for new limitations on the supplies, and calls upon this Council, and those who are responsible for the diversion of these ships, to assume a very serious responsibility in the matter of invading the anticipatory use which would be made of this tonnage now against a shortage at the end of the cereal year.

So far as the position of the United States is concerned, it is, as I am informed, approximately this. The shipbuilding programme of the United States is going along well. The number of ships being turned out is increasing month by month. As we estimate the tonnage requirements of the American Army, by the latter part of February it will be possible to release most, if not all, of the additional tonnage now deemed necessary to be put in for the cargo support of the American Army. Unless some wholly unforeseen interruption of that building programme takes place, beginning at the month of March there will be shipping available, which may be called surplus in this sense, that it will be more than is needed for the tonnage support of the American Army, increased as it is scheduled to increase, to attain the 80-Division Programme within the time specified.

The question, therefore, comes : What arrangement will be equitable to be made with regard to the use of that surplus tonnage? and the first thought that occurred to my mind—and the first thought I am sure of most of those here—was that if we in fact borrowed tonnage from the European Allies for the support of our Army until March, then, with the available surplus tonnage, it would be wise for us to undertake to rebuild the invaded cereal supply, ton for ton, until it was entirely re-established according to the original estimates, and thus make good what we had temporarily borrowed. The more I have thought of that the more I am satisfied that that is a narrower view of the action of the United States in co-operating in this matter than I should feel justified in taking. I prefer to think of this as a cause in which we have put our soldiers and in which we ought not to hesitate to put our ships for the common good.

Therefore, the resolution as it is drawn here seems to me to be the correct solution of the whole problem. If it be decided that the American 80-Division Programme is a feasible programme, and can be carried out without putting in jeopardy the vital interests of any of the European Allies, then it ought to go forward and be carried out. As soon as American shipping is in excess of the requirements of the American Army, the surplus of that ought to be as available as the Allied shipping is now being made available for what may then seem to be the most important need of the United States and the European Allies.

The difficulties which have obtained heretofore I know very little about. I suspect that the width of the Atlantic is in part responsible for much of the hesitancy and uncertainty which has seemed to attend the getting of statistics and the getting of programmes from the United States. But I am entirely in accord with the views expressed by Lord Robert Cecil, that we ought to exhibit our import programmes in the Programme Committees, that we ought to be advised and informed by any counsel of those associated in the examination of those programmes, and, in the disposition of any shipping which the United States has under its control, it ought to be fully informed as to the needs of the Allies, surveyed and examined, as they would be, in a body of this sort where the one moving view of everybody is the best interest of the common cause at the moment. I think there will be no difficulty whatever in committing the American Government, and indeed I do commit the American Government to that view, that the United States will inform itself, by participation in the Programme Committees and in the deliberations of this body, as to what the needs are, and will, except in the exceptional cases which are enumerated in the resolution itself, be guided by the deliberations of this body in determining the disposition of its own shipping. This I say with this understanding of the case as stated. It is quite impossible, of course, for any nation to part with the control of its own shipping in the ultimate and last analysis. No one of the European Allies would, and the United States would not in like case, part with the ultimate right of determining an interest of its own to be vital, even though it seemed to this Conference not to be vital when compared with other needs.

That has not happened in the deliberations of this body heretofore, and it does not seem to me to be likely to happen, but a reservation of the ultimate right to the disposal of the ships designated by that nation seems to me to be a necessary reservation, and I am glad to see it is made on behalf of the other Allies, and I think it ought to be made by the United States.

I think this observation ought to be made, that the 80-Division Programme will go forward and is going forward now. The men are being carried and the cargoes of supplies are being sent. This body ought to be as foresighted as it can in regard to the 80-Division Programme, and if it is going to be necessary to cut that programme down the warning note should be sounded as soon as possible, and we should all know it as soon as possible. If it should turn out, for instance—I use these figures wholly as illustrative, and in order not to make them deceptive and still make them illustrative I make them, perhaps, absurd—that the maximum use of the tonnage available permits only of a 79-Division Programme, we ought to know that just as soon as possible, because the United States will have to regard as a vital use of its shipping the maintenance of whatever forces it has in France. That force will be 3,000 miles from home; it will have to be supplied and maintained, and its necessary and essential supply must always remain a vital need to the United States. So that if there is to be any later diversion of shipping from the support of the American Army we ought to try to foresee it as soon as possible, and not to bring up a situation in which the United States would be obliged to regard the actual maintenance and essential supply of its Army as a need too vital to admit of comparison with any other need that might be presented.

I notice with pleasure that the right is reserved here to this Council by these Resolutions at a later time, if it should seem necessary, to suggest or recommend a modification of the 80-Division Programme. I think it is a better understanding for us to proceed upon than it would be for us, just out of hand, to agree on the 80-Division Programme, and not reserve the right of future examination. The thing ought to lie in constant examination and constant counsel.

APPENDIX 49.

Report of Allied Maritime Transport Executive as to Amount of Munitions which can be Imported for the European Allies in the next Six Months.

The Executive had before them the request of the Munitions Council that:—

In the six months, October to March inclusive, the importations (arrivals (of munitions in the three European countries should be 10,000,000 tons.

The Executive understand that the Munitions Council would propose that these should be divided approximately as follows:—

Ore, Pyrites, and Phosphate Rock	-	3,855,000
North American (mainly iron and steel), about	-	4,500,000
Nitrates	- - - - -	300,000
Other Articles, about	- - - - -	1,306,000

In considering this proposal the Executive had to take the following factors into account:—

1. It was estimated that in view of the reduction in Nitrates from the distant source of Chili, the figure for food and munitions for the year could be taken at 40,000,000 tons, leaving 18,000,000 tons for munitions, on the assumption that food and military oats could be kept within 22,000,000 tons.

It was on the basis of this figure that a division of 10,000,000 tons for food and 10,000,000 tons for munitions had been suggested in the next six months, leaving 12,000,000 tons for food and 8,000,000 tons for munitions in the other six months.

2. The next six months, however, being winter months, are the worst months for imports, and it would be too optimistic to assume that half the total for the year could be brought in in that period. It is estimated by the professional advisers that only 19,000,000 tons could be brought in (without allowing for the further considerations in the following paragraphs).

3. The programme would involve an immense additional importation into France and Italy as compared with Great Britain. This involves a longer steaming distance for the vessels and to that extent reduces importing capacity.

The following figures show the extent of the change :—

	Importation proposed for Six Months.	Half of Last Year's Importations (approx.).
France - - - - -	3,531,000	2,377,000
Italy - - - - -	1,160,000	529,000
Great Britain	5,279,000	5,950,000

4. Any further allocation of tonnage to the American Army supply in the six months in question would necessarily also reduce the total imports which can be conveyed.

5. The extent to which, on purely practical shipping considerations, heavy material such as iron and steel, which form the bulk of the munitions from America, can be substituted for food, &c., is very restricted. Vessels cannot properly take more than a certain proportion of heavy material, and this consideration is stronger when troops are being carried on board, as a vessel with troops which is loaded with very heavy material would be in a "tender" and dangerous condition, particularly during the winter months.

6. The immense increase which the programme contemplates in shipments to France and Italy clearly involves a serious port problem. The Italian ports never have any large margin for extra importations, and in the case of French ports there is the special difficulty that the increased American Army supplies are being sent in in the same period and the working of the ports is in any case reduced during the winter months.

7. It is believed that the importations of military oats cannot in fact be kept within the limits of the old programme, and that the figure for the four months September–December 1918 will have to be raised from 750,000 tons to about 900,000–1,000,000 tons.

These considerations are being submitted to the Council in order to illustrate the impracticability of determining with any real accuracy the total quantity of probable munitions which can be imported during the next six months.

Having regard to—

(a) these serious factors of uncertainty, which it has been impossible to measure with any precision in the few hours allowed, and

(b) to the fact that the fixing of any absolute figure would necessarily prejudice the provision of tonnage for the American supply service programme,

it is submitted that the Council should confine its instructions to the Executive to working, as far as is found practicable in the next six months, towards importations of munitions in priority over food, while in the immediate future giving special priority in loading to any classes of munitions importations which the Munitions Council regard as especially urgent and important.

2nd October 1918.

APPENDIX 50.

Association of other Allies with the Allied Maritime Transport Council.

Requests have been made by the Governments of Portugal, Brazil and Belgium to be represented on the Allied Maritime Transport Council.

When the Council was created direct representation was limited to the four main associated Powers, partly because they had the greatest direct interest, and partly because it was feared that a larger Council might prove unwieldy.

At the last meeting of the Council it was decided to invite Japan to similar representation in view of her importance as a maritime Power.

The inclusion of representatives of four further Powers, who might not be at all directly interested in a large proportion of the questions discussed by the Council, is not perhaps desirable. At the same time, with the development of the Council's work and organisation it is felt that there will be advantages if opportunities are afforded to Portugal, Brazil, Belgium and Greece to be in close touch with the various Allied shipping organisations. The result of such organisation would lead to closer co-ordination, and it is recommended that steps should be taken to invite each of these Governments to appoint a liaison officer to keep in touch with the Council's Executive.

September 25th 1918.

APPENDIX 51.

Transport of Italian Recruits from America.

1. As a result of the Military Convention recently signed between the United States and Italy, about 400,000 Italian citizens residing in the United States are likely to return to Italy to join the colours. Although a certain proportion of these may avail themselves of the option of joining the American Army, there will certainly remain a very considerable number of men to be repatriated.

The Italian Government do not possess sufficient passenger tonnage for the purpose. The few Italian liners available for the transport of troops in the North Atlantic have already been handed over to the British Government for the conveyance of American soldiers to France. The Italian Government was also ready to hand over two further vessels of the same type—the "Taormina" and the "Regina D'Italia"—for the purpose, when the new circumstance referred to above arose.

2. To meet the circumstances, the following alternatives appear to be possible:—

- (a) That the Italian Government should not hand over the two steamers in question, and that they should get back (as and when the necessity arises) also the boats which they have handed over to the United States Government;
- (b) That the transport of the Italian troops from the U.S.A. should be considered and dealt with on international lines, drawing, when necessary, from the Allied pool; the Italian boats remaining, of course, in the pool, with the addition of the two vessels mentioned above.

It would appear that the second course suggested might, from many points of view, prove more desirable. It should be understood, of course, that the transport of Italian recruits should be effected by the shortest sea route.

28th September 1918.

ALLIED MARITIME TRANSPORT COUNCIL.

Report of Executive, September 16th to October 15th, 1918.

The Allied Maritime Transport Executive issue the following report of action taken from September 16th to October 15th.

Lancaster House.

J. A. SALTER.

Summary and Index of Report.

General Tonnage Position. (Paragraph 1.)

In the first nine months of this year the losses of the three European Allies exceeded building by 1,133,000 tons deadweight, while American building exceeded American losses by 1,845,000 deadweight. This excess in American building over losses, however, is much less than what is required to meet the increased requirements of the American Army, and it has been necessary to allot 200,000 tons at the expense of European imports to the American supply programme for October loading. The European Allies have about 2 million tons deadweight less for their own services than a year ago.

Italian Coal. (Paragraph 2.)

	Tons.
Programme - - - - -	600,000
Supply, 15th September to 14th October -	562,935
Average 7 months - - - - -	589,076

French Coal. (Paragraph 3.)

Provisional Programme - - - - -	1,740,000
Supply, September - - - - -	1,604,260
Average 6 months - - - - -	1,462,066

Belgian Relief. (Paragraph 4.)

Belgian Relief arrangements are working satisfactorily, and it is anticipated that the tonnage available should meet present requirements.

Special Allocations among Allies. (Paragraph 5.)

(a) During September, 228,088 American soldiers were embarked, 106,513 in American and French vessels, 5,795 in Italian vessels, and 115,780 in British vessels.

Allocations of British Vessels to Allies.

(b) 200,000 tons have been allocated for the American Army Supply Service for October loading.

(c) Liner Service: U.S.A./France. October loading 52,000 tons (*i.e.*, after transferring 50,000 tons to the American Army Supply Programme). Provisional November loading, 50,000 Tons.

(d) Liner Services: U.S.A./Italy. October loading 101,427 tons, November 29,198 tons.

(e) *Sugar*.—20,693 tons have been diverted to France.

(f) *Cereals*.—In September 218,000 tons have been diverted to France, and 133,000 tons to Italy.

(g) *Wagons*.—5,782 railway wagons have now been despatched from the United Kingdom to France.

Allocation, Neutral Tonnage. (Paragraph 6.)

(a) A total deadweight tonnage of 498,496 is now operating in the Pool.

(b) Arrangements have been concluded with reference to Danish vessels under charter to the Italian Government.

Other Tonnage Arrangements (Paragraph 7.)

(a) A scheme is under consideration for the more economical use of cargo space on vessels engaged on the American Army Supply Programme. The combination of light American cargo with heavy French munitions is expected to effect a net saving of about 50,000 tons deadweight a month, equivalent to 125,000 tons deadweight continuously employed in the N. Atlantic.

(b) An amended proposal for the employment of sailing tonnage south of the line is under examination.

(c) Emergency shipments of wool for Italy have been arranged.

(d) Additional timber requirements for the American army in France have been considered and dealt with.

Allied Programmes. (Paragraph 8.)

(a) Food.

(b) Munitions.

Appendices 52 and 53.—Copies of correspondence with the Food and Munitions Councils.

Meeting of the Council.

A meeting of the Council was held on September 30th and two following days.

DETAILED REPORT.**I.—General Tonnage Position.**

The general shipping position is shown in the following statement of the losses and new building of vessels in the first nine months of the year :—

	European Allies (Great Britain, France, Italy).	United States.	Other Allies.	Neutrals.
	Deadweight Tonnage.	Deadweight Tonnage.	Deadweight Tonnage.	Deadweight Tonnage.
Losses (all causes) - - -	3,029,000	328,000	265,000	425,000
Gains (building and miscellaneous) -	1,896,000	2,173,000	596,000	194,000
Net loss or gain - - -	-1,133,000	+1,845,000	+331,000	-231,000

During the period, therefore, America has built a little over $1\frac{3}{4}$ million tons deadweight more than she has lost, while the European Allies have lost a little over 1 million tons deadweight more than they have built. The excess of American building over losses is, however, much less than the extra tonnage required for the increased Army requirements, and it has been necessary to allot 200,000 tons for October loading.

II.—Italian Coal.

The coal dispatched to Italy in the period September 15—October 14 was as follows :—

	Plan.	Execution.
	Tons.	Tons.
Shipments of British Coal by Long Sea route - - -	150,000	289,492
British Coal passing Italian frontier - - -	100,000	88,137
French Coal passing Italian frontier - - -	350,000	91,335
French Coal on board at Mediterranean ports - - -		93,971
	600,000	562,936

The stocks of British coal at the Gironde Ports waiting to be railed to Italy amounted on October 10th to 32,388 tons.

The deficit of 41,633 tons carried forward from previous months has unfortunately been increased to 78,698 tons. This has been due to a further decrease in the railings of French coal, which for the month in question amount to only 185,306 tons

as compared with the programme of 350,000 tons a month, and with previous railings of about 230,000 tons a month. The further reduction is most serious, and some improvement appears essential if the Italian coal supply is to be maintained at 600,000 tons a month.

III.—*French Coal.*

The September shipments amounted to 1,604,260 tons, a deficit of 135,740 tons on the provisional programme of 1,740,000 tons.

IV.—*Belgian Relief.*

The arrangements for meeting the tonnage requirements of the Belgian Relief are working satisfactorily. So far as can be foreseen and unless special difficulties arise (such as the recent strike at Rotterdam) the tonnage in view up to the end of 1918 should be sufficient.

V.—*Special Allocations among Allies.*

(a) During September 228,088 American troops were embarked, of whom 115,780 were carried in British tonnage, 98,562 in American, 7,951 in French, and 5,795 in Italian.

Allocations of British Vessels to Allies.

(b) 200,000 tons have been allocated for the American Army supply service for October loading.

(c) Liner Services U.S.A. to France. It was originally arranged that about 102,000 tons would be available for the French Government in October (*see* last Report), but owing to the decision to transfer 50,000 tons to the American Army supply, the balance of 52,000 tons only will be at the disposal of the French. As regards November 50,000 tons has been provisionally agreed.

(d) Liner Services U.S.A. to Italy.

The figures given in the last Report have since been subject to adjustment. September shows a loading of 37,758 tons; compensation being afforded in October loadings, which amount to 101,427 tons. The forecast for November is 29,198 tons.

(e) Sugar. Three cargoes of Sugar amounting to 20,693 tons have been diverted to France since the last Report.

(f) Cereals. In September 218,000 tons have been diverted to France, and 133,000 tons to Italy.

(g) Wagon. A total number of 5,782 railway wagons have now been despatched from this country out of the 10,000 agreed upon to be allocated to Italy.

VI.—(a) *Pool Tonnage.*

In the period covered since the last Report a further 16 vessels have come into the pool of neutral tonnage under direction of the Allied Maritime Transport Council.

The total number of vessels which have come under this scheme is 187, with a deadweight of 498,496 tons. Of these, 7 vessels of 23,040 tons deadweight have been lost, leaving 475,456 tons deadweight now in the Pool. Among these vessels 269 allocations and re-allocations have taken place.

The following statement shows approximately how on the 16th October the Pool tonnage was employed in accordance with the working plan adopted by the executive.

	Deadweight Tons.
Coal to France - - - - -	115,122
Coal to Italy—	
(a) To Blaye - - - - -	60,713
(b) To Italy (ore home) - - - - -	55,002
(c) Mediterranean Trade (France/Italy) - - - - -	10,990
	<hr/> 126,705
Belgian Relief - - - - -	102,832
Wheat Executive and Miscellaneous Voyages - - - - -	130,797

(b) Danish Tonnage Agreement.

A number of Danish vessels, aggregating 56,000 tons deadweight, have been working for Italy under voyage charter with the Danish owners. As a result of the Danish Agreement these vessels will eventually come into the Allied Pool, and by arrangement with the U.S.A. authorities they are to be reckoned as part of the British share under the Agreement.

With the approval of the Tonnage Committee these vessels have been left in Italian service for the immediate voyages to Italy.

VII—(a). Co-operative Use of Allied Cargo Space in North Atlantic.

An exceptionally good example of the economy which can be effected by combining Allied programmes has been afforded by the arrangements made to load French Steel in vessels bringing American Army Supplies.

The executive were confronted with the fact that the American Army Supplies Programme, as presented by Mr. Baker, included a very high proportion of light measurement cargo, with the consequence that if this programme were dealt with separately the vessels would necessarily sail full but light, *i.e.*, well above their marks; while, on the other hand, the new French Munition Programme included a very high proportion of heavy deadweight cargo such as steel and rails, and if dealt with alone would involve vessels sailing down to their marks but with their space only partially full.

Arrangements are therefore being made for the American Government to load 150,000 tons of French Steel a month (instead of only about 35,000 tons as previously), while extra British ships are allotted to compensate for the comparatively small proportion of space thus lost for American Supplies, and for certain extra time taken in loading, discharging, &c. This arrangement, if successfully carried out, should result in a net saving of about 50,000 tons a month, which is equivalent to the continuous employment of about 125,000 tons deadweight of shipping in the North Atlantic.

(b) Use of Sailing Tonnage.

With reference to the scheme for the employment of sailing tonnage described in the previous report (August 16th–September 15th), it was subsequently found necessary to modify the original proposals in consequence of the inflammable nature of South African coal, and its unsuitability for carriage in sailing vessels. The attention of the Tonnage Committee was drawn to recent cases of vessels on fire at sea with this coal on board. A revised plan has therefore been proposed and agreed, on the following lines:—

(1) Chili to South Africa with nitrates; South Africa to Australia in ballast, or with such cargo as may be offering (*e.g.*, maize, wattle-bark); Australia to Chili with coal.

(2) Australia to Chili with coal (or to Peru with wheat and thence to a nitrate port); Chili with nitrates (*a*) to Pacific coast of North America, or (*b*) to Atlantic coast of North America; thence to Australia with cargo according to North American loading port.

(3) Australia to Plate with coal; Plate to the States with linseed (or from Brazil with other cargo, also in some cases from Plate, &c., to Canada); United States (or Canada) to Australia with general cargo, lumber oil, &c.

(4) Australia to South Africa with sleepers, flour, &c., and back to Australia (either in ballast or with such cargo as may be suitable). This plan which is being put into operation as quickly as possible is subject to the extent to which the United States Government might have to replace with sailing or auxiliary tonnage the steam tonnage taken from coastal traffic for overseas work.

(c) Wool for the Italian Army.

The present demands of Italy for at least 10,000 tons of wool during the remaining months of the year have been considered. This requirement relates to military needs, and could in present circumstances be considered only on the basis of an emergency demand and dealt with as such.

To meet Italy's need the following steps have been taken :—

- (1) British vessels have been allocated to lift all the available wool in South Africa for immediate shipment to Italy ; this is understood to amount to rather more than 2,000 tons.
- (2) It has been agreed that Italy may ship at the expense of cereals, up to 5,000 tons of wool from the Argentine, which will be carried in British ships. It is hoped that finance will shortly be arranged for this wool.

Wool from Australia for Italy and France is normally brought in British Liners to Port Said and there transhipped. The Italian wool now coming forward in this way will be dealt with as quickly as possible at Port Said, and efforts are being made to arrange for some part at any rate of the stock of wool (amounting to 2,644 tons) now held by the French at Port Said to be handed over for Italian use.

(d) American Army Timber Requirements in France.

The Executive received an urgent demand from the United States Army Authorities for the transport of an additional 10,000 standards of timber a month into France. This demand was put forward by the Chairman of the Timber Programme Committee as one which had to be met, and failing an increase in the production of timber in France, it could only be met by an allocation of further tonnage in the Scandinavian trade to the carriage of timber.

The United States Army Authorities had originally proposed to endeavour to charter free neutral tonnage for the purpose, but it was agreed that this was not practicable and would certainly interfere seriously with the working of the Swedish Agreement.

In these circumstances negotiations were entered into with the British Timber Controller, who agreed to meet the United States Army demand provided that he was assured a minimum of 10,000 standards a month from Norway and 18,000 standards a month from Sweden.

The shipping difficulty with regard to Sweden is that it is the one country to which non-national tonnage cannot, for naval considerations, be sent, while the impossibility was at the same time recognised of relying upon getting Swedish tonnage in excess of the 60,000 tons a month which Sweden is under obligation to provide. To meet the Timber Controller's demands would mean the allocation to timber of 54,000 tons out of this 60,000. Subject to the justification of the American demand by the Timber Programme Committee, and seeing that either the undertaking required by the Timber Controller had to be given or the shipping advantages gained by the Swedish agreement lost, the Tonnage Committee decided to approve the Ministry of Shipping giving the undertaking requested by the Timber Controller, as this seemed the only practicable solution apart from the possibility of obtaining the timber in France.

VIII. Allied Programmes.

(a) Food.

The Tonnage Committee, in conjunction with the Freight Committee of the Food Council, have been engaged upon the Allied Food Programme for the first four months of the cereal year 1918-19 (*i.e.*, the four months ending 31st December 1918).

The necessary connection between the two Committees has been effected by Mr. Hurcomb, a member of the Freight Committee, becoming a member of the Tonnage Committee.

As a result of considerable discussion, a programme for the four months has been produced which may be regarded as workable from a tonnage point of view, and has been accepted by the Tonnage Committee.

This programme reflects principles governing the distribution of tonnage during the period which the Tonnage Committee decided were essential to the proper working of Allied tonnage. From the point of view of the allocation of tonnage between the Allies, it may be observed that the programme involves the transference of 50,000 tons of oil seeds from Great Britain to France, with a corresponding increase of 50,000 tons in British Cereals, and an adjusting decrease of 50,000 tons in French cereals.

The food programme is, of course, now in process of execution; the various shipping departments making necessary adjustments in detail from time to time.

(b) Munitions.

The Executive has received the programme for the United Kingdom for the six months October 1918/March 1919; the full programmes for France and Italy have not yet been received.

The chief difficulty in relation to this programme arises from the very large increases foreshadowed in the demands for France. Apart from the difficulty of providing the necessary tonnage there is the acute problem of the French ports. The present state of these ports and the delays already occurring make it a matter of great doubt whether they can handle the large increases in heavy cargoes contemplated in the munitions programme; this question is receiving the closest attention of the Executive.

However, pending receipt of the full programme and the result of the investigation into the capacity of the French ports, steps are being taken which should enable the requirements to be covered to a large extent. The most important action taken in this respect is the arrangement now under discussion with the United States Authorities, whereby the maximum amount of deadweight cargo for France will be carried in American ships in conjunction with military supplies. It is hoped by this method, which is more fully described in paragraph VII. (a), to lift as much as 150,000 tons a month of heavy French cargo.

APPENDICES 52 and 53.

- (a) Letter from the Transport Council to the Food Council.
- (b) Reply of Food Council.
- (c) Letter from the Transport Council to the Munitions Council.

APPENDIX 52.

(a) LETTER FROM TRANSPORT COUNCIL TO FOOD COUNCIL.

SIR,

4th October 1918.

I AM directed by the Allied Maritime Transport Council to inform you that at their recent session they had under further consideration the policy which should govern the disposition of tonnage between the various competing services for the cereal year 1918-19.

In view of the fact that the allocation of tonnage is mainly a question of the competing demands of food on the one hand and munitions and army supplies on the other, the range of possible variation in the needs of other services being comparatively limited, the Transport Council are anxious to put the fullest possible information as to the shipping position, and as to the reasons which have influenced them in their decisions before the Food Council and the Munitions Council.

For this purpose I am to enclose for your information a copy of the Report* of the Allied Maritime Transport Executive to the Council in which a general statement of the tonnage position is given, together with the principal grounds of the several recommendations.

In view of the position there disclosed the Council arrived at the following decisions affecting the food programme subject to the covering assent of the respective Governments:—

- (1) That during the later Autumn and Winter a general preference should be given to the transport of munitions and army supplies as compared with food.
- (2) That when necessary, but as late as possible without running undue risk of actual shortage of food, a similar preference should be given to the transport of food in the spring or early summer.
- (3) That in view of the prospect of substantial improvement in the whole Allied tonnage position by next summer, and in order to avoid reducing the shipment of essential commodities required for actual consumption during the

* The Report is printed as Appendix 47 (pages 196-202) in the Minutes of the Fourth Session.

- year (particularly munitions), all Supply Departments should be asked to effect a reduction of stocks until they approximate towards the end of August to the quantities required for actual distribution.
- (4) That 18·5 million tons of importations of all articles included in the food programme except military oats should be confirmed as the figure for the year.
 - (5) That if the food position at the end of the winter or later shows such a course to be necessary in order to avoid food shortage, food shipments should have priority in excess of the proportion due on the 18·5 basis at the expense of tonnage allotted to other services.
 - (6) That for the purpose of considering the tonnage available for other services the total importations of food (and all other articles included in the food programme including all miscellaneous foodstuffs and military oats) should be provisionally estimated at 22 million tons.

The Council requests that these decisions should be read in conjunction with the explanatory notes in the enclosed memorandum.*

With regard to military oats, the Council felt unable, in the absence of further information, to specify any exact figure for this year's programme.

The Executive reported to the Council that in their view it would be necessary to contemplate an importation of 900,000 to 1,000,000 tons in the four months September to December inclusive, instead of 750,000 tons previously mentioned, and the Council authorised the Executive to arrange for a corresponding allocation of tonnage.

I am to request that you will take this decision as modifying my letter of September 6th with regard to military oats.

I am to observe that the Council are anxious that the importations should, if practicable, be kept down to the lower figure of 900,000 tons, and to add that the Executive would prefer to await the report on the military oats position of the Food Committee's representative who is going to France for the purpose, before giving a final figure.

I should add that this figure relates solely to the period of four months ending 31st December and is not intended to imply anything as to the rate of importations for later months, as to which no decision is possible until the receipt of the further information now being awaited.

In addition to the decisions given directly in relation to the food programme certain decisions given in relation to munitions and the American Army Supply also affect food importations and will therefore be of interest to your Committee.

The munitions programme which originally amounted to 22 $\frac{3}{4}$ million tons was first reduced to 19 million tons, and in view of the fact that considerable reductions were made in the proposed importations of nitrates from the distant source of Chile, it was considered that the figure for the total importations of food and munitions can be raised from the 39·8 as stated in the memorandum to 40 million tons, thus leaving 18 million tons for munitions on the assumption that food would be limited to 22 million tons, and that taking the cereal year as a whole the arrangements with America would not involve any net loss of imports.

On this basis the Munitions Council proposed that in the next six months (October to March inclusive) munitions should import 10 million tons, leaving 8 million tons for the other six months (September and April to August).

The Council accepted, however, the advice of the Executive to the effect that it was not practicable to fix any definite figure and that their instructions should be confined to working as far as was found practicable in the next six months towards importations of munitions in priority over food, while in the immediate future giving special priority in loading to any classes of munitions which the Munitions Council regard as specially urgent and important.

The Council also had before them representations from the Italian Government to the effect that the capacity of the Italian ports is so limited that Italy is not in a position to distribute imports in uneven quantities over the different months. In these circumstances the Council approved a recommendation of the Executive that shipments should be so adjusted as between food and munitions as to keep importations as even as possible in Italy throughout the year, shortages in munitions ready for shipment at any time being compensated for by increased shipments of food, &c. so far as may be desirable for the above reasons. This decision may occasionally involve the shipment of food to Italy instead of munitions when the latter are not available, but such an

* i.e., Appendix 47 of Minutes of Fourth Session.

arrangement would, of course, only be made when there was a reasonable prospect of the Italian ports being able to deal with such shipments without undue delay.

The Committee of Representatives has already been informed of the arrangement to provide 200,000 tons of shipping space for loading by the end of October for the American Army Supply services and of the effect of this arrangement upon the shipments of food.

I have to inform you that the Council decided that further tonnage should be provided for the same services for loading in November and December, a total of 300,000 tons in these two months being mentioned as the quantity contemplated. It was, however, decided that this figure should be subject to further consideration in the light of additional information now being obtained as to the immediate needs of the American Army in relation to the competing needs of other services, and a further communication will be made to you on the subject.

In conclusion, I am to ask that your Committee give their earnest consideration to the general tonnage position as described in the enclosed memorandum and will, in particular, take every possible step to avoid the necessity of importations in excess of the standard figures of 18·5 millions or 22 millions including military oats and sundries, in view of the extremely serious effect of any such excess upon other services, in particular the importations of munitions and the American Army Supply Service.

J. A. SALTER.

(b) LETTER FROM FOOD COUNCIL TO TRANSPORT COUNCIL.

SIR,

14th October 1918.

I AM directed by the Committee of Representatives of the Inter-Allied Food Council to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 4th October, referring to the decisions which were taken at the recent session of the Allied Maritime Transport Council.

I am to state that the Committee of Representatives fully accept the decision that a general preference should be given to the transport of munitions and Army Supplies during the next few months, subject to a preference being given to the transport of food for the rest of the cereal year. It is essential that the preference for food should be given sufficiently early to obviate undue risk of a shortage of food and that the possibility of shipping increased amounts through the American ports be kept in mind. The Committee adhere to the principle that in order to reduce present importation, recourse should be had to stocks to such an extent as may be reasonably safe.

The Committee of Representatives note that the total tonnage available for foodstuffs and military oats is provisionally estimated at 22 million tons. While they agree to proceed on this basis in the first instance, they desire to place on record their view that on present estimates it appears clear that it will be necessary to assign additional tonnage to the carriage of foodstuffs in the last six months of the present cereal year.

The provisional allocation of tonnage assigned to the transport of military oats has been noted, and I am directed to inform you that the whole position as regards military oats is being considered at Conferences in Paris at the present time. The Committee of Representatives will at once communicate with the Allied Maritime Transport Council, if, on further investigation, the proposed allocation of 900,000 or 1,000,000 tons for this purpose for the first four months of the present cereal year is found to be insufficient. In the meantime they are communicating this proposed limitation to the various military authorities with a suggested allocation as between countries of the tonnage at present considered available.

With regard to the further points mentioned in your letter, the Committee of Representatives note the special features affecting the Italian position, and will endeavour to adjust their programme so as to work in with any general Italian importation programme that may be arranged.

The effect on the Food Programme of the additional allocation made for the transport of American troops by the end of October next has been noted, and the Committee of Representatives desire me to state that, while fully sympathising with the proposals to increase the allocation of tonnage to the American Military Programme during November and December, they do not feel that it would be safe to meet this by any further reduction in the programme of food importation.

GERTRUDE C. DIXON.

APPENDIX 53.

(c) LETTER FROM TRANSPORT COUNCIL TO MUNITIONS COUNCIL.

SIR,

10th October 1918.

I AM directed by the Allied Maritime Transport Council to acquaint you, for the information of the Inter-Allied Munitions Council, that at their recent Session they had under further consideration the policy which should govern the disposition of tonnage between the various competing services for the cereal year 1918-19.

In view of the fact that the allocation of tonnage is mainly a question of the competing demands of food on the one hand and munitions and army supplies on the other, the range of possible variation in the needs of other services being comparatively limited, the Transport Council are anxious to put the fullest possible information as to the shipping position and as to the reasons which have influenced them in their decisions, before both the two Councils for Munitions and Food.

For this purpose I am to enclose for your information a copy of the report* of the Allied Maritime Transport Executive to the Council, in which a general statement of the tonnage position is given, together with the principal grounds of the several recommendations.

In view of the position there disclosed the Council arrived at the following decisions affecting the Munitions Programme, subject to the covering assent of the respective Governments :—

- (1) That during the later Autumn and Winter a general preference should be given to the transport of munitions and army supplies as compared with food.
- (2) That when necessary, but as late as possible without running undue risk of actual shortage of food, a similar preference should be given to the transport of food in the spring or early summer.
- (3) That in view of the prospect of a substantial improvement in the whole Allied tonnage position by next Summer, and in order to avoid reducing the shipment of essential commodities required for actual consumption during the year (particularly munitions), all Supply Departments should be asked to effect a reduction of stocks until they approximate, towards the end of August, to the quantities required for actual distribution.
- (4) That in estimating what is available for the European munitions imports it should be provisionally estimated that any tonnage assistance rendered to America, whether by the allocation of ships or the supply of artillery, will be returned within the cereal year, thus leaving 18 million tons for European munitions, including ore, pyrites, phosphate rock, railway material, and lubricating oil, but that it should be recognised that this requires reconsideration after the examination of the Munitions Programme, and, in particular, of the arrangements there proposed for supplies to the American Forces.

The Council requests that these decisions should be read in conjunction with the explanation in the enclosed Memorandum.*

I have to request that you will be good enough to consider the application of the principle indicated in resolution (3) above, *i.e.*, the reduction of stocks towards a minimum towards the end of the cereal year. I am to suggest that this principle while, doubtless, applicable to other commodities within the munitions programme, may apply with particular force in the case of nitrates.

The Council were informed that the Munitions Programme, which originally amounted to $22\frac{3}{4}$ million tons, had been reduced to 19 million tons, and, in view of the fact that considerable reductions were made in the proposed importation of nitrates from the distant source of Chile, it was considered that the figure for the total importations of food and munitions could be raised from 39·8 million tons, as stated in the Memorandum, to 40 million tons, thus leaving 18 million tons for munitions, on the assumption that food would be limited to 22 million tons, and that, taking the cereal year as a whole, the arrangements with America would not involve any net loss of imports.

On this basis it was proposed by M. Loucheur and Mr. Winston Churchill, on behalf of the Munitions Council, that in the next six months (October to March inclusive) munitions should import 10 million tons, leaving 8 million tons for the other six months (September and April to August).

* Appendix 47 of Minutes of Fourth Session.

The Council accepted, however, the advice of the Executive, to the effect that it was not practicable to fix any definite figure, and that their instructions should be confined to working, as far as was found practicable, in the next six months, towards importations of munitions in priority over food, while in the immediate future giving special priority for the loading of any classes of munitions which the Munitions Council regard as specially urgent and important.

The Council also had before them representations from the Italian Government to the effect that the capacity of the Italian ports is so limited that Italy is not in a position to distribute imports in uneven quantities over the different months. In these circumstances the Council approved the recommendation of the Executive that shipments should be so adjusted between food and munitions as to keep importations as even as possible in Italy throughout the year, shortages in munitions ready for shipment at any time being compensated for by increased shipments of food, &c., so far as may be desirable for the above reasons.

I have also to inform you that M. Loucheur announced that a Freight Committee of the Munitions Council would be established in London under the chairmanship of Mr. W. T. Layton, Captain Pilliard representing France and Lieutenant Farina Italy—for the purpose of arranging details as to loading, &c., with the Tonnage Committee of this Council. This Committee has already held preliminary meetings.

I should be glad to receive, as soon as possible, the detailed export programme (showing sources and quantities of the several commodities, and specially noting any that are specially urgent and important) which corresponds to the request for 10 million tons for the 6 months. The question of shipping allocation will then be carefully considered. I am, however, to observe that the very different distribution of imports as between the three countries, which appears to be contemplated in the provisional statement received, will necessarily raise questions of great difficulty (including the question of the capacity of the ports to receive the desired quantities), and it must not be assumed that shipping arrangements can be made in close conformity with the programme.

J. A. SALTER.

ALLIED MARITIME TRANSPORT COUNCIL.

Report of Executive, October 16th—November 15th, 1918.

Summary and Index of Monthly Report.

Italian Coal. (Paragraph 1.)

	Tons.
Programme - - - - -	600,000
Supply 15th October to 14th November - -	637,023
Average 8 months - - - - -	595,057

French Coal. (Paragraph 2.)

Provisional Programme - - - - -	1,740,000
Supply, October - - - - -	1,251,073
Average, 7 months - - - - -	1,431,909

Belgian Relief. (Paragraph 3.)

Emergency shipments of 18,000 tons of foodstuffs from the United Kingdom are being arranged.

Special Allocations among Allies. (Paragraph 4.)

(a) During October, 183,533 American troops were embarked; 74,578 in American and French vessels, 8,094 in Italian vessels, and 100,861 in British vessels.

(b) In order to relieve civilian requirements in Greece, three Greek coasting vessels in French and Italian service have been released.

(c) The six Italian passenger liners employed since April in American trooping have been returned to Italian service.

Allocations of British Vessels to Allies. (Paragraph 5.)

(d) A vessel with 5,446 tons of wheat has been diverted to Salonika for immediate Serbian relief.

(e) Transport is being arranged for 800 Serbians from Vladivostok for repatriation.

(f) Allocations for the American Army Supply programme in November amounted to 69,893 tons.

(g) Liner Services, U.S.A./France, November, loading 38,000 tons.

(h) Liner Services, U.S.A./Italy, November, loading 29,198 tons.

(i) Cereals. In November 191,763 tons were diverted to France, and 216,268 tons to Italy.

(j) Wagons. 7,792 railway wagons have now been despatched to Italy from the United Kingdom.

Pool Tonnage. (Paragraph 6.)

(a) At the end of October 192 vessels of 518,223 tons deadweight had been allocated.

Congestion in French Ports. (Paragraph 7.)

A scheme for the appointment of an Allied Commission, consisting of representatives of France, America, and Great Britain, was, with the co-operation of the French Government, agreed upon to supervise and report upon the situation in those French ports which the three Allied countries use in common. This scheme is now being reconsidered in view of the cessation of hostilities.

Appendices 54, 55, and 56:

- (a) Letter from Shipping Tonnage Committee of Inter-Allied Munitions Council.
- (b) Reply of Transport Council Executive.
- (c) Inter-Allied Food Council. Statement of Position on November 16, 1918.
- (d) Provisional statement of Allied and Neutral Tonnage, October 31, 1918.

Detailed Report.

I. *Italian Coal.*

The coal despatched to Italy during the period October 15th–November 14th was as follows :—

	Plan.	Execution.
	Tons.	Tons.
Shipments of British coal by long sea route - - - -	150,000	402,986
British coal passing Italian frontier - - - -	100,000	85,175
French coal passing Italian frontier - - - -	350,000	68,383
French coal on board at Mediterranean ports - - - -		80,479
Total - - - -	600,000	637,023

The deficit carried over to November/December period is 41,675 tons.

II. *French Coal.*

During October 1,251,073 tons of British coal were shipped to France—a deficit of 488,927 tons on the provisional programme of 1,740,000 tons.

III. *Belgian Relief.*

In addition to the normal tonnage requirements of the Belgian Relief Commission, emergency shipments amounting to 18,000 tons of food have been arranged from this country to meet the extensive relief necessary in the newly delivered territory ; of this 12,000 tons is flour, and the remainder pulses, lard and bacon. Prompt tonnage is available to lift it.

A table showing requirements and arrivals for the six months June/November is attached.

The Commission for Relief in Belgium.

Shipping Position showing Comparison between Programme Requirements and Arrivals at Rotterdam for Six Months ending November 25, 1918.

Based on Cargo Capacity.

(In Metric Tons.)

Commodities.	Arrived Three Months June–August 1918.	Arrived September 1918.	Arrived September 26– October 31, 1918.	Arranged November 1–25, 1918.
<i>Arrivals :—</i>				
<i>General Cargo—</i>				
Overseas - - - -	87,185	15,454	33,621	26,496
United Kingdom - - - -	4,511	7,834	7,928	8,000
Total “General” -	91,696	23,288	41,559	34,496
<i>Grain (equivalent Wheat)—</i>				
Overseas - - - -	211,333	53,032	110,015	95,834
United Kingdom - - - -	10,390	—	—	—
Total “Grain” -	221,723	53,022	110,015	95,834
Net foodstuffs - - - -	313,419	76,310	151,574	130,330
Allow lost space - - - -	20,651	3,860	11,726	11,240
Total cargo capacity -	334,070	80,170	163,300	141,570
<i>Programme Requirements :—</i>				
Cargo capacity -	360,000	122,500	136,400	136,400
Shortage - - - -	25,930	42,300	—	—
Excess - - - -	—	—	26,900	5,170

Special Allocations among Allies.

(a) During October 183,533 American troops were embarked, of whom 100,861 were carried in British tonnage, 70,536 in American, 4,042 in French, and 8,094 in Italian.

(b) The shortage of Greek coasting tonnage, which seriously threatened the transport of civilian requirements, and was due to military exigencies, was brought up for attention. It was agreed that as there were seven small Greek vessels in French service and three in Italian service which were suitable for coasting work, the French should release two steamers and the Italians one in order to relieve the shortage.

(c) The six Italian liners which have been employed in American trooping to France since April have been returned to Italian service. They have transported approximately 58,216 men.

V.—Allocations of British Vessels to Allies.

(d) Serbian Relief.—An urgent appeal was received for the diversion of a Wheat Executive boat to Salonika with cereals to meet the first relief measures necessary for the freed inhabitants of Serbia, pending the settlement of the larger question of the re-victualling of the country. The Tonnage Committee agreed to the diversion of a prompt vessel, and arrangements were made for the s.s. "Porsanger," with 5,446 tons of wheat, to proceed to Salonika.

(e) Arrangements are being made to provide transport for 800 Serb invalids, women and children, from Vladivostock, for repatriation.

(f) Allocations for the American army supply programme in November amounted to 69,893 tons.

(g) Liner Services, U.S.A./France.—Tonnage loading on this service in November will amount to 38,000 tons. The situation renders any forecast for December impossible.

(h) Liner Services, U.S.A./Italy.—The November loading amounts to 29,198 tons. No programme has been compiled for December.

(i) Cereals.—In October 191,763 tons were diverted to France, making a total for the seven months April–October of 1,104,000 tons, or an average of 157,714 tons a month.

The diversions of cereals for Italy in October amounted to 216,268 tons, making a total of 989,000 tons for the seven months April–October, an average of 141,285 tons a month.

(j) Wagons.—A total number of 7,792 railway wagons have been despatched up to date out of the 10,000 to be specially allocated by this country to Italy.

VI.—Pool Tonnage.

By the end of October 192 vessels of approximately 518,223 deadweight tons, over two-thirds of the total expected to come into the Pool, had been allocated. Nine vessels of 27,090 deadweight tons had been sunk, and 180 vessels of 480,337 deadweight tons were in active service under the allocations made.

Of this tonnage 43 per cent. was Norwegian, 42 per cent. Swedish, and 15 per cent. Danish. Approximately 23 per cent. of the deadweight tonnage was employed in the French coal trade, 28 per cent. in the Italian coal trade, 21 per cent. in the service of the Wheat Executive, 21 per cent. (all Swedish) in Belgian relief, and 7 per cent. in the Swedish ore trade and miscellaneous assignments.

Tables showing (1) the deadweight tonnage operating in the different services at the end of each month from May to October, and (2) showing the classification by flag for the same period are appended.

TABLE I.

Neutral "Pool" Tonnage in various Services as allocated by the Inter-Allied Chartering Executive at the end of each month from 31st May 1918 to 31st October 1918.

(Figures in Deadweight Tons.)

Service.	May 31.	June 30.	July 31.	Aug. 31.	Sept. 30.	Oct. 31.
Total : All Services -	60,825	173,715	350,637	416,912	463,034	480,337
French coal (cross-Channel)	9,515	22,655	42,605	51,457	58,312	61,867
French Bay Trade -	—	7,280	30,405	47,300	46,810	49,398
Italian Blaye Trade -	13,895	23,165	49,625	50,273	51,113	54,818
U.K.—It. Coal/Ore -	9,865	13,965	35,545	49,495	59,995	60,875
Italian Mediterranean -	2,600	5,940	5,100	15,350	15,350	19,650
Swedish Ore -	—	—	—	17,310	17,310	17,310
Wheat Executive -	10,300	38,900	52,740	72,400	95,167	99,342
Belgian Relief -	11,110	51,260	118,292	93,922	98,572	98,572
Miscellaneous -	3,540	10,550	16,325	20,405	20,405	18,505

TABLE II.

Neutral "Pool" Tonnage in Service at the End of each Month, 31st May 1918 to 31st October 1918, classified by Flag.

Date.	Total : All Flags.			Norwegian.			Swedish.			Danish.			Dutch.		
	No.	Gross.	D.W.	No.	Gross.	D.W.	No.	Gross.	D.W.	No.	Gross.	D.W.	No.	Gross.	D.W.
May 31	25	38,677	60,825	15	26,366	43,785	—	—	—	9	12,156	16,815	1	155	225
June 30	65	111,625	173,715	36	65,747	103,880	11	25,805	41,400	17	19,918	28,210	1	155	225
July 31	132	227,859	350,637	53	103,180	154,770	59	102,220	163,557	19	22,459	32,085	1	155	225
August 31	160	274,629	416,912	68	126,815	185,990	71	123,589	196,447	20	24,070	34,250	1	155	225
September 30	173	295,444	463,034	77	136,071	212,535	71	125,095	198,737	24	34,123	51,537	1	155	225
October 31	180	306,616	480,337	77	131,947	205,065	73	127,744	202,737	29	46,800	72,320	1	155	225

VII. Congestion of Ports in France.

The question of the congestion of French ports had for long been causing anxiety and has gradually become one of the most urgent problems in the shipping situation. Towards the end of October it was stated that the American authorities were contemplating the withdrawal of certain American vessels from French service until the delay in the discharge of vessels in general was remedied. The British Ministry of Shipping was considering similar action in order to relieve the situation. A proposal has been made and agreed to by both the French Authorities and the U.S. Army Authorities that Allied Commissions of a consultative or advisory character should be established at the principal French ports, consisting normally of a representative each of France, Great Britain, and the United States. These commissions would send in weekly reports to :—

- (a) Paris,
- (b) the Allied Maritime Transport Council in London,
- (c) the American headquarters at Tours,
- (d) the British representative at Tours.

The weekly report at each port would be based on the statement of the working of the port prepared by the French Chef d'Exploitation, the other members of the Commission making such observations on this statement as they think fit and in particular indicating their views as to the amount.

The information obtained by these reports, together with other information regarding the prospective movements of British and French controlled ships, will be brought together by the Port Section of the Allied Maritime Transport Council, which should thus be in a position to decide what amount of tonnage should properly be directed to each port during the following weeks.

This scheme is now being reconsidered in view of the cessation of hostilities.

APPENDICES 54, 55, and 56.

- (a) Letter from Shipping Tonnage Committee of Inter-Allied Munitions Council.
- (b) Reply of Transport Council Executive.
- (c) Inter-Allied Food Council—Statement of Position on November 15th, 1918.
- (d) Provisional Statement of Allied and Neutral Tonnage, 31st October 1918.

APPENDIX 54.

(a) LETTER FROM SHIPPING TONNAGE COMMITTEE OF INTER-ALLIED MUNITIONS COUNCIL.

SIR,

5th November 1918.

I AM directed by the Shipping Tonnage Committee of the Inter-Allied Munitions Council to forward copies* of the Monthly Imports requirements of France and Italy from all parts of the world.

As regards shipments from North America, the figures of the French programme differ slightly from those already put forward in Mr. Birkett's letter of October 15th, and in this connection I am to say that, owing to the late date at which the Munitions Programme was established, it will be impossible for the programme to be carried out equally over the winter months, since it will take some time for the deliveries on the orders that have now been placed to be made. The figures of shipments are not yet available for the month of October, but it is anticipated that they will be between 200,000 and 250,000 tons. It is believed that in view of the stocks already at port, or on the way to port, this figure can be increased in November to a minimum of 300,000 tons and a maximum of 350,000 tons—the latter figure being attained if the supply of rails, which is receiving high priority in the United States, actually reaches port in large quantities during the next few days. I am therefore to ask that an allocation of ships may be made on this basis, on the understanding that provided that the general situation calls for the carrying out of the programme as now arranged, it will be necessary to make good the deficiency in October and November shipments by a still further increase in the allocation of ships during December.

As regards Italy, the Committee has not yet received information as to the Italian ships available for munitions traffic from North America, and is not yet in a position to present a specific demand for the allocation of tonnage.

As regards Great Britain, it is understood that shipping has already been allocated, in accordance with the programme put forward by my Committee on October 15th.

J. GEE,
Acting Secretary.

(b) REPLY OF TRANSPORT COUNCIL EXECUTIVE.

SIR,

7th November 1918.

WITH reference to your letter of the 5th instant, I have to inform you, on behalf of the Allied Maritime Transport Executive, that they note that the Shipping Tonnage Committee of the Inter-Allied Munitions Council anticipate that the shipments of French munitions available for loading in the month of November will reach a minimum of 300,000 tons and a maximum of 350,000 tons, the latter figure being conditional upon large supplies of rails reaching the port in the next few days.

The Executive understand that if tonnage is allocated for shipments so becoming available in November, the Munitions Programme authorised by the Transport Council at its last session will have been carried out up to date so far as its execution depends upon the allocation of ships.

I have to inform you that an arrangement was recently made with the American Government to ship 150,000 tons of French munitions in American vessels, British ships being allotted to America to compensate for loss of carrying capacity so involved. The French representatives estimate that French ships will load 120,000 tons in November and the British Government are prepared to provide a further 50,000 tons, making a total of 320,000 tons, which would appear to be likely to be sufficient in view of the information you gave as to shipments probably available.

* It has not been thought necessary to print these in detail in this report.

The Executive note that your Committee is not yet in a position to present a specific demand for the allocation of tonnage for the shipment of munitions from the North Atlantic to Italy, and that the allocation already made for the shipment of British munitions from the same source is adequate.

With reference to your warning that it may be necessary to make good the deficiency in the supplies available for loading in October and November by increased allocations in December, I am to remind your Committee of the proviso made by the Transport Council in connection with the Munitions Programme, viz., that the allocation of tonnage must be conditional upon the capacity of the ports.

I am to state that present indications render it probable that this limiting factor will prove to be a serious one.

J. A. SALTER.

APPENDIX 55.

(c) INTER-ALLIED FOOD COUNCIL COMMITTEE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

Requirements and Arrivals. Position as on 16th November 1918.

	Require- ments. September— December.	Arrivals.					Arrivals expressed, as of require- ments.
		Actual.		Estimated.			
		September.	October.	November.	December.	Total.	

United Kingdom.

Cereals - -	2,050,000	596,732	654,688	592,284	500,926	2,344,630	114·4
Meats - - -	400,000	118,251	103,537	98,723	119,275	439,786	109·9
Fats - - -	180,000	52,646	41,147	33,452	32,436	159,681	88·7
Miscellaneous foods—							
Class A - -	140,000	28,850	45,906	40,206	40,648	155,610	111·1
Sugar - - -	380,000	98,139	140,794	67,645	102,609	409,187	107·6
Miscellaneous foods—							
Class B - -	24,900	5,892	1,355	3,639	36	10,922	43·8
Seeds and oils -	400,000	90,654	92,781	133,447	96,561	413,443	103·4
Total	3,560,000	991,164	1,080,208	969,396	892,491	3,933,259	110·5

France.

Cereals - -	840,000	363,190	266,770	156,261	136,369	922,590	109·8
Meats - - -	160,000	29,160	36,936	34,218	53,289	153,603	96·0
Fats - - -	—	56	43	—	—	99	—
Miscellaneous foods—							
Class A - -	40,000	1,668	2,817	1,225	3,500	9,210	23·0
Sugar - - -	150,000	22,243	34,332	49,957	34,863	141,395	94·2
Miscellaneous foods—							
Class B - -	40,000	3,873	3,439	976	1,000	9,288	23·2
Seeds and oils -	200,000	10,223	20,637	51,329	80,259	162,448	81·2
Total - - -	1,430,000	430,413	364,974	293,966	309,280	1,398,633	97·8

Italy.

Cereals -	995,000	222,186	360,065	257,569	197,393	1,037,213	104·2
Meats -	145,000	15,328	33,806	27,289	40,235	116,658	80·4
Fats -	10,000	818	2,034	1,759	2,723	7,334	24·4
Miscellaneous foods—							
Class A -	45,000	3,298	3,374	2,335	1,905	10,912	24·2
Sugar -	15,000	3,843	1,860	4,840	6,171	16,714	111·4
Miscellaneous foods—							
Class B -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Seeds and oils -	50,000	—	282	—	6,147	6,429	12·8
Total -	1,260,000	245,473	401,421	293,792	254,574	1,195,260	94·8

APPENDIX 56.

**REVISED STATEMENT OF ALLIED AND NEUTRAL
TONNAGE FOR OCTOBER 1918.**

Seagoing Steam Merchant Vessels of 500 Gross Tons and over.

TABLES.

- I. EMPLOYMENT, 31st OCTOBER 1918.
- II. CONSTRUCTION : PROGRESS AND POSITION, OCTOBER 1918.
- III. ADJUSTMENTS FOR THE PERIOD 1st JANUARY TO 31st OCTOBER 1918.
- IV. SUMMARY, BY MONTHS AND QUARTERS, OF LOSSES AND GAINS FOR THE PERIOD
1st JANUARY TO 31st OCTOBER 1918.
- V. ADJUSTMENTS FOR THE MONTH OF OCTOBER 1918.

TABLE I.—EMPLOYMENT OF ALLIED AND NEUTRAL TONNAGE, 31ST OCTOBER 1918.
Seagoing Steam Merchant Vessels of 500 Gross Tons and over.
 (All figures in thousands of deadweight tons.)

Employment of Tonnage, exclusive of Tankers.	Tonnage under Flag of					Total.
	Italy.	France.	United Kingdom.	United States.	Other Allies.	Neutrals.
I. EMPLOYED IN IMPORT SERVICE OF FOUR PRINCIPAL ALLIES:—						
(a) In import service of Italy - - -	771	...	1,556	128	231	331
(b) " " France - - -	5	934	1,546	124	311	486
(c) " " United Kingdom - - -	19	60	6,762	45	200	356
(d) " " United States - - -	160	782	335	571
Total in Import Service of Four Principal Allies	795	994	10,024	1,079	1,077	1,744
II. EMPLOYED IN OTHER MERCHANT SERVICE:—						
(a) In coasting service of flag nation - - -	56	23	238	896	566	279
(b) In colonial service of flag nation - - -	1	31	1,610	83	35	284
(c) In coasting or colonial service of other principal allies.	664	59	492	357
(d) In merchant service of other allies or neutrals -	475	1,425	2,055
(e) In enemy interests - - -	21
Total in other Merchant Service	57	54	2,512	1,513	2,518	2,996
III. EMPLOYED IN NON-MERCHANT SERVICE:—						
(a) In military service of flag nation - - -	108	99	2,347	2,641	1	...
(b) In naval service of flag nation - - -	35	182	1,985	200	5	8
(c) In other military or naval service (mainly transportation of American troops).	30	25	884	24	203	144
(d) In other non-merchant service (mainly cable repairing).	...	4	22	...	4	...
Total in Non-Merchant Service	173	310	5,238	2,865	213	152
V. UNEMPLOYED OR EMPLOYMENT UNKNOWN:—						
(a) Repairing or remodelling - - -	126	256	1,385	185	101	137
(b) Otherwise unemployed - - -	41	2	...	351	73	520
(c) Employment unknown - - -	...	14	1,054	609
Total Unemployed or Employment Unknown -	167	272	1,385	536	1,228	1,266
Total Tonnage, exclusive of Tankers	1,192	1,630	19,159	5,993	5,036	6,158
TANKERS, EXCLUDED ABOVE	48	24	1,681	1,371	36	188
						248

NOTES ON TABLE I.

The above table includes approximate figures for lesser maritime nations, such as China, Roumania, and South and Central American Allied and Neutrals, to a total of some 800,000 deadweight tons. For about two-thirds of this tonnage the employment is known. The rest, while shown here under V. c ("Employment Unknown"), is largely employed "in merchant service of other Allies or Neutrals." (I. a, II. b, II. d.)

For lack of more recent information, the figures for Italy above are adapted from those for 30th September. The present revision corrects an error appearing in the revised table for 30th September, which overstated the tonnage of "Other Allies" and "Neutrals" in the import service of France (I. b) and understated this tonnage in other military and naval service (II. c).

American figures do not include certain purely passenger vessels in coasting service and certain vessels of merchant type built or converted for and owned by the Navy, of whose movements the U.S. Shipping Board does not keep itself informed. A similar qualification as to vessels in naval service applies in the case of the other principal Allies, although probably in lesser degree.

The basis of this table is actual service, not control or allocation. Thus, some tonnage of "Other Allies" and "Neutrals" which is controlled by the principal Allies is here shown as in the service of

"Other Allies" or "Neutrals," since it is at the moment carrying cargo to them. Also, the tonnage shown as in the service of the principal Allies includes some not under their control.

Import Service.—The tonnage shown as in the import service of a country or countries is in general that which at the time is carrying cargo to that country or countries, or going out largely or wholly in ballast to obtain cargo for such countries.

Of about 1,000,000 tons of British liners in the North Atlantic approximately 40 per cent. of the cargo space proves to be sacrificed to the carriage of troops. Accordingly, 60 per cent. of this tonnage is accounted in "Import Service of the United Kingdom" and 40 per cent. in "Other Military or Naval Service."

Coasting Service.—Italian tonnage indicated as in coasting service includes certain vessels employed in local service in the Mediterranean. As noted above, not all American coasting tonnage is included

Tonnage "Unemployed or Employment Unknown" includes, for the United States, new vessels completed but not yet assigned to service (chiefly vessels built on the Great Lakes), and for "Other Allies" some 525,000 tons of Russian vessels locked up in the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea.

TABLE II.—CONSTRUCTION: PROGRESS AND POSITION, OCTOBER 1918.

Seagoing Steam Merchant Vessels of 500 Gross Tons and over.

(Tonnage figures in thousands of tons.)

	Italy.			France.			United Kingdom.			United States.		
	No.	Gross.	D.W.	No.	Gross.	D.W.	No.	Gross.	D.W.	No.	Gross.	D.W.
ON STOCKS, beginning of month	-	-	-	35	67	92	272	1,329	1,951	690	?	3,470
Additions: Keels laid during month	-	-	-	34	134	208	141	?	687
Deductions: Launchings during month	-	-	-	3	5	7	25	115	176	80	?	400
ON STOCKS, end of month	-	-	-	32	62	85	281	1,348	1,983	751	?	3,757
LAUNCHED BUT NOT COMPLETED, beginning of month	-	-	-	5	47	35	51	218	323	271	?	1,327
Additions: Launchings during month	-	-	-	3	5	7	25	115	176	80	?	400
Deductions: Completions during month	-	-	-	28	127	190	75	?	391
LAUNCHED BUT NOT COMPLETED, end of month	-	-	-	8	52	42	48	213	311	276	?	1,336
TOTAL UNDER CONSTRUCTION, beginning of month	-	-	-	40	114	127	323	1,547	2,274	961	?	4,797
" " " " end of month	-	-	-	40	114	127	329	1,561	2,294	1,027	?	5,093

NOTE.—Figures for United Kingdom are exclusive of construction in the Dominions, and for the United States include only construction for the Emergency Fleet Corporation. In both cases the amount of tonnage excluded is relatively small. Slight discrepancies in figures are accounted for by the fact that except for *completions* the tonnage figures are merely estimates. Differences between the figures at the end of one month and the beginning of the next are due partly to inaccuracies in reports which could not be corrected in the time available, and partly to removals of vessels from stocks before launching.

TABLE III.—ADJUSTMENTS IN ALLIED AND NEUTRAL TONNAGE FOR THE TEN-MONTH PERIOD FROM 1ST JANUARY TO 31ST OCTOBER 1918.
Seagoing Steam Merchant Vessels of 500 Gross Tons and over.

(All figures in thousands of deadweight tons.)

Adjustments in Tonnage.	Tonnage under Flag of						Total.
	Italy.	France.	United Kingdom.	United States.	Other Allies.	Neutrals.	
I. LOSSES, 1st JANUARY—31st OCTOBER :—							
(a) By enemy action -	197	214	2,359	245	186	381	3,582
(b) By marine risk -	19	20	340	143	111	74	707
(c) By other causes -	1	...	36	37
Total Losses	217	234	2,735	388	297	455	4,326
II. GAINS, 1st JANUARY—31st OCTOBER :—							
(a) By construction -	61	9	2,032	2,596	624	211	5,533
(b) From other sources -	7	...	23	25	48	52	155
Total Gains	68	9	2,055	2,621	672	263	5,688
NET LOSS OR GAIN, 1st January—31st October	-149	-225	-680	+2,233	+375	-192	+1,362
III. TRANSFERS AND SUNDRY ADJUSTMENTS :—							
(a) Transfers to foreign flag -	...	1	38	150	425	801	1,415
(b) Transfers from foreign flag -	13	152	600	632	18	...	1,415
(c) Sundry adjustments : <i>Net</i> -	- 4	-99	+142	+ 68	-109	+ 25	+23
Net Transfers and Adjustments	+ 9	+52	+704	+550	-516	-776	+23
NET CHANGE, 1st January—31st October	-140	-173	+24	+2,783	-141	-968	+1,385
TONNAGE UNDER NATIONAL FLAG, 1st JANUARY 1918	1,380	1,827	20,816	4,581	5,213	7,314	41,131
TONNAGE UNDER NATIONAL FLAG, 31st OCTOBER 1918	1,240	1,654	20,840	7,364	5,072	6,346	42,516

TABLE IV.—SUMMARY, BY MONTHS AND QUARTERS, OF LOSSES AND GAINS IN ALLIED AND NEUTRAL TONNAGE FOR THE PERIOD FROM 1ST JANUARY TO 31ST OCTOBER 1918.

Seagoing Steam Merchant Vessels of 500 Gross Tons and over.

(All figures in thousands of deadweight tons.)

Period.	Italy.			France.			United Kingdom.			United States.			Other Allies.			Neutrals.			Total.		
	Total Losses.	Total Gains.	Net Loss or Gain.	Total Losses.	Total Gains.	Net Loss or Gain.	Total Losses.	Total Gains.	Net Loss or Gain.	Total Losses.	Total Gains.	Net Loss or Gain.	Total Losses.	Total Gains.	Net Loss or Gain.	Total Losses.	Total Gains.	Net Loss or Gain.	Total Losses.	Total Gains.	Net Loss or Gain.
January -	29	8	- 21	46	...	- 46	320	108	- 212	8	96	+ 88	42	50	+ 8	57	24	- 33	502	286	- 216
February -	38	3	- 35	10	...	- 10	362	137	- 225	21	137	+ 116	25	50	+ 25	69	24	- 45	525	351	- 174
March -	64	8	- 58	23	...	- 23	319	263	- 56	24	132	+ 158	45	50	+ 5	83	24	- 59	558	527	- 31
1st Quarter -	131	19	- 112	79	...	- 79	1,001	508	- 493	53	415	+ 362	112	150	+ 38	209	72	- 137	1,585	1,164	- 421
April -	5	11	+ 6	30	...	- 30	341	155	- 186	27	191	+ 164	25	20	- 5	27	41	+ 15	455	418	- 37
May -	28	13	- 15	24	...	- 24	312	281	- 31	54	233	+ 229	11	95	+ 84	32	12	- 20	461	684	+ 223
June -	5	17	+ 12	25	...	- 25	247	200	- 47	50	302	+ 252	8	80	+ 72	48	53	+ 5	383	652	+ 269
2nd Quarter -	38	41	+ 3	79	...	- 79	900	636	- 264	131	776	+ 645	44	195	+ 151	107	106	- 1	1,299	1,754	+ 455
July -	34	8	- 26	20	...	- 20	249	231	- 18	44	270	+ 226	33	63	+ 30	24	6	- 18	404	578	+ 174
August -	32	...	- 32	238	221	- 17	70	345	+ 275	48	110	+ 62	49	19	- 30	487	695	+ 258
September -	3	...	- 3	11	9	- 2	226	232	+ 6	46	336	+ 340	30	78	+ 48	28	25	- 3	344	730	+ 386
3rd Quarter -	37	8	- 29	63	9	- 54	713	684	- 29	160	1,001	+ 841	111	251	+ 140	101	50	- 51	1,185	2,003	+ 818
October -	11	...	- 11	13	...	- 16	121	227	+ 106	44	429	+ 385	30	76	+ 46	38	35	- 3	257	767	+ 510
Total for Period -	217	68	- 149	234	9	- 225	2,735	2,055	- 680	388	2,621	+ 2233	297	672	+ 375	455	263	- 210	4,326	5,688	+ 1362

NOTE.—As in Tables III. and V., "Losses," "Gains," and "Net Loss or Gain" in this table are exclusive of changes in tonnage due to transfers of flag and sundry adjustments.

TABLE V.—ADJUSTMENTS IN ALLIED AND NEUTRAL TONNAGE FOR THE MONTH OF OCTOBER 1918.
Seagoing Steam Merchant Vessels of 500 Gross Tons and over.

(All figures in thousands of deadweight tons.)

Adjustments in Tonnage.	Tonnage under Flag of						Total.
	Italy.	France.	United Kingdom.	United States.	Other Allies.	Neutrals.	
I. LOSSES DURING MONTH :—							
(a) By enemy action -	11	11	81	13	26	24	166
(b) By marine risk -	...	2	40	31	4	14	91
(c) By other causes -
Total Losses -	11	13	121	44	30	38	257
II. GAINS DURING MONTH :—							
(a) By construction -	227	421	76	17	741
(b) From other sources -	8	...	18	26
Total Gains -	227	429	76	35	767
Net Loss or Gain during Month -	- 11	- 13	+ 106	+ 385	+ 46	- 3	+ 510
III. TRANSFERS AND SUNDRY ADJUSTMENTS :—							
(a) Transfers to foreign flag -	27	24	...	51
(b) Transfers from foreign flag -	...	22	5	24	51
(c) Sundry adjustments, net -	...	- 15	+ 85	- 9	- 56	+ 34	+ 39
Net -	...	+ 7	+ 90	- 12	- 80	+ 34	+ 39
Net Change during Month -	- 11	- 6	+ 196	+ 373	- 34	+ 31	+ 549
TONNAGE UNDER NATIONAL FLAG, BEGINNING OF MONTH -	1,251	1,660	20,644	6,991	5,106	6,315	41,967
TONNAGE UNDER NATIONAL FLAG, END OF MONTH -	1,24	1,654	20,840	7,364	5,072	6,346	42,516

VII.

**DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATING THE
DEVELOPMENT AND PROCEDURE OF THE
PROGRAMME COMMITTEES—
MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS.**

*Copy of Memorandum issued by British Government to British Representatives
on Programme Committees, June 14, 1918.*

Allied Programme Committees. Chairmanship, Composition, and Procedure.

Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Robert Cecil as the principal British representatives on the two Allied Councils on War Purchase and Finance and Maritime Transport respectively have had their attention drawn to certain views strongly entertained by the Allies as to the composition, &c., of the Allied Programme Committees.

While the composition and procedure of the different Committees must necessarily vary to a considerable extent according to the varying circumstances with which they deal and departmental convenience, it is desirable that, subject to these necessary variations, a consistent policy should be followed, and that this policy should be made to conform as closely as possible with the reasonable expectations of the Allies.

1. It is of the first importance that both the composition, procedure, and whole method of conduct of these bodies should express the fact that they are, both in form and in substance, Allied bodies, and not in any sense British Committees to which Allied representatives are invited. It is more important that special pains should be taken to achieve this object since the domicile is in most cases to be in London.

2. With this object Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Robert Cecil request that the following principles should be observed so far as practicable by the British Departments concerned in the formation of the Committees :—

- (a) The normal composition of a Committee should be taken as allowing for one representative for each of the four associated Governments. It is realised that additional members must in some cases be appointed, but this should not be done unless really necessary. The appointment of additional members may be reduced by arranging for persons other than members to attend where necessary as advisers.

(NOTE.—If several British delegates are appointed to a single Committee, we shall be exposed to the danger that the Allies may feel that the Committee is allied in name only, and that it is the intention of the British Government to swamp them by numbers. To protect themselves against this they may appoint an equal number of delegates, so that the Committee becomes of unmanageable size.)

- (b) It is desirable that the British representatives should be men who can speak with authority for the Departments concerned in relation to the special products with which they are called upon to deal.

(NOTE.—It is recognised that the Programme Committees are only advisory bodies, and that their decisions cannot be made binding on the Governments concerned, but it is desired that their constitution should be such that their recommendations are likely to secure the assent of their Governments, and that the Allied representatives, after securing the adherence of the British delegates to any particular decision, may feel that there is every probability that it will be accepted by our Government and that they will not find later that their work has to be begun again with other representatives of the British Supply Departments, in addition to being subject, as it must, of course, be, to possible modifications in view of the limiting factors of shipping and finance.)

- (c) It is very desirable that the Chairman of the Committee should be elected by the Committee itself from among the representatives.
- (d) It will no doubt be desirable to arrange to link Committees dealing with like or interchangeable commodities by arranging for additional national representatives to be present at the several Committees within the group, and, in some cases, to form a combined Programme Committee not superseding, but co-ordinating the work of several Committees within a group and assisting in the determination of relative urgency as between the commodities dealt with by the different Committees within the group.

It is important that where this is desired the assent of the Allies should be obtained beforehand, and their concurrence and goodwill secured.

Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Robert Cecil are anxious that the Programme Committees should keep in the closest possible touch with the permanent organisation of the Allied Maritime Transport Council, and for this purpose would be glad if the Committees would meet where practicable at Lancaster House.

Lancaster House,
June 14th, 1918.

Copy of Memorandum issued on May 25, 1918, by Allied Maritime Transport Council Executive with a view of development of Programme Committees in accordance with the Council's decision in April.

Note as to Executives and Programme Committees.

At the Paris Conference of December last the question of Allied imports and tonnage was considered, and with a view to making the most advantageous use of the available shipping it was agreed by the Allies that "America, France, Italy and Great Britain will all tabulate and make available to each other a statement showing in detail and as nearly as possible in the same form each class of requirements for which tonnage is needed, and secondly the tonnage available and likely to be available through new building, &c. These requirements having been classified (showing the source of supply, &c.) and having been adjusted—(a) to secure a reasonably uniform standard of adequacy both as between classes of commodities and as between countries, and (b) to bring the total within the carrying capacity of the Allies as a whole, will form the basis on which the general allocation of tonnage will be determined."

As a result of decisions taken at that Conference the Allied Maritime Transport Council was formed, consisting of Ministers from each of the three chief European Allies with a delegate from America, and was charged with the duty of examining the use of all tonnage under Allied control with a view to allotting it to the services most essential to the prosecution of the war. The Council's powers are limited to making recommendations for action to the respective Governments, who retain final control over the movements of their own ships.

As there is a general shortage of shipping when set against import requirements, it was realised that the Council's recommendations would necessarily involve decisions not only (a) on the relative importance of the various import requirements, but also (b) on the relative needs of the several Allies for a particular commodity. It was therefore further decided at Paris, for the purpose of obtaining the best opinion as to the total amount required of a particular commodity, and as to its distribution among the Allies, that Allied bodies (Programme Committees) should be formed for the different main requirements (food, munition, raw materials, &c.) on the model of the Wheat Executive, America being associated with these bodies. It was contemplated that the formation of expert Allied bodies of this nature would greatly simplify the work of allotting tonnage, as considered programmes for each article would be rendered available, and that where the total of all the programmes exceeded the carrying capacity, the A.M.T.C. would be able to discuss possible reductions of programmes with the Committees before proceeding to make recommendations to the Allied Governments as to what reduction must be made.

It may be conveniently stated here that the A.M.T.C. will work in close co-operation with the Inter-Ally Council on War Purchase and Finance, documents being interchanged between the two Councils, and that it is understood that the latter Council are strongly in favour of the appointment of Programme Committees to assist them in their task of considering imports in relation to finance.

At their last session in Paris on April 23rd to 25th, the A.M.T.C. adopted a statement as to the general tonnage and import position for 1918, showing that the import programmes of the three European Allies for 1918 exceeds the carrying capacity available by some $8\frac{1}{2}$ million tons. It is, therefore, urgently necessary that these import programmes should be revised and reduced. Except in the case of cereals, meats and fats, and nitrates, the demands of each Ally for a particular commodity have not been criticised by a joint Allied body dealing with that commodity. The Council accordingly felt that it was imperative for the Allied Governments to proceed at once with the formation of joint expert bodies which should investigate the demands for commodities other than cereals and nitrates.

A copy of their Resolution is enclosed, attention being particularly called to paragraphs 3 (a) and 6.

The associated Governments are anxious that the Programme Committees should be instituted and commence their effective work at the earliest possible date.

From the point of view of the A.M.T.C. the work which it is hoped the Programme Committees will undertake may be provisionally described as follows :—

- (i) To obtain such information as is necessary to determine the requirements of each Allied country for the commodity or class of commodities with which the Programme Committee is concerned, including past consumption and stocks.
- (ii) To secure effective Allied criticism of the requirements so that the programme distributes the sacrifice entailed by any necessary shortage as equally as possible between the different countries, and in such a way as to be least injurious to the prosecution of the War.
- (iii) To prepare a programme for such period or periods, and on such a basis as the Council may desire, the programmes of all being as nearly as possible comparable and uniform, and also being so designed as to enable them to be readily adjusted to tonnage calculations in view of the varying strain imposed upon tonnage according as the country of shipment is near or distant. (Appropriate forms are being circulated by the A.M.T.C.)
- (iv) To forward the programmes so prepared to the Council with all such supplementary information as to stocks, &c., as will facilitate a decision between the competing claims of classes of imports for tonnage.
(As regards the competing claims of different countries for their share of a given commodity it is desirable that in every possible case the Programme Committee should agree upon the distribution without appeals to the Council, the Council's main consideration being, *e.g.*, the competing claims of cereals and munitions, not the competing claims of France and Great Britain for cereals.)
- (v) To discuss possible reductions of programme with the Council and its permanent organisation when forecasts of available tonnage show a deficiency as compared with the total of all programmes. The present position being that a reduction of imports is inevitable, it is proposed, as soon as the total requirements of the Programme Committees have been examined afresh in relation to the tonnage expected to be available during the rest of this year, to make a provisional plan for reduction which will bring the total imports within the capacity of the tonnage, and to ask the several Programme Committees what redistribution they would make among the Allies on the assumption of such a reduction and what would be the position of each country as a result, having regard to its stocks, &c.

25th. May 1918.

Meeting Place of Allied Programme Committees.

Lancaster House.

The Council Chamber at Lancaster House will be available for meetings of the Allied Programme Committees, and it is important that the meetings should take place there for the following reasons :—

- (1) In the first place, it is desirable that the whole conduct and procedure of these Committees should express the fact that they are definitely Allied bodies. For this purpose, the place of meeting is of importance. In founding the Allied Maritime Transport Council, and arranging both for its meetings and also the location of its permanent staff, it was found to be of importance to have a separate building used entirely for Allied work, and not directly connected with any British Department. Precisely the same reasons apply in the case of the Allied Programme Committees.
- (2) It would, doubtless, be more convenient in some respects for the British Departments concerned with the different commodities to have meetings in their own offices, where their papers are readily accessible. It must,

however, be remembered that the Allied representatives, with their papers and documents, are located in Lancaster House, and to ask the Allies to go to a British Department is to ask three sets of representatives to attend with their papers, &c., to meet the convenience of one, instead of *vice versa*.

- (3) The programmes of the Programme Committees are being prepared primarily and mainly to adjust the Allied requirements to the definite limiting factor of tonnage through the machinery of the Transport Council and its organisation. This involves a somewhat elaborate co-ordination and co-relation of the work of the different Committees. Questions will constantly arise as to the precise division of responsibility as between two Committees in relation to a particular commodity, and as to the form in which information is required, &c. It will be of great convenience that when the Committees are dealing with such questions, they shall have close at hand the staff of the Transport Council to assist and advise them. It is true that the work of the Programme Committees will be used by the War Purchase and Finance Council located at Sunderland House, as well as by the Transport Council. In view of the fact, however, that there is every prospect that tonnage and not finance will be the more difficult limiting factor, the scale of reduction to which the Programme Committees must work will necessarily be given, at any rate, in the first instance, rather by the Transport Council's organisation than by the Finance Council's. It is, therefore, convenient from every point of view, that the work of the Programme Committees should be very closely associated with the organisation of the Transport Council.

The above remarks refer only to Programme Committees and not to bodies like the Wheat Executive, which, while performing the duties of a Programme Committee, have also other duties of an executive character, and already meet in a building in which Allied representatives concerned with those duties are themselves located.

It will be convenient if the Secretary of each Programme Committee would make arrangements for the Lancaster House Council Room to be available for any desired meeting by telephoning to Mr. J. F. Henderson, Lancaster House (Regent, 3131; Ext. 13).

APPENDIX 57.

*Draft of Statement prepared for Publication in November 1918, but not issued
in view of Conclusion of Armistice.*

General Statement as to Allied Shipping Position.

The Allied Maritime Transport Council issue the following statement:—

In view of the important assistance which it is possible for the public in the Allied countries to give to the supply of the military forces, and in particular to the transport and supply of the American Army, by economising in the consumption both of food and other imported commodities, the Allied Maritime Transport Council have decided to issue from time to time a general statement of the shipping position with full information as to losses and new building.

For this purpose it has been thought best to include in the information the losses and building of all the main maritime countries including neutrals, enemy powers alone being excluded; and to make the statement in terms of deadweight tonnage, in order to give a closer indication of cargo-carrying capacity than gross tonnage does. In view of the difficulty of obtaining up-to-date information as to new building in certain neutral countries, and of ascertaining the exact deadweight tonnage of certain classes of vessels, the information may sometimes be somewhat less exact than if it were confined to Allied countries and stated in terms of gross tonnage. The margin of possible inaccuracy is, however, small, and not sufficient, in the opinion of the Council, to outweigh the advantages of this form of statement.

Subject to this reservation the following table gives the losses and new building of vessels (exclusive of small craft) in the first eight months of this year.

	Three European Allies (Great Britain, France, Italy).	United States.	Other Allies (Japan, Russia, Brazil, Greece, Portugal, Belgium).	Neutrals (Norway, Holland, Sweden, Spain, Denmark).
	Deadweight Tonnage.	Deadweight Tonnage.	Deadweight Tonnage.	Deadweight Tonnage.
Losses (all causes)	2,819,000	387,000	222,000	396,000
Building -	1,679,000	1,798,000	470,000	169,000
Net loss or gain -	- 1,140,000	+ 1,411,000	+ 248,000	- 227,000

The general Allied shipping position is thus that the Allies are now building more ships than they are losing but not so many more as the additional number required for the American Army in France.

During this period, therefore, America has built nearly $1\frac{1}{2}$ million tons deadweight more vessels than she has lost, but she has needed all these and more besides to transport and maintain her forces in France.

The European Allies have, on the other hand, lost a little over one million tons more than they have built, and as it is for the present necessary for British tonnage to assist in both the transportation and supply of American tonnage, the need for economy and rigid restriction of all import commodities is as great as ever.

It is true that the submarine has failed in its first object, which was to reduce the military strength of Great Britain, France, and Italy, by reducing the supplies both to maintain their forces and to feed their populations.

Every army in every field has hitherto been fully supplied, and no reduction has been made on account of the submarine campaign. On the contrary, in addition to the forces which were in the field when the intensive campaign commenced in the early part of 1917, it is a matter of public knowledge that there are now in France about $1\frac{3}{4}$ million of American troops. That army is the measure of the failure of the submarine.

World building, including American, now exceeds world losses, and the harvests of this year are somewhat better than those of last year. This means that the Allies can transport and supply in France for next year's campaign an immensely larger army than they have ever commanded before, but it does not mean that there is tonnage sufficient to import more or even as much for civilian consumption in the future as in the past. On the contrary, both the need and reward of economy are greater than ever. Early victory depends upon having sufficient forces in France to

achieve decisive success and upon making it clear at the earliest moment to all countries, including the enemy, that the Allies will have such a force and mean to use it. America has the men, and desires as much as the European Allies do that they shall come and come quickly. But these forces would necessarily be limited if the supplies in France to maintain them and the ships to transport those supplies were insufficient. Every pound of supplies, whether of food or clothing or other imported articles, which we can save here means so much more shipping to take supplies for the armies in France, and therefore so much more help towards a bigger force and early victory.

If everyone in the three European Allied countries saved only two ounces a day as compared with last year's consumption, this saving alone would enable half a million additional troops to be sent to France and maintained there.

It is well that the public should, in considering the sacrifices they are asked to make, remember those which Germany has borne for several years. In Germany the allowance of bread is $2\frac{3}{4}$ pounds a week, their allowance of bacon and meat together amounts to 9 ounces a week, their allowance of fat between 2 and $2\frac{1}{2}$ ounces per week.

The Allied countries will not be asked to suffer a reduction in food so serious as this, and such reductions as will be necessary will be made with the definite prospect of lasting only a few months. There is every hope that by the summer of next year at the latest the whole Allied shipping position will be substantially improved. If, however, the maximum number of American troops are to be transported to France before the fighting of next year, and if the supplies, without which they cannot attain their full fighting efficiency, are also to be sent, it can only be by such a use of ships as will necessarily involve severe, though temporary, hardship to the public in the Allied countries.

APPENDIX 58.

*Draft of Statement prepared for publication but not issued in view of
Conclusion of Armistice.*

UNITY OF CONTROL.

The Principle applied to Allied Supplies.

The Allied Maritime Transport Council make the following announcement :—

The Council, which was established by the Allied Conference at Paris in December last, and is now working through a permanent organisation at Lancaster House and a series of Committees in which Allied representatives of all the main Supply Departments in each country are co-operating, stands for the application of the principle of Allied control to Allied supplies.

The strength of the forces the Allies can command in France depends upon the amount of supplies which can be transported to maintain them, and any failure to organise the transport and supply system to its maximum efficiency might easily mean postponing victory by a year.

It is essential, therefore, that the resources of the Allies shall be used to their utmost; and for this that they shall be used under a central plan and under unified control.

The Allies have agreed that the allocation of ships, upon which depend all their imported supplies both for Military and Civilian purposes, shall be arranged upon the simple and equitable principle of securing that they help most effectively in the prosecution of the war and distribute as evenly as possible among the associated countries the strain and sacrifice which the war entails.

The available supplies of food for the Allies are limited, the output of munitions is limited, the manufacture of every form of supplies and provisions required for both combatants on land or at sea is limited. If any service has more than it can fairly demand as its share of the common resources, if any country has more than it can fairly demand, there is a net reduction in the forces directed against the enemy and an unfair distribution of the sacrifices entailed by the war. This is a problem which no single country can solve by itself. France from the first moment of the war had to divert so many men to her army as to make the need for assistance from her Allies for supplies and shipping essential. Italy, too, has engaged in military operations

beyond the power of her production and her industrial sources. Great Britain and America are bound to provide both ships and supplies. To America the Allies are bound to look for the main portion of their food supplies, for financial help, and later, as her shipbuilding increases, to tonnage assistance too. Great Britain, for the time being, bears the main burden of supplying her Allies' deficiencies in tonnage.

The essential basis of any such organisation must be the control of shipping, for shipping is the limiting factor in all allied supplies. Throughout the last two years of the war more supplies have been produced than ships could transport. The amount of supplies therefore depends upon the ships to carry them, and the amount which each ally can obtain depends upon the allocation of tonnage to that ally. It has become necessary therefore that the authorities who control the different mercantile marines which serve the allies should be so associated as to direct their vessels under a common plan, and should have at hand an Allied organisation competent to advise them as to the relative importance of all Allied requirements.

Much has already been done. A year ago, although the tonnage at the disposal of the Allies was considerably greater than it is now, the European Allies were in grave doubt and uncertainty till right up to the harvest as to whether they would reach the harvest without serious shortage of food. This year, in spite of shipping losses, each of the Allies knew by the end of the spring that it was assured of an adequate food supply to the harvest and well beyond. Not only that, but each Ally is satisfied that in its most important food supply—bread—the resources open to the Allies as a whole have been fairly distributed between them.

The principle successfully vindicated in the case of bread and all cereals is now being applied to the whole range of imported commodities required by the Allies, each of which is being examined by Allied experts. A Munitions Council is examining the requirements for munitions of America, France, Italy, and Great Britain, and is attempting to see that, in relation to the military strength and commitments of the four countries, the arrangements for production, for supply and for transport are adequate and fairly distributed. Similar committees under an Allied Food Council are dealing with every class of imported food and with every class of article required as raw materials for industries. When the programmes have been so produced by agreement between these different Allied experts, they will be considered in relation to the total carrying power of the available tonnage under Allied control, and so far as the tonnage suffices, it is intended that arrangements shall be made between the different Governments to allocate tonnage accordingly. In order that the more important questions of policy as to the direction in which reduction should be made if the total programmes exceed the carrying power of the total ships, the whole of the above machinery of Allied Committees is linked up to a Council of Allied Ministers (the Allied Maritime Transport Council). This Council consists of two Ministers from each of the European Governments and two delegates from America. Its current executive and administrative work is carried out by a permanent organisation, the Allied Maritime Transport Executive, consisting of expert staffs supplied by the four Governments and working together in one office.

It is the definite duty of this Council and this Executive to make a plan which will, by arrangement with the different Governments, secure that the whole of the imported supplies of the different Allies are fairly allotted so as to aid most effectively the successful prosecution of the war, and to share the burden of sacrifice as equally as possible between the different countries. These principles were explicitly and unanimously accepted by all the Allies at the great Paris Conference of December last. The organisation is now at work, the investigations are being made, and the purpose can be achieved. One thing, however, is necessary to success. The civilian populations must be prepared to accept sacrifices which fall in one direction or another as a part of the general plan.

It is essential that the public in the four countries should realise what the shipping position is and how much depends upon a rigid economy in every direction if we are to end the war quickly and victoriously.

The Allied Maritime Transport Council propose for this purpose to issue from time to time a general statement of the Allied shipping position (*see* Appendix 57).

APPENDIX 59.

Note (of April 19th, 1918) as to prospective shipping position immediately after the War.

The main factors to be taken into consideration are the following :—

(a)—(i) There will be a large demand on shipping for the repatriation of troops to Australasia, Canada, and America.

(ii) There will be a large emigration traffic, emigration having been practically stopped for the period of the war.

(iii) There will be a large tourist traffic across the Atlantic, tourist traffic to Europe having also been stopped by the war, and the fact of American troops having fought in France providing of course an immense additional incentive to travel.

(iv) Stocks will have been depleted throughout the war and consumption will rise above war level.

(v) There will be a great movement of material for reconstruction work in all devastated areas.

(vi) Enemy countries will come into the market and possibly make demands upon neutral tonnage and at the same time be competing for the nearer sources of supply of grain, &c., *e.g.*, Argentine, which may force us to go to more distant sources such as Australia.

(vii) Most ships are being run down to a worse state of repair, and a considerable proportion of ships now running are of an age at which they would in normal times be broken up. There will therefore be a considerable withdrawal of vessels from service and large repair work.

(b) On the other hand there are the following considerations :—

(i) The German and Austrian tonnage will be coming into the market and I think may be fairly set against German and Austrian needs.

(ii) There will be an immediate and immense release of vessels from the carriage of munitions and the raw materials for munitions, &c., and a large though more slowly increasing release of vessels from naval and military services generally.

(iii) By the end of the war, world building is likely to exceed world losses, even including war and marine losses. As soon as war losses stop, the excess of output each month will be immensely above losses.

(iv) The immediate abolition of the convoy system will add greatly to the carrying power of ships and at once.

(v) I think it is an entire mistake to assume, as is done in so many calculations, that we shall jump rapidly back to peace standards of consumption and peace methods of supply. There will be a general sense of financial exhaustion which will prevent enterprise at once being resumed on a pre-war scale. In addition to this, the change of sources of supply by development of home produce in every direction will only be gradually reversed, and it will be many years before imports are likely to be on a pre-war level.

(vi) The provision of smaller vessels for ore will at once be helped by the resumption of work in the French coal mines combined with a diminution in the use of coal for munition factories.

On balance I am definitely of opinion that the considerations under (b) immensely outweigh those under (a). That is to say, there is likely to be an immense and immediate decline in freight rates as soon as peace is declared, and a decline, though not so sensational, in values of ships. I have been of this opinion for some years, although until recently I believe I have been in a minority.

19th April 1918.

J. A. S.

SHIPPING INTELLIGENCE SECTION.

Allied Maritime Transport Executive.—Note of Records and Work.

This section maintains a record of movements, employment, and commitments of all ocean-going merchant vessels of all nationalities, whether British, Allied, or Neutral. This record now gives not only current information with regard to all vessels, but a history of the employment of each vessel, extending back for three years in the case of British vessels and two years in the case of Allied and neutral vessels.

The record is kept up to date by means of daily "Conship" telegrams (110 daily) from Consuls, Admiralty Intelligence Officers, and Lloyd's Agents at Foreign ports; by télégrams from Naval Transport and Shipping Control Officers at home and abroad (about 400 daily); daily telegrams (followed by reports by post) from Customs Officers in the United Kingdom (160 daily); copies of telegrams intercepted by the Censor (originally about 1,000 a day, but in the latter part of the war under new arrangements reduced to 400 to 500): from various returns, viz.:—Monthly returns by shipowners (originally 400 a month, but now partly discontinued); returns by Secretaries of Liner Conferences; returns of Charters arranged by Chartering Committees; Licences granted by Ship Licensing Committee; Contraband Committee Minutes, Patrol and Boarding Reports; bunker agreements, and information supplied by executive branches of the Ministry of Shipping and the Admiralty.

The basis of record is a card system with a card for each vessel. The cards are arranged in three alphabetical series—one for British, one for the Allied nations and one for the Neutral vessels. The cards contain, in addition to movements and commitments, particulars as to size, speed, type, date built, whether fitted with W/T, E/L, defensive armament, mine protection gear; dazzle painted, &c. In the British Index, coloured cards are used to distinguish the class of vessel, *i.e.* :—

Blue.—Passenger liner.

Pink.—Cargo.

White.—Tramp.

Green.—Oil tankers.

Brown.—Large coaster.

Salmon.—Small coaster.

Buff.—Other types.

Tab cut in the cards in different positions subdivide each class according to size.

In the Allied and Neutral Indexes the colour card combined with position of tab indicates nationality. Moveable metal signals are used on the top edge of the main card to bring into prominence particulars temporarily required. These signals were also used to show the geographical position of the vessel, but are not so used at present, the Geographical Index referred to later having taken their place.

An Owners' Index is run in connection with the British Record, showing the Fleets arranged under each owner, and adjusted as necessary for vessels newly built, vessels sunk, or vessels sold or purchased.

A third Record, a Geographical Distribution Index, is maintained from the same sources to show at any moment the vessels, British, Allied, or Neutral, in a given area or on a given route. This record is used in connection with the Ocean Convoying of vessels for tracing unknown vessels reported in particular areas and for ascertaining the volume of traffic on the different routes.

A fourth Record, a list of British Masters, is compiled from information furnished by owners and from Customs reports.

A fifth Record of Allied and Neutral Masters, &c., compiled from Customs Forms and from information supplied by the Admiralty. The main object of this is to keep a record of masters of pro-German or pro-Ally sympathies.

In addition to the upkeep of these Records and for the purpose of enquiry in respect of particulars of vessels, the section supplies a number of regular returns (*see* schedules attached) and also as required special returns giving position or tonnage, &c., of vessels arranged under Nationality, under size and under special qualifications.

Shipping Intelligence Section.—The section originally created as a part of the Ministry of Shipping (Requisitioning Branch) was transferred to Lancaster House to work as part of the Allied Maritime Transport Executive. A large part of its work has been Allied in character (*e.g.*, the preparation of the statistical tables in this volume), but it has in addition continued to prepare a number of purely British returns for the Executive work of the Ministry of Shipping (as will be seen from the enclosed list).

**SCHEDULE OF RETURNS RENDERED REGULARLY BY SHIPPING
INTELLIGENCE SECTION.**

DAILY.

- (a) U.K.—Scandinavia, Holland, &c.—Arrivals at and sailings from U.K.
- (b) Arrivals of vessels, 1,600 G.T. and over, defensively armed.
- (c) Arrivals of vessels, 400 G.T. and over, not armed.
- (d) Steamers homeward bound but not in convoy to U.K., French Channel Ports and Rotterdam from—
 - (1) Canadian ports.
 - (2) New York and U.S.A. ports north thereof.
 - (3) U.S.A. ports south of New York.
 - (4) From or *viâ* Cape, Dakar, &c.
 - (5) „ „ „ Gibraltar.
- (e) Arrivals in U.K. from overseas.
- (f) Steamers loading ore at Bilbao for U.K. sailed for U.K. and arrived in U.K. from Bilbao, giving nationality and G.T.
- (g) Statement of vessels leaving U.K. ports for European ports south of Corunna, Mediterranean, Africa, and America.
- (h) Notification of movements of steamers outward bound from U.K. in convoy up to and including date of their arrival at destination.
- (i) Steamers leaving Far Eastern, Australian, and Indian and E. African ports for Mediterranean ports west of Malta, Gibraltar, and ports west of Gibraltar (*viâ* Suez).
- (j) Cable to C.-in-C., Malta, all vessels departing for Mediterranean ports *viâ* Gibraltar from (or *viâ*) Atlantic ports.
- (k) Return of vessels entering or leaving Requisitioned Service.
- (l) Casualty List—all nationalities giving War and Marine losses and casualties, with particulars of voyage and cargo.
- (m) Reports of vessels overdue.
- (n) Movements of Spanish vessels trading Spain to U.K.
- (o) Sailings U.K.—N. France.
- (p) „ U.K.—Bay.
- (q) Arrivals and sailings from Gibraltar.
- (r) Sailings from certain Mediterranean ports, Genoa, &c.
- (s) Daily cable to New York—Movements of steamers arriving in and sailing from Europe and Africa from and to continent of America.
- (t) Advice of American steamers sailing from U.K. in convoy.
- (u) Movements of time-chartered Neutrals.
- (v) „ „ liners running between U.K. and ports in U.S.A. and Canada.
- (w) „ „ collier transports reported in convoy.

WEEKLY.

- (a) Summary of steamers on passage to Mediterranean with amending and supplementary particulars not cabled.
- (b) List of vessels requisitioned but not allocated to a particular service.
- (c) Position of all oil tankers—British, Allied and Neutral, showing cargoes and prospective movements.
- (d) Statement of adjustment of British tonnage.
- (e) Alphabetical list of steamers on passage to Suez from the East.
- (f) U.K. arrivals and sailings (on Hollerith system of cards).

- (g) Vessels homeward bound from Mediterranean, Far East, &c., *viâ* Gibraltar.
- (h) " " " " *viâ* Cape, W. Africa, and S. America.
- (i) Advice to "Lloyds" of additions and deletions to the list of names of vessels engaged in the service of the Government.
- (j) List of vessels in which Commonwealth Government of Australia is interested—up-to-date positions.
- (k) Position of homeward-bound meat ships.
- (l) Danish, Dutch, and Swedish vessels arriving in Scandinavia without calling at U.K., and Danish, Dutch, and Swedish vessels arriving at overseas ports from Scandinavia without calling at U.K.

FORTNIGHTLY.

- (a) Position of Danish tonnage.
- (b) Neutral vessels carrying oil in bulk or barrel approaching European waters—positions and cargo.
- (c) Liner List, showing allocation of world's liners under the various trades.

MONTHLY.

- (a) Statistical Return. Employment of British Shipping 500 G.T. and over (end of month).
- (aa) Statement showing the relation of British tonnage engaged on importing services to that engaged on non-importing services (vessels 1,600 G.T. and over).
- (b) Position of vessels not in full Government requisition (15th month).
- (c) Statistical Returns of Employment of Danish Shipping.
- (d) " " " " Dutch Shipping.
- (e) " " " " Greek Shipping.
- (f) " " " " Norwegian Shipping.
- (g) " " " " Swedish Shipping.
- (h) " " " " Spanish Shipping.
- (j) " " " " Portuguese Shipping.
- (k) " " " " Japanese Shipping.
- (l) " " " " U.S.A. (overseas) Shipping.
- (m) " " " " French Shipping.
- (n) " " " " Belgian Shipping.
- (o) " " " " Russian Shipping.
- (p) " " " " Italian Shipping.
- (q) " " " " Brazilian Shipping.
- (r) Analysis of Neutral tonnage sunk, arranged under trades.
- (s) British tonnage under requisition or trading on French account.
- (t) Vessels (British, Allied, and Neutral) arriving in United Kingdom from—
(a) North Spanish ports. (b) South Spanish (European) ports. (c) North African loading ports, and vessels sunk (all risks) or damaged (all risks) in same categories.
- (u) Analysis of vessels shown in (1) 1,600 G.T. and over—returning to United Kingdom with ore—showing destinations on proceeding outward journey.
- (w) Analysis of British vessels sunk in French section.

AT INTERVALS.

- (a) British vessels; record of Government Service (with supplements), *i.e.*, *Service List*.
- (b) Reports as to performance of Neutral vessels under 30 per cent. agreement.
- (c) Reports as to performance of neutral vessels under particular trade restrictions.
- (d) Reports of vessels which appear to have passed through the blockade without interception or without calling for inspection.
- (e) Blockade statistics as required.

BI-WEEKLY.

Alphabetical list of steamers homeward bound which have left last overseas port for United Kingdom.

VIII.

STATISTICAL TABLES SHOWING EMPLOYMENT OF EACH NATIONAL MERCANTILE MARINE ON CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES.

NOTE.—The following tables give a complete presentation of the employment of all ocean-going ships of every nationality, country by country.

They have been prepared by the Shipping Intelligence Section of the Allied Maritime Transport Executive, the information being obtained as described on page 238.

For a summarized statement of the employment of World Tonnage, see pages 223–8.

**Statement of Employment of Allied and Neutral Vessels,
31st October 1918.**

								PAGE
Employment of British	Vessels	-	-	-	-	-	-	244
„	French	„	-	-	-	-	-	255
„	Italian	„	-	-	-	-	-	259
„	U.S.A.	„	-	-	-	-	-	263
„	Belgian	„	-	-	-	-	-	269
„	Brazilian	„	-	-	-	-	-	273
„	Danish	„	-	-	-	-	-	277
„	Dutch	„	-	-	-	-	-	283
„	German	}	„	-	-	-	-	287
„	Austrian							
„	Greek	„	-	-	-	-	-	291
„	Japanese	„	-	-	-	-	-	295
„	Norwegian	„	-	-	-	-	-	299
„	Portuguese	„	-	-	-	-	-	307
„	Russian	„	-	-	-	-	-	311
„	Spanish	„	-	-	-	-	-	315
„	Swedish	„	-	-	-	-	-	319

(a) EMPLOYMENT OF BRITISH VESSELS OF
31st October

Excluding vessels in the Baltic, or such employment (e.g., in the Great

1918.												Passenger Vessels.		Cargo Vessels (Tramps and Liners).	
Mar.	Apl.	May.	June.	July.	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.					No.	Tonnage.	No.	Tonnage.
								I. Requisitioned Vessels :— (excluding Wheat, see b.)							
347	322	273	313	289	311	340	343	(a) British :—Navy -				60	377,475	283	967,500
297	320	312	262	287	275	282	297	War Office - -				85	413,097	212	885,822
45	38	50	52	70	55	33	18	Sugar - - -				—	—	18	68,892
								Pyrites and Iron				—	—	68	214,069
								Ore.				—	—	8	44,017
								Nitrates - - -				—	—	83	314,693
								Other munitions and				1	4,435	—	—
								general (including				—	—	31	69,788
								berth) cargoes.				—	—	106	389,875
305	300	331	357	353	317	338	310	U.K./Norway -				—	—	—	—
								Repairing (from				13	53,766	—	—
								Services in I.).				—	—	5	27,436
8	5	4	3	5	6	6	6	Australia - - -				1	6,942	1	4,638
9	10	9	7	4	3	4	3	New Zealand -				2	11,860	42	134,042
84	82	83	85	85	89	90	86	India				44	153,893	2	6,571
—	—	—	—	1	5	5	2	Other colonies, &c.				—	—	62	212,436
73	77	63	44	55	41	39	62	France - - -				—	—	94	377,738
41	58	57	60	84	81	71	94	Italy - - -				—	—	—	—
1	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	France or Italy (destination not				—	—	—	—
								determined).				—	—	34	170,902
9	15	12	12	14	20	30	47	United States				13	233,060	20	87,376
5	4	6	6	6	22	21	23	Russia -				2	6,430	4	12,644
3	5	3	3	3	5	4	4	Other Allies -				—	—	—	—
								(b) Vessels carrying Cereals and							
								similar food stuffs for							
								discharge in :—							
56	47	35	21	43	75	84	84	United Kingdom				1	4,078	83	379,233
13	26	55	88	106	89	44	36	France - - -				1	5,833	35	170,845
25	59	77	56	64	67	81	73	Italy - - -				—	—	73	326,271
1	—	1	1	—	—	—	—	France or Italy -				—	—	—	—
18	11	5	5	6	2	7	9	Other destinations -				—	—	9	37,248
76	68	47	50	19	15	2	—	Destination not determined				—	—	—	—
7	25	24	12	6	6	8	7	II. Vessels under notice of requi-				—	—	7	26,379
								sition but not yet allocated				—	—	—	—
								to a particular Service.*				—	—	—	—
1	1	—	2	2	1	1	—	III. Vessels temporarily released to				—	—	—	—
								owners with an obligation to				—	—	—	—
								resume Government Service.*				—	—	—	—
								IV. Vessels at present free from				223	1,270,869	1,280	4,928,415
								Admiralty requisition† :—				—	—	—	—
								§(a) Vessels trading on behalf of				—	—	—	—
								Allied Governments :—				—	—	—	—
79	83	81	81	108	106	109	100	France - - -				4	44,650	96	392,895
24	21	14	13	23	48	46	61	Italy - - -				7	37,258	54	232,530
—	—	—	—	—	2	3	2	Other Allies -				1	3,140	1	1,608
1,281	1,241	1,267	1,266	1,174	1,162	1,154	1,146	(b) Other Vessels not included				577	2,511,449	770	3,493,686
								under previous heads.				—	—	—	—
2,808	2,818	2,809	2,799	2,808	2,803	2,802	2,813	TOTALSφ - -				612	3,867,366	2,201	9,049,134
								V. Vessels fitted for carriage of				No.		Tonnage.	
205	208	210	215	217	217	222	229	petroleum in bulk.				2,813		12,916,500	
Prizes and	detained V	essels.						VI. Passenger and Cargo Vessels				229		1,177,627	
99	97	97	94	98	93	94	80	launched and completing.				80		312,599	
3,112	3,123	3,116	3,108	3,123	3,113	3,118	3,122	GRAND TOTAL††				3,122		14,406,726	

For notes, see page 246.

1,600 GROSS TONNAGE AND OVER ON 1918.

Lakes) as to render them not available for ocean-going trade or requisition.

II.

ANALYSIS OF VESSELS UNDER NOTICE OF REQUISITION, SHOWN UNDER II.

	No.	Tonnage.	No.	Tonnage.
(1) Vessels outward bound, to enter service abroad - - -	—	—	—	—
(2) Vessels repairing - - - - -	—	—	1	3,624
(3) Vessels homeward bound with cargo :—				
(a) For discharge in United Kingdom :—				
Pyrites or iron ore - - - - -	1	3,848		
Whale oil - - - - -	1	3,460		
General - - - - -	1	5,247		
Coasting - - - - -	1	2,005	4	14,560
(b) For discharge in France :—				
General - - - - -	2	8,195	2	8,195
		Total -	7	26,379

III.

ANALYSIS OF VESSELS TEMPORARILY RELEASED TO OWNERS, SHOWN UNDER III.

	No.	Tonnage.	No.	Tonnage.
(1) Vessels outward bound, to enter service abroad -	—	—	—	—
(2) Vessels repairing - - - - -	—	—	—	—
(3) Vessels homeward bound with cargo - - - - -	—	—	—	—

ANALYSIS OF FREE VESSELS SHOWN UNDER IV. (b).

	No.	Tonnage.	No.	Tonnage.
(1) Colonial registered vessels permanently abroad :—				
(a) Australia - { Passenger vessels - - -	16	43,832		
- { Cargo vessels - - -	76	208,007		
(b) Canada - - - { Passenger vessels - - -	12	32,169		
- { Cargo vessels - - -	32	113,417		
(c) Other Colonies, &c. { Passenger vessels - - -	3	7,199		
- { Cargo vessels - - -	15	35,449		
			154	440,073
(2) United Kingdom registered vessels trading abroad :—				
(a) Passenger vessels - - -	32	75,635		
(b) Cargo vessels - - -	27	64,373		
			59†	440,008
φ(3) Passenger vessels repairing or surveying - - -	24	168,740		
Cargo vessels repairing or surveying - - -	59	283,409		
			83	452,149
(4) Other vessels (not under full requisition) :—				
† Passenger Liners on berth - - -	281	2,164,942		
† Cargo Liners loading on berth, including Tramps chartered to Liner Cos., &c.	515	2,654,292		
			796†	4,819,234
Vessels trading for Colonies but not permanently abroad -	14	52,241		
Cereals for discharge in United Kingdom - - -	—	—		
Ore, phosphates, lead, &c., for discharge in United Kingdom	13	30,854		
General cargo and munitions for discharge in United Kingdom	3	10,364		
Coasting United Kingdom - - -	21	42,831		
Cable repairing and laying - - -	4	17,381		
			55	153,671
			1,147	6,008,135

NOTES.

* For analysis, see page 245.

† For analysis, see pages 246 and/or 247.

§ To ascertain the number of vessels actually in the service of the Allies on the date of this return the numbers given under I. and IV. on page 244 and in II. (b) on page 245 must also be included. In addition, a number of vessels shown under ore, phosphates, lead, &c., load outward for an Allied Government. A comparison of the numbers shown under IV. for the 8 months does not therefore give an accurate criterion of the vessels in Allied service at the different periods.

¶ "Requisition" is here used to mean "requisition for full Government service." The vessels shown as "free from requisition" therefore include the vessels that are requisitioned under the special liner requisitioning scheme.

† SPECIAL LINER REQUISITIONING SCHEME :—

All liner trades are now requisitioned under special conditions, which, while leaving the vessels still under the management of their owners, and free so far as circumstances permit to accept private as well as Government cargo, secure that the vessels are operated on Government account, the owners being paid on a Blue Book basis.

|| The decrease in the Liners shown under (4) on page 246 is due to the inclusion under IV. (a) on page 244 of Liners which are now definitely engaged in importing work for France and Italy. In addition, certain other vessels which were previously shown under IV. (a) on page 244 have also now been brought within the Liner Requisitioning scheme, so that, in all, there are now included under "Trading for France and Italy" respectively, the following vessels which are under Liner Requisition :—

France	- 39—229,035 G.T.
Italy	- 47—223,858 G.T.

†† Includes 26 vessels (65,736 G.T.) transferred from Norwegian flag under the Norwegian Agreement. As these require to be replaced in Norwegian service by British vessels they do not represent additional vessels available for British service.

φ Prize and detained vessels, previously shown separately under VII. on page 244, were from 31st July onwards included with ordinary vessels in their relative categories. On the other hand, "Vessels launched and completing," previously included under V. on page 244 and analysis (4) on page 246, were from 31st July onwards shown separately under VII. on page 244.

Detailed Analysis of Passenger and Cargo Liners included under V.

See note at foot of page 246.

I.—To UNITED KINGDOM.

(Including Liners discharging part cargoes in N. France.)

No. of Passenger Vessels.		No. of Cargo Vessels.		Route.
No.	Tonnage.	No.	Tonnage.	
2	5,321	19	56,739	Egyptian Ports and U.K. (including N. France).
3	8,540	18	45,608	Mediterranean (other than Egyptian Ports), Bay Ports, and U.K. (including N. France).
8	29,257	25	87,731	W. Africa and U.K. (including N. France).
2	12,134	26	139,128	S. and E. Africa and U.K. (including N. France).
19	170,642	15	85,899	Australia and New Zealand and U.K. (including N. France).
16	105,293	65	381,773	India and Burmah (up to and including Rangoon) and U.K. (including N. France).
3	22,574	19	116,053	Straits (including Singapore and Java) and Far East and U.K. (including N. France).
119	1,147,619	157	934,728	N. America (including Canada and Gulf) and U.K. (including N. France).
41	321,920	68	346,146	S. America (Atlantic) and U.K. (including N. France).
7	32,011	13	59,346	West Coast N. and S. America and U.K. (including N. France).
3	5,742	8	20,907	Scandinavia and U.K.
223	1,861,053	433	2,274,058	Total.

II.—To COUNTRIES OTHER THAN UNITED KINGDOM.

				Route.
—	—	—	—	Mediterranean and Bay Ports, and N. America (including Canada and Gulf).
2	7,631	15	61,579	Africa (W., S. & E.) and N. America (including Canada and Gulf).
2	9,342	16	88,308	India and Burmah (up to and including Rangoon) and N. America (including Canada and Gulf).
—	—	1	4,365	Australia and New Zealand and N. America East Coast (including Canada and Gulf).
3	18,399	5	31,578	Straits (including Singapore and Java) and Far East and West Coast (N. America).
—	—	3	15,972	India and S. America (Atlantic and Pacific).
—	—	1	3,969	N. America and S. America.
5	31,106	6	17,131	Australia and New Zealand and West Coast N. and S. America.
6	22,076	10	40,087	India and South and East Africa.
5	25,282	4	17,378	India and Australia.
6	27,282	4	13,426	India and Far East.
—	—	7	33,789	India and Egyptian and Mediterranean Ports.
14	42,739	6	32,720	Indian Coastal Trade.
5	23,238	2	5,864	N. America and Canada and Central America.
10	96,794	2	14,068	Australia and Egyptian Ports.
58	303,889	82	380,234	Total.
281	2,164,942	515	2,654,292	Grand Total.

III.—OTHER UNITED KINGDOM REGISTERED VESSELS TRADING ABROAD.

				Area of Trading Routes.
5	17,898	2	5,077	In Australian Seas.
5	13,450	6	18,730	In American (including Canadian) Seas.
22	44,287	19	40,566	In other Seas (principally Indian, Chinese, and Java Seas).
32	75,635	27	64,373	Total.

COMPARATIVE STATEMENTS.

(1) COMPARISON BETWEEN BRITISH TONNAGE JULY 1914 AND 31ST OCTOBER 1918.

	No. of Vessels.	Tonnage.		No. of Vessels.	Tonnage.
July 1914 - -	4,068	17,516,876	Deduct :—		
Add :—			War losses - -	1,764	7,379,986
Launched - - -	890	4,170,601	Vessels interned in enemy ports or captured.	46	153,067
Transferred from foreign flags and other causes.	328	1,354,526	Marine losses - -	248	917,997
Prizes - -	144	611,778	Transferred to foreign flags and other causes.	248	998,463
Alterations to gross tonnage (net gain).	—	204,920	Locked in Baltic - -	2	2,462
			(Not in enemy ports.)		
Totals - -	5,430	23,858,701	Totals - -	2,308	9,451,975

Position 31st October 1918 = 3,122 of 14,406,726 tons.

(2) COMPARISON BETWEEN MONTHLY NET REDUCTION IN VESSELS AVAILABLE FOR TRADE OR REQUISITION (excluding Oilers).

November 1917.	December 1917.	January 1918.	February 1918.	March 1918.	April 1918.	May 1918.	June 1918.	July 1918.	August 1918.	September 1918.	October 1918.
28	56	19	35	6	Gain 8	9	13	Gain 13	10	Njl	3

The alterations during October 1918 were as follows :—

Additions.					Deductions.				
Launched - - - -	-	-	-	22	War losses - - - -	-	-	-	12
Transferred from foreign flags and other causes	-	-	-	1	Marine losses - - - -	-	-	-	9
Net loss - - - -	-	-	-	3	Transferred to foreign flags and other causes	-	-	-	5
				<u>26</u>					<u>26</u>

(3) COMPARISON BETWEEN MONTHLY NUMBER OF REQUISITIONED VESSELS FOR ARMY, NAVY, AND ALLIES (excluding Wheat, Sugar, Ore, and Oilers).

November 1917.	December 1917.	January 1918.	February 1918.	March 1918.	April 1918.	May 1918.	June 1918.	July 1918.	August 1918.	September 1918.	October 1918.
1,137	1,109	1,054	1,050	985	1,010	943	898	937	962	1,007	1,086

(4) COMPARISON BETWEEN MONTHLY TOTAL FIGURE OF BRITISH VESSELS, 1,600 GROSS TONS AND OVER (including vessels launched and completing but excluding Oilers).

November 1917.	December 1918.	January 1918.	February 1918.	March 1918.	April 1918.	May 1918.	June 1918.	July 1918.	August 1918.	September 1918.	October 1918.
3,023	2,967	2,949	2,913	2,907	2,915	2,906	2,893	2,906	2,896	2,896	2,893

(b) 500—1,599 Gross Tonnage.

(b) Employment of British Vessels of 500—

	Passenger Vessels.		Cargo Vessels. (Tramps, Cargo Liners, and Coasters.)	
	No.	Tonnage.	No.	Tonnage.
I. Requisitioned vessels :—				
British :—Navy - - - - -	31	27,140	119	121,439
War Office - - - - -	23	25,997	118	112,273
Pyrites and iron ore - - - - -	—	—	3	4,039
Other munitions and general cargo - - - - -	—	—	—	—
U.K./Holland—Supplies - - - - -	1	1,274	1	1,198
U.K./Norway - - - - -	—	—	30	35,749
Salvage - - - - -	—	—	1	537
Miscellaneous—(e.g., Net charter, Irish Trade) - - - - -	4	4,802	2	2,404
Repairing - - - - -	3	3,518	16	18,041
India - - - - -	3	2,692	4	5,114
France - - - - -	—	—	60	56,181
United States - - - - -	—	—	1	754
Other Allies - - - - -	1	1,401	2	1,506
II. Vessels under notice of requisition but not yet allocated to a particular service.	—	—	2	2,040
III. Vessels temporarily released to owners with an obligation to resume Government service.	—	—	—	—
IV. Vessels at present free from requisition :—				
(a) Vessels trading on behalf of Allied Governments :—				
France - - - - -	8	9,238	133	122,809
Italy - - - - -	—	—	1	1,105
Russia - - - - -	—	—	1	1,330
Other Allies - - - - -	—	—	8	6,179
(b) Other vessels not included under previous heads*	106	110,210	338	329,516
Total † - - - - -	180	186,272	840	822,214
	No. 1,020†		Tonnage. 1,008,486	
V. Vessels fitted for carriage of petroleum in bulk - - -	8		8,564	
VI. ‡ Passenger and cargo vessels launched and completing - - -	5		6,305	
GRAND TOTAL † - - - - -	1,033		1,023,355	

* For analysis, see next page.

† Including 79 vessels (79,214 G.T.) transferred under the Norwegian Agreement which (as they require to be replaced by British vessels in Norwegian service) do not represent additional vessels for British service.

‡ Prize and detained vessels, previously shown separately under VII. on this page, were from 31st July onwards included with ordinary vessels in their relative categories. On the other hand, "vessels launched and completing," previously included under IV. on page 250 and analysis (3) on page 251, were from 31st July onwards shown separately under VI. on page 250.

1,599 Gross Tonnage on 31st October 1918.

ANALYSIS OF FREE VESSELS SHOWN UNDER IV B.

	No.	Gross Tonnage.	Total.	
			No.	Gross Tonnage
(1) Colonial registered vessels permanently abroad :—			130	142,128
(a) Australia { Passenger vessels - - - - -	10	10,716		
{ Cargo vessels - - - - -	44	45,194		
(b) Canada - { Passenger vessels - - - - -	6	6,736		
{ Cargo vessels - - - - -	38	43,935		
(c) Other - { Passenger vessels - - - - -	1	926		
{ Cargo vessels - - - - -	31	34,621		
(2) United Kingdom registered vessels trading abroad :—				
(a) Australia { Passenger vessels - - - - -	—	—		
{ Cargo vessels - - - - -	5	5,469		
(b) Canada - { Passenger vessels - - - - -	4	5,125		
{ Cargo vessels - - - - -	8	8,002		
(c) Other - { Passenger vessels - - - - -	10	11,387		
{ Cargo vessels - - - - -	27	24,818		
(3)* Passenger vessels repairing, &c., or laid up -	4	3,637	54	54,801
Cargo vessels repairing, &c., or laid up - - - - -	24	23,585		
			28*	27,222

* See note φ on page 250.

**EMPLOYMENT OF BRITISH VESSELS
(EXCLUDING TANKERS) 1,600 GROSS TONNAGE AND
OVER—31st OCTOBER 1918.**

**Statement showing the relation of Tonnage engaged on
Importing Services to that engaged on
Non-Importing Services.**

TABLE I.

	No.	Gross Tonnage.	Deadweight.
I.—Tonnage engaged in the following services:—			
(a) <i>British</i> :—			
Navy - - - - -	343	1,344,975	1,806,400
War Office - - - - -	392	1,637,730	2,167,500
Trading in Colonial interests and not directly on Allied import services.	275	1,016,619	1,445,100
Coasting, cable repairing, &c. - - -	26	62,217	76,900
(b) <i>Allies: Non-Importing</i> :—			
France - - - - -	1	7,379	11,300
Russia - - - - -	4	15,952	28,600
United States - - - - -	47	403,962	394,100 } *
			450,000 }
II.—Tonnage repairing and surveying - - -	203	899,414	1,327,700
Total Non-Importing - - -	1,291	5,388,248	7,707,600
III.—Importing services:—			
(a) <i>British</i> :—			
Liners and tramps on berth - - - - -	703	4,314,851	5,220,900*
Tramps - - - - -	241	907,223	1,475,600
(b) <i>Allies, &c.</i> :—			
France - - - - -	199	827,475	1,294,600
Italy - - - - -	228	973,797	1,554,800
Russia - - - - -	18	77,854	117,300
United States - - - - -	22	103,266	148,400
Other Allies and neutrals - - - - -	111	323,786	459,500
Total Importing - - - - -	1,522	7,528,252	10,271,100
GRAND TOTAL - - - - -	2,813	12,916,500	17,978,700

* The deadweight figures "U.S.A.—Non-Importing" and "U.K.—Importing Liners" have been adjusted to cover 450,000 tons deadweight of liner space shut out by the transport of U.S.A. troops.

† For detail, see Tables II. and III.

Employment of British Vessels (excluding Tankers) 1,600 gross tonnage and over—31st October 1918—continued.

TABLE II.

IMPORT SERVICES (DETAIL), UNITED KINGDOM.

	Liners and Tramps on Berth.	Tramps.		Total.
	Deadweight.	No.	Deadweight.	
Cereals - - - - -	1,288,300	84	624,300	1,912,600
Sugar - - - - -	83,700	18	115,500	198,200
Meat - - - - -	480,900	—	—	480,900
Oils and fats - - - - -	611,000	1	5,700	616,700
Other foodstuffs - - - - -	397,000	—	—	397,000
Ore—iron and pyrites - - - - -	39,200	82	408,700	447,900
Nitrates - - - - -	58,500	8	64,700	123,200
Other munitions and general cargo - - - - -	2,262,300	48	256,700	2,519,000
	5,220,900	241	1,475,600	6,695,500

TABLE III.

LINERS AND TRAMPS ON BERTH (DETAIL OF LINES).

	No.	Deadweight.
Egypt and U.K. - - - - -	24	112,700
Mediterranean ports (other than Egyptian ports) and U.K.	22	83,300
West Africa and U.K.	45	242,300
S. and E. Africa and U.K.	30	229,100
Australia and N. Zealand and U.K.	34	329,700
India and U.K. - - - - -	89	791,700
Far East and U.K. - - - - -	22	194,700
N. Atlantic ports, including Canada and Gulf, and U.K.	278	2,132,900*
S. Atlantic ports and U.K. - - - - -	114	886,900
W.C. America and U.K. - - - - -	20	139,300
Scandinavia and U.K. - - - - -	22†	78,300
	700	5,220,900

* Reduced by 450,000 tons deadweight to cover space shut out by transport of U.S.A. troops.

† Figures for vessels on passage to United Kingdom only—vessels outward bound are included in III. (b) "Other Allies and Neutrals," in Table I.

FRENCH VESSELS.

ALLIED MARITIME TRANSPORT EXECUTIVE,
SHIPPING INTELLIGENCE SECTION.

Monthly Statement of the Employment of FRENCH VESSELS—31st October 1918.

	Steamers 500 G.T. and upwards.						Total.		Steamers under 500 G.T.		Sailing Vessels.	
	1,600 G.T. and upwards.			500—1,599 G.T.			No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.
	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.						
Total Tonnage - - -	336	1,436,278	181	181	186,235	517		1,622,513	64	21,336	181	238,303
I.—Employed in Import Service of Principal Allies :	187	790,762	76	76	79,299	263		870,061	13	4,760	82	87,118
(a) <i>In Import Service of United Kingdom :</i> Total	10	30,497	8	8	7,560	18		38,057	—	—	8	2,307
Cargoes from France (Atlantic) - - -	3	7,877	7	7	6,176	10		14,053	—	—	8	2,307
Spain (Atlantic) and Portugal - - -	4	9,489	1	1	1,384	5		10,873	—	—	—	—
N. Africa and Spain (Mediterranean). - - -	2	8,722	—	—	—	2		8,722	—	—	—	—
Levant - - -	1	4,409	—	—	—	1		4,409	—	—	—	—
(b) <i>In Import Service of France :</i> Total	176	758,265	68	68	71,739	244		830,004	13	4,760	47	21,085
Cargoes from United Kingdom - - -	39	93,253	43	43	45,506	82		138,759	7	2,564	35	9,456
N. Africa and Spain (Medn.) - - -	29	73,723	21	21	22,536	50		96,259	4	1,715	4	2,867
Portugal - - -	—	—	—	—	—	—		—	1	351	—	—
United States (Atlantic) - - -	40	236,850	—	—	—	40		236,850	—	—	1	754
West Indies and Caribbean - - -	6	25,730	—	—	—	6		25,370	—	—	1	868
La Plata - - -	18	108,753	1	1	703	19		109,456	1	130	4	2,651
North Chili - - -	5	26,884	—	—	—	5		26,884	—	—	—	—
Central Chili - - -	2	8,677	—	—	—	2		8,677	—	—	—	—
East Asia - - -	5	44,880	1	1	1,173	6		46,053	—	—	—	—
Australia - - -	—	—	—	—	—	—		—	—	—	2	4,489
East Indies - - -	2	6,180	—	—	—	2		6,180	—	—	—	—
India - - -	1	8,150	—	—	—	1		8,150	—	—	—	—
Egypt - - -	2	7,665	—	—	—	2		7,665	—	—	—	—
East Africa and Madagascar - - -	5	20,553	—	—	—	5		20,553	—	—	—	—
West Africa - - -	22	97,327	2	2	1,821	24		99,148	—	—	—	—
(c) <i>In Import Service of United States :</i> Total	1	2,000	—	—	—	1		2,000	—	—	27	63,726
Cargoes from W. Indies - - -	1	2,000	—	—	—	1		2,000	—	—	1	412
Central Brazil - - -	—	—	—	—	—	—		—	—	—	2	5,207
La Plata - - -	—	—	—	—	—	—		—	—	—	1	2,255
North Chili - - -	—	—	—	—	—	—		—	—	—	5	14,532
Central Chili - - -	—	—	—	—	—	—		—	—	—	2	5,789
Australia - - -	—	—	—	—	—	—		—	—	—	3	7,002
West Africa - - -	—	—	—	—	—	—		—	—	—	13	28,529

II.—Employed in other Merchant Service :										
	25	83,056	37	34,427	62	117,483	33	10,799	40	83,040
(a) <i>In Coasting Service of France :</i>	Total	4	8,154	12	11,356	16	19,510	13	4,567	—
(b) <i>In Colonial Service of France :</i>	Total	13	34,791	20	18,009	33	52,800	19	5,782	25,697
West Africa from United Kingdom -	2	6,348	—	—	—	2	6,348	—	—	—
* " " " La Plata -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	651
* " " " Australia -	1	5,633	—	—	1	5,633	—	—	9	20,370
Trading West Africa -	—	—	2	1,115	2	1,115	7	2,252	—	—
North Africa from United Kingdom -	2	6,722	—	—	2	6,722	—	—	—	—
Trading North Africa -	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	1,355	—	—
Madagascar from S. Africa -	1	2,382	—	—	1	2,382	—	—	—	—
" " Australia -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1,964
Trading Madagascar -	2	4,082	—	—	2	4,082	1	255	—	—
New Caledonia from United Kingdom -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2,208
" " &c., from United States (Pacific) -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	106
Trading New Caledonia, &c. -	1	1,938	5	4,503	6	6,441	2	675	—	—
Trading E. Asia and Cochín -	1	2,395	12	11,343	13	13,738	—	—	—	—
St. Pierre (Miquelon) from Portugal -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	398
" " " United States (Atl.) -	1	1,600	—	—	1	1,600	—	—	—	—
Trading Caribbean -	1	2,073	1	1,048	2	3,121	5	1,245	—	—
French West Indies from United States -	1	1,618	—	—	1	1,618	—	—	—	—
(c) <i>In Coasting Service of United States :</i>	Total	1	2,200	—	—	1	2,200	—	—	2,613
(d) <i>In Colonial Service of United Kingdom :</i>	Total	3	30,059	2	1,423	5	31,482	1	450	17,482
Australia from Canada (Pacific) -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Trading Australia -	—	—	2	1,423	2	1,423	1	450	—	—
*Egypt from East Asia -	3	30,059	—	—	3	30,059	—	—	—	—
Australia from United States -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	8	17,199
Newfoundland from Portugal -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	283
(e) <i>In Colonial Service of United States :</i>	Total	—	—	1	1,431	1	1,431	—	3	6,366
Hawaii, &c. from North Chili -	—	—	1	1,431	1	1,431	—	—	—	—
Philippines from United States (Pacific) -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	4,394
" " " " (Atlantic) -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1,972
(f) <i>In Import Service of other Allies and Neutrals :</i>	Total	4	7,852	2	2,208	6	10,060	—	13	30,882
Allies.—Central Brazil from La Plata -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	3,737
" " " " United States -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	3,283
La Plata from United States -	1	2,126	—	—	1	2,126	—	—	—	—
Neutrals.—La Plata from West Africa -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	2,646
" " " " United States (Atl.) -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1,400
North Chili from United States (Atl.) -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	7	19,816
" " " " from United States (Pac.) -	3	5,726	—	—	3	5,726	—	—	—	—
Switzerland (via France) from La Plata.	—	—	2	2,208	2	2,208	—	—	—	—

* Probably cargoes for transshipment to France.

MONTHLY STATEMENT OF THE EMPLOYMENT OF FRENCH VESSELS—31ST OCTOBER 1918—continued.

	Steamers 500 G.T. and upwards.						Steamers under 500 G.T.		Sailing Vessels.		
	1,600 G.T. and upwards.			500—1,599 G.T.			Gross Tonnage.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.	
	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.					
III.—Employed in Non-Merchant Service:	Total	59	271,223	34	36,773	93	307,996	2	660	1	2,942
(a) In Military service of France	-	20	88,026	13	13,051	33	101,077	—	—	—	—
(b) In Naval service of France	-	35	129,862	20	22,467	55	152,329	2	660	1	2,942
(c) In Military service of United Kingdom	-	—	—	1	1,255	1	1,255	—	—	—	—
(d) " " United States	-	3	50,132	—	—	3	50,132	—	—	—	—
(e) Other Non-Merchant service	-	1	3,203	—	—	1	3,203	—	—	—	—
IV.—Unemployed or Employment unknown:	Total	65	291,237	34	35,736	99	326,973	16	5,117	58	65,203
(a) Repairing or remodelling	-	45	184,025	18	21,038	63	205,063	2	808	9	10,105
(b) Otherwise unemployed	-	3	13,516	1	699	4	14,215	—	—	16	35,868
(c) Employment unknown	-	17	93,696	15	13,999	32	107,695	14	4,309	33	19,230

ITALIAN VESSELS.

ALLIED MARITIME TRANSPORT EXECUTIVE,
SHIPPING INTELLIGENCE SECTION.

Monthly Statement of the Employment of ITALIAN Vessels—31st October 1918.

	Steamers 500 G.T. and upwards.						Steamers under 500 G.T.		Sailing Vessels.	
	1,600 G.T. and upwards.			500—1,599 G.T.			Total.		No.	Gross Tonnage.
	No.	Gross Tonnage.		No.	Gross Tonnage.		No.	Gross Tonnage.		
Total Tonnage	225	929,983		110	109,052		335	1,039,035	54	70,600
I. Employed in Import service of principal Allies:	140	572,062		17	17,200		157	589,262	10	14,695
(a) <i>In Import service of United Kingdom:</i>	1	2,487		—	—		1	2,487	—	—
Cargoes from N. Africa and Spain (Medn.)	1	2,487		—	—		1	2,487	—	—
(b) <i>In Import service of Italy:</i>	139	569,575		17	17,200		156	586,775	4	5,085
Cargoes from United Kingdom	4	16,684		—	—		4	16,684	—	—
N. Africa and Spain (Medn.)	4	10,186		8	7,778		12	17,964	1	210
France (Medn.)	13	34,908		6	5,852		19	40,760	1	434
Egypt	9	25,411		1	1,013		10	26,424	—	—
Red Sea Ports	1	4,204		—	—		1	4,204	1	974
India	22	93,926		1	1,395		23	95,321	—	—
East Asia	1	8,950		—	—		1	8,950	—	—
Canada (Atlantic)	2	9,731		—	—		2	9,731	—	—
United States (Atlantic)	46	214,946		—	—		46	214,946	—	—
Caribbean Area	1	7,870		—	—		1	7,870	—	—
Central Brazil	6	24,653		1	1,162		7	25,815	—	—
La Plata	27	113,929		—	—		27	113,929	3	4,111
West Africa	3	9,177		—	—		3	9,177	—	—
(c) <i>In Import service of United States: Cargoes from West Africa. Total</i>	—	—		—	—		—	—	6	9,610

II.—Employed in other Merchant Service										
	6	12,915	27	25,488	33	38,403	18	6,457	3	3,155
Total	6	12,915	26	23,909	32	36,824	18	6,457	—	—
(a) <i>In Coasting service of Italy :</i>	—	—	1	1,579	1	1,579	—	—	1	1,280
(b) <i>In Colonial service of principal Allies :</i>	—	—	1	1,579	1	1,579	—	—	—	—
United Kingdom—Cargoes to Egypt from Arabia, &c.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1,280
*France—Cargoes to Dakar from La Plata	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	1,875
(c) <i>In Import service of other Allies and Neutral :</i>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	935
Allies :—Central Brazil from United States (Atlantic)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	940
Neutrals :—La Plata from N. Africa	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
III. Employed in Non-Merchant Service :	46	184,977	59	58,102	105	243,079	18	6,106	—	—
(a) In Military service of Italy	27	87,953	44	43,468	71	131,421	10	3,107	—	—
(b) In Naval service of Italy	6	17,387	6	6,094	12	23,481	8	2,999	—	—
(c) In Military service of United States	6	47,303	—	—	6	47,303	—	—	—	—
(d) In other non-merchant service	7	32,334	9	8,540	16	40,874	—	—	—	—
IV. Unemployed or Employment not known :	33	160,029	7	8,262	40	168,291	4	1,583	41	52,750
(a) Repairing or re-modelling	24	104,684	2	2,717	26	107,401	1	410	13	19,535
(b) Otherwise unemployed	4	36,431	2	2,728	6	39,159	—	—	13	19,545
(c) Employment unknown	5	18,914	3	2,817	8	21,731	3	1,173	15	13,670

* Probably cargoes for transhipment to Italy.

UNITED STATES VESSELS.

ALLIED MARITIME TRANSPORT EXECUTIVE,
SHIPPING INTELLIGENCE SECTION.

Monthly Statement of the Employment of UNITED STATES Vessels. 31st October 1918.

	Steamers (excluding Tankers) 500 G.T. and upwards.						Tankers 500 G.T. and upwards.						Steamers under 500 G.T.		
	1,600 G.T. and upwards.			500-1,599 G.T.			Total.			1,600 G.T. and upwards.			500-1,599 G.T.		
	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.	
Total Tonnage - - -	1,093	4,483,437	169	181,784	1,262	4,665,221	168	918,475	4	4,482	18	5,902			
I. Employed in Import Service of Total Principal Allies:	238	859,316	45	49,022	283	908,338	77	421,149	—	—	2	774			
†(a) In Import Service of U.K.: - Total	10	56,280	—	—	10	56,280	12	59,456	—	—	—	—			
Cargoes from Canada - - -	1	5,211	—	—	1	5,211	—	—	—	—	—	—			
United States (Atlantic) -	2	26,500	—	—	2	26,500	12	59,456	—	—	—	—			
North Chili - - -	2	10,438	—	—	2	10,438	—	—	—	—	—	—			
Spain (Atlantic) and Portugal. -	1	3,004	—	—	1	3,004	—	—	—	—	—	—			
France - - -	4	11,127	—	—	4	11,127	—	—	—	—	—	—			
†(b) In Import Service of France: - Total	16	53,388	1	1,352	17	54,740	10	53,919	—	—	—	—			
Cargoes from United Kingdom - -	1	1,929	—	—	1	1,929	—	—	—	—	—	—			
N. Africa and Spain (Medn.). -	1	2,372	1	1,352	2	3,724	—	—	—	—	—	—			
United States (Atlantic) -	13	46,310	—	—	13	46,310	10	53,919	—	—	—	—			
Caribbean Sea - - -	1	2,777	—	—	1	2,777	—	—	—	—	—	—			
†(c) In Import Service of Italy: - Total	24	101,063	—	—	24	101,063	5	22,446	—	—	—	—			
Cargoes from United States (Atlantic) -	24	101,063	—	—	24	101,063	5	22,446	—	—	—	—			
†(d) In Import Service of United States:	188	648,585	44	47,670	232	696,255	50	285,328	—	—	2	774			
Atlantic—Cargoes from Canada (Atl.) -	9	21,305	1	992	10	22,297	—	—	—	—	—	—			
Mexico (Gulf) - - -	1	1,988	1	989	2	2,977	44	248,838	—	—	—	—			
Caribbean Area - - -	18	67,591	12	12,166	30	79,757	—	—	—	—	—	—			
W. Indies - - -	54	158,860	14	16,512	68	175,372	4	22,175	—	—	1	484			
Central Brazil - - -	3	7,688	1	1,296	4	8,984	—	—	—	—	—	—			
La Plata - - -	10	39,948	—	—	10	39,948	—	—	—	—	—	—			

Central Chili -	7	23,872	—	—	7	23,872	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
North Chili -	50	203,828	1	1,473	51	205,301	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Spain (Atlantic) and Portugal.	1	5,861	—	—	1	5,861	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
West Africa -	—	—	1	746	1	746	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Pacific—Cargoes from Hawaii -	13	38,411	3	3,485	16	41,896	1	6,521	—	—	—	—	—
North Chili -	4	14,942	5	5,759	9	20,701	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Central Chili -	3	5,606	—	—	3	5,606	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
East Asia -	7	35,607	1	1,249	8	36,856	1	7,794	—	—	—	—	—
Australia -	6	15,849	3	2,166	9	18,015	—	—	—	—	—	1	290
India -	2	7,229	—	—	2	7,229	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Peru -	—	—	1	837	1	837	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
II. Employed in other Merchant Service:													
(a) In Coasting Service of United States:													
Atlantic -	214	606,443	20	23,872	234	630,316	28	160,563	1	1,596	3	882	—
Pacific -	29	81,901	35	36,989	64	118,890	12	54,748	1	1,295	2	717	—
Pacific—Atlantic	21	86,575	—	—	21	86,575	1	6,836	—	—	—	—	—
(b) In Coasting Service of other Allies:													
United Kingdom -	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	2,207	—	—	—	—	—
(c) In Colonial Service of United States:													
Cargoes to Hawaii, &c., from United States (Pacific).	22	67,812	12	14,010	34	81,822	1	7,277	—	—	1	499	—
Cargoes to Hawaii, &c., from United States (Atlantic).	9	25,079	—	—	9	25,079	1	7,277	—	—	—	—	—
Coasting Hawaii, &c. -	2	4,236	—	—	2	4,236	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Cargoes to Philippines from United States (Pacific).	—	—	3	3,750	3	3,750	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Cargoes to Philippines from Australia -	5	24,774	1	1,000	6	25,774	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
" " " East Indies	—	—	1	818	1	818	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
" " " India	2	6,263	6	7,825	8	14,088	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Coasting Philippines -	1	1,736	—	—	1	1,736	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
" " " "	3	5,724	1	617	4	6,341	—	—	—	—	1	499	—

† Vessels discharging cargoes on Naval and Military A/c for United States are shown under III.

MONTHLY STATEMENT OF THE EMPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES VESSELS (continued). 31ST OCTOBER 1918.

	Steamers (excluding Tankers) 500 G.T. and upwards.						Tankers 500 G.T. and upwards.				Steamers under 500 G.T.	
	1,600 G.T. and upwards.			500-1,599 G.T.			Total.		1,600 G.T. and upwards.		500-1,599 G.T.	
	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.
(d) In Colonial Service of Other Total	11	31,764	3	2,841	14	34,605	1	2,196	—	—	1	197
<i>Allies:</i>												
United Kingdom.—Australia from U.S. (Pac.).	5	14,654	1	1,200	6	15,854	—	—	—	—	—	—
Singapore from Hong Kong.	1	2,607	—	—	1	2,607	—	—	—	—	—	—
India from E. Asia	1	2,557	—	—	1	2,557	—	—	—	—	—	—
India from E. Indies	—	—	1	523	1	523	—	—	—	—	—	—
Gilbert Is. (Pac.) from U.S. (Pac.).	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	197
Canada (Pac.) from U.S. (Pac.).	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	2,196	—	—	—	—
Canada (Atl.) from U.S. (Atl.).	1	2,400	—	—	1	2,400	—	—	—	—	—	—
Malta from U.S. (Pac.).	1	5,676	—	—	1	5,676	—	—	—	—	—	—
France.—Cochin China from East Asia	—	—	1	1,118	1	1,118	—	—	—	—	—	—
West Africa from U.K.	1	1,671	—	—	1	1,671	—	—	—	—	—	—
Italy.—Abyssinia from Red Sea Ports	1	2,199	—	—	1	2,199	—	—	—	—	—	—
(e) In Import Service of Other Total	79	247,407	23	25,773	102	273,180	11	73,351	—	—	3	1,173
<i>Allies and Neutrals:</i>												
<i>Allies.</i> —Portugal from United States (Atlantic).	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	4,938	—	—	—	—
W. Indies from United States (Atlantic).	18	51,632	5	6,481	23	58,113	—	—	—	—	—	—
Caribbean from United States (Atlantic).	1	2,159	3	3,170	4	5,329	—	—	—	—	—	—
Caribbean from United States (Pacific).	2	6,795	—	—	2	6,795	—	—	—	—	—	—
Central Brazil from United States (Atlantic).	4	7,862	—	—	4	7,862	—	—	—	—	—	—
La Plata from United States (Atlantic).	1	1,844	—	—	1	1,844	—	—	—	—	—	—

MONTHLY STATEMENT OF THE EMPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES VESSELS (continued). 31st OCTOBER 1918.

	Steamers (excluding Tankers) 500 G.T. and upwards.				Tankers 500 G.T. and upwards.				Steamers under 500 G.T.			
	1,600 G.T. and upwards.		500-1,599 G.T.		1,600 G.T. and upwards.		500-1,599 G.T.		1,600 G.T. and upwards.		500-1,599 G.T.	
	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.
III. Employed in Non-Merchant Service: Total	410	2,214,727	3	3,954	413	2,218,681			30	160,265	1	209
(a) In Naval and Military Service: Total	81	625,804	1	1,380	82	627,184			12	47,111	1	209
In Military Service of United States -	49	485,349	-	-	49	485,349			-	-	-	-
In Naval Service of United States -	30	128,203	1	1,380	31	129,583			10	40,420	1	209
In Military Service of United Kingdom -	2	12,252	-	-	2	12,252			-	-	-	-
In Naval Service of United Kingdom -	-	-	-	-	-	-			1	2,520	-	-
In Naval Service of France -	-	-	-	-	-	-			1	4,171	-	-
(b) Discharging cargo on United States Naval, Military, and Food Administration account in: Total	329	1,588,923	2	2,574	331	1,591,497			18	113,154	-	-
United Kingdom -	23	73,318	-	-	23	73,318			6	37,242	-	-
France -	306	1,515,605	2	2,574	308	1,518,179			12	75,912	-	-
IV. Unemployed or Employment unknown. Total	69	287,492	28	25,322	97	312,814			6	29,883	2	1,591
Repairing or remodelling -	32	148,864	5	3,752	37	152,616			6	29,883	-	-
Otherwise unemployed -	12	56,307	1	1,188	13	57,445			-	-	-	-
Employment unknown -	25	82,321	22	20,432	47	102,753			-	-	2	1,591
Vessels launched but not completed. Total not included in total tonnage figures.	171	550,032	1	1,400	172	551,432			1	7,707	-	-

BELGIAN VESSELS.

II. Employed in other Merchant Service : (a) <i>In Import Service of Belgium : Total</i> <i>(principally Belgian Relief).</i> Cargoes from United Kingdom to France United States to France - United States to Holland	27	97,768	11	10,419	38	108,187	1	264	—	—
	24	86,153	10	9,203	34	95,356	1	264	—	—
	2	4,906	10	9,203	12	14,109	1	264	—	—
	3	7,014	—	—	3	7,014	—	—	—	—
	19	74,233	—	—	19	74,233	—	—	—	—
(b) <i>In Colonial Service of Belgium :</i> United Kingdom to Congo.	3	11,615	—	—	3	11,615	—	—	—	—
	—	—	1	1,216	1	1,216	—	—	—	—
(c) <i>In Coasting Service of United Kingdom :</i> Total										
III. Employed in Non-Merchant Service : (a) In Military Service of United Kingdom -	3	5,281	5	6,476	8	11,757	—	—	—	—
	3	5,281	5	6,476	8	11,757	—	—	—	—
	—	—	7	7,097	7	7,097	—	—	—	—
IV. Unemployed or Employment unknown : (a) Repairing - - - - - (b) Employment unknown - - - - -	—	—	3	3,024	3	3,024	—	—	—	—
	—	—	4	4,073	4	4,073	—	—	—	—

BRAZILIAN VESSELS.

ALLIED MARITIME TRANSPORT EXECUTIVE,
SHIPPING INTELLIGENCE SECTION.

Monthly Statement of the Employment of BRAZILIAN Vessels—31st October 1918.

	Steamers 500 G.T. and upwards.						Steamers under 500 G.T.		Sailing Vessels.	
	1,600 G.T. and upwards.		500—1,599 G.T.		Total					
	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.
Total Tonnage - - -	92	346,374	36	36,319	128	382,693	10	3,879	5	4,485
I. Engaged in Import Service of Principal Allies:	34	140,820	7	8,145	41	148,965	1	336	1	1,336
(a) In Import service of United Kingdom:	2	5,263	1	1,566	3	6,829	—	—	—	—
Cargoes from Amazon - - -	1	3,046	—	—	1	3,046	—	—	—	—
Central Brazil - - -	1	2,217	—	—	1	2,217	—	—	—	—
France (Medn.) - - -	—	—	1	1,566	1	1,566	—	—	—	—
(b) In Import service of France:	16	90,209	—	—	18	90,209	1	336	—	—
Cargoes from Canada - - -	1	5,099	—	—	1	5,099	—	—	—	—
United States - - -	7	37,104	—	—	7	37,104	—	—	—	—
Central Brazil - - -	5	23,695	—	—	5	23,695	—	—	—	—
La Plata - - -	1	5,472	—	—	1	5,472	—	—	—	—
Spain (Atlantic) - - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	336	—	—
West Africa - - -	1	3,081	—	—	1	3,081	—	—	—	—
N. Africa & Spain (Medn.) - - -	2	12,032	—	—	2	12,032	—	—	—	—
United Kingdom - - -	1	3,726	—	—	1	3,726	—	—	—	—

<i>(c) In Import service of Italy :</i>										Total
12	36,545	6	6,579	18	43,124	—	—	—	—	—
Cargoes from Central Brazil	7	23,475	6	6,579	13	30,054	—	—	—	—
La Plata	5	13,070	—	—	5	13,070	—	—	—	—
<i>(d) In Import service of United States :</i>	2	8,803	—	—	2	8,803	—	1	1,336	1,336
Cargoes from Canada (Atlantic)	1	2,347	—	—	1	2,347	—	—	—	—
La Plata	1	6,456	—	—	1	6,456	—	—	—	—
Central Brazil	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1,336	1,336
II. Employed in other Merchant Service :	41	128,937	22	20,576	63	149,513	5	2,173	1	298
<i>(a) In Import service of Brazil</i>	12	46,287	4	4,463	16	50,750	—	—	—	—
Cargoes to Amazon from United States	1	1,859	—	—	1	1,859	—	—	—	—
Central Brazil from United States	3	13,655	1	758	4	14,413	—	—	—	—
Central Brazil from La Plata	8	30,773	3	3,705	11	34,478	—	—	—	—
<i>(b) Coasting Brazil and La Plata</i>	22	54,454	17	15,212	39	69,666	1	427	—	—
Amazon to Central Brazil	1	2,003	1	1,294	2	3,297	—	—	—	—
Amazonian Area	8	18,574	1	1,498	9	20,072	1	427	—	—
Central Brazil	13	33,877	15	12,420	28	46,297	—	—	—	—
<i>(c) Colonial Service of France</i>	1	4,801	—	—	1	4,801	1	484	—	—
Caribbean from Amazon	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	484	—	—
N. Africa from United Kingdom.	1	4,801	—	—	1	4,801	—	—	—	—
<i>(d) In Import service of Neutrals</i>	6	23,395	1	901	7	24,296	3	1,262	1	298
Cargoes to La Plata from Central Brazil	3	7,046	—	—	3	7,046	3	1,262	—	—
La Plata from United States	1	8,227	—	—	1	8,227	—	—	—	—
La Plata from United Kingdom.	1	4,663	—	—	1	4,663	—	—	—	—
Switzerland (via France) from Central Brazil.	1	3,459	1	901	2	4,360	—	—	—	—
Spain from Central Brazil	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	298

(Continued overleaf.)

MONTHLY STATEMENT OF THE EMPLOYMENT OF BRAZILIAN VESSELS--31ST OCTOBER 1918--continued.

	Steamers 500 G.T. and upwards.						Steamers under 500 G.T.		Sailing Vessels.	
	1,600 G.T. and upwards.			500--1,599 G.T.			Total.			
	No.	Gross Tonnage.		No.	Gross Tonnage.		No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.
III. Employed in Non-Merchant Service : Military Service of France.	1	4,739	Total	—	—	1	4,739	—	—	—
IV. Unemployed or Employment unknown :	16	71,878	Total	7	7,598	23	79,476	4	1,370	2,801
(a) Repairing	3	17,711	-	—	—	3	17,711	—	—	2,066
(b) Otherwise unemployed	7	35,246	-	—	—	7	35,246	—	—	—
(c) Employment unknown	6	18,921	-	7	7,598	13	26,519	4	1,370	735

DANISH VESSELS.

ALLIED MARITIME TRANSPORT EXECUTIVE,
SHIPPING INTELLIGENCE SECTION.

Monthly Statement of the Employment of DANISH Vessels—31st October 1918.

	Steamers 500 G.T. and upwards.						Steamers under 500 G.T.		Sailing Vessels.	
	1,600 G.T. and upwards.			500—1,599 G.T.			Total.		No.	Gross Tonnage.
	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.		
Total Tonnage - - -	128	378,620	131	144,351	259	522,971	93	23,729	232	75,615
I. Employed in Import Service of Principal Allies :	75	206,583	27	31,012	102	237,595	14	3,959	20	16,392
(a) In Import service of United Kingdom :	10	27,985	7	8,986	17	36,971	3	764	4	1,320
Cargoes from Scandinavia - -	1	2,567	1	1,218	2	3,785	-	-	2	1,021
Spain and Portugal - -	4	7,348	6	7,768	10	15,116	-	-	-	-
Greenland and Iceland - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	764	2	299
United States - -	3	8,699	-	-	3	8,699	-	-	-	-
N. Chili - -	1	4,112	-	-	1	4,112	-	-	-	-
India - -	1	5,259	-	-	1	5,259	-	-	-	-
(b) In Import service of France :	10	22,046	11	10,271	21	32,317	9	2,597	4	2,004
Cargoes from United Kingdom - -	5	9,389	10	9,371	15	18,760	9	2,597	2	1,557
W. Africa - -	1	1,896	1	900	2	2,796	-	-	-	-
W. Indies - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	222
Caribbean Area - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	225
United States - -	3	6,954	-	-	3	6,954	-	-	-	-
Canada - -	1	3,807	-	-	1	3,807	-	-	-	-

(c) <i>In Import service of Italy :</i>		Total	15	42,681	—	—	15	42,681	—	—	3	694
Cargoes from United Kingdom -		-	1	3,453	—	—	1	3,453	—	—	—	—
United States -		-	14	39,228	—	—	14	39,228	—	—	—	—
Iceland and Scandinavia		-	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	694
(d) <i>In Import service of United States :</i>		Total	40	113,871	9	11,755	49	125,626	2	598	9	12,374
Cargoes from West Indies -		-	15	30,128	9	11,755	24	41,883	1	225	2	320
Canada (Atlantic) -		-	1	1,693	—	—	1	1,693	—	—	—	—
Central Brazil -		-	1	3,704	—	—	1	3,704	—	—	4	6,044
La Plata -		-	6	22,686	—	—	6	22,686	—	—	3	6,010
Central and North Chili		-	9	23,845	—	—	9	23,845	1	373	—	—
Peru -		-	3	6,616	—	—	3	6,616	—	—	—	—
Hawai, &c. -		-	3	14,679	—	—	3	14,679	—	—	—	—
Canada (Pacific) -		-	1	5,570	—	—	1	5,570	—	—	—	—
Australia -		-	1	4,950	—	—	1	4,950	—	—	—	—
II. Employed in other Merchant Service :		Total	36	120,814	80	88,648	116	209,462	26	6,899	116	42,051
(a) <i>In Import service of Denmark :</i>		Total	13	51,242	62	67,566	75	118,808	8	2,877	24	5,216
Cargoes from United Kingdom -		-	9	17,528	56	60,046	65	77,574	2	952	1	331
Spain (Atlantic) and Portugal.		-	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	10	1,831
N. Africa and Spain (Medn.).		-	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	295	6	1,344
Scandinavia, Iceland, and Greenland.		-	1	11,850	6	7,520	7	19,370	5	1,630	5	1,189
Canada -		-	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	521
United States -		-	3	21,864	—	—	3	21,864	—	—	—	—

(Continued overleaf.)

MONTHLY STATEMENT OF THE EMPLOYMENT OF DANISH VESSELS—31ST OCTOBER 1918—*continued*.

	Steamers 500 G.T. and upwards.						Steamers under 500 G.T.		Sailing Vessels.	
	1,600 G.T. and upwards.			500—1,599 G.T.			Total.		No.	Gross Tonnage.
	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.		
II. Employed in other Merchant Service—<i>continued</i>. (b) <i>In Colonial service of Denmark:</i> Total	1	1,660	7	7,145	8	8,805	7	1,212	34	6,396
Cargoes to Faroes, Iceland, &c.; from Denmark.	1	1,660	1	900	2	2,560	—	—	6	1,132
Cargoes to Faroes, Iceland, &c., from United Kingdom.	—	—	2	1,680	2	1,680	—	—	1	266
Cargoes to Faroes, Iceland, &c., from N. Africa and Spain.	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	365	4	631
Cargoes to Faroes, Iceland, &c., from Portugal and Spain (Atlantic).	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	402	21	3,856
Cargoes to Faroes, Iceland, &c., from Canada.	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	445	1	296
Cargoes to Faroes, Iceland, &c., from United States.	—	—	4	4,565	4	4,565	—	—	—	—
Cargoes to Faroes, Iceland, &c., from Caribbean.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	215
(c) <i>In Coasting service of Allies:</i> Total France.	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	245	—	—
(d) <i>In Colonial service of Allies:</i> Total	6	28,877	—	—	6	28,877	—	—	7	5,865
United Kingdom.—S. Africa from United States.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1,341
S. Africa from La Plata.	1	5,219	—	—	1	5,219	—	—	—	—
S. Africa from Chili.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1,674
India from United States.	1	4,874	—	—	1	4,874	—	—	—	—

India from East Africa.	1	5,296	—	—	1	5,296	—	—	—	—
India from Egypt	1	3,515	—	—	1	3,515	—	—	—	993
Australia from United States (Atl.).	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Australia from United States (Pacific).	1	5,259	—	—	1	5,259	—	—	—	—
France.—Algeria, &c., from Scandinavia	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	620
W. Africa from United States	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1,237
United States.—Hawaii, &c. from United States (Pacific).	1	4,714	—	—	1	4,714	—	—	—	—
(e) <i>In Import service of Other Allies or</i> Total	16	39,035	10	13,407	26	52,442	4	831	51	24,574
<i>Neutrals:</i>										
<i>Allies.</i> —Cuba, &c., from United States	10	21,731	6	8,536	16	30,267	—	—	3	702
Brazil and Uruguay from United States.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	7	7,739
Trading E. Asia	—	—	1	525	1	525	—	—	—	—
<i>Neutrals.</i> —Scandinavia from United States.	—	—	1	1,544	1	1,544	—	—	—	—
Spain from United States -	1	2,109	—	—	1	2,109	—	—	13	2,109
Spain from Scandinavia, Iceland, and Greenland.	—	—	1	1,229	1	1,229	2	347	—	—
Spain from Newfoundland	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	100	19	2,750
N. Africa from Spain (Atlantic) and Portugal.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	272
Mexico from United States	1	1,693	1	1,573	2	3,266	—	—	—	—
La Plata from United States.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	6	8,113
La Plata from United Kingdom.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1,119
La Plata from India	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Chili, &c., from United States.	1	3,931	—	—	1	3,931	—	—	—	—
Chili, &c., from India	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Peru from United States	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Switzerland (via France) from United States.	2	7,145	—	—	2	7,145	1	384	1	1,770
	1	2,426	—	—	1	2,426	—	—	—	—

(Continued overleaf.)

MONTHLY STATEMENT OF THE EMPLOYMENT OF DANISH VESSELS—31ST OCTOBER 1918—continued.

	Steamers 500 G.T. and upwards.						Steamers under 500 G.T.		Sailing Vessels.	
	1,600 G.T. and upwards.			500—1,599 G.T.			Total.		No.	Gross Tonnage.
	No.	Gross Tonnage.		No.	Gross Tonnage.		No.	Gross Tonnage.		
(f) Trading with Germany :	—	—		1	530		1	530	—	—
Total										
III. Employed in Non-Merchant Service : U.S. Government cargoes to France.	2	7,922		1	716		3	8,638	—	—
IV. Unemployed or Employment Unknown :	15	43,301		23	23,975		38	67,276	53	12,871
(a) Repairing or remodelling -	6	17,739		4	4,983		10	22,722	1	202
(b) Otherwise unemployed -	3	5,706		4	4,759		7	10,465	1	230
(c) Employment unknown -	6	19,856		15	14,233		21	34,089	51	12,439
Total									96	17,172
									9	1,863
									7	1,412
									80	13,897

DUTCH VESSELS.

**ALLIED MARITIME TRANSPORT EXECUTIVE,
SHIPPING INTELLIGENCE SECTION.**

Monthly Statement of the Employment of DUTCH VESSELS—31st October 1918.

	Steamers 500 G.T. and upwards.						Steamers under 500 G.T.		Sailing Vessels.	
	1,600 G.T. and upwards.			500—1,599 G.T.			Total.		No.	Gross Tonnage.
	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.				
	171	774,218	74	77,155	245	851,373	31	8,074	35	11,372
Total Tonnage - - - - -	8	35,101	9	9,358	17	44,459	5	919	1	144
I.—Employed in Import Service of Principal Allies :	2	4,060	7	7,442	9	11,502	—	—	—	—
<i>(a) In Import Service of United Kingdom :</i>	2	4,060	6	6,046	8	10,106	—	—	—	—
Cargoes from Holland - - - - -	—	—	1	1,396	1	1,396	—	—	—	—
La Plata - - - - -	—	—	2	1,916	2	1,916	5	919	1	144
<i>(b) In Import Service of France :</i>	—	—	1	538	1	538	4	784	—	—
Cargoes from United Kingdom - - - - -	—	—	1	1,378	1	1,378	1	135	1	144
Holland - - - - -	6	31,041	—	—	6	31,041	—	—	—	—
<i>(c) In Import Service of United States :</i>	2	5,474	—	—	2	5,474	—	—	—	—
Atlantic.—Cargoes from West Indies - - - - -	2	13,291	—	—	2	13,291	—	—	—	—
East Indies - - - - -	1	6,400	—	—	1	6,400	—	—	—	—
Pacific.—Cargoes from East Indies - - - - -	1	5,876	—	—	1	5,876	—	—	—	—
Hawai, &c. - - - - -	90	396,885	30	29,335	120	426,220	10	3,114	7	3,340
Total	27	99,197	20	20,354	47	119,551	4	1,013	4	615
<i>(a) In Import Service of Holland :</i>	14	38,428	16	16,014	30	54,442	3	810	4	615
Cargoes from Scandinavia - - - - -	1	1,837	3	3,081	4	4,918	1	203	—	—
United Kingdom - - - - -	10	51,816	—	—	10	51,816	—	—	—	—
United States - - - - -	2	7,116	—	—	2	7,116	—	—	—	—
La Plata - - - - -	—	—	1	1,259	1	1,259	—	—	—	—
Spain, Atlantic, and Portugal - - - - -	36	179,071	2	1,718	38	180,789	3	1,218	1	1,336
<i>(b) In Colonial Service of Holland :</i>	7	36,371	—	—	7	36,371	—	—	—	—
Cargoes to E. Indies from India - - - - -	7	37,790	—	—	7	37,790	—	—	—	—
" " " " East Asia - - - - -										

Cargoes to E. Indies from Australia	1	4,687	—	—	—	1	4,687	—	—	—	—	—	—
" " " United States (Pacific)	9	48,535	—	—	—	9	48,535	—	—	—	—	—	—
" " " United States (Atlantic)	2	13,933	—	—	—	2	13,933	—	—	—	—	—	—
" " " Holland	2	19,079	—	—	—	2	19,079	—	—	—	—	—	—
" " " Trading locally in E. Indies	7	16,865	—	2	1,718	9	18,583	3	1,218	1	1,336	—	—
Caribbean from United States (Atlantic)	1	1,811	—	—	—	1	1,811	—	—	—	—	—	—
(c) In Colonial Service of Principal Allies:	Total	82,226	7	6,528	26	88,754	2	728	1	1,221	1	1,221	—
United Kingdom.—India from East Asia	1	6,800	—	—	—	1	6,800	—	—	—	—	—	—
India from East Indies	4	14,899	—	1	638	5	15,537	—	—	—	—	—	—
India from Arabian Area	1	3,608	—	—	—	1	3,608	—	—	—	—	—	—
Trading locally in India	3	18,578	—	1	950	4	19,528	—	—	—	—	—	—
Singapore, &c., from E. Indies	4	11,880	—	3	3,200	7	15,080	2	728	1	1,221	—	—
Singapore from E. Asia	2	9,473	—	2	1,740	4	11,213	—	—	—	—	—	—
Australia from East Indies	1	2,345	—	—	—	1	2,345	—	—	—	—	—	—
Trading in Australian Area	1	5,041	—	—	—	1	5,041	—	—	—	—	—	—
United States.—Manila from E. Asia	1	4,871	—	—	—	1	4,871	—	—	—	—	—	—
Hawaii, &c., from E. Asia	1	4,731	—	—	—	1	4,731	—	—	—	—	—	—
(d) In Coasting Service of Principal Allies:	Total	3,209	—	—	1	3,209	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
United States	1	3,209	—	—	—	1	3,209	—	—	—	—	—	—
(e) In Import Service of other Allies and Neutrals:	Total	33,182	1	735	8	33,917	1	155	1	168	1	168	—
Allies.—Belgium (via Holland) from United Kingdom	—	—	1	735	1	735	1	155	—	—	—	—	—
East Asia from East Indies	5	22,723	—	—	5	22,723	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Trading in East Asia	1	3,859	—	—	1	3,859	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Neutrals.—Central Chili from United States (Atlantic)	1	6,600	—	—	1	6,600	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Local trading in Spain	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	168	—	—
III.—Employed in Non-Merchant Service:	Total	12,395	—	—	3	12,395	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
(a) In Naval service of Holland	1	5,271	—	—	1	5,271	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
(b) In other non-merchant service—employed in interchange of prisoners-of-war, U.K.—Holland, &c.	2	7,124	—	—	2	7,124	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
IV.—Unemployed or Employment unknown:	Total	329,837	35	38,462	105	368,299	16	4,041	27	7,888	1	149	—
(a) Repairing or remodelling	1	2,522	—	—	1	2,522	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
(b) Otherwise unemployed	45	245,807	20	25,013	65	270,820	—	236	6	2,974	—	—	—
(c) Employment unknown	24	81,508	15	13,449	39	94,957	15	3,805	20	4,765	—	—	—

GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN VESSELS.

GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN VESSELS.

At Cessation of Hostilities.

Disposition.	Steamers.				Sailing Vessels.	
	1,600 G.T. and over.		Under 1,600 G.T.			
	No.	G.T.	No.	G.T.	No.	G.T.
Total Tonnage -	1,009	5,042,624	559	461,118	118	241,633
I. <i>In Enemy Ports or Trade:</i> Total	533	2,660,591	468	390,524	23	24,275
(a) In port or engaged in trade, &c.	383	1,682,617	406	328,452	17	22,707
(b) New vessels and vessels completing -	89	750,368	10	9,461	—	—
(c) Originally detained in Belgian ports -	25	115,289	8	7,425	2	1,172
(d) Originally detained in Russian ports -	36	112,317	44	45,186	4	396
II. <i>In Neutral Ports:</i> Total	164	773,481	26	20,229	74	172,614
III. <i>Under Allied Flag:</i> Total	312	1,608,552	65	50,365	21	44,744
British - - - - -	85	386,353	23	22,513	6	13,178
United States - - - - -	90	622,963	6	5,288	11	23,891
French - - - - -	12	40,441	5	4,290	2	3,629
Italian - - - - -	35	154,334	6	3,463	—	—
Portuguese - - - - -	34	143,523	6	6,153	1	1,980
Brazilian - - - - -	39	215,434	1	1,103	1	2,066
Other Allies - - - - -	17	45,504	18	7,555	—	—

Section I. (a) and I. (b).

VESSELS IN ENEMY PORTS, IN TRADE, &C., AND NEW VESSELS COMPLETED OR COMPLETING.

	Steamers.				Sailing Vessels.	
	1,600 G.T. and over.		Under 1,600 G.T.			
	No.	G.T.	No.	G.T.	No.	G.T.
German Vessels : —						
In trade, &c.	265	1,220,291	346	279,159	17	22,707
New vessels - - - - -	85	722,267	9	8,161	—	—
Austrian Vessels : —						
In trade, &c. - - - - -	118	462,326	60	49,293	—	—
New vessels - - - - -	4	28,101	1	1,300	—	—
Total - - - - -	472	2,432,985	416	337,913	17	22,707

Section I. (c).

VESSELS ORIGINALLY DETAINED IN OCCUPIED BELGIAN PORTS.

	Steamers.				Sailing Vessels.	
	1,600 G.T. and over.		Under 1,600 G.T.			
	No.	G.T.	No.	G.T.	No.	G.T.
German Vessels - - - - -	23	109,416	8	7,425	2	2,172
Austrian Vessels - - - - -	2	5,873	—	—	—	—
Total - - - - -	25	115,289	8	7,425	2	2,172

GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN VESSELS.**Section I. (d).****VESSELS ORIGINALLY REPORTED AS DETAINED IN RUSSIAN PORTS IN BALTIC OR BLACK SEA.**

	Steamers.				Sailing Vessels.	
	1,600 G.T. and over.		Under 1,600 G.T.			
	No.	G.T.	No.	G.T.	No.	G.T.
German Vessels - -	25	70,201	43	43,647	4	396
Austrian Vessels - -	11	42,116	1	1,539	—	—
Total -	36	112,317	44	45,186	4	396

Section II.**VESSELS IN NEUTRAL PORTS.**

—	Steamers.				Sailing Vessels.	
	1,600 G.T. and over.		Under 1,600 G.T.			
	No.	G.T.	No.	G.T.	No.	G.T.
German Vessels -	134	661,492	26	20,229	74	172,614
Austrian Vessels	30	111,989	—	—	—	—
Total - -	164	773,481	26	20,229	74	172,614

GREEK VESSELS.

Monthly Statement of the Employment of GREEK Vessels—31st October 1918.

	Steamers, 500 G.T. and upwards.						Steamers under 500 G.T.		Sailing Vessels.	
	1,600 G.T. and upwards.			500—1,599 G.T.			Total.		No.	Gross Tonnage.
	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.		
Total Tonnage - - - -	57	174,336	41	38,339	98	212,675	15	5,461	2	689
I. Employed in Import Service of Principal Allies:	30	95,953	15	14,557	45	110,510	1	423	—	—
(a) <i>In Import service of United Kingdom:</i> Total	3	7,137	1	1,131	4	8,268	—	—	—	—
Cargoes from Spain (Atlantic) and Portugal	2	4,088	1	1,131	3	5,219	—	—	—	—
N. Africa and Spain (Medn.)	1	3,049	—	—	1	3,049	—	—	—	—
(b) <i>In Import service of France:</i> Total	12	37,041	12	12,294	24	49,335	—	—	—	—
Cargoes from United Kingdom	1	1,821	10	10,581	11	12,402	—	—	—	—
Spain (Atlantic) and Portugal	1	2,294	—	—	1	2,294	—	—	—	—
N. Africa and Spain (Medn.)	4	13,016	2	1,713	6	14,729	—	—	—	—
Egypt	2	6,582	—	—	2	6,582	—	—	—	—
India	2	6,064	—	—	2	6,064	—	—	—	—
W. Africa	1	3,702	—	—	1	3,702	—	—	—	—
Central Chili	1	3,562	—	—	1	3,562	—	—	—	—
(c) <i>In Import service of Italy:</i> Total	14	45,730	2	1,132	16	46,862	1	423	—	—
Cargoes from United Kingdom	1	2,993	—	—	1	2,993	—	—	—	—
France (Medn.)	1	1,781	1	524	2	2,305	—	—	—	—
N. Africa and Spain (Medn.)	1	2,885	—	—	1	2,885	1	423	—	—
Greece	—	—	1	608	1	608	—	—	—	—
India	4	14,403	—	—	4	14,403	—	—	—	—
South Africa	1	2,237	—	—	1	2,237	—	—	—	—
Canada (Atlantic)	1	4,295	—	—	1	4,295	—	—	—	—

United States (Atlantic) -	3	11,543	—	—	3	11,543	—	—	—	—	—	—
La Plata -	2	5,593	—	—	2	5,593	—	—	—	—	—	—
(d) <i>In Import service of United States:</i>	1	6,045	—	—	1	6,045	—	—	—	—	—	—
Cargoes from South Africa.												
II. Employed in other Merchant Service:	19	51,740	6	5,831	25	57,571	2	714	—	—	—	—
(a) <i>In Import service of Greece:</i>	12	34,098	3	3,679	15	37,777	—	—	—	—	—	—
Cargoes from United Kingdom -	1	2,490	—	—	1	2,490	—	—	—	—	—	—
France (Medn.) -	—	—	2	2,404	2	2,404	—	—	—	—	—	—
Italy -	—	—	1	1,275	1	1,275	—	—	—	—	—	—
Egypt -	1	3,193	—	—	1	3,193	—	—	—	—	—	—
E. Africa -	6	18,716	—	—	6	18,716	—	—	—	—	—	—
South Africa -	1	2,700	—	—	1	2,700	—	—	—	—	—	—
India -	2	4,617	—	—	2	4,617	—	—	—	—	—	—
Australia -	1	2,382	—	—	1	2,382	—	—	—	—	—	—
(b) <i>In Coasting service of Greece:</i>	3	6,188	3	2,152	6	8,340	2	714	—	—	—	—
(c) <i>In Colonial service of Principal Allies:</i>	4	11,454	—	—	4	11,454	—	—	—	—	—	—
United Kingdom—Gibraltar from United Kingdom.	1	2,444	—	—	1	2,444	—	—	—	—	—	—
France—N. Africa from Spain (Atlantic) and Portugal.	1	3,047	—	—	1	3,047	—	—	—	—	—	—
Ditto from United Kingdom -	2	5,963	—	—	2	5,963	—	—	—	—	—	—
III. Employed in Non-Merchant Service:	2	7,429	2	1,935	4	9,364	1	492	—	—	—	—
(a) In Military service of France -	1	3,039	2	1,935	3	4,974	1	492	—	—	—	—
(b) In Military service of United Kingdom -	1	4,390	—	—	1	4,390	—	—	—	—	—	—
IV. Unemployed or Employment Unknown:	6	19,214	18	16,016	24	35,230	11	3,832	2	689	—	—
(a) Repairing or remodelling -	5	17,076	—	—	5	17,076	1	338	—	—	—	—
(b) Otherwise unemployed -	1	2,138	2	1,903	3	4,041	—	—	1	414	—	—
(c) Employment unknown -	—	—	16	14,113	16	14,113	10	3,494	1	275	—	—

JAPANESE VESSELS.

ALLIED MARITIME TRANSPORT EXECUTIVE,
SHIPPING INTELLIGENCE SECTION.

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Monthly Statement of the Employment of JAPANESE Vessels—31st October 1918.

		Steamers 500 G.T. and upwards.						Steamers under 500 G.T.	
		1,600 G.T. and upwards.		500-1599 G.T.		Total.			
		No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.
Total Tonnage		403	1,552,984	96	112,413	499	1,665,397	6	1,678
I. Employed in Import Service of Principal Allies:									
(a) In Import service of United Kingdom:									
Cargoes from East Asia		65	350,176	—	—	65	350,176	—	—
Total		15	96,716	—	—	15	96,716	—	—
(b) In Import service of France:									
Cargoes from East Asia		15	96,716	—	—	15	96,716	—	—
Total		13	47,682	—	—	13	47,682	—	—
Cargoes from United States (Atlantic)		12	59,388	—	—	12	59,388	—	—
North Africa and Spain (Medn.)		1	4,392	—	—	1	4,392	—	—
Egypt, &c.		2	5,861	—	—	2	5,861	—	—
India		2	6,512	—	—	2	6,512	—	—
East Asia		6	20,774	—	—	6	20,774	—	—
East Africa		2	10,143	—	—	2	10,143	—	—
Total		5	19,581	—	—	5	19,581	—	—
(c) In Import service of Italy:									
Cargoes from India		2	7,866	—	—	2	7,866	—	—
East Asia		3	11,715	—	—	3	11,715	—	—
Total		32	186,197	—	—	32	186,197	—	—
(d) In Import service of United States									
Cargoes from La Plata		2	11,138	—	—	2	11,138	—	—
Central Chili		1	4,499	—	—	1	4,499	—	—
North Chili		5	18,332	—	—	5	18,332	—	—
Peru		2	9,356	—	—	2	9,356	—	—
East Asia		17	115,123	—	—	17	115,123	—	—
East Indies		3	15,232	—	—	3	15,232	—	—
India		2	12,517	—	—	2	12,517	—	—
Total		287	1,029,762	58	69,869	345	1,099,631	3	841
II. Employed in other Merchant Service:									
(a) In Import service of Japan:									
Cargoes from East Asia		—	—	1	1,455	1	1,455	—	—
East Indies		23	54,560	4	5,864	27	60,424	—	—
India		24	85,781	—	—	24	85,781	—	—
Total		93	403,457	6	8,714	99	412,171	—	—

Australia	-	-	-	-	6	23,450	-	-	6	23,450	-	-
Egypt	-	-	-	-	5	14,178	-	-	5	14,178	-	-
United States (Atlantic)	-	-	-	-	7	46,405	-	-	7	46,405	-	-
La Plata	-	-	-	-	1	6,327	-	-	1	6,327	-	-
United States (Pacific)	-	-	-	-	24	155,013	1	1,395	25	156,408	-	-
Canada (Pacific)	-	-	-	-	1	2,537	-	-	1	2,537	-	-
Central Chili	-	-	-	-	2	15,206	-	-	2	15,206	-	-
Total						89	240,053	44	51,854	133	291,907	841
(b) In Coasting service of Japan :												
Total						74	273,313	4	4,840	78	278,153	-
(c) In Colonial service of Principal Allies :												
United Kingdom.—Canada Pacific from E. Asia	-	-	-	-	1	5,858	-	-	1	5,858	-	-
Singapore from E. Asia	-	-	-	-	10	29,062	-	-	10	29,062	-	-
" " Cochin or Borneo	-	-	-	-	1	1,725	1	1,200	2	2,925	-	-
East Indies from United States	-	-	-	-	1	10,927	-	-	1	10,927	-	-
" " " Canada Pacific	-	-	-	-	1	3,079	-	-	1	3,079	-	-
" " " E. Asia	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1,471	1	1,471	-	-
" " " India	-	-	-	-	1	2,898	-	-	1	2,898	-	-
India from E. Asia	-	-	-	-	13	55,576	1	912	14	56,488	-	-
" " East Indies	-	-	-	-	3	9,782	1	1,257	4	11,039	-	-
" " Egypt	-	-	-	-	5	18,410	-	-	5	18,410	-	-
" " United States	-	-	-	-	5	22,043	-	-	5	22,043	-	-
Arabia from East Indies	-	-	-	-	1	2,641	-	-	1	2,641	-	-
Australia from East Asia	-	-	-	-	9	32,081	-	-	9	32,081	-	-
" " India	-	-	-	-	1	2,148	-	-	1	2,148	-	-
Egypt from East Asia	-	-	-	-	9	26,611	-	-	9	26,611	-	-
" " E. Indies	-	-	-	-	1	2,698	-	-	1	2,698	-	-
" " India	-	-	-	-	1	3,135	-	-	1	3,135	-	-
South Africa from East Asia	-	-	-	-	1	5,158	-	-	1	5,158	-	-
" " India	-	-	-	-	1	5,226	-	-	1	5,226	-	-
" " " Arabia	-	-	-	-	1	3,191	-	-	1	3,191	-	-
" " " La Plata	-	-	-	-	1	5,810	-	-	1	5,810	-	-
" " " United States	-	-	-	-	1	3,791	-	-	1	3,791	-	-
East Africa from India	-	-	-	-	1	3,778	-	-	1	3,778	-	-
" " " Levant	-	-	-	-	1	4,311	-	-	1	4,311	-	-
France.—East Africa from Arabia	-	-	-	-	1	4,366	-	-	1	4,366	-	-
Cochin from East Asia	-	-	-	-	3	9,008	-	-	3	9,008	-	-

(Continued overleaf.)

NORWEGIAN VESSELS.

ALLIED MARITIME TRANSPORT EXECUTIVE,
SHIPPING INTELLIGENCE SECTION.

Monthly Statement of the Employment of NORWEGIAN Vessels—31st October 1918.

	Steamers 500 G.T. and upwards.						Steamers under 500 G.T.		Sailing Vessels.	
	1,600 G.T. and upwards.			500-1,599 G.T.			Total.		No.	Gross Tonnage.
	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.		
Total Tonnage - - -	291	947,413	328	345,562	619	1,292,975	146	40,086	197	267,131
I. Employed in Import service of Principal Allies :	156	472,535	184	196,117	340	668,652	39	13,933	64	104,839
(a) In Import service of United Kingdom :	24	71,867	19	23,750	43	95,617	3	897	—	—
Cargoes from Scandinavia - - -	1	1,913	4	4,592	5	6,505	3	897	—	—
France—Bay Ports - - -	1	2,084	—	—	1	2,084	—	—	—	—
Spain (Atlantic) and Portugal. - - -	4	7,089	13	16,738	17	23,827	—	—	—	—
Spain (Medn.) and N. Africa. - - -	7	19,534	2	2,420	9	21,954	—	—	—	—
Italy - - -	2	4,351	—	—	2	4,351	—	—	—	—
United States - - -	1	4,390	—	—	1	4,390	—	—	—	—
La Plata - - -	5	20,442	—	—	5	20,442	—	—	—	—
Central Chili - - -	2	7,484	—	—	2	7,484	—	—	—	—
South Africa - - -	1	4,580	—	—	1	4,580	—	—	—	—
(b) In Import service of France :	52	149,875	122	119,692	174	269,567	34	12,241	2	2,631
Cargoes from Scandinavia - - -	2	3,384	4	4,076	6	7,460	2	506	—	—
United Kingdom - - -	27	58,946	113	109,681	140	168,627	32	11,735	2	2,631

Spain (Atlantic) and Portugal.	—	—	1	1,132	1	1,132	—	—	—
Spain (Medn.) and N. Africa.	1	2,191	1	500	2	2,691	—	—	—
West Africa -	2	5,880	—	—	2	5,880	—	—	—
India -	1	3,267	1	1,436	2	4,703	—	—	—
United States -	18	72,675	2	2,867	20	75,542	—	—	—
La Plata -	1	3,532	—	—	1	3,532	—	—	—
Total	47	144,103	18	22,509	65	166,612	1	397	—
(c) In Import service of Italy :									
Cargoes from Scandinavia -	—	—	1	1,472	1	1,472	—	—	—
United Kingdom -	11	32,990	3	3,694	14	36,684	—	—	—
France (Medn.) -	3	5,346	6	7,297	9	12,643	—	—	—
Spain (Medn.) and N. Africa.	2	5,095	3	3,792	5	8,887	—	—	—
Egypt -	—	—	1	1,101	1	1,101	—	—	—
India -	1	3,867	—	—	1	3,867	—	—	—
East Asia -	—	—	2	2,912	2	2,912	—	—	—
Canada -	1	3,863	2	2,241	3	6,104	—	—	—
United States -	11	37,744	—	—	11	37,744	—	—	—
La Plata -	18	55,198	—	—	18	55,198	1	397	—
Total	33	106,690	25	30,166	58	136,856	1	398	102,208
(d) In Import service of United States :									
Cargoes from Mexico -	3	13,013	—	—	3	13,013	—	—	—
Caribbean Area -	3	6,044	5	5,852	8	11,896	—	—	—
West Indies -	4	11,116	17	20,345	21	31,461	1	398	—
Central Brazil -	4	12,375	3	3,969	7	16,344	—	—	42,555
La Plata -	7	25,944	—	—	7	25,944	—	—	21,423
Central Chili -	3	8,038	—	—	3	8,038	—	—	—
North Chili -	3	9,422	—	—	3	9,422	—	—	—
Australia -	1	4,253	—	—	1	4,253	—	—	33,428
India -	1	6,369	—	—	1	6,369	—	—	—
South Africa -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4,802
Scandinavia -	4	10,116	—	—	4	10,116	—	—	—

MONTHLY STATEMENT OF THE EMPLOYMENT OF NORWEGIAN VESSELS—31ST OCTOBER 1918—continued.

	Steamers 500 G.T. and upwards.						Total.		Steamers under 500 G.T.		Sailing Vessels.	
	1,600 G.T. and upwards.		500-1,599 G.T.									
	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.
II.—Employed in other Merchant Service :	107	392,591	108	110,844	215	503,435	31	9,461	83	120,250		
Total	42	149,498	74	71,019	116	220,517	27	8,219	2	1,261		
(a) <i>In Import service of Norway :</i>												
Cargoes from Scandinavia -	—	—	48	40,995	48	40,995	24	7,209	1	496		
United Kingdom -	2	4,972	18	20,112	20	25,084	2	827	—	—		
France -	1	1,670	4	4,472	5	6,142	—	—	—	—		
Spain (Atlantic) and Portugal.	1	1,712	1	1,317	2	3,029	—	—	—	—		
Spain (Medn.) and N. Africa.	4	8,784	1	1,339	5	10,123	—	—	—	—		
Greenland and Iceland -	—	—	1	1,380	1	1,380	1	183	1	765		
United States -	25	93,954	—	—	25	93,954	—	—	—	—		
La Plata -	4	16,707	1	1,404	5	18,111	—	—	—	—		
Australia -	3	12,830	—	—	3	12,830	—	—	—	—		
India -	1	4,682	—	—	1	4,682	—	—	—	—		
East Indies -	1	4,187	—	—	1	4,187	—	—	—	—		
(b) <i>In Coasting service of Allies :</i>												
Total	4	17,411	4	4,333	8	21,744	3	845	—	—		
France -	—	—	3	3,196	3	3,196	3	845	—	—		
Italy -	1	2,117	1	1,137	2	3,254	—	—	—	—		
United States -	3	15,294	—	—	3	15,294	—	—	—	—		
(c) <i>In Colonial service of Allies :</i>												
Total	17	53,164	9	10,589	26	63,753	—	—	20	28,895		

MONTHLY STATEMENT OF THE EMPLOYMENT OF NORWEGIAN VESSELS—31ST OCTOBER 1918—continued.

	Steamers 500 G.T. and upwards.						Steamers under 500 G.T.		Sailing Vessels.	
	1,600 G.T. and upwards.			500-1,599 G.T.			No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.
	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Total.				
II. Employed in other Merchant Service—continued.										
France.—New Caledonia from United States (Pacific).	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1,437
New Caledonia from Australia	—	—	1	1,244	1	1,244	—	—	—	—
Indo-China from E. Indies -	1	1,625	2	2,193	3	3,818	—	—	—	—
Indo-China from E. Asia -	2	3,439	1	1,380	3	4,819	—	—	—	—
United States.—Honolulu from United States (Pacific).	1	2,007	—	—	1	2,007	—	—	—	—
Philippines from East Asia.	1	4,768	—	—	1	4,768	—	—	—	—
Philippines from United States (Pacific).	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1,327
(d) In Import Service of other Allies or Neutrals:										
<i>Allies.</i> —Belgium (via Holland) from United States.	15	63,336	1	1,353	16	64,689	—	—	—	—
Portugal from Scandinavia -	—	—	1	1,383	1	1,383	—	—	—	—
Portugal from United Kingdom.	—	—	1	995	1	995	—	—	—	—
W. Indies from United States -	1	1,629	5	5,852	6	7,481	—	—	—	—
West Indies from Scandinavia	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	755
West Indies from India -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	2,307
Total	44	172,518	20	24,062	64	196,580	—	—	61	90,094

Caribbean Area from United States.	—	—	2	1,984	2	1,984	—	—	1	174
Anazonian Area from United States.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	864
Central Brazil from United States.	3	9,273	—	—	3	9,273	—	—	30	46,270
Central Brazil from Mexico -	1	7,020	—	—	1	7,020	—	—	—	—
La Plata from Spain -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1,290
La Plata from United States -	3	12,495	—	—	3	12,495	—	—	5	5,994
E. Asia from United States (Atlantic).	1	5,254	—	—	1	5,254	—	—	—	—
<i>Neutrals.</i> —Spain from Scandinavia	—	—	2	2,622	2	2,622	—	—	1	952
Greenland from Scandinavia	—	—	1	884	1	884	—	—	—	—
Greenland and Iceland from Spain.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1,053
Switzerland (viâ France) from La Plata.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1,753
Caribbean Area from United States.	1	2,012	6	8,171	7	10,183	—	—	—	—
Mexico from United States -	—	—	1	818	1	818	—	—	—	—
" " W. Indies -	1	1,620	—	—	1	1,620	—	—	—	—
La Plata from United States	5	15,419	—	—	5	15,419	—	—	16	25,296
" " Central Brazil	1	2,153	—	—	1	2,153	—	—	1	737
" " India -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	2,649
Central Chili from United States.	1	1,648	—	—	1	1,648	—	—	—	—
N. Chili from United States	6	20,867	—	—	6	20,867	—	—	—	—
N. Chili from Mexico -	3	20,968	—	—	3	20,968	—	—	—	—
Peru from United States -	1	2,876	—	—	1	2,876	—	—	—	—
E. Indies from Levant -	1	5,948	—	—	1	5,948	—	—	—	—
(e) Trading with Germany: Total	—	—	1	841	1	841	—	397	—	—

MONTHLY STATEMENT OF THE EMPLOYMENT OF NORWEGIAN VESSELS—31ST OCTOBER 1918—continued.

	Steamers 500 G.T. and upwards.						Steamers under 500 G.T.		Sailing Vessels.	
	1,600 G.T. and upwards.		500-1,599 G.T.		Total.		No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.
	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.				
III. Employed in Non-Merchant Service: Total In Military service of United Kingdom.	1	1,673	1	1,170	2	2,843	—	—	—	—
IV. Unemployed or Employment unknown: Total	27	80,614	35	37,431	62	118,045	76	13,692	50	42,042
(a) Repairing or remodelling	15	47,120	8	8,294	23	55,414	1	393	9	15,414
(b) Otherwise unemployed	3	9,531	11	14,382	14	23,913	3	1,099	8	8,272
(c) Employment unknown	9	23,963	16	14,755	15	38,718	72	15,200	33	18,356

PORTUGUESE VESSELS.

Monthly Statement of the Employment of PORTUGUESE Vessels--31st October 1918.

[illegible]

II. Employed in other Merchant Service:									
<i>(a) In Import service of Portugal:</i>									
24	95,444	12	12,536	36	107,980	4	1,281	18	8,142
22	86,166	5	4,886	27	91,052	—	—	17	6,162
5	16,459	1	603	6	17,062	—	—	2	1,121
1	4,705	—	—	1	4,705	—	—	1	113
3	7,413	—	—	3	7,413	—	—	—	—
4	13,411	4	4,283	8	17,694	—	—	—	—
5	26,019	—	—	5	26,019	—	—	—	—
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	5	1,067
3	12,095	—	—	3	12,095	—	—	6	2,987
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	269
1	6,064	—	—	1	6,064	—	—	2	605
1	5,515	6	6,256	7	11,771	2	656	1	1,980
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1,980
1	5,515	5	5,398	6	10,913	2	656	—	—
—	—	1	858	1	858	—	—	—	—
—	—	—	—	—	—	2	625	—	—
—	—	1	1,394	1	1,394	—	—	—	—
1	3,763	—	—	1	3,763	—	—	—	—
8	36,900	—	—	8	36,900	—	—	—	—
1	3,574	—	—	1	3,574	—	—	—	—
5	23,124	—	—	5	23,124	—	—	—	—
1	3,566	—	—	1	3,566	—	—	—	—
1	6,636	—	—	1	6,636	—	—	—	—
2	14,955	1	1,377	3	16,332	—	—	15	9,265
2	14,955	1	1,377	3	16,332	—	—	5	3,666
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	8	4,265
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	1,334
IV. Unemployed or Employment unknown:									
<i>(a) Repairing</i>									
<i>(b) Otherwise unemployed</i>									
<i>(c) Employment unknown</i>									

RUSSIAN VESSELS.

II. Employed in other Merchant Service:

	15	37,952	10	12,479	25	50,431	—	11	17,862
<i>(a) In Coasting service of Principal Allies : United Kingdom</i>	2	3,500	—	—	2	3,500	—	—	—
<i>(b) In Colonial service of Principal Allies :</i>	3	9,664	—	—	3	9,664	—	8	13,233
United Kingdom—Canada (Atlantic) from West Indies	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	2,085
Australia from United States—Atlantic	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	3,009
Canada—Pacific from Straits Settlements	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	2,426
Straits Settlements from Borneo	1	3,462	—	—	1	3,462	—	—	—
Trading in India	1	4,259	—	—	1	4,259	—	—	—
S. Africa from United States—Atlantic	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	5,713
United States—Philippines from East Asia	1	1,943	—	—	1	1,943	—	—	—
<i>(c) In service of other Allies and Neutrals :</i>	10	24,788	10	12,479	20	37,267	—	3	4,629
<i>Allies :</i> United Kingdom to Arctic Russia	—	—	2	2,250	2	2,250	—	—	—
Local service in Arctic Russia	—	—	1	1,553	1	1,553	—	—	—
Cuba from Rangoon	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	2,426
Service between Vladivostok, Japan, and China	10	24,788	7	8,676	17	33,464	—	—	—
<i>Neutrals :</i> La Plata from Newfoundland	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	658
La Plata from United States—Atlantic	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1,545
Total	3	11,059	1	1,380	4	12,439	—	—	—

III. Employed in Non-Merchant Service:

<i>United Kingdom :</i> Naval Service	1	3,436	—	—	1	3,436	—	—	—
<i>France :</i> Service between Port Said and Salonika	1	2,387	1	1,380	2	3,767	—	—	—
<i>United States :</i> Military Service	1	5,236	—	—	1	5,236	—	—	—
Total	3	11,059	1	1,380	4	12,439	—	—	—

IV. Unemployed or Employment unknown:

<i>(a) Repairing or remodelling</i>	2	4,136	—	—	2	4,136	—	2	4,304
<i>(b) Otherwise unemployed</i>	4	7,986	1	1,153	5	9,139	—	8	7,277
<i>(c) Employment unknown</i>	4	12,154	10	11,478	14	23,632	2	3	4,054
<i>(d) Employment unknown—presumably in Black Sea</i>	47	149,618	43	47,199	90	196,817	4	—	—
<i>(e) Employment unknown—presumably in Baltic Sea</i>	29	90,260	37	39,874	66	130,134	5	—	—
Total	86	264,154	91	99,704	177	363,858	11	4,214	15,635

SPANISH VESSELS.

II. Employed in Other Merchant Service:										Total	
(a) In Import service of Spain:										Total	
134	425,224	99	109,697	233	534,921	18	5,992	20	14,166		
61	195,938	12	12,137	73	208,075	1	305	11	9,387		
Cargoes from United Kingdom	18,287	4	3,413	12	21,700	—	—	—	—		
France	1,818	5	4,954	6	6,772	1	305	—	—		
Italy	2,845	1	1,207	2	4,052	—	—	—	—		
Levant	—	1	1,138	1	1,138	—	—	—	—		
West Africa	3,179	—	—	1	3,179	—	—	—	—		
Newfoundland	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	239		
United States—Atlantic	43,383	—	—	13	43,383	—	—	1	685		
Caribbean	9,876	—	—	2	9,876	—	—	—	—		
West Indies	15,702	—	—	4	15,702	—	—	3	1,821		
Central Brazil	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	1,854		
La Plata	80,522	—	—	25	80,522	—	—	4	4,788		
East Asia	16,488	1	1,425	6	17,913	—	—	—	—		
India	3,838	—	—	1	3,838	—	—	—	—		
(b) In Coasting Service of Spain:	99,484	72	81,053	113	180,537	16	5,417	3	1,391		
Total	26,652	2	2,534	8	29,186	—	—	—	—		
(c) In Colonial Service of Principal Allies:	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		
United Kingdom.—Egypt from Levant	9,967	2	2,534	2	2,534	—	—	—	—		
S. Africa from Spain (Medn.)	4,126	—	—	2	9,967	—	—	—	—		
India	2,884	—	—	1	4,126	—	—	—	—		
India from Spain (Medn.)	9,675	—	—	1	2,884	—	—	—	—		
United States.—Philippines from Spain (Medn.)	—	—	—	2	9,675	—	—	—	—		
(d) In Import Service of other Allies and Neutrals:	103,150	13	13,973	39	117,123	1	270	6	3,388		
Allies.—Greece from Spain (Medn.)	—	3	3,772	3	3,772	—	—	—	—		
W. Indies from Spain (Atlantic)	24,571	1	1,537	6	26,108	—	—	1	598		
La Plata	5,910	—	—	2	5,910	—	—	—	—		
Brazil	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	342		
Neutrals.—Switzerland (via France) from N. Africa and Spain (Medn.)	—	8	7,976	8	7,976	1	270	—	—		
Switzerland (via France) from Spain (Atlantic).	—	1	688	1	688	—	—	—	—		
" " " India	4,291	—	—	1	4,291	—	—	—	—		
" " " La Plata	2,710	—	—	1	2,710	—	—	—	—		
Denmark from N. Africa and Spain (Medn.)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	114		
La Plata from N. Africa and Spain (Medn.)	52,877	—	—	12	52,877	—	—	1	221		
La Plata from Spain (Atlantic)	9,439	—	—	4	9,439	—	—	2	2,113		
North Chili from Spain (Atlantic)	3,352	1	—	1	3,352	—	—	—	—		

(continued overleaf.)

MONTHLY STATEMENT OF THE EMPLOYMENT OF SPANISH VESSELS—31st OCTOBER 1918--continued.

	Steamers 500 G.T. and upwards.						Steamers under 500 G.T.		Sailing Vessels.		
	1,600 G.T. and upwards.			500-1,599 G.T.			Total.		No.	Gross Tonnage.	
	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.					
III. Employed in non-Merchant Service : In Naval Service of France.	Total	3	8,876	—	—	3	8,876	—	—	—	—
IV. Unemployed or Employment unknown :	Total	9	20,091	17	19,002	26	39,093	24	5,439	13	7,517
Repairing or remodelling	-	1	1,922	—	—	1	1,922	1	280	1	333
Otherwise unemployed	-	1	2,257	1	1,380	2	3,637	3	760	1	642
Employment unknown	-	7	15,912	16	17,622	23	33,534	20	4,399	11	6,542

SWEDISH VESSELS.

Monthly Statement of the Employment of SWEDISH Vessels.—31st October 1918.

	Steamers 500 G.T. and upwards.						Sailing Vessels.	
	1,600 G.T. and upwards.			500-1,599 G.T.			Steamers under 500 G.T.	
	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.	No.	Gross Tonnage.
Total Tonnage	164	459,993	242	244,901	406	704,894	146	40,405
48,878							96	
I. Employed in Import Service of Principal Allies :	39	94,621	62	68,232	101	162,853	3	898
(a) In Import Service of United Kingdom :	16	32,141	26	30,071	42	62,212	2	520
Cargoes from Spitzbergen	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	520
Scandinavia	7	15,189	19	20,902	26	36,091	—	—
France	1	1,626	1	981	2	2,607	—	—
Spain (Atlantic) and Portugal	7	12,140	6	8,188	13	20,328	—	—
Italy	1	3,186	—	—	1	3,186	—	—
(b) In Import Service of France :	6	10,302	28	26,774	34	37,076	1	378
Cargoes from Scandinavia	5	8,566	3	3,170	8	11,736	1	378
United Kingdom	1	1,736	25	23,604	26	25,340	—	—
Caribbean Area	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
(c) In Import Service of Italy :	1	1,984	5	6,937	6	8,921	—	—
Cargoes from United Kingdom	1	1,984	2	2,634	3	4,618	—	—
France	—	—	2	2,776	2	2,776	—	—
N. Africa and Spain (Medn.)	—	—	1	1,527	1	1,527	—	—
(d) In Import Service of United States :	16	50,194	3	4,450	19	54,644	—	—
Cargoes from Mexico (Gulf)	1	1,845	—	—	1	1,845	—	—
West Indies	1	1,702	2	3,001	3	4,703	—	—
Central Brazil	1	1,865	—	—	1	1,865	—	—
La Plata	5	17,832	—	—	5	17,832	1	1,699
Central Chili	2	9,243	—	—	2	9,243	—	—
Northern Chili	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Australia	1	3,365	—	—	1	3,365	—	—
India	1	3,880	—	—	1	3,880	—	—
South Africa	1	4,182	—	—	1	4,182	—	—
Scandinavia	3	6,280	1	1,449	4	7,729	—	—

II. Employed in other Merchant Service :

	96	283,791	99	95,835	195	379,626	45	13,530	26	17,998
Total	50	157,790	72	76,569	122	284,359	27	8,293	8	3,395
(a) In Import Service of Sweden :										
Cargoes from Spitzbergen	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	233	-	-
Scandinavia	4	11,995	17	12,575	21	24,570	18	5,275	1	184
United Kingdom	18	32,962	52	60,123	70	93,085	7	2,449	1	173
France (Atlantic)	2	3,991	2	2,536	4	6,527	-	-	5	-
Spain (Atlantic) and Portugal	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	386	1	1,637
United States (Atlantic)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,401
Caribbean	10	41,122	1	1,335	11	42,457	-	-	-	-
La Plata	1	5,029	-	-	1	5,029	-	-	-	-
Australia	7	30,070	-	-	7	30,070	-	-	-	-
India	3	12,535	-	-	3	12,535	-	-	-	-
East Indies	3	10,933	-	-	3	10,933	-	-	-	-
North Chili	1	5,414	-	-	1	5,414	-	-	-	-
	1	3,739	-	-	1	3,739	-	-	-	-
Total	2	3,346	4	4,266	6	7,612	-	-	1	413
(b) In Coasting Service of Principal Allies :										
United States (Atlantic)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	413
Italy	2	3,346	3	3,716	5	7,062	-	-	-	-
France	-	-	1	550	1	550	-	-	-	-
Total	6	23,209	-	-	6	23,209	-	-	5	7,031
(c) In Colonial Service of Principal Allies :										
United Kingdom.—India from Arabia	1	3,985	-	-	1	3,985	-	-	1	556
S. Africa from Canada	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	3,329
Scandinavia	4	15,554	-	-	4	15,554	-	-	1	1,640
Australia from Scandinavia	1	3,670	-	-	1	3,670	-	-	1	1,506
" " United States (Pacific)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	38	99,446	4	2,364	42	101,810	2	543	11	6,989
(d) In Import Service of other Allies and Neutrals :										
Allies.—Belgium (via Holland) from United States	28	72,659	-	-	28	72,659	-	-	-	-
" " West Indies	1	2,437	-	-	1	2,437	-	-	-	-
" " La Plata	2	5,352	-	-	2	5,352	-	-	1	277
West Indies from United States	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	463
Central Brazil from United States	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	254
La Plata from West Indies	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Neutrals.—S. Africa	1	2,973	-	-	1	2,973	-	-	-	-
" Norway from Scandinavia	-	-	3	1,697	3	1,697	-	-	-	-
" United Kingdom	-	-	1	667	1	667	-	-	1	390
Denmark from Scandinavia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	168
Holland from Scandinavia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Iceland from United States	1	2,393	-	-	1	2,393	-	-	3	1,377
Spain from Scandinavia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2,092
" W. Indies	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1,968
La Plata from United States	4	9,907	-	-	4	9,907	-	-	-	-
" " Scandinavia	1	3,725	-	-	1	3,725	-	-	-	-
Total	-	-	19	12,636	19	12,636	16	4,694	1	170
(e) Trading with Germany :										

(Continued overleaf.)

